THE ALLIES’ ANTI-RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA

Just as Mazepa had disseminated anti-Russian manifestoes prior to Pokava, Orlyk and his Tatar and Swedish allies also launched an elaborate propaganda campaign prior to their invasion of Ukraine.

On 28 January, the same day that Sultan Mehmet issued his manifesto, Charles distributed his own statement: the Literae Uni­versales Regis Sueciae ad Ucrainenses.²² This was a longer and more sophisticated piece of propaganda. It first established Orlyk’s intent to continue the work of his predecessor, Mazepa, in striving to rid the Ukrainians of the “Muscovite yoke,” with the aid of Charles and in concert with the Tatars and Ottomans. The Literae Universales contended that the Russians intended to expel the Cossacks from their lands:

The perverted plans of the enemy reach even further, so that the Cossacks, able and famous in war, are to be expelled from their ancient habitations and transported to areas distant from their ancestral lands; the Muscovite is always on the lookout for the rich lands of Ukraine and wants them for himself forever.²³

The statement concluded on the prophetic note that if they did not act now, the people of Ukraine would not have the right to com­plain in the future about their unfortunate lot (at the hands of Moscow), because they will have brought it upon themselves through their own sluggishness.

Although Orlyk probably influenced the formulation of Charles XIΓs and Sultan Mehmet’s statements, it is unlikely that he had much to do with the preparation of the manifesto issued by Jozef Potocki, the wojewoda of Kiev, on 15 February. Stanislaw’s field commander also used the anti-Russian and patriotic appeals of his colleagues, calling on the population of Ukraine to emulate the “great Mazepa” and—here the Polish perspective of the campaign emerges—fight so that it might be united with the Polish Com­monwealth.²⁴ Essentially, this statement was quite similar to the singularly unsuccessful appeals issued by Stanislaw on the occa­sion of Mazepa’s change of allegiance.²⁵ This particular appeal by Potocki, like those of Stanislaw, did not elicit a favorable response from the Cossacks.

Orlyk was especially experienced and energetic in issuing his manifestoes. Unfortunately, there are no extant texts of his procla­mations, a fact that attests to the thoroughness and zeal with which the Russian authorities and their Cossack compatriots collected and destroyed these documents. Nevertheless, subsequent events indicated that Orlyk’s manifestoes evoked a favorable response from the Ukrainian population, especially on the Right Bank.

It may be noted, parenthetically, that Ukrainian historiography of the late 18th and early 19th centuries devoted special attention to Orlyk’s “subversive letters and universals.” Its invariably negative appraisal of this aspect of the Hetman’s activity rested on a single source—a short and inaccurate passage in the Istoriia Rusov (actu­ally more a political pamphlet than an historical work):

After the death of Mazepa, the Ottoman Porte and the Swed­ish King nominated Semen (sic) Orlyk, Mazepa’s chancellor, as the Little Russian Hetman and he, with his universals, spread falsehoods in the Trans-Dnieper regiments and all of Little Russia, urging the people to accept his authority. He did this until mid-1711, that is, up to the time when the Turks signed an eternal peace with Russia and then, together with his cohorts, he disappeared forever, going to live in France.²⁶

The author of the Istoriia Rusov stresses the fact that the inhabi­tants of Ukraine “completely ignored his diversions and tempta­tions and remained consistently faithful to their legal authori­ties.” ²⁷ Soloviev, however, provided evidence that leads to different conclusions.

The reason why all the Zaporozhians do not go to submit to the Tsar is that they have received word from Ukraine: if you go (to the Tsar) all is lost. Conclude a treaty with the Tatars and liberate us because we perish on account of Moscow.²⁹

Clearly, there was fertile ground in Ukraine for Orlyk’s appeals to take root. However, these appeals were not directed only to the general public; Orlyk also attempted to utilize his contacts with his former colleagues who remained in the Tsar’s service. In a letter to Skoropadskyi, Orlyk first appealed to such generalities as the pub­lic welfare of Ukraine, feelings of patriotism and anti-Russian resentment.³⁰ This was followed by an effort to set Skoropadskyi’s mind at ease as to his personal fate should the Russians be defeated. In such a case, Orlyk promised to resign his claims to the Hetman’s office in favor of the older Skoropadskyi, on the condition that Orlyk’s private lands would be returned to him. As for the unpopu­lar possibility that Ukraine might become the vassal of the Porte, the Hetman stated that Charles XII, the Khan and the Porte had issued a guarantee that, “Ukraine should not be a vassal to anyone but should remain forever a free and independent republic (Rzecz Pospolita). ”³¹

Thus, all the manifestoes and letters which the allies sent into Ukraine emphasized the same themes: they fueled anti-Russian resentment, guaranteed ancient liberties and privileges, and as­sured the populace that an alliance with the Tatars and Ottomans was not to be feared, on the contrary, it was the primary means of removing Russian oppression.