THE UKRAINIAN-TATAR TREATY
Late in October 1710, Khan Devlet Girei stopped briefly in Bender on his way to Constantinople to argue for war against Russia. During his stay in Bender, he conferred with Orlyk.
Their meeting must have been successful, for, a few days later, the Hetman wrote to the Khan that their encounter had brought him “great joy, as did the idea of liberty that emerged from the conference.”9 The first step towards an understanding between the Ukrainian emigres and the Tatars had been taken.About one month later, when the Khan returned from his successful stay in the capital, a delegation of Ukrainian dignitaries set out for the Crimea. It consisted of Dmytro Horlenko, the colonel of Pryluky, Klym Dovhopolyi, the Judge-General of the Host and Ivan Maksymovych, the Chancellor-General. Its goal was to negotiate a treaty with the Crimean Khanate on the basis of which the Hetman and the Khan could launch a campaign against the Russians.
On 23 January 1711, after several weeks of negotiations, a treaty was concluded. Since both the list of Ukrainian desiderata and the final, Tatar-approved text of the treaty have survived, it would be fruitful to examine them more closely. For purposes of analysis, the list of Ukrainian desiderata, which consisted of 23 articles, may be divided into two separate groups.10 One group consists of “traditional” stipulations, that is, those recurring, in one form or another, in all the agreements made between the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars (and, where applicable, with the Sublime Porte) from the time of Khmelnytskyi; the other group contains articles which are peculiar to this treaty, that is, ones which reflect the issues of the specific situation which existed in 1710-1711.
By far the majority of articles (Nos. II-VI, VIII, IX, XII-XVIII, XXI-XXIII) presented by the Cossack envoys for negotiation come under the category of traditional stipulations.
They are keynoted by the second article, which proposes that the treaty signed in 1648 between Khmelnytskyi and Islam Girei III serve as the model for the treaty to be negotiated.[I] [II] The articles in this group may be subdivided as follows:Tatar appetite for booty and iasyr had to be satisfied in some way and therefore a qualification was added to this point. Article X states that if the inhabitants of the “Muscovite slobodas” [sparsely settled territories in what is now eastern Ukraine, which, although colonized by a predominantly Ukrainian population, were under Russian jurisdiction] did not accept the “protection of the allies’ army,” or if the inhabitants refused to return to the Hetmanate once it came under Orlyk’s control, then they “should be treated as enemies,” i.e., become subject to the prey of the Tatars. In this manner, Orlyk strove to divert Tatar appetites from the lands he hoped to govern.
H. Guarantees of an economic nature
While article XIII aimed at preventing the encroachment of any foreign power on Zaporozhian territories, article XIV demanded exclusive rights for the Zaporozhians to the lands of the lower Dnieper— lands which they considered to be their inviolable hunting and fishing areas. Finally, article XVIII requested for Ukrainian merchants equal rights with Muslim merchants within the Khanate and the Ottoman Empire.
III. Political guarantees
These included non-interference in the internal affairs of the Cossacks (articles IV, V, XXI); the Khan’s guarantee of Ukraine’s borders (article XII); and his acceptance of the principle of the free election of the Hetman (article XXIII). Also, the Tatars had to agree to give up jurisdiction over Cossacks who committed crimes against them and hand them over to Cossack courts (article XV). Finally, no peace could be made by the Khan with the enemy (the Russians) until the consent of the Hetman and the Zaporozhian Host had been secured (article VI).
Since the articles summarized above recurred in all the Ukrainian Cossack-Tatar treaties, we may conclude that these stipulations went beyond immediate political considerations and encompassed the general issues which had to be regulated in order that the Ukrainian Cossack and Crimean Tatar political, social and economic systems could cooperate for the attainment of a common goal.
We may now consider the aspects of the treaty which reflect the specific situation in which Orlyk and his followers found themselves at the time the treaty was formulated.
I. Confirmation of Charles XITs protection over the Zaporozhian Host
It is somewhat surprising that negotiations between Cossacks and Tatars should begin with the demand that the proposed alliance should in no way interfere with the relationship of the Cossacks and the entire Ukrainian (“Ruthenian”) people with Charles XII, their protector and patron (article I).12 But there were g∞d reasons for Orlyk to wish for a confirmation of Charles XIΓs patronage. One of the reasons why Mazepa sought Swedish protection was because he considered a preferable form of patronage to be that of a strong but distant overlord. Apparently, the Cossack emigres in Bender wished to follow this principle as well. Furthermore, even after Poltava, it appeared that Charles XII had the possibility of defeating the Russians militarily and this possibility seemed to be the best assurance that the emigres’ goals would be attained. Finally, the inclusion of this point might have been motivated by the emigres’ desire not to become overly dependent on their Tatar allies.
II. Tatar aid in case of internal problems
Orlyk and his advisors had no illusions about the difficulties they would encounter in attempting to maintain their regime once they succeeded in re-establishing themselves in Ukraine. In such a case, the adherents of the Tsar in Ukraine who would be forced out of their positions would not give up without a bitter and protracted struggle. Therefore, the Cossack delegates were instructed to request the aid of Tatars in such internal conflicts (article VII), hoping, at the same time, that the protection of the Swedish King would prevent their allies from converting aid into political domination. Other indications that internal opposition was expected are evident in the requests that the Khan provide the Hetman with a bodyguard (article XVII) and that he promise to return to the Hetman all traitors and would-be assassins who might try toescape to his Crimean domain (article XXII).
III. Pretensions of the Hetman to authority over the Don Cossacks As a result of the Bulavin revolt and the arrival of some Don Cossack envoys to Bender, the Hetman and his staff felt that they had an opportunity to establish their authority over the Don Cossacks on the pretext that this would help in the anti-Russian effort. Therefore, they requested that the Khan aid the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host in bringing the Don Cossacks under his authority (article XX) so that “one flock may be under one shepherd.” This request is interesting in several aspects. Not only does it reveal that, in the early 18th century, Cossacks, be it in Ukraine or the Don, felt the Russian system of government to be a common threat to their way of life (i.e., to the proverbial Cossack rights and privileges), but it also reflects an awareness of the need to unite in the face of this threat. For example, in 1704, Mazepa informed G. I. Golovkin that, “just as one crow will not jab out the eyes of another crow, neither will a Cossack effectively fight against another Cossack.”13 It is also noteworthy that Mazepa’s successor considered common social forms to be sufficient reason to extend the Ukrainian Hetman’s authority over the Don Cossacks.
The final text of the Ukrainian-Tatar treaty of 1711, which has survived only in the Tatar version, indicates that not all the Ukrainian desiderata were met. Nonetheless, this formulation seemed to be acceptable to Orlyk and his colleagues for they often referred to it as the binding version of the treaty. In essence, the basic terms of the treaty between the Ukrainian emigres and the Crimean Khan were as follows:
—that under no pretext should harm be done to Ukrainian and Zaporozhian Cossacks and their families and that they should be allowed to live according to their ancient customs, rights and privileges;
—that, in diplomatic correspondence, the same titulature be used in reference to the present Hetman as had been applied to Khmelnytskyi;
—that the Cossacks have the right to dwell, fish and hunt in the same areas they had traditionally done so;
—that the Cossacks have freedom of religion and that their churches not be harmed.
The Tatars concluded that part of the treaty which regulated their general relations with the Cossacks with the statement, “In brief, let them (the Cossacks) be a free people and a free province.”15
However, the Tatars refused to make any specific commitments pertaining to the current political situation. Indeed, in comparing the list of Cossack desiderata with the text of the final treaty, it is evident that the non-traditional group of stipulations was completely omitted. As far as the planned anti-Russian campaign was concerned, only a general statement was made to the effect that the allies should aid each other against the mutual enemy and be united in concluding the peace as well as in carrying on the war, and ending with the sanctimonious phrase that, “Everyone whois wise acknowledges this treaty as just (and) created with the aid of God.”16
What was omitted from the final text of the treaty was as interesting as that which was included. The fact that the Tatars excluded the non-traditional stipulations may be explained, to some degree, by the Tatars’ innate traditionalism. There were also very concrete and immediate reasons for the Tatars’ omission of such points as the recognition of Charles XIΓs protection over the Cossacks, the proposal to extend the Hetman’s authority over the Don Cossacks and Tatar aid against the Hetman’s internal enemies.
As Orlyk might have suspected from the beginning (and as later became quite evident), Khan Devlet Girei had his own designs to secure protection over the Cossacks.17 Not only did the Khan refuse to recognize Charles XII as Ukraine’s protector, but he would later consider the treaty of 1711 as the legal basis for his own claims of protection and suzerainty over the Cossacks. From the Tatarpoint of view, this was justified by the Khanate’s unilateral grant of guarantees and rights to the Cossacks. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Khan was loath to support the Hetman in his ambitious plans vis-a-vis the Don Cossacks, since the unification of the Ukrainian Cossacks with the Cossacks of the Don would have created an ally almost as dangerous as Russia.
Moreover, there are indications that the Tatars suspected Orlyk and his followers of wanting to exploit the Tatars for their own ends while doing very little of the fighting themselves.18 As to the commitment to support the Hetman in his internal difficulties, it was obvious that the cost to the Tatars would be high, while the advantages would be few. In any case, it is safe to assume that, in the negotiation of this treaty, mutual suspicions were only thinly veiled.In summary, the analysis of the Cossack-Tatar treaty of 1711 indicates that it was based on general and traditional terms whose purpose was to regulate the cooperation and coexistence of the Crimean Khanate with the Ukrainian Cossacks. However, the treaty left unsettled the specific and pressing problems connected with the current political situation.