The Last Stalinist Festival

Stalin died on 5 March 1953, but the Stalinist models of remembrance were still in force in the spring of 1954, when the Soviet authorities celebrated the tercentenary of the Pereiaslav Treaty with unprecedented pomp However, Stalin’s death and the subsequent political reshuffling in the Kremlin did worsen the usual Soviet bureaucratic inefficiency In December 1953 the top leaders suddenly realized that none of the official announcements specified the exact date for the festivities Since the treaty’s 300th anniversary was to fall on 18 January, local officials in Ukraine and Russia were becoming concerned about the lack of preparation time for the commemorative events Moreover, the middle of winter did not seem an appropriate moment for festivals and parades On 14 December Pospelov and the new Ukrainian first secretary, Oleksu Kyrychenko, finally reported the problem to Khrushchev The resulting official announcement in the press explained that the authorities ‘accepted the proposal of party, Soviet, and civic organizations’ to move the festivities from January to May 1954 ³

In preparation for the celebration, Ukrainian party bureaucrats speedily final­ized proposals for several monuments and ideological pronouncements to mark the tercentenary ⁴ While none of the architectural projects was completed by May 1954 - nor, indeed, during the 1950s - ideologues in Kiev and Moscow managed to produce on time a number of slogans, open letters, and the Theses on the Tercentenary of Ukraine’s Reunification with Russia

The initiative to produce the last document, which became the definitive Soviet pronouncement on Russia’s historical relations with non-Russians, belonged to Ukrainian ideologues Although formally issued by the KPSS Central Committee in Moscow, Ukrainian historians played a major role in the preparation of the Theses The Central Committee’s Department of Learning and Culture appointed its officials F D.

The Central Committee resolution of 21 September 1953 obliged its apparatus to produce the Theses by the New Year In order to accomplish this task, Lykholat enlisted the services of the leading historians in Kiev (Boiko, Holobutsky, Huslysty, Kasymenko, Shevchenko) and Moscow (Bazilevich, Cherepnm, Pankratova, Picheta, Sidorov, Tikhomirov) to prepare draft materials He then compiled the final version of the text in consultation with Pospelov and Oleksn (Aleksei) Rumiantsev, the head of the Department of Learning and Culture and himself a transplanted Ukrainian economist Lykholat also consulted with Nazarenko, Kornnchuk, and Rumiantsevs Ukrainian counterpart, S V Chervonenko ⁶ On 5 January 1954 the final draft was submitted to Khrushchev, but neither his copy, nor the copy sent to the Ukrainian Politburo has significant marginal notes The Lykholat draft appeared practically unchanged as the Central Committee’s authoritative pronouncement ⁷

The Theses did not impose on Ukrainian ideologues and intellectuals an alien interpretive model, rather, this document affirmed the strategies of memory that the Ukrainian elites had been developing for at least a decade Nations, rather than classes, were presented as subjects of history, and the mighty Russian-dominated Soviet Union, rather than the victory of socialism, was given as history’s teleologi­cal outcome ⁸ By celebrating Ukraine’s ‘fraternal union’ with Muscovy, Stalinist ideologues were establishing historical continuity between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union But hailing the Ukrainians’ membership in the empire was possible only by proving that it was beneficial for the development of the Ukrain­ian nation Conversely, Ukrainian national memory could be promoted only within the imperial framework of Russian guidance The Theses and other official pronouncements of the time thus had an inherently double-edged nature they both restored the Ukrainian nation as a historical agent and prescribed its histori­cal trajectory as leading to the protection of the Russian elder brother

The Theses asserted, accordingly, that reunification had not resulted in the loss of Ukrainian ethnic identity or historical agency On the contrary, it resulted in the Russian people’s becoming the Ukrainians’ ‘great ally, faithful friend, and defender in the struggle for social and national liberation ’ In this scheme of things, the Bolshevik Revolution appeared to have been an important landmark in the ethnic history of the Ukrainians With help from their Russian brethren, they ‘achieved their age-old dream of establishing a truly free and sovereign national state occupying a prominent place in the family of Soviet republics ’ Moreover, their membership in the Soviet Union allowed Ukrainians to unite all their ethnic lands in one polity, the Ukrainian SSR, which became ‘one of the largest states in Europe,’ with economic powers suipissing those of France or Italy⁹

The Theses was published in major Russian and Ukrainian newspapers on 12 January 1954 and reprinted in practically all Soviet newspapers, magazines, and journals immediately after.

Meanwhile, the authorities concerned themselves with the production of vari­ous memorabilia, including a souvenir medal depicting two men, a Russian and a Ukrainian, holding the Soviet coat of arms against the background of the Kremlin wall. The ideal Russian was taller than his Ukrainian younger brother, on whose shoulder he patronizingly rested his left hand. The Russian also represented Soviet modernity by wearing a formal suit with a tie, while the Ukrainian wore an ‘ethnographic’ embroidered shirt. (The cover of the May 1954 issue of the magazine Ukraina features a similar composition depicting the two surrounded by the crowd of happy representatives of other Soviet nations.) The medal’s reverse side depicted the Pereiaslav Council. The medal was intended for the Ukrainian establishment and distinguished guests. For the general public, the authorities ordered 2 million copies of a simpler badge picturing the Kremlin tower, the flags of Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine, and the number ‘300.’ Special-edition stamps were also released featuring Derehus’s painting The Pereiaslav Council, the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the hetman’s statue in Kiev.¹¹

To ensure that ordinary citizens remembered the reunification, Ukrainian ideologues ordered a long list of products to be sold in festive wrappings featuring the monument to Khmelnytsky in Kiev, the Kremlin, and the words ‘300 years.’ The list included unexpected items such as women’s bras and silk nightdresses (200,000); stockings (250,000); men’s socks (200,000); cigarettes of the ‘Zaporozhians’ brand (2,000,000 packages); wine glasses with the inscription ‘Reunification; and a special beer, ‘Pereiaslavske’ (27,000 decalitres).

The anniversary date itself, 18 January 1954, was not marked by any special events. On the 17th, however, the authorities announced the renaming of the Ukrainian city of Proskuriv as Khmelnytsky and Kamianets-Podilsky province as Khmelnytsky province. Maroseika Street in Moscow became Khmelnytsky Street. On 19 February the Russian Federation presented the Ukrainian Republic with a precious festive gift: the Crimean province. Although the Crimea was historically Tatar and ethnically Russian, Mykola Bazhan claimed at the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium meeting, at which the transfer was formalized, that ‘close eco­nomic and cultural ties between Ukraine and Crimea had emerged in ancient

times.’ In April festive sessions of the Ukrainian and All-Union Academies of Sciences took place in Kiev and Moscow, featuring numerous speeches about the historical Russian-Ukrainian friendship. On 24 April a major Ukrainian concert was held in Moscow, followed from 6 to 16 May by the dekady of Ukrainian culture in Moscow and Russian art in Kiev.¹³

The celebrations reached their apogee in late May 1954. On 22 May a festive session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet opened in Kiev, with delegations from all other Soviet republics and the Polish Sejm in attendance. First Secretary Kyrychenko gave a lengthy speech elaborating on the Theses. Hundreds of organizations — from the Mongolian parliament to obscure collective farms - telegraphed their con­gratulations to the Ukrainian people.¹⁴ On 23 May military and civilian parades were held in Kiev, Kharkiv, Lviv, Sevastopol, Odessa, and Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky, followed by twenty-gun military salutes in the evening. In Kiev some 500,000 people marched down Khreshchatyk Street, many wearing Ukrainian ethnic costumes. The column of the Molotov District paraded a huge picture, The Pereiaslav Council, mounted on a truck.

To mark the anniversary, Russia and Ukraine exchanged symbolic gifts, includ­ing historical paintings, decorated boxes, vases, statues, carpets, and albums. Among the Ukrainian gifts were Khmelko’s Forever with Moscow, a tapestry version of Derehus’s The Pereiaslav Council, numerous boxes and vases with portraits of Khmelnytsky, and an imitation of the Cossack colonel’s mace. (In addition, the Ukrainian authorities presented eighteen Soviet marshals and generals with copies of the mace.) The list, however, also included such manifestly modern items as a TV set, a tape recorder, and a camera. Russia responded with pseudo-antique caps, heavily decorated boxes, sculptures, and carpets, as well as some modern items. Other republics also presented gifts to both Russia and Ukraine. After the celebra­tion, the State Historical Museums in Moscow and Kiev held exhibitions of the gifts, which displayed this bewildering mix of historical pageantry and Soviet modernity, itself allegedly a result of the seventeenth-century union.¹⁶

In the last days of May the celebrations moved to Moscow. The Russian Republic’s Supreme Soviet opened its jubilee session on 29 May, and military and civilian parades took place in Red Square the next day.¹⁷ The Moscow festivities added a new symbolic dimension to the tercentanary: it was the first time that the Soviet Union officially celebrated the anniversary of a tsarist territorial acquisition as a national holiday. A commemoration of the friendship of peoples and Russian guidance extending back into the past, the tercentenary established the paradigm of memory potentially applicable to other peoples of the USSR, as well as to the Soviet satellites abroad. The press reported on festive meetings, concerts, and

lectures in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.¹⁸ In August 1954 Kabarda party authorities were eager to celebrate the 400th anniversary of their land’s ‘voluntary incorporation into Russia’ in 1955.

Although the tercentenary festivities ostensibly commemorated Russian- Ukrainian friendship, some Ukrainian reactions to the Theses demonstrated that local intellectuals were using this official document as a tool to promote their national memory. A senior researcher at the Institute of Ukrainian Literature, a certain Savchenko, stated that the Theses did not ‘sufficiently elucidate the role of progressive Ukrainian cultural figures’ and did not even mention classical writers such as Skovoroda, Franko, Hrabovsky, Kotsiubynsky, and Lesia Ukrainka. At the Institute of History, the researcher Oleksii Voina subtly questioned the binary opposition of ‘elder brother’ and ‘younger brother’ by restoring a third historical actor, Poland. According to him, the document did not stress the historical ‘cooperation among the Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish peoples.’ At Drohobych Pedagogical Institute, a group of students were disappointed that the Theses did not restore the controversial Hetman Sahaidachny to Ukrainian historical memory: ‘The Institute’s students comrades Dyky, Puchkovsky, Kochmar, and others, while approving the Theses, expressed the wish to see the role of Hetman Sahaidachny - a native of Sambir district of Drohobych province — during the Ukrainian peoples struggle for their liberation clarified.’²¹

A massive propaganda campaign before and during the tercentenary celebra­tions stimulated the Ukrainian public’s interest in their national past.