The Left Bank under Russian Overlordship

Because of its proximity to Russia, the Left Bank remained in Moscow’s orbit. During the chaotic 1660s and 1670s, the area experienced fewer of the recurrent Ottoman, Tatar, Polish, and Russians invasions that had plagued the once-flourishing Right Bank.

These internal struggles flared up soon after Iurii Khmelnytsky’s first hetmancy. Iakiv Somko, a member of a wealthy burgher family and an outspoken champion of starshyna elitism, united with his erstwhile rival, Va-syl Zolotarenko, the colonel of Nizhyn, to secure the latter’s election as hetman and thereby assure the starshyna a predominant position. Opposing the Somko/Zolotarenko faction was Ivan Briukhovetsky, a man of lower-class origins whose demagogic skill assured him election as otaman of the Zaporozhians. As usual, Moscow played one faction off against the other. In this case, it favored Briukhovetsky, since it suspected the starshyna of pro-Polish tendencies. In June 1663, Muscovite officials approvingly looked on at the famous “Black Council” (chorna rada), a riotous elective assembly at which the Cossack masses (chern), reinforced by peasants and poor burghers, overwhelmed Somko’s supporters by force and chose Briukhovetsky as hetman. Later, the new hetman had both Somko and Zolotarenko executed. Ivan Briukhovetsky (1663–68)

Completely dependent on Moscow’s support, Briukhovetsky made one concession after another to the tsarist government. He willingly endorsed the disadvantageous 1659 Pereiaslav Treaty and, in addition, offered to pay for the maintenance of Russian garrisons in Ukraine. In 1665, expressing a desire to “gaze upon the shining eyes of the monarch,” he became the first hetman to journey to Moscow, accompanied by an entourage of 500.

But before long, Briukhovetsky paid dearly for his neglect of Ukrainian interests. As Muscovite garrisons moved into Ukrainian towns, as the tsar’s census-takers pried into the people’s personal affairs, and as arrogant tax officials imposed exorbitant duties, dissatisfaction grew with the Muscovites and particularly with the hetman who had invited them into Ukraine. Even members of the ecclesiastical elite, some of whom had previously supported a pro-Moscow line, openly protested against more Muscovite influence. The event that most outraged Ukrainians and decisively turned them against Briukhovetsky and Moscow was the Treaty of Andrusovo of 1667.

Like their compatriots on the Right Bank, Left-Bank Ukrainians were shocked and outraged that the tsar, who had promised to defend all of Ukraine against the Poles, had surrendered half of it to the hated szlachta. In 1667–68, a series of uprisings spread throughout the Left Bank against the tsar’s garrisons and their Ukrainian supporters. Realizing that he had pushed his pro-Moscow policies too far, Briukhovetsky issued manifestos in which he decried “the ruin of our beloved motherland, Ukraine” and secretly established contacts with Doroshenko for the purpose of forming an anti-Russian alliance. But it was too late. As Doroshenko’s regiments crossed over to the Left Bank in spring 1668, an angry crowd of Briukhovetsky’s former Left-Bank supporters captured him and beat him to death.

Polish pressure had forced Doroshenko to return to the Right Bank and to appoint Damian Mnohohrishny, the colonel of Chernihiv, as acting hetman on the Left Bank. A “simple and unlettered man,” Mnohohrishny had a reputation for eliciting obedience, if not loyalty, from his subordinates. As the fortunes of his nominal superior, Doroshenko, sank, Mnohohrishny abandoned all thoughts of breaking away from Moscow and instead renewed the pledge of loyalty to the tsar, for which he was rewarded by Moscow by being recognized as hetman of the Left Bank.

However, his rapprochement with Moscow did not mean that, like Briukhovetsky, he intended to be a puppet of the tsar. In characteristically blunt, forceful fashion, Mnohohrishny informed the Russians of Ukrainian grievances and insisted that Moscow’s garrisons be withdrawn from the Left Bank. In a compromise solution, the tsar agreed to limit the garrisons to five of the major towns. On the issue of Kiev, the hetman pointedly reminded Moscow that the tsar had not conquered Kiev or the other Ukrainian towns, but that the Zaporozhian Host had submitted them voluntarily under his rule, and that, therefore, the Russians had no right to surrender Kiev to the Poles. In general, Moscow’s responses were conciliatory. Apparently, its statesmen had concluded that they had been too hasty and aggressive during Briukhovetsky’s tenure in office. Moscow’s astute downplaying of its presence on the Left Bank compared favorably with the political ineptitude of the Poles, whose consistently repressive and vengeful measures on the Right Bank only served to increase the population’s hatred of them.

In addition to recouping some of the autonomy that had been lost by his predecessor, Mnohohrishny also made headway in restoring law and order to the Left Bank with the aid of his mercenaries (kompaniitsi). Yet the hetman’s fatal flaw was his lack of tact and inability to cooperate with the starshyna. This led the resentful Cossack elite to conspire against him by sending the tsar a series of denunciations implying that Mnohohrishny was secretly corresponding with Doroshenko and planning to accept Ottoman overlordship.

While the election of Briukhovetsky reflected the conflict between the starshyna and the masses, the deposition of Mnohohrishny highlighted the inherent tensions between the hetmans and the starshyna. Fearful, in principle, of powerful hetmans, the starshyna delayed electing a successor to Mnohohrishny for about three months. Meanwhile, it turned to the tsar with proposals to limit the hetmans’ prerogatives. For its part, Moscow was only too happy to comply. Thus, when Samoilovych was elected in 1672, it was on condition that he not discipline and judge members of the starshyna or carry on foreign relations without consulting the starshyna council. Moreover, the new hetman was forced to disband the hired troops that had traditionally been under his direct control. By imposing these conditions, the starshyna expanded its already considerable influence, but it did so at the cost of undermining the prerogatives of the hetmans and, with them, Ukrainian autonomy.

The son of a priest, Samoilovych had studied with notable success at the Kiev Academy before enrolling in the Zaporozhian Host. For most of his tenure as hetman, he was careful to maintain good relations with the starshyna. He awarded it generous land grants and created the so-called companions of the standard, a corps of junior officers – mostly sons of the starshyna – who became part of the hetman’s entourage and were given special assignments in preparation for assuming the positions that would be vacated by their fathers. By creating this corps, Samoilovych encouraged the development of a hereditary elite on the Left Bank.

In external affairs, Samoilovych, like all hetmans, attempted to extend his authority over all of Ukraine. He tightened his control over the unruly Zaporozhians and in 1676 valiantly led his regiments, together with the Russian armies, in the fierce struggle to evict the Ottomans and Doroshenko from the Right Bank.

Another setback to Samoilovych’s hopes of reuniting Ukraine came in 1686 when the Poles and Russians signed the so-called Eternal Peace. It placed Kiev and the Zaporozhian lands permanently under the sovereignty of the tsar. Yet, despite the hetman’s remonstrations to Moscow that the Right Bank and Eastern Galicia (the Rus’ palatinate) belonged to the Ukrainians and should not be given up, these lands were left under Polish contol. Disgruntled by Moscow’s policies, Samoilovych was not very cooperative when the Russians launched a huge campaign against the Tatars in 1687. Although over 100,000 Russians and about 50,000 Cossacks participated in the offensive, poor preparedness and natural calamities turned the campaign into a costly fiasco. Accused by dissident members of the starshyna of illegally enriching himself and his family and blamed by Russian commanders for the failure of the campaign, Samoilovych was removed from office in 1687 and exiled to Siberia.