<<
>>

The Liberal in the Face of the Social and National Awakening of the Masses

Even if Drahomanov had been nothing but a sort of East European in­carnation of the spirit of John Stuart Mill, he would still have been an in­teresting and unusual historical phenomenon (for genuine liberalism was a rare thing in the Russian Empire), but he would not be as worthy of honour as he is.

Drahomanov5S starting point was always liberal, but his originality as a political thinker is shown when he steps outside the framework of classical liberalism and treats problems that were beyond the vision of the typical nineteenth-century liberal philosophy.

Although the liberal gospel, as formulated in the first half of the nine­teenth century, claimed universal applicability, in practice the blessings of liberalism reached very few. Liberalism defended the interests of the middle class. In the nationality question the liberals had only the peoples of Western and Central Europe at heart; farther to the east they were only interested in a few historical nationalities, such as the Greeks, the Poles, and the Hungarians. Liberalism had nothing to offer either to the fourth estate in Western Europe or to the peoples of most of Eastern Europe, not to mention Asia and Africa.

After 1848, and particularly after 1870, the tide of the liberal move­ment began to ebb. The economic postulates of the middle classes had been fulfilled. In all European states, with the exceptions of Russia and Turkey, constitutional governments had been introduced. Italy and Ger­many had been unified and reconstructed as national states. All the more important goals of liberalism seemed to have been reached, and nothing was left for it but to rest on its laurels; liberalism became conservative in the worst sense of the word —lazy and self-satisfied. Thereby it lost the chance to bring the awakening social and political forces into its camp.

Drahomanov was painfully aware of this decline of Western liberal­ism.

He once said to a Polish democrat:

Everywhere the epoch of the purely political democracies is at an end. Even in its classic lands, France and Italy, you can scarcely find two or three uncompromised names.... All of that democracy is dried up, rotten, incapable of bearing fruit. Only look at Gam- betta’s republic. For these “democrats,” the Russian tsar and his oppressive bureaucracy, with the money they have squeezed out of the Polish people, are more interesting as business partners than is a Polish revolutionary.34

It is noticeable that in his writings Drahomanov more often calls him­self a “radical” than a “liberal.” Naturally it is not a question here of words, and on the basis of an analysis of his political philosophy, Drahomanov must be counted a member of the liberal school, whatever label he may have given to his position. But in the reticence which Drahomanov shows toward the use of the word “liberal,” we see a symptom of his disinclination, conscious or unconscious, to use a name which he felt to be compromised by the decadence of Western liberalism.

Two great new political forces were appearing on the stage of history: the social awakening of the fourth estate and the national awakening of the oppressed peoples. Drahomanov,s attitude toward these two forces was emphatically positive, for in them he saw an enormous stride for­ward on the road of the emancipation of humanity. But even for their sake he was not willing to deviate a hair’s breadth from his liberal princi­ples of individual freedom, the decentralization of power, and the rule of law.

Drahomanov believed that the logical consequence of democratic prin­ciples was socialism.35 For the moment we can leave aside the question of the exact content of Drahomanov,s socialist program. The basic ten­dencies must be made clear, however. True civic freedom requires not only that men have legal rights, but also that their social and economic conditions permit them to use these rights.

The essence of the concept of democracy includes the idea of social change and social progress; other­wise it is no living democracy.

Drahomanov’s ideas on the nationality question parallel these.

Peoples do not exist for states, but states for peoples. The peoples of multi-national states do not exist for the interests of one or two [ruling] peoples, but for themselves. A state has the duty to satisfy the requirements of all its peoples, not only those of the privileged ones.36

Drahomanov5S pedagogic experiences convinced him that the work of popular education would make progress only if it were conducted in the language of the people, and in accordance with national traditions. Con­versely, the policies of Russification and Polonization were the chief causes of the cultural doldrums in Ukraine. From this it was only a step to a much broader conception: that the centralism and chauvinism of the ruling nations were condemning the millions of the other nationalities to cultural stagnation. The masses can only participate in a universal culture through the medium of their own national cultural traditions. Drahomanov was a thorough believer in the blessings of national-cultural pluralism and in the historic mission of the less numerous peoples. Natu­rally it was Drahomanov5S opinion that the development of national cul­tures could only be assured through a corresponding change in political institutions.

The range of Drahomanov5S vision can be seen in his glad welcome to the beginnings of constitutional government in Japan and the movement for self-government in British India. He expressed the hope that this ex­ample would soon have an effect on the other Asiatic lands.37

Drahomanov felt that the social and national movements were closely related. He introduced the sociological term “plebeian nation,5’ that is, a nation that has been reduced to a peasant mass and has no aristocracy or bourgeoisie of its own.

With a few exceptions, such as the Poles and the Magyars, almost all the peoples of Eastern Europe were, in Drahomanov5S lifetime, such plebeian nations. In lands where the lines of class division were at the same time lines of national division, where the dominant class was sharply divided from the simple people by the deep chasm of a different language, culture, and ideology, the move­ments for social and national emancipation became one and the same.38

Drahomanov believed that it was a weakness of the socialist parties in Western Europe that, since they were not immediately confronted by the problem of national oppression, they did not understand the inter­relationship of the social and national questions.

The Hungarian state can be a useful object lesson for a socialist, for there he can observe how social relations are complicated by na­tional ones. In all the states of present-day Europe the laws of so­cial development have led to the subjugation of the working classes by a capitalist oligarchy. The working classes are even more op­pressed in those lands where a conquering nationality has enslaved other nationalities. Then the conquering nationality forms a sort of aristocracy.... An observer accustomed to the socialist movement in the great industrial centres, with its enlistment of important masses of workers, and to the national homogeneity of France, En­gland, and Germany, would not understand what he saw if he were transported from the sphere of metropolitan socialism to Eastern Europe.39

But Drahomanov’s instinctive sympathy for the masses struggling for their social and national emancipation never brought him even to a partial abdication of his liberal principles. A number of his writings were aimed at convincing the Russian revolutionary factions that the struggle for po­litical freedom in the Russian Empire must have priority over specifically socialist aims. In his arguments Drahomanov usually stressed tactical points: only the introduction of liberal political institutions would create the necessary conditions for a labour movement.

But we can scarcely doubt that for Drahomanov himself civic freedoms had a logical priority over specifically socialist postulates.

Although the bourgeoisie is a heavy burden on the working masses, it is not the unrestricted ruler of the masses, and it does not even have absolute control of capital. Rather it plays the role of trustee in the present economic system. With the progressive devel­opment and organization of the workers, this trusteeship will be re­placed by economic self-government. On the other hand the politi­cal autocrats are the shepherds and masters of the people. The autocrats regard the people as a herd, or at best as eternal children. The first step toward the self-government of the people must be the breaking of the power of these shepherds, masters, fathers, or whatever they may choose to call themselves.40

Drahomanov formulates his views on nationalism in an analogous manner:

All civic work in Ukraine must wear a Ukrainian dress, must be Ukrainian. But of course Ukraine alone cannot be the aim of this activity. The aims of human activity are the same all over the world, just as theoretical knowledge is the same everywhere.41

I acknowledge the right of all groups of men, including nationali­ties, to self-government. I believe that such self-government brings inestimable advantages to men. But we may not seek the guiding idea for our cultural and political activity in national feelings and interests. To do this would lose us in the jungle of subjective view­points and historical traditions. Governing and controlling ideas are to be found in scientific thoughts and in international, univer­sal human interests. In brief, I do not reject nationalities, but na­tionalism, particularly nationalism which opposes cosmopolitan­ism.... I have always repeated: cosmopolitanism in the ideas and aims, nationality in the foundation and form.... For thirty years I have raised my voice against both Russian pseudo­cosmopolitanism, which neglects the Ukrainian nationality, and against the Ukrainian nationalists who, by their rejection of cos­mopolitanism, bury the only sure indicator of progress and na­tional rebirth and open the door to chauvinism, exclusivism, and reaction.42

The example of Germany shows that national homogeneity in a state does not guarantee greater freedom, and that the national idea can lead to the violation of men and to great injustice....

By itself the national idea cannot bring men to greater general free­dom and truth; it is not even enough for the settlement of political matters. We must seek something else, above all nations, that can reconcile the nations when they fight among themselves. We must seek a universal truth common to all nations.43

Drahomanov defended the cosmopolitanism of cultural values against all national egocentricity. In this he drew on the example of the great religions, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, and on that of mod­ern scientific progress, which is only made possible by international co­operation. At the same time Drahomanov spoke up against the “false cosmopolitanism’’ of the ruling nations, which used the idea of “progress’’ to excuse their forcible levelling and discrimination against the weaker nations. However, legitimate resentment against foreign domination and cultural discrimination can have dangerous conse­quences if directed by blind hatred. For this the classic example is the German reaction to Napoleon’s occupation.

In its struggle to throw off French occupation and to re-establish the honour of its own language, the German national movement wasjustified. Not only was it not opposed to the cosmopolitan idea of the brotherhood of all men, it even drew directly from this idea.... But, in time, educated Germans developed the notion that the most important thing for men is their nationality, and that universal humanism is something abominable. They decided that in every respect Germans might think of nothing but being Ger­man, that in all relations with foreigners they must think of noth­ing but Germany’s advantage, that they might live only in the Ger­man spirit, always have a German understanding, and possess purely German customs, etc. Thus they would cultivate that pecu­liar national character or spirit which God or Nature had espe­cially destined for the Germans for all eternity.44

Drahomanov opposed the myth of innate and unalterable national character. Of course he recognized that empirically there are various dif­ferences between one folk and another, but he felt that these were the re­sult Ofhistorical development, and therefore subject to further alteration. Moreover, for Drahomanov the cultural individuality of a nation did not lie in unique and independent originality, but in its particular manner of combining elements, each of them common to a number of peoples. Here Drahomanov used the evidence of his special field of study: the number of “wandering motifs’’ in folklore and folk poetry, i.e., in those very fields which the Romantics claimed as the purest expression of the na­tional soul.45

Drahomanov ’ s general attitude toward the problems created by the emancipation of previously oppressed groups can be illustrated by his ideas on sexual morality and on the role of women in society. The ques­tions were debated very heatedly in Russian revolutionary circles. Under the influence of Chernyshevsky’s programmatic novel, Chto delat? (What Is to be Done?), the slogan of free love, unfettered by any conven­tions, found considerable response. To a friend Drahomanov confided:

Free love is just as difficult as monogamy. One should approach this problem cautiously. Defend women’s rights to education, work, and participation in public life. Struggle to make divorce less difficult. But keep from preaching free love in the fashion of the birds. Even among birds there is usually monogamy until the little ones are grown, and the human child takes twenty years to grow up.... A constitution is as necessary for the maintenance of freedom in love as for the maintenance of freedom in society. Liberum veto is not suited to either one or the other.46

Drahomanov desired the emancipation of all oppressed groups, but sought an orderly freedom, not individual or collective arbitrariness.

<< | >>
Source: Rudnytsky I.. Essays in modern Ukrainian history. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies University of Alberta,1987. — 500 p.. 1987

More on the topic The Liberal in the Face of the Social and National Awakening of the Masses:

  1. Once upon a time, humans did not have to contend with violence beyond the hearth and their face-to-face community.
  2. Chapter 6 Roxolana’s Memoirs as a Garden of Intertextual Delight
  3. Index
  4. 11 Meanwhile in Europe