The Second Trial

The not-guilty verdict in the case of Karamyshev was, in his words, “sympathetically received by the majority of the Chekist collective.” Karamyshev himself was called to return “to the life of that collective,” to which he was “organically connected and [with whom] he had actively fought in the front ranks of the class struggle, defending the positions of the party and soviet power.”⁷⁸

The shock was therefore all the greater when, on 9 January 1941, five days after Karamyshev’s release, he was re-arrested.

In his letter to M. A. Burmistenko, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and chair of the Ukrainian republic Supreme Soviet, Karamyshev wrote, “this is beyond my endurance,” but, as before, he believed in the “triumph of Bolshevik truth.”⁷⁹

What Karamyshev could not have known was that the chief justice of the Military Tribunal for the NKVD Troops of the Kiev Special Military District, Gur’ev, had on 4 January 1941, the day the not-guilty verdict was issued, already officially handed down his own “special opinion.” Although he did not criticize the not-guilty verdict in Karamyshev’s case, Gur’ev nonetheless characterized the verdicts reached in the cases of Trushkin and Voronin as exceedingly “light.”⁸⁰ The “special opinion” of Gur’ev, and the corresponding protest that followed, was almost certainly sent to the All-Union People’s Commissar of Justice and clearly became the main reason for the second arrest of Karamyshev and Garbuzov.

The formal decision to hold a new trial was adopted only in the course of the appeal process, on 4 March 1941, two months after the completion of the first trial. This decision was adopted at the highest levels in Moscow, by the Military Collegium of the All-Union Supreme Court. The most important innovation compared to the first court proceeding was that both lay judges who were responsible for the unsatisfactory verdict were purposely replaced by two NKVD workers, Svirskii and Voedilo.

Moreover, the presiding judge was also replaced. In place of Gur’ev, the tribunal was headed by Military Jurist Feld’man. Along with the quick second arrest of Karamyshev, this was another sign that the 4 January 1941 verdict had provoked dissatisfaction in Moscow. Gur’ev’s “special opinion” did not help the situation.⁸¹

The second court proceeding was quickly organized. It took place from 18 to 23 March 1941, again in the oblast UNKVD building in Nikolaev.⁸² On the whole, the second trial did not differ from the first. In addition to the witnesses already known, only a few new ones were called, such as Poiasov, the former Nikolaev UNKVD deputy chief. Neither the new witnesses nor the witnesses testifying a second time, however, gave the proceeding any new quality. As before, the witnesses not only sharply criticized and accused the NKVD personnel on trial, but also boundlessly praised them. As they say, however, the devil is in the details. Only during the second examination did a strengthening of a tendency already present in the first trial, but not fully developed due to the “incorrect” composition of the tribunal, become notable: the court strove to condemn the accused Chekists for arbitrariness and an inclination to excesses. As a result, even more stress was placed on the NKVD’s obligations to oversee investigations, examples given of irresponsible treatment of their subjects of investigation, and attention paid to their testimony and incriminating evidence. The core of the accusations of abuses of office were portrayed as negligence toward official obligations, neglect of work with agent networks, making changes to interrogation protocols and other investigatory documentation, their incompleteness and selective nature, violation of directives and orders, unauthorized actions, and the application of “physical force measures.” These were precisely the criticisms of the 17 November 1938 directive.

The former UNKVD boss, Karamyshev, was the only one of the four accused who noticed these new features in the trial, which did not immediately reveal themselves, but were not to be discounted due to the new composition of the court.

In contrast to Karamyshev, Trushkin practically did not defend himself. Clearly, he understood that his final hour had arrived. He not only refused to make a closing statement, but even made an escape attempt during the trial. He was captured in the vestibule of the UNKVD building.⁸³

In the second trial, the verdict handed down to Karamyshev was not acquittal; instead, he was sentenced to be shot. The same fate was applied to Trushkin. The punishment of Voronin was made significantly more severe, increased from three years in a camp to ten. Garbuzov, who had previously received a suspended sentence, was sentenced to eight years in a camp.⁸⁴ No appeal was permitted. Trushkin and Karamyshev were shot, presumably in May 1941, after first the Military Collegium of the All-Union Supreme Court and then the Presidium of the All-Union Supreme Court had overruled all objections.⁸⁵

Fig. 3.2 P. V. Karamyshev’s prison photo from 1939, HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 1, ark. 9 (convert). By exclusive permission of the State Archive of the Security Services of Ukraine.

The height of the campaign to restore socialist legality in Nikolaev occurred in the fall of 1939. At the time, a special commission comprising personnel from the office of the special plenipotentiary of the Ukrainian republic NKVD and the special plenipotentiary from the all-union NKVD surveyed the terrain to select which cases to pursue. This was not an easy task, inasmuch as those Chekists “chosen with hindsight,” especially personnel of the UNKVD apparat, had earlier received the full support of the bosses. The would-be accused also fully supported each other in opposing the arrests and trial that threatened them. In the course of this very real struggle, the Chekists sometimes expressed thoughts they could not state openly in their defense: their personal criticism of the actions of the political leadership of the country appeared at times in agent reports and in statements made by now-released individuals previously under investigation.

In these statements, the central leadership was depicted as naïve and indecisive. These statements similarly sounded oblique warnings of the dangerous consequences of the campaign to punish violators of “socialist legality.” Further, it was noted that it was the party and state that had prepared the ground for the mass repressions. Yet these passages should not be interpreted as a criticism of the system itself: the Chekists only alluded to the possibility of lighter and more consistent treatment of those who had spared no strength in carrying out the directives of the party and state. The authorities neither responded to these warnings and appeals, nor paid attention to the attempt to discredit the former victims who had been under attack by the Chekists. This appeal to the authorities went unheeded, moreover, because the NKVD personnel formulated it in the familiar but out-of-date style of the struggle with Trotskyism. The situation had fundamentally changed, as a result of which the military tribunals had stopped reacting to accusations of Trotskyism.

The high degree of activity and organization employed in self-defense by the Chekists in the first trial—for example, in the acquittal of Karamyshev—to a significant degree resulted from cooperation between the accused Chekists and the leadership of the Nikolaev UNKVD. This chance conjuncture, however, had fatal consequences for the Chekists, because subsequently the courts began to punish this kind of cooperation. It is more than likely that both the new judge heading the tribunal and the lay judges were aware of Moscow’s undivided attention. Consequently, they demonstrated particular zeal, considering themselves obligated to hand down especially harsh sentences. Keeping in mind Karamyshev’s not-guilty verdict in the first trial, there is some basis to speak of a strong corporate culture among Chekists. At the same time, the most important protector of the accused, the UNKVD boss Iurchenko, had been mobilized to work in the organs from the ranks of the party and fell into disgrace because of his attempts to protect his former colleagues.⁸⁶

For all convicted Chekists in Nikolaev, the preliminary investigation and review was a profound event and, most of all, psychologically unbearable.

Without exception, they were loyal Stalinists and, in their own eyes, had stood up for the goals of the state and party with all their strength. During the investigation and the trials, they intended to demonstrate political and moral loyalty to the regime. They could not, did not want to, and were required not to question their system, unlike the Nazi perpetrators tried at Nuremberg. The Chekists rightly claimed victimhood because of the sudden change in policy by the political and administrative leadership. These NKVD personnel had the perfectly valid sense that they were being scapegoated for the mass persecutions during the Great Terror. They had done what had been asked of them, even though they had made what they called “little mistakes,” but they considered the mistakes neither uncorrectable nor punishable. Under these conditions, showing remorse for the crimes committed was impossible.

The sentencing of the Nikolaev Chekists to death or to long prison sentences between 1938 and 1943 showed some similarities to the Great Terror. Yet the purge of the purgers was not a process of random selection, as was the case with the mass persecutions associated with the Great Terror, but instead took the shape of a Soviet Union–wide campaign to punish the violation of socialist legality. A direct similarity to the Great Terror’s mass persecution is the secret conduct of the trials, even if they can be described as semi-public due to the significant participation of NKVD colleagues as victims and witnesses. In Nikolaev and in other regions of the Soviet Union, the trials were closed to the public. The exceptions were in Siberia and Moldavia, where commentary on two trials was published in the newspapers.⁸⁷ Chekists were acquitted only in exceptional cases in a few regions of Ukraine. In common with the Great Terror, the accused had no defense counsel. Once again, the exceptions prove the rule. For example, in Zaporozh’e, the Chekists had defense attorneys. Unlike in the extrajudicial proceedings used in the Great Terror, the accused could defend themselves while on trial, an element similar to the rural show trials but distinct from the mass operations.⁸⁸

Nonetheless, in Soviet circumstances, the trials of the Nikolaev Chekists appeared to be completely normal judicial proceedings, while the “courts” of troikas and the Military Collegium of the All-Union Supreme Court were not.

This can be explained precisely in the falling away of fictive “political” articles in the indictments. Moreover, methods of investigation now substantively differed from those used by the Chekists themselves during the Great Terror. Only in exceptional instances were the accused tortured and mistreated. The psychological pressure on them was much less. The investigators were less likely to use manipulation, exaggeration, or falsification. The court trials took much longer, often several days. Consequently, the presupposition that criminals among the Nikolaev UNKVD personnel fell victim between 1939 and 1941 of the very same punitive system that they had previously served in appears to be a crude oversimplification. The situation between 1939 and 1941 was much more favorable for the observation of the legal requirements and the laws.⁸⁹ The state and party leadership once again decided to open the path to legality and law. In this way, there was no question of the believability or unbelievability of the proofs, as in the acceptance of proof of guilt of the Trotskyite sabotage organization put forth by the Nikolaev UNKVD.

The most striking difference from the Great Terror is the substantive content of the campaign. The focus on punishing violations of socialist legality can be considered unique in the history of the Soviet Union, even though similar attempts to widely combat violations of socialist legality had already been made in in the early 1930s in the wake of collectivization and rapid industrialization.⁹⁰ Even in the very course of the Great Terror there were investigations of violations of socialist legality, but they fizzled out, and at most only led to dismissal and transfers of personnel.⁹¹ In Ukraine and Moldavia, similar trials occurred in all regions.⁹² In Ukraine, the sentencing of Chekists followed the disciplinary measures defined in Article 206-17 Parts A and B of the republic criminal code. Chekists were convicted for abuses of office. This was the main accusation made against them by the Soviet state beginning in the autumn of 1938, when it replaced accusations of a political nature—as a rule, of Trotskyism—that virtually always were earlier used to convict Chekists and other members of the party-state elite.

The political articles of the criminal code, including the infamous Article 58—in Ukraine it was Article 54—with their many sub-sections, faded into the background. Between 1936 and 1938, the ritualized accusations of Trotskyite (or Bukharinist or Zinovievite) deviation were driven to the point of absurdity, emptied of meaning. It was replaced—and not only in the cases of the Chekists—with a more rational punitive practice for which the main reference point was the interests of Soviet governance.

Uniquely, the Soviet Union convicted “its own” perpetrators without a change of regime. The perpetrators were therefore forced to realize that they were now being investigated and even charged by a state that had previously ordered, or at least suggested and tolerated, what they had done, something that is significantly different from the Nuremberg Trials. Their sense of powerlessness was compounded by the fact that, as individual perpetrators, each had participated in his own way in a project that they accepted, supported, and believed in. Notes

“Spravka vremenno ispolniaiushchego obiazannosti nachal’nika 7-go otdela UGB UNKVD po Nikolaevskoi oblasti D. B. Davidenko o kolichestve rabochikh na oboronnykh zavodakh No. 198 i No. 200. 19.01.1939,” in “Cherez trupy vraga na blago naroda”: “Kulatskaia” operatsiia v Ukrainskoi SSR, 1937–1938 gg., ed. Marc Iunge et al. (Moscow: Rosspen, 2010), 2:585–86.

“Protokol doprosa obviniaemogo P. V. Karamysheva, 19.10.1939,” State Archive of the Security Services of Ukraine (Haluzevyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy, hereafter HDA SBU), f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 1, ark. 165.

“Akt ekspertnoi komissii inzhenerov fabriki No. 200 g. Nikolaevа. 28.08.1938,” State Archive of Nikolaev Oblast (Derzhavnii arkhiv Mikolaїvs’koї oblasti, hereafter, DAMO), f. 5859, op. 2, spr. 5747, ark. 330–31. In comparison with the very low living standard in the Soviet Union, this was a huge sum. In 1939, lower-level NKVD staff earned between 500 and 800 hundred rubles a month.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 1, ark. 165.

“Protokol No. 31 zasedaniia orgbiuro TsK KP(b) Ukrainy po Nikolaevskoi oblasti ‘O pozhare na zavode No. 200,’ 02.08.1938,” DAMO, f. 7, op. 1, spr. 20, ark. 130–31.

“Protokol zakrytogo sudebnogo zasedaniia Voennogo tribunala voisk NKVD Kievskogo okruga po obvineniiu P. V. Karamysheva, Ia. L. Trushkina, M. V. Garbuzova, K. A. Voronina 27.12.1940–04.01.1941,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 1, ark. 112, 121, 129, 229.

“Protokol zakrytogo sudebnogo zasedaniia Voennogo tribunala voisk NKVD Kievskogo okruga po obvineniiu P. V. Karamysheva, Ia. L. Trushkina, M. V. Garbuzova, K. A. Voronina, 18–23.03.1941,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 424.

In the majority of documents used, of which the largest number date to 1939 and afterward, this is about the Second, rather than the Fourth, Department of the Nikolaev UNKVD. At the end of 1938, the NKVD structure was changed, during which the Fourth (Secret Political) Department was reorganized into the Second.

The creation of an independent Seventh Department to oversee shipbuilding occurred only at the end of 1939. HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 111–236.

10.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 226 and 424. On the trials of these three individuals by the osobaia troika, see “Prigovor,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 484–88. The “special troikas” were established by Directive No. 00606, and replaced the dvoika used earlier in the National Operations. See “Prikaz No. 00606 Narodnogo komissara vnutrennykh del SSSR ‘Ob obrazovanii Osobykh troek dlia rassmotreniia del na arrestovannykh v poriadke prikazov NKVD SSSR No. 00485 i drugikh,’ 17.09.1938,” in Bol’shevistskii poriadok v Gruzii, tom 2, Dokumenty o Bol’shom terrore v Gruzii, ed. Marc Junge and Bernd Bonvech (Moscow: AIRO XXI, 2015), 165–67. See also V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S. Plotnikova, eds., Lubianka. Stalin i glavnoe upravlenie gosbezopasnosti NKVD, 1937–1938 (Moscow: Materik, 2004), 549.

11.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 484–88.

12.

In 1940, Konstantin Ivanovich Efremov worked as assistant to the director of the Andre Marty Plant for cadres.

13.

The former was one of the oldest shipbuilding enterprises of the Russian Empire. The battleship Potemkin had been built there. In 1920, it was organized under the name “Tremsud” (Trust for Oceangoing Shipbuilding) by combining three plants, “Russud,” “Remsud,” and “Temvod.” In 1931, the plant was renamed in honor of the sixty-one workers from the “Russud” shipbuilding plant who had been shot by Denikin’s White forces on the night of 20 November 1919. Andre Marty (1886–1956) was a French communist activist, a member of the French National Assembly from 1924 to 1955 (with interruptions), Secretary of the Comintern from 1935 to 1943, and a Comintern political commissar leading the International Brigades in Spain from 1936 to 1938.

14.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 111–226 ob.

15.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 174.

16.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 174.

17.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 227.

18.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 263.

19.

“Protokol doprosa obviniaemogo P. V. Karamysheva, 19.10.1939,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 165.

20.

Reabilitovani istoriieiu: Mikolaivs’ka oblast’ (Nikolaev: Svitohliad, 2008), 4:261–63.

21.

Reabilitovani istoriieiu, 4:261–63.

22.

Reabilitovani istoriieiu, 4:262.

23.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 405–58; and “Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 3, ark. 133–41, 274–87.

24.

“Telegramma zamestitelia narodnogo komissara vnutrennikh del SSSR M. P. Frinovskogo nachal’niku UKNVD Nikolaevskoi oblasti P. V. Karamyshevu, 17.06.1938,” HDA SBU, f. 9, spr. 672, ark. 187–94.

25.

“Protokol doprosa obviniaemogo Ia. L. Trushkina, 05.10.1939,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 3, ark. 274–87.

26.

“Dopolnitel’noe pokazanie M. V. Garbuzova, 12.09.1939,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 3, ark. 147–49.

27.

“Raport Narodnogo komissara vnutrennikh del Ukrainy A. I. Uspenskogo ob operativnoi zasedanii ot 16 iiuliia 1938 g. so vsem sostavom apparata UKNVD i gorraiotdelenii Nikolaevskoi oblasti, 16.07.1938,” HDA SBU, f. 16, spr. 300, ark. 42–49.

28.

“Protokol doprosa obviniamogo Karamysheva, 03.10.1939,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 1, ark. 131–34; and “Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 111–226 zv.

29.

“Protokol zudebnogo zasedania,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 405–58.

30.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 451.

31.

Reabilitovani istoriieiu: Mikolaivs’ka oblast’ (Nikolaev: Ilion, 2005), 1:269–270.

32.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedania,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 405–24.

33.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedania,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 111–226, 405–58.

34.

“Obvinitel’noe zakliuchenie starshego sledovatelia sledstvennoi chasti UGB NKVD USSR N. A. Burdana po delu P. V. Karamyshev, Ia. L. Trushkina, M. V. Garbuzova, K. A. Voronina, 11.05.1940,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 347–58.

35.

Reabilitovani istoriieiu: Mikolaivs’ka oblast’, 1:266.

36.

Kobtsev was freed on 2 April 1939. “Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 111–226 zv.

37.

“Svodka agenta ‘Gerd’ 2-mu otdelu UNKVD Nikolaevskoi oblasti, 12.05.1939,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 9, ark. 132–33; and “Dokladnaia zapiska nach. UNKVD po Nikolaevskoi oblasti I. T. Iurchenko zam. Narkoma vnutrennikh del. USSR A. Z. Kobulovu, 22.07.1939,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 9, ark. 147–52.

38.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 201.

39.

“Vypis’ki iz akta rastrela,” DAMO, f. 5859, op. 2, spr. 5747, ark. 354, 356, 358.

40.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 485–86 zv.

41.

Reabilitovani istoriieiu: Mikolaivs’ka oblast’, 1:458.

42.

“Dokladnaia zapiska,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 9, ark. 147–52.

43.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 111–11 zv.

44.

“Petr Karamyshev: Nashi deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta USSR” [Our Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Republic], Iuzhnaia pravda 116 (30 May 1938). The author thanks Maria Panova and Irina Bukhareva for searching for and reviewing the newspaper Iuzhnaia pravda.

45.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 112–13 zv.

46.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 262.

47.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 114–115 zv, 232, 242.

48.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 114–15 zv, 232, 242.

49.

“Protokol doprosa Karamysheva, 15.08.1939,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 1, ark. 91–94.

50.

The commission headed by Gorlinskii worked in Nikolaev on 17 and 21 September 1938, and later over the course of several months beginning in January 1939. HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 115, 173, 232. In September 1938, Gorlinskii was still serving as the operational plenipotentiary of the Fourth Department, Main State Security Administration, Ukrainian republic NKVD. If this is true, then one can suppose that in September 1938 he headed a commission dispatched directly on the orders of Moscow, whereas the January 1939 commission was formed by an order that assigned to it personnel of the Ukrainian republic NKVD apparat, inasmuch as in December 1938, Gorlinskii was appointed deputy people’s commissar of internal affairs for Ukraine.

51.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 245.

52.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 113–15, 232.

53.

“Prigovor,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 305–10.

54.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 111–226 zv. Ivan Grigor’evich Belov (b. 1897) had been a member of the Communist Party since 1925, having served in the VChK-OGPU-NKVD since 1919. In 1938, he was head of the Novo-Troitsk district NKVD, and in 1940 occupied the post of head of the Golo-Pristan district NKVD in Nikolaev Oblast.

55.

Lavrinko was dismissed for “abnormalities” during investigations. Mishustin was likewise dismissed from the NKVD for “abnormalities” during investigations, but Karamyshev explained this only during the second trial. “Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 405–58. Martynenko was the secretary of the Elanetsk District NKVD. The issue of turning Martynenko over to the courts was considered because he had concealed cases of “abuses” of socialist legality. Lazar’ Il’ich Vinnitskii (b. 1915) was in 1940 a senior operational plenipotentiary of the Drohobych UNKVD in the Ukrainian republic. In 1938, Vinnitskii worked first in the Third Department of the Nikolaev UNKVD, and then was transferred to the Second, subordinate to Trushkin.

56.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 112–13 zv, 232.

57.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 232. In 1940, Grigorii L’vovich Goncharov worked as an aid to the head of the State Bank Administration for armored car security, but before that had worked as head of the Skadovsk district NKVD and aide to the head of the Nikolaev UNKVD.

58.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 233.

59.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 263..

60.

“Zaiavleniia obviniaemykh Ia. M. Vasiutinskomu,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 14–19 zv, 46–49 zv, and “Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 254.

61.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 46–49.

62.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 233. As special plenipotentiary of the Ukrainian republic NKVD, A. M. Tverdokhlebenko worked on cases of violations of socialist legality by UNKVD personnel. Uspenskii had worked in Kaluga as head of the Orenburg UNKVD prior to coming to Ukraine. He brought with him many NKVD workers from his patronage network, hence the reference to Kaluga.

63.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 245, 261, 262, 265.

64.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 262.

65.

“Zaiavlenie P. V. Karamyshev L. P. Beriiu, 27.11.1939,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 1, ark. 186–86 zv.

66.

No document sanctioning the use of torture has yet been found.

67.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 232.

68.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 262.

69.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 1, ark. 277–81.

70.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 1, ark. 100–4, 142–45, and HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 263.

71.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 263.

72.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 231.

73.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 232.

74.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 264.

75.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 113.

76.

“Zaiavlenie P. V. Karamyshev L. P. Beriiu, 18.08.1939,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 1, ark. 98–99 zv.; “Zaiavleniia obviniaemykh Ia. M. Vasiutinskomu,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 46–49 zv; “Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 1, ark. 98–99 zv; and “Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 264.

77.

“Prigovor,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 305–10.

78.

“Zaiavlenie P. V. Karamysheva sekretariu TsK KP(b)U i predsedateliu Verkhovnogo Soveta USSR O. M. Burmistenku, 15.01.1941,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 510.

79.

SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 510.

80.

“Osoboe mnenie predsedatel’shchego Voennogo tribunala voisk NKVD Kievskogo okruga Gur’eva po delu Ia. Trushkina i drugikh [January 5, 1941],” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 304a (envelope).

81.

“Opredelenie Voennoi kollegii Verkhovnogo suda Soiuza SSR, 04.03.1941,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 369–69 zv.

82.

“Protokol sudebnogo zasedaniia,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 405–58.

83.

HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 405–58.

84.

“Prigovor,” HDA SBU, f. 5, spr. 67990, tom 13, ark. 484–88.

85.

Serhii Kokin and Jeffrey Rossman, “Prestuplenie i nakazanie. Dokumenty iz arkhivnykh ugolovnykh del na sotrudnikov NKVD USSR, osuzhdennykh za ‘narusheniia sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti’ vo vremia Bol’shogo terrora,” in Ekho bol’shogo terrora: Dokumenty iz arkhivnykh ugolovykh del na sotrudnikov organov NKVD Ukraina, osuzhdennykh za narusheniia sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti (oktiabr’ 1938 g.–iiun’ 1943 g.), ed. Marc Junge, Lynne Viola, and Jeffrey Rossman, tom 2, book 2 (Moscow: Probel 2000, 2019), 7–124; also see “Opredelenie Voennoi kollegii Verkhovnogo suda SSSR po delu P. V. Karamysheva i drugikh sotrudnikov NKVD, 30.04.1941,” 509–10.

86.

“Protokol operativnogo soveshchaniia nachal’stviuiushchego sostava UNKVD Nikolaevskoi oblasti, 05.04.1940,” HDA SBU, f. 16, spr. 421, ark. 108–19.

87.

See Andrei Savin, Aleksei Tepliakov, and Mark Iunge, eds., “Protsesy nad chekistami v zerkale regional’noi pressy,” in Ekho bol’shogo terrora: Chekisty Stalina v tiskakh “sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti.” Ego-dokumenty 1938–1941 gg., ed. Marc Junge, Lynne Viola, and Jeffrey Rossman, tom 3 (Moscow: Probel, 2018), 481–514.

88.

At the major show trials (in Moscow), the defendants had defense counsel.

89.

The exceptions to this rule were the territory of Moldavia and the Baltic countries occupied by the Soviet Union after the war. See David Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924–1953 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 405–36.

90.

Aleksei G. Tepliakov, “Chekisty Kryma v nachale 1920-kh gg.,” Voprosy istorii 11 (2015): 139–45. The Party’s action against the excesses of the secret police in relation to the violation of socialist legality between 1918 and 1921 is considered a special case because of the conditions of civil war.

91.

In January 1938, Vyshinskii, Stalin, and Molotov referred to the “unjustified arrests of secretaries of the Communist Party district committees and the illegal methods of investigation used by the NKVD of the Tatar ASSR.” See “A. Vyshinskii, I. V. Stalinu i V. M. Molotovu o materialakh o neobosnovannykh arestakh sotrudnikami NKVD Tatarskoi ASSR,” Voprosy istorii 1 (2017): 103. On 27 March 1938, an article, “Dikii proizvol” (Wild Arbitrariness), appeared in the newspaper Krasnoiarskii rabochii and reported on the leader of the district police division known as Grigor’ev, who arrested young people as hooligans even though he was not authorized to do so. On 8 May 1938, the same newspaper reported that all the facts had been proven and that Naidenov, the leader of the militia in Krasnoiarsk territory, had given the order to free Grigor’ev and to hand him over to the military tribunal because of his actions in violation of socialist law. Additionally, all employees of the district and city police had been warned that they would be made accountable if they violated socialist laws: “Dikii proizvol,” Krasnoiarskii rabochii (27 March 1938), 3, and Krasnoiarskii rabochii (8 May 1938), 4.

92.

See the trial documents published in Marc Junge, Lynne Viola, and Jeffrey Rossman, eds., Ekho bol’shogo terrora, tom 2, books 1 and 2 (Moscow: Probel 2000, 2018–2019).

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Source: Viola Lynne, Junge Marc-Stephan (eds.). Laboratories of Terror: The Final Act of Stalin's Great Purge in Soviet Ukraine. Oxford University Press,2023. — 565 p.. 2023

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