THE UKRAINIAN-OTTOMAN TREATY

Although the Porte had declared war on the Tsar, this was more of a threat to force the Tsar to live up to his promises than an actual intention to commence military operations. The Russian envoys realized this and, throughout January 1712, they steadfastly refused to give in to Ottoman demands that they abandon all of Ukraine.

On 27 February, Orlyk was informed of this new development by Horlenko, the chief of the Cossack delegation. Horlenko wrote that the Grand Vizir had told him that agreement had been reached with the Russians on all points except that of Ukraine and that when this matter was discussed, “Moscow declared that it was ready to abandon all of Ukraine and only asked us that it be allowed to keep Kiev to which we were about to agree.... But now, having realized how important Kiev is for Ukraine, we will attempt to get Kiev for you also.”²²

Upset by the thought of not regaining Kiev, the Hetman re­sponded with a long treatise, based on “authentic historical books” as well as on arguments of a geo-political nature, which he ad­dressed to the Grand Vizir. He argued that it was impossible even to consider letting the Russians retain the Ukrainian capital because, “Neither Kiev without Ukraine nor Ukraine without Kiev can pos­sibly exist, for what g∞d is a head without a body or a body with­out a head? ”²³ In support of this contention, Orlyk described the central role that Kiev played in the social, cultural and religious life of Ukraine:

What could be dearer and more resplendent for the political and ecclesiastical position of Ukraine than her capital, Kiev, where the source and beginning of our religion glitters, where the holy places are preserved with great pomp, whither the people from all Ukraine flow to take their marriage vows and fulfill religious duties, where they become fortified in the study of our Orthodox faith, where our clerics establish the holy laws, where the Roxolanian (Ukrainian) youth obtains its education.²⁴

Not only would Ukraine be unable to exist without its ancient capital but, by retaining it, the Russians would have a gateway to renewed control of the land and a bridgehead for a future offensive against the Ottomans.

Orlyk’s letter arrived t∞ late. After Peter I agreed to give up Azov and bum Taganrog, the Ottoman-Russian talks proceeded smooth­ly, putting the anti-Russian party in Constantinople on the defen­sive. On 15 January (O.S.), the leader of this party, Devlet Girei, left the capital. He was accompanied by the Zaporozhian koshovyi, Hordienko, whose departure with the Khan was an indication of serious disunity within the Cossack delegation. Under these cir­cumstances Yusuf Pasha had much more leeway to deal with the Russians as he saw fit. And just what he considered to be fitting became apparent to the Cossack delegates on 5 March 1712.

On this day a charter (hatti-sherif) signed by Ahmet III was issued to the Ukrainian delegates. Its contents must have caused them boundless, if not unexpected, disappointment. Notonly Kiev and its environs, but entire Left Bank Ukraine as well were left in the possession of the Tsar. Apparently, the Grand Vizir, anxious to conclude the long and frustrating negotiations, felt that the Right Bank was sufficient for Ottoman needs. However, in order to profit from the acquisition, the Ottomans would need the aid of Orlyk and his Cossacks. Hence the charter contained this magnanimous statement:

Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper (Right Bank) which we tore away from the Tsar with our victorious armies Iastyear on the river Prut was previously inhabited and ruled by the Cossacks. It was also formerly ruled and occupied by Petro

Doroshenko, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and his en­tire people under the most gracious protection of our realm. We and the most powerful and illustrious Khan wish that Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper again be granted by us to the current Hetman, Pylyp Orlyk, so that Cossacks should live there as before and so that Ukraine should again be their land.²⁵

It is noteworthy that the charter was granted in the name of both the Sultan and the Khan, thereby establishing dual authority over the Hetman.

Cossacks

—the Cossacks and the entire Ukrainian population were guaran­teed their freedom

—the Hetman was to be freely elected

—the Porte was not to interfere in Cossack affairs

—Ukraine was to pay no taxes or tribute to the Porte.

On the other hand, the duties and obligations of the Cossacks to the Porte were as follows:

—the Porte was to have the Hetman’s and Cossacks’ constant loyalty

—the Cossacks were to partake in the defense and military cam­paigns of the Ottoman Empire

—the Hetman, Cossacks and all the inhabitants of Ukraine were to acknowledge the protectorate of the Sultan.

Taken as a whole, this treaty, like the agreement concluded with the Tatars a year earlier, was based on precedents set by Khmel­nytskyi and Doroshenko. And, like the Tatars, the Porte also re­fused to discuss current political issues such as the matter of Charles XIΓs protection over Ukraine. Indeed, this Ottoman traditional­ism was evident in one of the concluding phrases of the treaty: “Let the current Hetman and his successors possess Ukraine, free and whole, on this bank of the Dnieper on the same basis and in the same manner as did Petro Doroshenko who remained under the protection of our realm.”²⁷

*

* *

In assessing the negotiations between the Ukrainian emigres and the Ottoman Porte, it is evident that the one point which both sides had in common was the desire to expel the Russians from Ukraine. But besides this, there were few other interests which the two parties shared.

The emigres’ main concern in the negotiations was, assuming that the Russians were expelled, to arrange a future relationship with the Porte which would be favorable to the Ukrainians. Essen­tially, this meant limiting as much as possible any influence which the Porte might have in their land. It was for this reason that the Ukrainians insisted, unsuccessfully, to have a weak and distant Swedish king rather than the nearby and powerful Sultan recog­nized as Ukraine’s sovereign.

The religious dimension also strongly influenced the negotiat­ing postures of the Ukrainians in general and of Orlyk in particu­lar. The Hetman clearly felt extremely uneasy about cooperating with the enemies of Christendom. Therefore, when he announced the treaty, Orlyk assured all Christians that “neither the ambition nor the sincerity we feel for our dear fatherland can force us to act against a Christian nation.”³⁰ Furthermore, he insisted that the Porte publicly repudiate Russian allegations that he had any in­tention of establishing Islam in Ukraine.

The Porte, on the other hand, viewed the Ukrainian issue from a different and more pragmatic perspective. Orlyk represented a chance finally to take advantage of such opportunities as those which glimmered in the times of Khmelnytskyi and Doroshenko— to detach rich and strategically important Ukraine from such dan­gerous opponents as Poland and Russia. However, Orlyk’s case was quite different from that of his predecessors since, in terms of external policy, the Ottoman Empire was in the process of basic change. During the 1660s and 1670s, the Ottomans were still on the offensive in Eastern Europe. They were still intent on incorporat­ing the Christian lands they conquered, the absorption of Podillia in 1672 being a case in point. By the beginning of the 18th century, however, the empire was on the defensive.

Furthermore, the Ottoman conception of Ukraine’s role was essentially a static one, i.e., that of a land area sufficiently large to act as a barrier. The function of Orlyk and his Cossacks was to be something akin to a garrison which, at a minor cost to the Otto­mans, would occupy and defend this bastion against Russian ex­pansion. This explains why a series of five Grand Vizirs consistently supported the Ukrainian project from 1710 to 1713, a fact most striking since it occurred during a period of chronic disruptions and vacillations in the Porte and its policies. Given this Ottoman view of the Ukrainian issue, it is easier to understand why the ques­tion of Kiev and the Left Bank seemed irrelevant or unimportant to them and why they relinquished them so easily.

For Orlyk, however, this attitude of the Porte was suspicious. It did not take into account the need to provide the Hetman and his exile government with a basis for a viable state which could exist autonomously, if not independently. In the opinion of Orlyk, the ravaged Right Bank, without Kiev, was inadequate for such a func­tion. The conclusion which he reached was that the Porte and the Khan planned to commit him and part of Ukraine to a position of subordination and servitude, actual if not formal, to the “infidel.”