Cossack Tatar Fighters

The following year a new wooden stronghold was erected at Kyiv by Prince Casimir with financial help from the Pope. Other forts were also rebuilt to hinder any Tatar advance into the more populated northern lands and their great estates.

The Tatars were also no longer those of Batus Mongol Horde. The heavy cavalry had been replaced by light horsemen usually without armor or siege machinery to slow them down in their lightning raids for pillage, particularly for the valuable slaves to be sold on the Ottoman markets of Kafa. Many cap­tives were also held for ransom in accordance with the practice of the time, and sold back to their families or relatives with the price depending on the importance of the individual. Money was sometimes raised for those who couldn’t pay; Ivan III of Muscovy, for example, collected funds to buy back Orthodox Christians offered for sale on the Crimean slave markets.

Not wishing to finance a large standing army, the nobilities OfPoland-Galicia and Lithuania-Rus decided to negotiate an agreement with Khan Mengli Giray.

Neither the treaty nor the payment of tribute succeeded in halting the Tatar attacks, partly due to the fact that the Crimean khans at this time lacked control over Tatars who were not in their service, such as the men of the Karachi clans and the nomadic Nogays. Thus even as treaty negotiations were proceeding a large Tatar detachment entered the Kyiv, Belarus and Podilia regions. Loaded with loot, they were defeated by Prince Ostrohsky and the local nobility as they were returning to the Crimea, with the loss of all booty and captives. Those in Podilia were intercepted by Crown troops and also defeated. It was difficult to prevent the Tatars from entering the frontier where they could split up and infiltrate Christian territory in small bands. On their way back the bands would re-unite into one (or more) large units to protect the booty, and it was at this point that they were most vulnerable and easy to trace, being slowed down by the captured herds and human captives. Two years before the raids (and the treaty) a Crimean army had marched into the Ukraina, and splitting into two groups ad­vanced on Moldavia and Lithuania-Rus.

The constant attacks and destruction prompted the Polish and Lithuanian governments to take additional measures for defense. The Lithuanian Diet (parliament) of 1514 reinforced the 1507 Iawby establishing possible capital punishment and confiscation of property even if a nobleman was late for mobi­lization. In 1518 the Polish nobility s parliament, the Sejm, voted funds for a defensive army of 3,000 men, and a gathering of palatines and Starostas in Lviv in 1520 appropriated funds for an additional force of 600. Also, alarmed by news that more Tatar attacks were coming, the Polish sejm voted appropriations for a corps of4,000 men to be stationed in Podilia, which was to be used in a Tatar campaign called by King Casimir I to begin in the summer of 1522. Few of the funds actually reached the treasury, and in the following year barely 1,000 men were re­cruited which would clearly be insufficient to oppose any Tatar attack.

The defense of the Ukraina was thus left to the local pop­ulation. The medieval principalities of Rus had lost much of their population but hardy individuals remained in what had become a “no man s land” where only the daring and the fit sur­vived. Forming self-defense bands to protect their farming set­tlements and ranches which were beginning to spring up, they became increasingly exposed to the Cossack styles of fighting, supplementing and broadening the Cossack numbers in the steppe and the frontier towns of Cherkassy, Kaniv and Bratslav.

Survival depended on strength of limb and constitution as well as the skill in the use of arms, which a Cossack would begin to master as a young boy, first becoming proficient in the use of bow and arrow, then saber, lance, and eventually firearms. Knowledge of steppe ecology was also crucial for survival in the irregular-type warfare that prevailed most of the time be­tween Cossack and Tatar. Scouts or “plastuns” had to be trained who could track and report a Tatar force moving through the steppe, as well as “swystuns” (whistlers) who were masters at bird calls and could communicate a pre-arranged signal within enemy earshot. The Sieur de Beauplan, a French nobleman who knew the Cossacks well, left us with a description: “[the Cos­sacks] are of a strong and sturdy build and easily endure heat and cold, hunger and thirst; untiring in war (they) care not for risk, are brave—rather of great courage—and take no account of their lives.”¹⁹ To all intents and purposes the Cossacks were becoming a separate military social caste which was heading into a direct competitive conflict with the nobility.

What began to distinguish Cossack-style Tatar fighting and gave it a unique flavor were the raids staged on Tatar instal­lations and settlements. Unlike the Lithuanian and Polish au­thorities, who were reluctant to provoke Tatar retaliatory inva­sions, the steppe Cossacks and those of the frontier settlements began to take the war to the enemy. The raids on Tatar fortifi­cations and villages resulted in Tatar threats to the Grand Prince, and would force the Cossacks to fight on two fronts. By the sec­ond half of the 15th century Cossack bands were attacking Tatar and Muscovite caravans and Tatar settlements on a regular basis. There are no official accounts of the raids except when one threatened to create an international incident. Certainlybythat time they were more numerous than what documentary evi­dence suggests. Many being landless hunters, fishermen and freebooters, the Cossacks of Ukraine had no official status, were disrespectful of state authority, and were considered riff-raff by the propertied nobility.

Town Cossacks were also increasingly involved in the raids, with or without the permission of the Grand Prince, such as the winter campaign of 1502 by Kyiv and Cherkassy Cos­sacks, who sailed down the Dnipro and attacked Tatars that were escorting envoys (probably from Muscovy) across the Tiahin ferry of the Dnipro River. Before that in 1489 some men from the Kyivpalatinate had also attacked a Muscovite caravan loaded with merchandise at the Tavan crossing of the Dnipro. Led by the Cossacks Bohdan Holubets (“Little Dove”) and Vasko Zhylo (“Bloodvein”) they routed the merchants’ hired men and returned with much booty. With a low frontier pop­ulation the Cossacks were unable to raise large forces, and de­pended on Smallbut well-armed and trained groups for a quick raid, rarely exceeding 200 men. Before being accepted in a Cos­sack steppe unit a "novak* (novice) underwent training with a ^aVataha* or a detachment, and only those who made the grade were accepted into the Brotherhood.

The first known official state expedition using Cossacks took place in 1493 following a Tatar attack on Cherkassy, when Prince Bohdan Glinsky (Hlynsky) took a force down the Dnipro River. His target was the Tatar fortress at Ochakov, built the previous year on the estuary of the river to be used as a springboard for raiding the northern lands. The fort was at­tacked and destroyed with many Tatar prisoners brought back for ransom, or to be exchanged for Christians. The daring Cos­sack raids against the Crimean Tatars soon drew the attention of the wider population, particularly the nobility. In the early 16th century the nobles still formed the class whose main oc­cupation and responsibilitywas the defense of the Tatherland* in return for land. Trained in the use of weapons and the art of war, most had some education and were given positions as "starostas” and other officials in the Ukrainian towns, those drawn by adventure who were indifferent to the rigors and dan­gers of the frontier.

As a social class that formed up to 10 percent of Poland- Galicia and Lithuania-Rus, the nobility played the dominant role in the Commonwealth, as it would become known. It was a republic for the nobles and ruled by the nobles, with the (soon to be) elected monarch playing a secondary role. The gentry, who held a monopoly on military and legislative power and filled the executive bodies and other state institutions, was in complete control of the state to the exclusion of all other classes. Initially, recruiting men into the nobility was based on service or bravery on the battlefield, but soon it became restricted mainly to offspring of recognized aristocratic families. Nobles in the Commonwealth did not possess titles such as those com­mon in the rest of Europe, with the exception of the designation "prince* ("Kniaz*), and were mainly differentiated by wealth. At the top were the rich and powerful magnates whose estates by the second half of the 16th century consisted of tens of thou­sands ofhectares of land. The most wealthy and powerful in Lithuania-Rus was the princely Ostrohsky family which was soon to own 1300 villages, 100 towns, 40 castles and forts, and 1600 (mainly) Orthodox churches.²⁰ Rather than rely on a cen­tral royal army the magnates employed their own forces and bodyguards, both for defense and to maintain "order* on their estates. Thus although Kostiantin Ostrohsky was the hetman of the Lithuanian-Rus forces, he himself kept 2,000 armed men on his estates at all times. The magnates were only subject to the King (Grand Duke) and were not answerable to the ap­pointed government officials.

Although much of the domestic and agricultural work on the magnates’ and royal estates was done by slaves, the peas­antry was Increasinglybeing made to perform these duties. In Poland-Galicia serfdom began to develop when in 1493 and 1496 the nobles’ parliament (the Sejm) limited the peasants’ right to move, even though they could own and inherit land. Besides paying most of the taxes, theoretically in return for the nobility’s military protection, the peasants also had to provide labor on the landlords’ estates (the corvee duty). By a parlia­mentary decree of 1520 this was set at a minimum of one day per week, but quickly grew to 3 and even 4 days. In Lithuania- Rus most peasants were tenant farmers who paid rent in kind or by coin, as well as by labor—3 days for plowing and 6 days for harvesting grain.²¹ In 1447 a charter prohibited many from changing their noble or royal landowners, and although the Lithuanian Statute of 1588 ended slavery it also stipulated that peasants who had resided in the same place for ten years (or more) lost the right to move. By the beginning of the 16th cen­tury wealthy manors were springing up at the expense of village communal lands and peasant holdings to take advantage of the lucrative grain markets in western Europe.

Many nobles possessed no villages or tenant farmers and worked their own land holdings. Moreover not all nobles were granted land in perpetuity, being given ownership for two or three "lives,” and the death of a father or a grandfather would force a noble to vacate the property. The disposed gentry and those with small farms would often seek employment with a wealthy magnate as men-at-arms, while others headed south to the Ukrainian frontier to seek fortune and adventure. With mil­itary training which often began in boyhood and a certain level of education, noblemen were a welcome addition to a Cossack unit, but they had to measure up to the rigorous Cossack cam­paigns and lifestyle. By the second half of the 16th century mem­bers of the gentry were a common sight in the Cossack strong­holds on the lower Dnipro region as reported by Carolus Gamberini, who in the early 1580s was in the service of the Warsaw Papal nuncio Bolognetti:

Other Cossacks... are those remaining on the islands under the command of a captain to guard the place and observe the move­ments of the Tatars; these number only 1500. There are also ad­venturers of noble birth, for the most part (those) who assemble from the adjoining regions to battle the Turks and Tatars, return­ing to their own homes when it seems fit. Their weapons are the scimitar (sic) and a certain arquebus with much ammunition that they (the Cossacks) claim to fire faultlessly.²²

Much of the reported steppe fighting in the early 16th cen­tury was led by the Grand Prince’s appointees, such as the Starosta of Khmilnyk, Przeclaw Lankoronski, and Prince Kos- tiantin Ostrohsky s vice-starostas of Vinnytsia and Bratslav. To­gether with a force of 1200 Polish troops stationed in Podilia, border guards and Cossacks, Lankoronski invaded Ottoman territory in the lower Dnipro region in 1516, Successfullybeating back a Turkish force sent against him from Bilhorod (Akker- man).²³ The government Starostas of the frontier region, how­ever, were mainly dependent on the well-armed Cossacks with their high morale and training in the martial arts.²⁴ They felt themselves at home in the “wild prairie/’ were well acquainted with Tatar tactics and fighting techniques, and often spoke their Turkic language. The attacks were contrary to government pol­icy of appeasing the Ottoman Empire and its allies since the treaty of 1512-13 signed by Zygmunt I and Mengli Giray was still in force, and the raids often landed the local starostas and town Cossacks in hot water.

The raids continued, however, and government officials and other nobles who were prepared to lead them on Tatar raids were readily accepted by the Cossacks, where a man was judged by his personal ability rather than his background. Good leaders ensured good spoils of war, or “Cossack bread” as they were known, and the presence of a Starosta gave the raid a semblance Oflegitimacy. In return the officials expected the best part of the trophy, as noted by a contemporary observer:

If the people of Cherkassy happen to get booty or captives from the enemy, then the Starosta has the right only to what is best in the booty—horses or armor or prisoners—and the rest... be­longs to the people of Cherkassy. Also if the (steppe) Cossacks come from enemy lands with booty, they should give the Starosta only what is the best of that booty.²⁵

One of the first government officials to realize the Cos­sacks’ potential was a nobleman by the name of Senko Polo- zovich of Ovruch (Kyivprovince) who defeated a Tatar attack in 1508 with their help, earning him the uncharacteristic praise from Polish chroniclers as “Poloz the Rusak, famous Cossack.” He scored another victory when a Tatar force advanced on Ovruch three years later, again with crucial Cossack support. Together with Kryshtof Kmytich, the holder of Chornobyl, Polozovich began to raise Cossack units serving under a regular military command for pay, based in the frontier towns as guards. The presence of noblemen in the command structure began to introduce some of the traditional military Rus structure into Cossack units, giving them the semblance of regular troops. This can be seen in the dual rank titles, with the usual Sarmatian and Turkic ranks of “ottoman,” “osavul” and “koshevoy” being supplemented with Slavic titles, so that hundred-man com­panies or “sotnias” were commanded by a “sotnik” (captain), divided into the usual ten-man squads led by a “desiatnik” with an entire army under a “hetman.” As Cossack numbers grew a fundamental unit became the 500-man “polk” or regiment com­manded by a “polkovnik” (colonel). Except when hired to fight under an appointed command, all Cossack officers (“starshina”) were elected by the rank and file, usually from more experienced and/or able Cossacks. Gentry-type forms of address such as “sir” or “m’lord” were avoided, except in sarcastic jest.

Nothing came of Polozovichs and Kmytichs efforts to raise a permanent Cossackunit in government service as is ex­plained by an interesting letter sent in 1524 by Great Prince Zygmunt I to the Council of the Principality.

We have already written to your Graces before, that you should order the holder of Rechytsa, Semen Polozovich and Kryshtof Kmytich (holder of Chornobyl) to gather Cossacks and to go serve us in the lower reaches of the Dnipro. We ordered that pay­ment (for expenses) be given to them, as well as several dozen êîðó (coins) and woolen cloth for the Cossacks. Master Semen and Master Kryshtof wrote to us reporting that they had gath­ered quite a number of Cossacks and had stayed with them in Kyiv for a long time, waiting for that donation from us but not a single piece of money had been sent to them for the Cossacks. Therefore the Cossacks dispersed... (but) they collected a small Cossack (personal) escort and went with them down the Dnipro to Kyiv and farther to Tavan... they rendered quite a service to us there: for a whole week they barred the passage to all those Tatar enemies who were in our domain. They engaged them in battle every day; they killed many and others drowned.... If, with such a small number of men such services were rendered to us, we see from this that if one or two thousand Cossacks were sta­tioned there, on the Dnipro, a greater and very significant service and defense of our dominion would result from that. Therefore we enjoin you our councilors: be so kind as to consult among yourselves and consider this. Ifyou conclude that Cossacks should be kept there, on the Dnipro, next year for the protection and defense of our dominions, then kindly elect someone appro­priate from among our courtiers and order him to go to Kyiv be­forehand, immediately after Easter, to gather the Cossacks. And order that woolen cloth and several hundred “êîðó” then be sent to them. Those Cossacks should be deployed along the Dnipro, at ferry crossings, so that they serve the state and us, and guard and defend those ferry crossings, insofar as God helps them.²⁶

The council consisted of wealthy and powerful magnates, who maintained their own forces for defense and to control the serf­like peasants on their estates. Nothing was further from their minds than to finance “willful” Cossackunits that, it was feared, would be difficult to control and impossible to check.

Polozovichs idea of forming Cossack units as border guards for the principality was taken up by another adventurous noble, Prince Kostiantin Ostrohskys subject, OstafyDashko- vich, who after a checkered career serving Grand Prince Alexan­der and Ivan III of Muscovy, by 1514 had become the Starosta of Kaniv and Cherkassy. Once in command of local border troops and Cossacks he proceeded to establish a flamboyant reputation by staging raids on Muscovy and the Crimean Tatars, as well as for his daring personal exploits. He was fluent in the Tatar language, and donning their dress he would enter a Tatar camp and engage the warriors in conversation. Once he knew their disposition and battle plans he would return to his men, and though outnumbered would launch a surprise attack with devastating results. Dashkovichs victories earned him such a reputation that in 1515 he was hired by the Tatars themselves to lead a raid on the Siverian (Chernihiv) region, then a part of Muscovy. In 1521, commanding a regiment of Khan Mehmet Giray s troops, he attacked Muscovite territory in an attempt to gain control over the eastern Tatar clans on the Volga. When a civil conflict broke out among the Crimean Tatars themselves Dashkovich attacked and burned the stronghold at Ochakoy marched into the Crimean Peninsula, and after causing much damage returned safely to Cherkassy and Kaniv with much booty.

The attacks brought Tatar retaliation, and in 1524 a 5,000- man army invaded Podilia and Galicia. Virtually unopposed by the Polish Crown and the nobility, the horde returned safely to the Crimea. For the first time the Tatars were supported by Ot­toman troops, and the following year a 13,000 man Turkish army repeated the attack. The Polish King and magnates again abstained from being involved and the invaders were only ha­rassed by small forces raised by the local Starostas including some Cossack units. Encouraged by the lack of resistance, a large Tatar and Ottoman army under the command of Khan Saadet Giray s cousin invaded the Kyiv Ukraina region and headed west into Volin and Galicia. Following their usual tactic the Tatars broke up into smaller bands and began to strip the countryside, especially the valuable captives destined for the Kaffa slave markets. Zygmunt I reacted by raising an army and marched towards Lviv, but by this time the Tatar-Turkish forces were gone having left Podilia and Galicia almost destroyed, as described by an eyewitness:

All Rus has been devastated with fire and sword, for even the land OfPeremyshl which had not been touched before has been turned to ashes by this second Tatar invasion. Countless num­bers of people and Iivestockhave been taken away. Remaining are only those few who managed to find refuge in some better forti­fied towns or citadels.²⁷

The Tatar-Turkish invasions were a clear demonstration that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was incapable, or more likely unwilling, to defend the southern lands, and the Tatar attacks became annual events. Occasionally, some gov­ernment troops were successful in intercepting Tatar raid­ing parties such as when Prince Ostrohsky, the Hetman of Lithuania-Rus, caught up with a Tatar horde near Kyiv. The Tatars were returning from a raiding expedition in Belarus and were badly defeated, with the loss of their entire loot including thousands of captives. Other government forces were not as successful. In 1529 a large Polish and Rusin army was sent to attack Ochakov, but intercepted by the Tatars and Turks it was totally destroyed with only a few survivors managing to return to break the bad news. Before that a 2,000 man raiding party from Rus had also been defeated near Ochakov due in part to the inexperience of the young Polish commanders.

With the inability of the nobility s state to protect its sub­jects—as it was obligated to do—the population of Ukraina began to live on a war footing. A statute was passed by Zygmunt I, prohibiting inhabitants from leaving a town under an alert of a Tatar attack unless a substitute could be left behind. A town burgher without a horse had to report for defense of the walls while those with horses were to form cavalry units to attack and harass the besiegers. In 1526 a law of great significance was passed, forbidding all but the gentry to carry weapons with the exception of the border Ukrainian provinces of Kyiv, Bratslav and eastern Volin, where bearing arms became obligatory for all men. The Iawwas simply a confirmation of established prac­tice. The frontier was breeding a special type of man and woman, who were prepared to accept the danger and the fre­quent fighting as a price for living in freedom and in a land of plenty. Cossack women also found themselves less restricted and more equal to men than was common in the rest of the Commonwealth, indeed probably in all of Europe. Big landlords also chose not to reside in frontier territory, and the Onlygentry present were nobles seeking military action with Cossackbands. They too found little respect or tolerance for aristocratic priv­ileges and class distinctions, which were clearly not earned by the more wealthy nobility.

By the middle of the 16th century the inhabitants of Ukraine had become adept at fighting and surviving in a hostile environment. Firearms were particularly popular as an effective weapon, leveling the playing field against numerically superior enemies. This was often commented on by outside visitors, such as a government inspector who noticed that the local gentry and townfolk “have muskets and know well how to shoot.” Also, a Polish king s envoy commented on the fact that the people of Bratslav were excellent sharpshooters and expe­rienced warriors, trained in frequent battles against the Tatars, and who had an excellent knowledge of the steppe. Arms were carried at all times, even when sowing or harvesting in the field, as was observed by Erich von Steblau, the envoy of the Haps- burg Emperor Rudolph II who was traveling through Ukraine in 1593, on a mission to the Zaporozhian Cossacks.

Pryluka, a castle and a large new unfortified town of about 4,000 burghers, belonging to Zbarasky (voivoda of Bratslav)... on (the) flatlands of the Desnytsia River. This town has very fine and rich soil and vast grain fields. One can often see many small, oddly built single houses with apertures for shooting. This is where the “peasants” run and defend themselves should they be attacked suddenly. Each “peasant” carries his musket on his back and his sword or “tesiak” as they call it at his side because Tatars often attack, and they can never be safe from them.²⁸

Led by Dashkovich the town Cossacks of Ukraina contin­ued to gain renown as Tatar fighters. In 1532 Khan Saadet Giray died and the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman sent Sahib Girayto the Crimea as his choice of khan. The Crimean Karachi “beys” re­fused to acknowledge the outside interference and elected an­other, Islam Giray, to be Khan. Sahib won the support of the Nogay chieftain Baki Bey and this touched off an internal con­flict. When Islam Giraywas replaced by Sahib Giray he sought refuge with Dashkovich in Cherkassy pursued by Sahib Giray at the head of OttomanJanissary infantry which advanced on the town and laid siege to the town fortifications.²⁹ After a month of storming the walls and artillery bombardment the elite Janissaries failed to take Cherkassy and Sahib Giraywas forced to withdraw after concluding a treaty with Dashkovich. News of the Ottoman failure quickly spread throughout the land and brought Dashkovich and his Cossacks much fame.

By the time Dashkovich died, his stock of personal respect and popularity had diminished. To increase his own revenue he imposed a duty on the game, dried fish, honey, wax and other produce such as fur and beaver pelts which Cossacks were ex­porting in large quantities to Kyiv. State taxes and fees for the hunting and gathering expeditions were also raised, but the bur­den was tolerated while Dashkovich was alive due to his personal prestige. When the new starosta Vasil Tyshkovich at­tempted to continue the practice, a rebellion broke out in 1536 in Cherkassy and Kaniy which led to his replacement. Six years later another revolt erupted against Prince Pronsky, the starosta OfBratslav and Vinnitsia. His officials were sent packing and he himself was held captive until a written statement was issued by him, assuring that a formal complaint against the incarcera­tion would not be lodged. The Cossacks’ general grievance was expressed in a lawsuit against the starosta of Cherkassy in 1544: “Nothing is owed to the starosta (i.e., the government) for those forage (hunting and gathering) grounds by ancient tradition, because we serve in exchange for that.”³⁰

The message was clear. Unlike the rest of the Grand Prin­cipality ofLithuania-Rus and the Kingdom of Poland, the town Cossacks provided their own self-defense as well as that of oth­ers, and the state and the Prince were owed nothing. It was an assertion and a reminder that the Cossacks were due certain privileges similar to those enjoyed by the gentry, which came from the right and the obligation to bear arms.³¹ It was also a direct challenge to the nobility, whom the Cossacks considered to be of little use for anything. The nobles, on the other hand, viewed the Cossacks as dangerous rival claimants to their priv­ileges ofbearing arms and the ownership of land.

In the meantime, the main struggle for survival was with the Crimean Tatars and their Ottoman overlords. We know that in 1534 a force of steppe Cossacks led by Venzhyk Khmel­nitsky destroyed a large Tatar horde near Zaslav in Volin, and as described by the Crimean Khan in a letter of protest to Zyg- munt I:

At Taran on the Dnipro (River), at Burkun, at Chorna Krinitsia, at Dribni Krinitsi, and on the Samara (River) they (the Cos­sacks) beat up our people, rout the merchants, kill some and take others alive into captivity, steal their merchandise, destroy the uluses (Tatarvillages), and steal countless livestock and herds.³²

The raiding and attacks had become a two-way operation, with Cossack bands giving as good as they received. The pursuit of war booty did not set them apart as land pirates, “social ban­dits” or even as Al Capone-type mafia gangsters, as at times has been claimed by different authors.³³ Spoils of war were con­sidered to be a legitimate and praise-worthy reward for a God­given victory by all states and their rulers, both Christian and Muslim. Islam was especially targeted by Cossacks due to the extensive slave trade carried on in the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire.³⁴ Since by the Islamic law only non-Muslims could be enslaved, the practice introduced a religious dimension to the Cossackwars. When captured, individual Cossacks were often chained to the Ottoman galleys as rowers, at the time a common method of propelling all Mediterranean and Black Sea men-of- war. An old Ukrainian ballad has come down to us, the “Duma O Nevolnikakh” (Ballad of the Captives), which describes the Cossack slave s fate³⁵:

A poor captive in Turkey sends greetings,

From the land of Mohammed to the Christian towns, To his father and mother;

He cannot greet them,

But greets he the gray dove;

‘0 thou gray dove,

That flies high and wanders far!

Fly thou to the Christian towns, to my father and mother, Remind them of my Cossack fate.

A new treaty was signed in 1540 by Zygmunt I and the Crimean Khan Sahib Giray but it had little effect in stopping Cossack-Tatar fighting. The Nogay Tatars and the men of the clan “beys” were beyond the khans control, and the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth could not impose its authority on the steppe and town Cossacks even when they were led by local royal starostas. In the meantime few opportunities were missed by the Ukrainian frontiersmen, as for example when in 1540 they joined the Tatars in an anti-Ottoman uprising and took part in destroying territory around the Turkish strongholds of Bilhorod (Akkerman) and Tighina.

During 1541-45 Tatar raids intensified, and a detailed ac­count of some of them was left by the nobleman Bernard Pretwich, a captain from Podilia who in 1540 was appointed as the starosta of a newly built fort at Bar. He became a renowned Tatar fighter and is credited with 70 battles, all of them victories. Polish sources have left us with a description of one of Pretwichs campaigns against Ochakov, conducted ac­cording to the savage norms of the times.

Shortlybefore that, the Tatars had invaded Rus and done great harm near Vinnytsia and in other places. Bernard Pretwicz of the crest (family emblem) Wczele, starosta of Bar worthy of memory among all of us Poles, went in pursuit of them with a small num­ber of Cossacks and Cheremises (local settlers). He followed them as far as the vicinity of Ochakov but the people (who had been) taken prisoner were already aboard ships. “How glad I would be to save you if I could” (he exclaimed). But he took a glorious revenge for their sake, slaying Tatar children and wives or drowning them when they fled into the water. The Cheremises shot them like ducks in the water. He returned home with booty and did the same thing the following year.³⁶

In the spring of the following year, the Bilhorod Tatars and Ottoman troops attacked and defeated the Starosta of Cherkassy s Cossacks, pillaging the countryside and taking cap­tives and larger herds of horses and cattle. The Muslim force was intercepted by Pretwich and destroyed, the booty regained and the captives freed. As the population of Ukraine slowly grew the town Cossacks were able to mount larger campaigns. During 1545-46, for example, we know that a ^tTarge force” of 800 Cossacks from Cherkassy, Kaniv, Bratslav, Vinnytsia and other smaller settlements led by atamans Karpo Maslo, An­drushko, Lesun, and Bilous began raiding and disrupting Tatar and Ottoman trade routes, in particular destroying a large car­avan on the Sanzharivka Riverwhich was heading for Muscovy. The damage was significant enough that Khan Sahib Giray sent a strong protest to Zygmunt I demanding a return of the goods and merchandise, or equivalent reparation, and punishment of the guilty Cossacks. Although some of the goods were restored, needless to say not a single Cossackwho took part in the cam­paign was found. Not satisfied with the reparations, the Khan launched an invasion of Ukraine and other parts of Rus which as he explained was to compensate his people for the lost mer­chandise.

Cossack attacks and raids continued, at times bringing the Commonwealth and the Muslim world to the brink of war. By the middle of the 16th century the lower reaches of the extensive and complex Dnipro waterway were under Cossack control and all who entered the territory were attacked, in­cluding Zygmunt Is envoys to the khan who had to take a detour through Moldavia to reach the shore of the Black Sea and the Crimea in safety.