The Cossacks

Epitomizing the new society that had evolved on the plains of the Dnieper basin was the emergence of a new class that could have evolved only on the frontier – that of the Cossacks.

To avoid the authorities, the Ukrainian Cossacks pushed farther south along the Dnieper and its lower tributaries and beyond the small frontier outposts of Kaniv and Cherkasy. In this bounteous but dangerous terrain they engaged in ukhody, that is, hunting and fishing expeditions, and in the grazing of cattle and horses. It was during these extended seasonal forays into the steppe that the first signs of organization appeared among them. As they ventured into the “wild field,” they chose the most experienced, brave, and resourceful men from among themselves as their leaders or otamany, and formed tightly knit groups (vatahy) to better fend off marauding Tatars as well as to cooperate in hunting and fishing ventures. Eventually, permanent fortified camps (sich) with small, year-round garrisons were established in the steppe and, for many, Cossackdom became a full-time, year-round occupation.

For royal officials (starosty) on the frontier, the sight of increasing numbers of armed, independent Cossacks who often flaunted their disrespect for established authority was worrisome.

The magnates who initially began to organize the Cossacks were still Orthodox, not yet Polonized Ukrainians. Most famous among them was Dmytro “Baida” Vyshnevetsky, starosta of Kaniv. The kaleidoscopic nature of his career and his legendary fame often make it difficult to separate fact from fiction. However, it is incontestable that in 1553–54, Vyshnevetsky gathered together scattered groups of Cossacks and on the remote, strategically located island of Mala Khortytsia below the Dnieper rapids (za porohamy) built a fort designed to obstruct Tatar raids into Ukraine. In so doing, he laid the foundations for the Zaporozhian Sich, generally regarded as the cradle of Ukrainian Cossackdom. Soon afterwards, he launched a series of attacks with his Cossacks against the Crimea and even had the temerity to attack the Ottoman Turks themselves. When the Commonwealth refused to support him in his anti-Muslim crusade, Vyshnevetsky moved to Muscovy, from where he continued his attacks on Crimea. Before long, he grew dissatisfied there and, after returning to Ukraine, became involved in Moldavian affairs. This proved to be his undoing, for the Moldavians treacherously handed him over to the Ottomans, who executed him in Constantinople in 1563.

Located far beyond the reach of government authorities, the Zaporozhian Sich continued to flourish even after the death of its founder. Any Christian male, irrespective of his social background, was free to come to this island fortress, with its rough wood-and-thatch barracks, and to join the Cossack brotherhood. He was also free to leave at will. Women and children, regarded as a hindrance in the steppe, were barred from entry. Refusing to recognize the authority of any ruler, the Zaporozhians governed themselves according to traditions and customs that evolved over the generations. All had equal rights and could participate in the frequent, boisterous councils (rady) in which the side that shouted loudest usually carried the day.

These volatile gatherings elected and, with equal ease, deposed the Cossack leadership, which consisted of a hetman or otaman who had overall command, adjutants (osavuly), a chancellor (pysar), a quartermaster (obozny), and a judge (suddia). Each kurin, a term that referred to the Sich barracks and, by extension, to the military unit that lived in them, elected a similar subordinate group of officers, or starshyna. During campaigns, the authority of these officers was absolute, including the right to impose the death penalty. But in peacetime their power was limited. Generally, the Zaporozhians numbered about 5000–6000 men of whom about 10% served on a rotating basis as the garrison of the Sich, while the rest were engaged in campaigns or in peacetime occupations. The economy of the Sich consisted mainly of hunting, fishing, beekeeping, and salt making at the mouth of the Dnieper. Because the Sich lay on the trade route between the Commonwealth and the Black Sea, trade also played an important role. Despite the ethos of brotherhood and equality that the Zaporozhians espoused, socioeconomic distinctions and tensions gradually developed between the wealthier Cossack officers (starshyna) and the rank and file (chern) and caused recurrent upheavals at the Sich.

Many Cossacks also lived in the frontier towns. In 1600, for example, the population of Kaniv consisted of 960 people classed as burghers and over 1300 Cossacks and their families. Like their compatriots at the Sich, the town Cossacks ignored the government authorities and recognized only their own elected officers. But although the Polish government realized that it was futile to attempt to control the remote, rebellious Sich, it did have hopes of harnessing the town Cossacks, or at least a selected portion of them, into its service. In 1572, King Sigismund August authorized the formation of a salaried 300-man Cossack unit, led by a Polish nobleman by the name of Badowski, which was formally removed from the jurisdiction of local government officials. Although the unit was soon dissolved, important precedents were set: it was the first time that the Polish government recognized the Cossacks, or at least 300 of them, as a distinct social class that, like the other estates in the land, had the right of self-administration.

Another, more successful attempt to form a government-sanctioned Cossack unit occurred in 1578 during the reign of King Stefan Batory. In return for pay and assignment of the town of Terekhtymyriv, which was to serve as an arsenal and place of convalescence for their wounded, 500 Cossacks agreed to accept nobles as their officers and to refrain from the “self-willed” attacks against the Tatars that often complicated the Commonwealth’s foreign relations. Duly inscribed into a register, the functions of these “registered” Cossacks were to serve as a border militia and, equally important, to control the nonregistered Cossacks. By 1589, there were 3000 registered Cossacks. In general, they came from the ranks of the town dwellers – established Cossacks who had families and who often owned considerable property. For example, according to his will, the property of a registered Cossack by the name of Tyshko Volovych included a house in Chyhyryn, two estates with fish ponds, woodlands and pastures, 120 beehives, and 3000 pieces of gold (1000 of which he lent out at high interest).

The relative wealth of these registered Cossacks contrasted sharply with the poverty of their nonregistered counterparts, who owned little more than did peasants. Consequently, tensions between the 3000 registered and the approximately 40,000–50,000 nonregistered Cossacks often ran high. This distinction did not prevent the sons of wealthier Cossacks from going down to the Sich to seek their fortunes, or other Cossacks who had managed to accumulate wealth from entering the ranks of the registered. Thus, by the early 17th century, there were essentially three overlapping categories of Cossacks: the well-established registered Cossacks who had been co-opted into government service; the Zaporozhians who lived beyond the pale of the Commonwealth; and the vast majority of Cossacks who lived in the frontier towns and led a Cossack way of life, but who had no officially recognized status. The struggle against the Turks and Tatars

In the early phase of their development, the nonregistered Cossacks, and particularly the Zaporozhians, were regarded not only by the magnates and royal officials but also by much of Ukrainian society as little more than brigands and social outcasts. By the late 16th century, this negative image of the Cossack had changed, at least in the eyes of the lower strata of Ukrainian society, largely as a result of the increased frequency, scope, and audacity of Cossack attacks on the Tatars and their powerful overlords, the Ottoman Turks. Ukrainians were not the only ones who suffered at the hands of the Muslim Turks. All of 16th-century Europe shuddered at the very thought of invasion by the Ottomans who, in 1529, had devastated Hungary and had almost captured Vienna; a large part of Eastern Europe remained directly exposed to Tatar raids. Therefore, anyone who dared challenge the bisurmany, as the Muslims were referred to in Ukraine, was sure to win sympathy at home and renown abroad.

Although they certainly reveled in the fame that their raids against the Turks brought them, the Zaporozhians also had pragmatic reasons for launching raids: they pushed the Tatars away from their settlements and the rich booty they captured from the Ottoman towns was a handsome supplement to their incomes.

Cossack raids against the Ottomans reached a high point between 1600 and 1620. In 1606, the Cossacks gutted Varna, the strongest Ottoman fortress on the Black Sea; in 1608, Perekop fell to them; in 1609, they sacked Kilia, Ismail, and Akkerman; in 1614, previously untouched Trabizond in Asia Minor was attacked; and in 1615 they dealt a most audacious blow when, within view of the sultan and a garrison of 30,000, about eighty Cossack chaiky managed to slip into Constantinople harbor, burn it, and make their escape. In 1620, they repeated the same feat. Meanwhile, in 1616, Kaffa, the emporium of the slave trade in the Crimea, was taken and thousands of slaves freed. In describing these Cossack forays, Naima, a 17th-century Ottoman historian, noted: “One can state with certainty that there are no people on earth who care less about life and have less fear of death than they … Military experts claim that this rabble, because of its bravery and skill, is unmatched in sea-warfare by anyone in the world.”³

Equally impressive were the Cossack exploits on land. Infuriated by the Poles’ inability to control the Cossacks, Sultan Osman II assembled a huge army of 160,000, together with thousands of Crimean auxiliaries, and moved against the Commonwealth. In 1620, the Poles suffered a disastrous defeat at Cecora. But a year later at Khotyn a Polish force of 35,000 that had tried to hold off the Ottomans was saved from certain annihilation by the timely arrival of 40,000 Cossacks led by Hetman Sahaidachny.

As a result of these successes, Cossack self-confidence grew. In their often acrimonious negotiations with the Poles, the Cossacks began to refer to themselves as defenders of the faith, as a brotherhood of knights, and as paladins fighting for the public good. This rhetoric was partly meant to serve the Cossacks’ narrow class interests by convincing the government that they were entitled to the rights and privileges normally accorded fighting men. Yet, to a large extent, the Cossacks took this exalted image of themselves as the defenders of Christendom and of their countrymen seriously. This new sense of mission in turn induced them to confront the burning internal issues of their society.