the Zaporozhians under TATAR OVERLORDSHIP
In the myriad letters, memorials and projects which Orlyk addressed to European statesmen, he invariably referred to the Zapo- rozhians as “his army,” a force which was ready to fight at any moment for the liberation of its “suffering fatherland.” The point of these remarks was obvious: they were meant to convince the Hetman’s correspondents that he had a military force at his disposal and was thus a factor to be reckoned with.
But in view of the great distance—and it was not simply a geographical distance— which separated the emigre Hetman from his “lusty lads at the Sich,'' the question arises of how accurate was his image of the Zaporozhians and their attitudes.At the Oleshki Sich the traditional rivalry between the pro- and anti-Moscow factions among the Zaporozhians continued to exist. In fact, the longer the Cossacks remained under the Khan’s overlordship, the more intense did the rivalry become. As long as Hor- dienko served as koshovyi, pro-Russian sentiments were stifled. And even after he was removed from office in 1717, his anti-Russian views were still influential. Thus, when Nakhymovskyi arrived at the Sich in 1721 with an enthusiastic letter from Orlyk telling the Zaporozhians of how the members of the Vienna alliance planned to move against Russia “by land and by sea,” the Cossacks responded positively and asked the Hetman not to forget about them.41 Soon afterwards, however, the new koshovyi, Ivan Mala- shevych, began to explore the possibilities of obtaining a pardon from the Tsar.42
One of the reasons for the increasingly conciliatory tendencies among the Zaporozhians was connected with commerce. When the Tsar ordered the inhabitants of the Hetmanate to avoid any contacts with the Zaporozhians—even Hetman Skoropadskyi could not write to them without the Tsar’s permission—he not only isolated them socially, but also undermined their profitable trade with the Left Bank.
Although some Ukrainian merchants still traded secretly at Oleshki, most went on to the Crimea, where they were allowed to trade, without stopping at the Sich. Since the Zaporo- zhians received a large part of their supplies from the Hetmanate the Tsar’s ban caused them extreme hardship.43Even more burdensome for the Zaporozhians were the problems which they encountered in the Khan’s service. Unable to get the supplies they needed by trade, the Cossacks proceeded to raid Polish and Russian controlled territories in search of booty. This brought on a storm of protests from the Commonwealth and Russia to the Khan and the Porte. Furthermore, when the Khan ordered the Zaporozhians to participate in his campaigns in the Kuban, many of them complained bitterly about the difficult conditions under which they had to fight and the unfair treatment which they received from the Tatars. So irritated was Saadet Girei by these complaints that he ordered some of the most vocal Za- porozhians to be sold as galley slaves.44 By 1722, the relationship between the Zaporozhians and their Muslim overlords became so tense that when Russian-Ottoman talks over Persia commenced, Ibrahim Pasha, at the Khan’s behest, raised the possibility of returning the Zaporozhians to Russian sovereignty.45 The Russian response was positive, but influential elements in the Crimea reacted vigorously against the idea.
In 1724, an uprising of the leading mirzas took place against Saadet Girei. This so-called “aristocratic revolution” has often been described as an internal Crimean struggle between the Khan and Cantimir Mirza, the leader of the powerful Shirin Jan.46 However, according to Orlyk and the reports of Russian spies in the Crimea, the major reason for the revolt was the Zaporozhian issue. Both of these obviously unrelated sources contend that the mirzas rose up and mobilized their troops, “so that the Khan would not give up the Zaporozhians to Russian rule since the Zaporozhians are our first defense against the Russians.”47 The mirzas also argued that the Zaporozhians knew the Tatar defenses and general situation in the Crimea too well to be allowed to go over to the Russians.48 In the end, the Zaporozhians remained under the protection of the Khan—but not of Saadet Girei, who was deposed, but of his successor, Mengli Girei II.
In distant Salonika, when Orlyk learned of the plans to return the Zaporozhians to Russian sovereignty, he warned the Porte not to believe Russian misrepresentations of the Cossacks and not to underestimate their military value:
I cannot help but believe that the Muscovites have painted this Army in false colors, attempting everything and straining their cleverness in the effort to induce the Sublime Porte to surrender the Zaporozhians before they begin their war with the Sublime Porte so that during the blazing war Ukrainians will have no place to flee and will have no one to ally themselves with in order to throw off their yoke.49
Orlyk’s perception of Russian motives and the Zaporozhians' possible role in a coming Ottoman-Russian conflict was well- founded. He realized that Peter Γs current attempts to liquidate Ukrainian autonomy were causing widespread dissatisfaction in Ukraine and that dissident elements within the Hetmanate might try to establish contact and coordinate their opposition with the Zaporozhians and even Orlyk himself. It was clear to him that, in securing the Zaporozhians, the Tsar would eliminate the traditional rallying point of Ukrainian opposition which, if allowed to crystallize, could leave the Russians very vulnerable in the event of a Russian-Ottoman clash.