THE TSAR’S TIGHTENING GRIP ON UKRAINE

If Orlyk’s depiction of the Zaporozhian attitudes was less than accurate, how true were his claims that Ukraine “groaned under the Muscovite yoke? ” And what exactly was the nature of this oft mentioned yoke? To deal with these questions, it is necessary to examine more closely the series of measures which Peter I imposed in Ukraine after Poltava and again after the victorious conclusion of the Great Northern War in 1721.

On 29 April 1722, the office of resident was replaced by the Malo- rossiiskaia Kollegia.⁵⁰ Unlike the Malorossiiskii Prikaz, which was abolished in 1717, the Kollegia was based in Ukraine, at the court of Hetman Skoropadskyi. It consisted of six Russian officers se­lected from the dragoon regiments, one of whom was appointed president. The Kollegia^tS first president was Brigadier S. Veliami­nov. The new institution’s powers were extremely broad: although initially it could deal with the Ukrainians only through the inter­mediary of the Military Chancellery of the Zaporozhian Host, the Kollegia was soon allowed to bypass Ukrainian authorities and to intervene at all levels of the local administration. No order could be issued by the Hetman or his staff without being countersigned by the Kollegia. It could also act as the highest court of appeals in the land, overturning, if it wished, the Hetman’s decisions. This was not merely dual government; to a large extent, the Malorossiiskaia Kollegia was designed to rule in Ukraine. It was at this point that the Pereiaslav Treaty was, in effect, abrogated by the Tsar.

If the establishment of the Kollegia was a radical step towards the abolition of Ukrainian self-rule, the rationale which Peter I gave it was well within the tsars’ traditional policy of divide et impera. In a manifesto issued to the populace, Peter I declared that “It (the Kollegia) has been created for no other purpose than to protect the Little Russian people from the unfairness of their courts and from the oppression of the starshyna.”⁵¹ By claiming to alleviate the indisputably difficult plight of the masses, the Tsar pushed his centralizing measures in Ukraine.

Coordination extended to all levels and all aspects of Ukrainian society. The Hetman’s residence was moved from Baturyn to Hlu- khiv which was much closer to Russia. Previously, the Cossacks had operated as an autonomous army; after Poltava, they were placed under a Russian commander-in-chief. As early as 1715, the practice of electing Cossack officers was altered. Regiments and companies were allowed to elect two or three candidates, all of whom had to be acceptable to the resident. One of these was then appointed, in close consultation with Russian officials, to the vacancy by the Hetman. Whenever vacancies appeared in the all- important offices of colonel, the Kollegia saw to it that foreigners were appointed. For instance, M. Myloradovych, a Serb, was ap­pointed commander of the Hadiach regiment, and Russians were installed as commanders of the Starodub, Chernyhiv and Nizhyn regiments. Moreover, a large part of the lands of the Mazepists was distributed to Russian notables. Most assiduous in obtaining these lands and peasants was A. Menshikov. In 1704, for example, he controlled 1,261 peasants in the Hetmanate; in 1709, the figure sky­rocketed to 28,035, and by 1725 it was 55,176.⁵⁴ Anxious to take advantage of such opportunities, B.

Nor did the social and cultural life of the land escape the atten­tion of the Tsar. The Starshyna was discouraged from marrying Poles and Lithuanians and was urged instead to marry into Rus­sian families.⁵⁵ The measures taken in the field of culture had a disturbingly modern ring to them. Regarding the printing of books in Ukraine, the Senate ordered as early as 1720 that:

No new books except old religious texts are to be published.

And before these old church books are published, they should be brought into complete accordance with the GreatRussian church books so that the (Ukrainian) books do not reflect any differences or separate dialect. As to non-religious books, neither old nor new texts are to be published without first informing the Dukhovnaia Kollegia and receiving its per­mission. This is in order that these books not contradict the Eastern Church and disagree with Great Russian publica­tions.⁵⁶

It was clear, as one of the Tsar’s close associates admiringly recalled in 1726, that Peter I “meant to take Little Russia in hand.”

Because Peter Γs projects were so vast and the means at his dis­posal relatively meager, his need for money was unusually press­ing. It was no doubt galling for him to know that the Ukrainians, who constituted nearly 12 percent of his subjects, contributed prac­tically nothing to his treasury. Up to the Battle of Poltava, little was done to alter this state of affairs. But after the battle, as the Tsar initiated his first great wave of reforms, a concerted effort was made to tap the resources of Ukraine.

Between 1709 and 1722, an indirect approach was taken to ex­tracting wealth from the Hetmanate.

Peter Γs policies had a disastrous effect on Ukrainian trade. For­merly, Ukrainian merchants were free to trade wherever they wished and many of them developed extensive contacts in the Baltic region and in Western Europe. In 1714, they were suddenly ordered to shift their business, regardless of the losses this entailed, to Russian or Russian-controlled ports such as Arkhangelsk, Riga and finally, St. Petersburg. In 1719, the export of Ukrainian wheat to the West was forbidden. This allowed the Russian government to buy up the wheat for its own use at a very low price. Simultaneously, an elaborate and stringent system of import duties was set up on Ukraine’s western borders. It was designed to prevent the import of finished products which might compete with Russia’s fledgling industry. Finally, Russian merchants were given preferential treat­ment in the export of their goods to the Hetmanate, while Ukrain­ians had to pay duties of 10-37 percent for the goods they sent to the north.⁵⁹ Taking advantage of the situation, such men as Menshi­kov and the Stroganovs became heavily involved in the Ukrainian trade, forcing many local merchants out of business.

But the greatest financial shock for the Ukrainianscame in 1722. That year, the Kollegia introduced direct taxation in the Hetman- ate. This was not an easy matter for the Kollegia to implement. Veliaminov had no precedents, no data and absolutely no coopera­tion from the starshyna. Before initiating the taxation, the per­plexed president traveled to St. Petersburg to the Tsar with a long list of questions and problems (foremost among these was the passive resistance of the starshyna). But no helpful advice was forthcoming. And so upon his return, Veliaminov began to collect taxes wherever and however he could. Initially, the payment of taxes in Ukraine was, to say the least, uneven. For example, in 1724, the Bolkan company of the Starodub regiment paid 7 rubles in taxes while the Korop company of the Chernyhiv regiment, roughly equal in size, paid 227 rubles. Even more striking was the disparity between the 8 rubles which the Poltava company of the Poltava regiment paid and the 2,276 rubles taken from the Kreme- nets company of the Myrhorod regiment.⁶⁰

Despite the unevenness in the collection of taxes, Veliaminov pushed on doggedly, introducing innovations which would in­crease the amount collected. Besides initiating the regular collec­tion of taxes, the Kollegia^tS most important innovation was to include the starshyna and the higher clergy among the taxpayers. Since these two groups possessed the most wealth in the land, sub­stantial amounts of money could not be collected without their inclusion. To make sure that the starshy na paid its allocated sums, Russian subalterns were assigned to supervise the collections. In order to further facilitate collection, Ukrainians were expected to pay in cash rather than in kind as had been the case with the Hetman’s tax collectors. The results of the Kollegia^tS efforts were impressive: in 1722, the amount collected was about 45,000 rubles in cash and 17,000 in kind; in 1723, it was 86,000 rubles in cash and 27,000 in kind; and in 1724, it was 141,000 rubles incash and 40,000 in kind.⁶¹

How did the Ukrainian Cossack leadership in the Hetmanate react to the Tsar’s measures? As one who had been implicated, if only peripherally in Mazepa’s izmena, Hetman Skoropadskyi had long been careful not to allow any doubts about his loyalty to arise.

On 3 May 1722, the aging Hetman personally appeared in St. Petersburg to argue before Peter I that there was no reason or prece­dent for the reforms that were introduced or were about to be intro­duced in Ukraine.⁶³ According to Skoropadskyi, the complaints lodged against the Cossack administration were for the most part the fabrications of the Russian resident in Hlukhiv, Feodor Pro- tasev, a man known for his bribe-taking and intrigue. Even bolder was the Hetman’s rebuttal of the Tsar’s claims that the Pereiaslav Treaty allowed for Russian interference in Ukrainian affairs:

During the time of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi there were no such courts (as instituted by the Kollegia) and no collections of money or bread for the treasury.... And only after Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi’s death were changes made in the (Pereiaslav) articles during the insecure hetmancy of his son, Iurii, and that of Briukhovetskyi. However, later... Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich... treated Little Russia with his pre­vious graciousness and then the articles of Iurii and of Briu- khovetskyi were revoked and the original articles of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi were again granted, even with some additions, to Damian Mnohohrishnyi and Ivan Samoilovych.⁶⁴

Despite Skoropadskyi’s uncharacteristic forcefulness, the results of his bold stand were disappointing. Peter I simply ignored the Hetman’s arguments and proceeded with his plans to eliminate Ukrainian autonomy.⁶⁵ On 3 July 1722, very soon after his return from St. Petersburg, Skoropadskyi died. Some historians claim that his death was hastened by a deep depression that set in after his fruitless mission.

Skoropadsky ³’s death raised the issue of succession. Because Peter I was on campaign in Persia, the Senate, which was em­powered to act in his name, postponed the election of the Hetman. However, in response to the pressing requests of the starshyna, it did allow the influential and respected colonel of Chernyhiv, Pavlo Polubotok, to fulfill the duties of acting Hetman “in concert with” the heneralna starshyna. Just as this decision was taken, Velia­minov arrived in Ukraine. A conflict between Polubotok and the Russian Brigadier was unavoidable.

As the Kollegia began its work, Polubotok did everything pos­sible to undermine it. He ignored many of Veliaminov’s instruc­tions, and refused to provide statistical information. In order to undermine the avowed rationale for the establishment of the Kol- Iegia—the alleged complaints from the Ukrainian masses against the Cossack administrative system—Polubotok ordered Ukrainians to lodge their complaints with Ukrainian authorities rather than with imperial institutions. This was only a stop-gap measure. The acting Hetman also tried to eliminate the causes of these com­plaints. Assessors were assigned to the Cossack courts to improve their performance and to prevent bribe-taking. And the starshyna was enjoined to be moderate in its demands on the peasants.⁶⁷ Finally, in December of 1722, Polubotok confronted Veliaminov directly. In a petition to the Senate, he accused the Brigadier of interfering with the Hetman’s affairs and of going beyond the limits of his authority.

Surprisingly, the Senate sided with the acting Hetman. It ruled that Veliaminov’s task was to cooperate with the Cossack adminis­tration, not to order it about. In Peter Γs absence, the Senate as­sumed that the issue in this case was that of the rational delimita­tion of authority. From this point of view, it was clear that Velia­minov had overstepped his prerogatives. Polubotok’s triumph was shortlived, however. As mentioned above, in March 1723, soon after Peter I returned from Persia, Veliaminov hurried to Moscow to present his case to him and to complain about the acting Het­man’s obstruction. The Tsar supported Veliaminov completely. It was obvious that he was not interested in the coordination of the Kollegia^tS and the Hetman’s functions, but rather in the replace­ment of the latter by the former.

The stubborn Polubotok did not give in. He was especially ada­mant about the need to elect a new Hetman. But when he ap­proached the Tsar in this matter, Peter I refused to discuss it. At this point, the Tsar was planning to abolish the hetmancy and there­fore the Hetman’s insistence was especially inopportune. More­over, Peter I had always distrusted Polubotok (in 1708 he vetoed his candidacy for the hetmancy) because he feared that his influence in Ukraine was too great. There were, moreover, rumors and indica­tions that Polubotok might be in league with Orlyk and the Za- porozhians.⁶⁸ Early in 1724, a denunciation from Ukraine stated that the acting Hetman secretly corresponded with Orlyk. The governor of Kiev was ordered to investigate this matter immedi­ately but, unable to find any evidence, he speculated that Polu- botok’s power intimidated the Ukrainians from revealing what they knew. Another denunciation accused Polubotok and his as­sociates of corresponding with the Zaporozhians. Convinced of the veracity and importance of this lead, Peter I gave Rumiantsev the following instructions:

Try to send someone to the Zaporozhians (preferably a person who is especially resentful of the Starshyna) in order that the letters which the Starshyna wrote to them might be retrieved. For this you can use 5,000 rubles which, I believe, should be enough for the purpose.⁶⁹

On the heels of these denunciations came even more disturbing news from Nepliuev in Constantinople:

The French consul arrived from Crimea and secretly informed me that several times this year people from several Cossack commanders in Ukraine... came to the leading Tatar mirza, Cantimir-bey and complained that their original rights have been revoked. Although they petitioned St. Petersburg in the matter, they were not successful. Therefore, the Ukrainians desire to accept Turkish help because in Ukraine there are many Russian troops. The mirza advised Khan Saadet Girei to intervene in these Cossack affairs but the Khan refused because, firstly, the Porte ordered him strictly to maintain peace with Russia and, secondly, because he is a peace-loving man.⁷⁰

The extent to which these denunciations and reports were accu­rate is difficult to establish. Orlyk does not mention any contacts with Polubotok in his diary. However, there are indications that Orlyk avoided noting extremely sensitive information in his jour- ïà¿. In any case, it was evident that the situation in Ukraine was tense and that Peter I was nervous about it. Therefore, when, in 1724, Polubotok incited the StarshynU to petition once more for the election of a new Hetman, the Tsar became furious. The acting Hetman and several of his colleagues were “invited” to St. Peters­burg to explain these petitions. There they were arrested, ques­tioned and jailed in the Petro-Pavlovsk fortress. Polubotok did not survive the rigors of imprisonment and, on 29 December 1724, he died. Only the death of Peter I which followed soon after saved his colleagues from a similar fate.

£ Echoes of the events in Ukraine reached Orlyk in Salonika. However, his perception of what was happening was necessarily incomplete. While aware that the Starshyna and many rank-and- file Cossacks were deeply dissatisfied with the Russian measures, Orlyk did not know how far-ranging and effective these measures were. He assumed that dissatisfaction in Ukraine would inevitably lead to some sort of uprising against the Tsar. At least this was the way it had always been in Ukraine. But the Hetman-in-exile did not realize how much had changed since the days of Mazepa and how incomparably tighter was the Tsar’s grip in Ukraine.