the Zaporozhians return to RUSSIAN SOVEREIGNTY

For Orlyk, the election of Apostol was both a personal and a politi­cal setback. Personally, he had always been on bad terms with the former colonel of Myrhorod whom he considered to be a man of mean birth and of an extremely opportunistic nature.

Friction between the Zaporozhians and their Tatar neighbors had increased in the late 1720s. As always, a major reason for this was socio-economic in nature. During the greater part of their sojourn in the Khanate, the Cossacks had had a difficult time earn­ing a living. As mentioned earlier, in retaliation for its “betrayal,” the Tsar had banned all commercial intercourse between the Sich and the Hetmanate. This was a severe economic blow since it de­prived, the Zaporozhians of an outlet for their exports (primarily salt and the products of fishing and hunting) and virtually elimi­nated the profit they gained from their favored position on the trade route between the Hetmanate and the Crimean and Ottoman commercial centers.

As long as the possibility of war with Peter I existed, both the Khans and the Porte recognized the need to compensate the Zapo- rozhians for their losses. In 1711-1713, the Porte supplied Orlyk with provisions and subsidies for his men. The Tatars, for their part, placed the income from several major fording places on the Dnieper and Boh Rivers at the disposal of the Sich.^λ2 The Zaporo- zhians were also given the right to gather salt in the lakes of the Crimea without paying the usual fees, while the treaties with the Khanate and the Porte stipulated that the Zaporozhians could en­gage in trade within the Khanate and the Ottoman Empire without paying higher rates than did Muslim merchants.

After the hostilities with the Russians ceased, the Khans de­manded that the Zaporozhians participate in campaigns against their enemies in distant Kuban and Circassia. Unlike the Russian Tsars, the Khans did not pay for such services, expecting their men to recompense themselves with booty (which was usually scarce in such difficult campaigns). Invariably, the Zaporozhians incurred more expense than profit from such ventures. Furthermore, they were accused, probably by their Tatar competitors in the salt trade, of allowing their compatriots from the Hetmanate, disguised as Zaporozhians, to use the Crimean salt works to which they had access. As a result of these accusations, the rights of the Sich in these areas were revoked.

Probably the most vexing problems were caused by the Sich’s Nogai neighbors. The Zaporozhians often complained that the noπlads stole their horses and cattle. Even worse, they interfered with fishing and hunting, frequently abducting the Zaporozhians thus engaged and selling them as slaves to the Circassians. When the koshovyi brought such complaints against the Nogais to the Crimean courts, the judges invariably favored their co-religionists.

Not surprisingly, many Zaporozhians turned to brigandage, often raiding Polish and Russian controlled territories in search of plunder. This brought down the wrath not only of the Poles and Russians on them but also that of the Tatar and Ottoman border officials, who, not wishing to irritate their neighbors, severely punished the trespassers for such raids.

As for the Tatar point of view, it was best summarized by the Crimean Grand Vizir, Haci Ali Aga, who stated that he was not sure whether the “union” with the Zaporozhians had done the Tatars more harm than g∞d. The Khans undoubtedly had a diffi­cult time controlling the Zaporozhians as illustrated by the latters’ decision, after the first abortive attempt, to leave the site provided by the Khan at Oleshki and return to the site of the old Sich at Bazaluk.

As similar altercations continued to take place during the fol­lowing years, the long-expected death of August II of Poland oc­curred on 1 February 1733. Immediately, all the interested parties put their well-prepared plans into effect. Stanislaw, assisted by Hryhor, prepared to leave France and present himself for election in Poland; the Russians prepared their troops for an intervention in Poland; and the Tatars and Ottomans finally decided to join the anti-Russian camp. In Constantinople, Villeneuve worked fever­ishly to activate the plan for a Tatar-Zaporozhian diversionary attack against the Russians. On 25 November 1733, he wrote to his government that, “I am using all possible means to have the Tatars attack Muscovy and to have Orlyk finally allowed to leave Turkey and join his army.”¹⁴ The Khan vigorously seconded the French ambassador’s efforts in this matter. At long last, on 12 March 1734, Villeneuve was able to report to his government that, “The present Grand Vizir, Ali Pasha, decided to allow Orlyk to leave Salonika a id proceed to the Crimea.”¹⁵ Some three weeks later, after having left the place of his twelve-year detention, Orlyk was reported on his way to Kaushany to meet with the Khan to prepare to go to the aid of Stanislaw.

While on his way to join the Zaporozhian Host, the Hetman heard the shocking news that the Zaporozhians had already made arrangements to go over to the protection of the Russian Empress. This was a terrible blow to Orlyk.

The importance of this event as a turning point in the life and career of Orlyk can hardly be exaggerated. The very basis for two decades of political proselytizing had suddenly been pulled out from under the Hetman’s feet. Now it became almost impossible, even theoretically, to claim an influential role in Ukraine and among the Cossacks. In the eyes of his French and Polish sup­porters, Orlyk now assumed the position of a semi-private indi­vidual. Although the Zaporozhian move did not immediately de­prive the Hetman of all his usefulness (either actual or potential) to his allies and compatriots, it did underscore the fact that his politi­cal role had been dramatically reduced.

Orlyk was not about to accept the new situation without at­tempting to alter it. Even before the final decision was made to abandon Tatar protection, Orlyk tried to convince the Zaporozhi- ans that they were making a mistake. According to him, his letter to the Host arrived at the same time as did the Empress’s envoys bearing rich gifts to the Zaporozhians.

The political argument was not original. Just as in his letters to the Zaporozhians in 1720-1721, the Hetman described the inter­national political situation in terms of a great anti-Russian coali­tion which included most of the European states and the Ottoman Empire. “Muscovy” was politically and military isolated and about to be overwhelmed. He chided the Zaporozhians that, at a time when the Ottoman and Tatar armies were once again ready to move against the Russians and the opportunity to free their father- land was at hand, they had allowed themselves to be f∞led by false Russian promises and lured to what would surely be the losing side in the coming conflict.

Ideologically, the Hetman-in-exile presented the classic Maze- pist position. He recounted how, from the time of Khmelnytskyi, Moscow had systematically whittled away Ukraine’s rights and privileges by a combination of trickery and force. The high point of this tyranny came under Peter I when an open and vicious attack was made against Ukrainian autonomy as represented by the at­tempt to abolish the Hetmanate and to establish in its place the Malorossiiskaia Kollegia which was merely a guise for putting Russians into governing positions in Ukraine. For obvious rea­sons, Orlyk did not discuss the changes which were introduced in 1727. The Hetman wondered how the Zaporozhians could be so foolish as to trust the Russians, “Now when the entire Ukrainian nation, your brothers, relatives and cohabitants, woefully and tear­fully lament that they did not listen to the well-meant and true warnings of the deceased Hetman Mazepa of blessed memory.” Orlyk concluded with the warning: “Beware, my honorable and worthy lads of the Zaporozhian Host, to what kind of friends you have gone or are about to go to.”¹⁸

Finally, the ex-Hetman brought up a technical but very impor­tant problem.

Ironically, after years of languishing under Ottoman detention and bemoaning his stay in “that godless Babylon,” theex-Hetman urged the Host to remain under that same rule. The reason for his ire and disappointment was, according to him, that, by their act, the Zaporozhians had undercut all his political plans by irritating the Tatars and “embarrassing me before the Ottoman Porte and the Christian allies, all of whom I have told of the bravery and strength of the Zaporozhian Host.”

The Zaporozhian reply was also not without its irony.¹⁹ In a polite and respectful manner, the Zaporozhians stated that, in case of an Ottoman-Russian war, they did not wish to find themselves in a situation where they would fight on the side of the Muslims against their Christian brethren. Knowing Orlyk’s religious com­mitment, they stressed that, should they join Stanisiaw and Orlyk and attack Ukrainian lands,

Then... as usual, when some (Ukrainian) towns would be taken, the Horde would, as it had done in past years (1711 and 1713) at Bila Tserkva and the Slobodas, round up our Chris­tian people and, returning to Crimea, lead them into eternal slavery. Then we would surely fall from the grace of God and into eternal damnation for (causing) the cries of Christians and the spilling of Christian blood.²⁰

In addition, the Zaporozhians seriously doubted whether the Khan, even if he gained control of Ukraine, would hand the land over to Orlyk this time. Therefore, they advised their former Hetman to desist from his efforts and to seek pardon as they had done. A simi­lar letter, with thanks for his hospitality, was sent to Kaplan Girei.²¹

Unpleasant and painful as this reply may have been for him, Orlyk did not desist. He continued to emphasize the point concern­ing the Zaporozhian lands and the exchanges became more bitter. When, in one of their letters, the Zaporozhians declared that the land between the Orel and Samara was theirs because they had won it by the sword, the ex-Hetman retorted that it had been won only with Ottoman help at the time of Doroshenko. This must have irritated the Zaporozhians enough for them to counter with per­sonal accusations against Orlyk. They wrote to Russian govern­ment officials that the reason the ex-Hetman so adamantly favored the Ottomans was that the Porte had promised him and his descen­dants title to the lands which he would help to bring under Otto­man suzerainty. Thus, for all practical purposes, Orlyk’s specula­tions, Stanislaw’s hopes and Kaplan Girei’s expectations concern­ing the “revolution in Ukraine” evaporated in the bitter recrimi­nations between the ex-Hetman and the Zaporozhians.