THE LAST EFFORTS

According to Hryhor, the loss of the Zaporozhian Host left his father in “terrible despair.”²² It was compounded by the fact that not only was the ex-Hetman helplessly dependent on the whims of the Ottomans and Tatars, but that he had completely no basis to assert any authority or influence on developing events which could have the greatest significance for both his own personal fate and that of Ukraine.

But the funds Orlyk had at his disposal were not enough to maintain a significant military force. In Poland itself, the cause of Stanislaw, with which Orlyk was so closely if not enthusiastically linked, was losing ground and the King was about to flee the coun­try before the advancing Russian tr∞ps. In view of this, the Khan postponed the planned incursion into Polish territory to support Leszczynski. As a result of these circumstances, just before the out­break of Ottoman-Russian hostilities (the Russian cabinet of min­isters declared war on 16 June 1735), the ex-Hetman was forced to disband his forces and retire with his staff to Bender to await new developments.

Although it was not feasible for Orlyk to carry on any military action against the advancing Russians, he proved to be useful to the Ottomans and Tatars as an advisor, informant and anti-Russian agitator.

(Orlyk) not only secretly continues to spread his intrigues and malicious suggestions against our empire, but this year he has been brought to the Crimean Khan and there, in prox­imity to our borders, he creates among our Little Russian subjects unrest and incitement to inimical acts against us, especially (encouraging) conflict and disagreement between us and the Porte.²⁵

In another report, it was noted that the ex-Hetman’s activity was especially dangerous because, “he enjoys great esteem at the Porte and especially with the Khan.”²⁶

Orlyk also made available his wide range of important contacts, especially in Poland, to the Ottomans. It was through him that, in 1736, in the midst of the Russian invasion of Ottoman territory, a secret meeting was arranged between J. Potocki, the wojewoda of Kiev, and the Ottoman envoy, Ibrahim Pasha, to negotiate for Polish permission for Ottoman and Tatar armies to enter the Right Bank and strike back at the Russians by taking Kiev.²⁷ This plan, however, did not materialize due to Count B. C. Miinnich’s invasion of the Crimea.

The Ottomans wanted to utilize Orlyk not only on their eastern front, but also further west, against the Austrians. At the end of

1737, an Ottoman offensive was being planned against the Rus­sians’ Habsburg allies. In order to take advantage of anti-Habsburg sentiment among the Hungarians, the Porte decided to utilize Jozef Rakoczi (1700-1738), the son of the recently deceased Ferenc Rakoczi (1676-1735), in the same way it had earlier hoped to use Orlyk in Ukraine before the Zaporozhian defection. Now that the ex-Hetman was not capable of leading a diversionary movement against the Russians, the Ottomans probably reasoned that the young Rakoczi could benefit from Orlyk’s experience and advice in performing a similar task against the Austrians.

1738, the ex-Hetman was ordered by the Grand Vizir to leave Bender and go to Vidin to join the young Rakoczi there as his official advisor.²⁸

Orlyk, however, was irritated by this assignment. He felt that it was a blow to his pride to serve the “Ungariae Dux” whom he considered his equal and in no way his superior.²⁹ Moreover, he was upset that the Porte had decided to concentrate on the Hun­garian problem and that it was ignoring Ukraine. When, at the end of February 1738, the Grand Vizir, Yegen Mehmet Pasha (1737- 1739), also arrived at Vidin, Orlyk voiced his dissatisfaction in a personal audience with him:

I am more than a little distressed by my appointment as ad­visor to Prince Rakoczi, something which is neither valid nor compatible with my rank. I have always been considered as a leader of a nation (chef d’une nation) by the Porte and as such I have rightful claims against Russia. It is not in my interests, which are common with those of the Porte, to be kept away from Ukraine where my presence is necessary under the pres­ent circumstances.³⁰

The Grand Vizir appeared to be seriously interested in what the ex-Hetman had to say, questioning him in detail about the state of affairs in Ukraine, the condition of the land, the size of the popula- don in various towns and villages and, especially, about the politi­cal inclinations of the “Cossack nation.”³¹ This renewed interest of the Ottomans in Ukrainian matters was most probably the result of French prodding which, in turn, reflected Hryhor’s continuous agitation at the French court. Just a few months before the meeting between his father and the Grand Vizir, Hryhor had addressed a long memorial to Fleury (10 October 1737) in which he urged the French to emphasize to the Ottomans the importance of Ukraine in the Porte’s war effort against the Russians.³² He had even presented a concrete plan that the Turks should occupy the Right Bank and the towns of Bila Tserkva, Uman and Bar as soon as possible be­cause “he who controls these points controls Ukraine.”³³

During his meeting with Orlyk, Yegen Mehmet Pasha reassured the ex-Hetman that the Porte still considered him the leader of “the Cossack nation” and that any Ukrainian territory which Ottoman troops occupied would revert to his rule.³⁴ The Grand Vizir agreed to let the ex-Hetman leave Vidin and return to Jassy, a location closer to the Polish-Ukrainian border. However, the most pleasant news came just before the Grand Vizir left Vidin.

Sometime in the latter part of 1738, Orlyk sent the outline of such a project to the Porte where, according to him, it was not only discussed at a meeting of the Divan, but also approved by Mahmud I in the presence of Khan Mengli Girei II (re-appointed in 1737). Apparently, Orlyk himself was to be called to the Ottoman capital for consultations, but there are no indications that this meeting actually took place. In any case, it was evident that, in the early months of 1739, the Porte was finally acting to take advantage of the anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine and in Poland. In February of 1739, Potocki, through his representative, A. Gurowski, came to an understanding with the Grand Vizir that was to facilitate Otto­man operations on the Right Bank.³⁶ Shortly thereafter, Orlyk was sent to Kaushany to join the Tatars who were preparing for an invasion of the Right Bank. From here he made another attempt to convince the Zaporozhians to return to Ottoman protection. With­out even opening the letter, the Zaporozhians sent it on to Miin- nich. The Tatar incursion which took place in late February and early March was repulsed by the Russians and, on 21 March 1739, Miinnich reported to the Empress that, ‘'In the (course of) my journey through Ukraine today, I could see that the successful repulsion of the Tatars has pleased the local population and it will thus be difficult for Orlyk to fulfill his plans.”³⁷

But Orlyk’s plans, indeed, his brief return to the forefront of events in the Russo-Ottoman war, were about to suffer yet another reversal. After Stanislaw’s formal abdication in February 1736, the French substantially toned down their anti-Russian stance (al­though they did continue to provide some help to Orlyk).

Ironically, Villeneuve’s great success effectively ended the politi­cal career of the man he had tried so much to help. Peace between the Russians and Ottomans left Orlyk without any political rele­vance to any of the major powers of Eastern Europe. Yet, even after years of frustration and disappointment, and despite his advanced age (67), the ex-Hetman was not willing to cease his efforts. Even while the Russo-Ottoman war was still in progress, both the young­er and elder Orlyks became involved in a plan to bring Sweden into the war on the Ottoman side.³⁹ A defensive alliance was signed (2 December 1739) between the Swedes and Ottomans, but it did not lead to military cooperation due to Swedish hesitation. But even after the Peace of Belgrade, the Swedes continued to show a willing­ness to fight the Russians. Consequently, all of Orlyk’s hopes throughout 1740-1741 revolved around the impending Swedish- Russian war.

Meanwhile the Porte, having no more use for Orlyk, ordered him to move to Adrianople where he would be unable to embroil it in any further international complications. The ex-Hetman dreaded the idea of being interned in Adrianople as he had once been kept in Salonika. He begged to be allowed to move to Jassy where he hoped his acquaintance with the Hospodar, Nicholas Maurocor- dato, would help him to be reunited with his family whom he had not seen for more than twenty years. The Porte insisted on Adri­anople and applied pressure by cutting off its financial support to the debt-ridden emigre. It was only with Ihegreatestdifficulty that, through the intervention of the Swedish residents in Constantin­ople, Orlyk was allowed to move to Jassy. This, however, did little to compensate for the disappointment which the ex-Hetman ex­perienced when he heard that the Swedish-Russian war, which had broken out in 1741, had ended with a Swedish defeat. With his last hopes gone, in poor health, deserted by his staff and nearly penni­less, Orlyk spent the last months of his life at the court of Nicholas Maurocordato in Jassy. On 7 June 1742, Castellane, the French envoy at the Porte, reported that, “M. Orlick est mort....”⁴⁰