MACHIAVELLI, CICERO, AND PLUTARCH ON THE LION AND THE FOX

Machiavelli’s teaching in Chapter 18 of the Prince that the virtuous must deceive not only the enemies of their country, for the sake of the public good, but also their subjects and friends, for their own sake, is deeply shocking.

(1891, 297). Yet Machiavelli claims that “ancient writers” taught, albeit covertly, that princes need to know how to use the beast as well as the man and suggests that they therefore also taught that princes must imitate the ferocity of the lion and the cunning of the fox in their dealings with their subjects and friends as well as their enemies. But did ancient writers truly teach these lessons, even covertly? Let us consider the three ancient writers whom Machiavelli here refers to in particular: Cicero, from whom he borrows the images of the man and the beast and the lion and the fox; Plutarch, from whom he also borrows the image of the lion and the fox;^[567] and Homer.

In On Duties, a work carefully tailored to his 21-year-old son - “most suited to your age” - Cicero explains the relation between duty (officium) and moral virtue (honestum), on the one hand, and expediency (utile) on the other (1.4).^[568] In the course of discussing the relation between justice in particular and war, Cicero states: “There are two types of conflict: the one proceeds by debate, the other by force. Since the former is the proper concern of man, but the latter of beasts, one should only resort to the latter if one may not employ the former” (1.34).^[569] Even though Cicero does, in contrast with Machiavelli, stress here that force should be used only as a last resort, like Machiavelli, Cicero teaches - overtly - that, at times, it is necessary for rulers to imitate the ferocity of beasts in order to triumph over their enemies.^[570] Indeed, Cicero goes on to cite approvingly the Romans’ destruction of the enemy cities of Carthage and Numantia (1.35), as Machiavelli does earlier in the Prince (5.20).

There is, however, an apparent divergence between Machiavelli and Cicero concerning deception. For Machiavelli overtly stresses the wisdom of imitating the cunning of the fox as well as the ferocity of the lion: “[T]he one who has known best how to use the fox has come out best. But it is necessary to know well how to color this nature and to be a great

Homer and Machiavelli on Education and Human Excellence 227 pretender and dissembler” (18.69-70). Cicero, however, insists on the importance of keeping faith - “the foundation of justice is the keeping of faith, that is, constancy and truth in what is said and agreed” (1.23) - and eschewing trickery and deceit, apparently under any circumstances:

There are two ways in which injustice may be done, either through force or through fraud; and fraud seems to belong to the little fox, force to the lion. Both of them seem most alien to a human being; but fraud deserves a greater hatred. And out of all injustice, nothing deserves punishment more than that of men who, just at the time when they are most false, act in such a way that they might appear to be good men. (1.41; see 1.33-41, 1.128, 2.10, 2.43, 3.57-77)

Cicero overtly denounces deceit even in war: “If any individuals have been constrained by circumstance to promise anything to an enemy, they must keep faith even in that” (1.39).^[571] Machiavelli, on the other hand, overtly argues for the wisdom of deceit, even in peace:

A prudent lord, therefore, cannot observe faith, nor should he, when such obser­vance turns against him, and the causes that made him promise have been eliminated.... Nor does a prince ever lack legitimate causes to color his failure to observe faith.... So let a prince win and maintain his state: the means will always be judged honorable, and will be praised by everyone. (18.69, 71)

We see, then, that the question of whether or not one should ever be faithless marks the dividing line between Machiavelli and Cicero.^[572]

Cicero does, however, quietly acknowledge, even within so seemingly morally upstanding a work as On Duties, that deception is sometimes justified.

(331c1-d3, 382c6-10) for the justice and utility of breaking “promises” and lying: “If someone has deposited his sword with you when he was of sound mind, and asks for it back when insane, it would be wrong to return it, and [would be] your duty not to return it” (3.95). In these ways, Cicero appears to teach covertly what Machiavelli teaches overtly: that it is advisable at times to deceive, not only enemies, but even fellow citizens. But Cicero is careful to indicate that such deception is justified only for the sake of the public good or for the sake of others, not simply for the sake of oneself, and he teaches even this lesson only covertly, apparently because he is concerned lest overtly justifying faithlessness even in exceptional circumstances undermine the trust that is, at least generally speaking, “the foundation of justice” (1.23).

At first glance, and in apparent contrast with Cicero, Plutarch in his Lysander seems to vindicate Machiavelli’s teaching in Chapter 18. For Lysander, as he himself almost openly acknowledges in his own words, imitates the ferocity of the lion and the cunning of the fox (7) and, as Plutarch explains, goes on to enjoy tremendous political success. Thanks to Lysander’s astute generalship, the Spartans inflict a catastrophic defeat on the Athenian navy at Aegospotami and thereby bring to an end the 27­year Peloponnesian War. In Plutarch’s words, Lysander accomplished “the greatest deed with the least toil” and brought to a close “in a single hour a war that was the longest in time and the most varied in its incidents and the most incredible in its fortunes, of the previous wars...

What is more, Plutarch highlights Lysander’s exceptional harshness and deceitfulness. He explains that Lysander ordered “many slaughters” of Athenians and, in general, of “the enemies of his friends” (13) and was responsible for the slaughter of “innumerable” supporters of democracy throughout Greece at the hands of supporters of oligarchy (19). Accordingly, “the harshness of his manner rendered the power of Lysander terrifying and oppressive” (19.4) and his opponents found him “stupefying [êàòàïÀïêò³êî;]” (22.1).

Plutarch stresses the remarkable deceitfulness of Lysander as well and it is here that the image of the lion and the fox appears. Plutarch explains that Lysander was at a certain point replaced as Spartan admiral by

Homer and Machiavelli on Education and Human Excellence 229 Callicratidas, who “appeared a man best and most just of all” and who was “comparable to the most eminent Greeks on account of his justice and greatness of soul and courage” but who went on to suffer a disastrous naval defeat at the hands of the Athenians at Arginusae (5.5, 7.1). When the Spartans restore Lysander as commander of the naval forces, Plutarch remarks:

[T]o those who cherished the simple and noble manner of their leaders, Lysander, compared with Callicratidas, seemed to be one who would stop at nothing and a sophist, adorning the many things of the war with deceptions and exalting the just when it was profitable, but if not, using the advantageous as though it were noble, and not believing truth to be by nature stronger than falsehood, but defining the value of each thing by the need.

Indeed, Lysander was, according to one report, breathtakingly indifferent to the sanctity of oaths in particular: “For he called for... deceiving children with dice but men with oaths” (8.4). In these ways, Lysander might seem a perfect example of the virtuous prince praised by Machiavelli, who knows how to use the lion and the fox.

Yet, if we examine Plutarch’s discussion more carefully, we see that, even though Plutarch praises Lysander most highly for his shrewd gener­alship at Aegospotami in particular (10-11), he sharply criticizes Lysander for both his faithlessness (8.4) and his cruelty: “[H]e did not give to the Greeks a decent example of Lacedaimonian rule” (13.4). Now, Machiavelli might argue that Plutarch here criticizes Lysander in a merely overt fashion, while covertly teaching that those who are ambitious and seek honor should imitate him (see 4.4). And Plutarch does conclude his life of Lysander by praising his “virtue” (30.2). But Plutarch stresses that Lysander was virtuous because he was so devoted to the public good that he refused to enrich himself, even at the height of his power. Moreover, in his Comparison of Lysander and Sulla, Plutarch underscores Lysander’s virtuous dedication to the good of Sparta (1.4) and defends his “injust­ices” - apparently his ferocious and deceitful deeds - on the grounds that they were on behalf of his “friends” and “companions,” that is, Sparta and her allies, rather than simply on behalf of himself (2.3-4). While Plutarch, even more overtly than Cicero, acknowledges the value of foxlike cunning and leonine cruelty, both ancient writers appear to teach, both overtly and covertly, that such means are justified only by devotion to one’s friends, subjects, and fellow citizens, and not by a narrow concern for oneself.