Cicero, Epictetus, Plutarch and the assumed apolitical attitude of the Epicureans

Cicero objects to the Epicureans that history remains mute in their arguments (Fin. 2.67). ‘I have never heard,' he writes, ‘Lycurgus mentioned in Epicurus' school, or Solon, Miltiades, Themistocles, or Epaminondas, all of whom receive due acknowledgement from other philosophers'.

Epictetus and Plutarch express themselves in similar terms to Cicero. After referring to the Epicureans' denial of providence and the piety of the polis, Epictetus ironically declares that it was out of principles like these that our well- governed states have grown great, and that Sparta has become what is. Those who died at Thermopylae, Epictetus sarcastically points out, died because of doctrines like those of Epicureanism (Diss. 2.20. 26). Plutarch is also in the habit of opposing Epicureanism to the great contributions to Greek political life by non-Epicurean philosophers, especially by Plato and his disciples. Plutarch practically depicts the Academy as a school for the training of politicians in the political life of the Greek world (Col. 1126B-D). In Live Unnoticed he contrasts the figures of Epaminondas, Thrasybulus, Themistocles, Camillus and Plato to the uselessness of Epicurus and his followers (1128D, 1129B-C).⁴

Cicero, Epictetus and Plutarch therefore present Epicureanism as a philosophy entirely contrary to the motivations and actions based on the natural sociability of human beings who forged the history and greatness of Greece and Rome.

Cicero and Plutarch argue that the natural sociability of human beings makes dedication to politics the most fulfilling way of life. At the beginning of On Republic, written in a difficult political time, Cicero asserts the supremacy of the exercise of real politics over theoretical life (De Re. 1.2, 2-3). He addresses this remark against philosophers in general and even repeats the same expressions (De Re. 1.2, 2) with which the character Callicles in Plato's Gorgias mocked Socrates' dedication to philosophy. Nevertheless, the Epicureans are the main targets of his criticism. As Gilbert underlines, Epicureanism is the ‘philosophical other' against which Cicero structured his arguments, literary persona and political/cultural self-representations.⁶ But, according to Schofield, there is a more unsettling dimension of Cicero's position regarding Epicurean (and Academic) philosophy.⁷ In Schofield's view, Cicero makes the assumption that establishing a philosophical foundation regarding the natural basis of justice that would put commonwealths on a firm footing and bring stability to cities requires pragmatism and authority, and that in this circumstance debate does not form part of the relevant methodology.⁸ Cicero therefore considers that, in this context, the views of the Epicureans must be rejected even if what they say is true. However, he also states that the Epicureans do not know and have never wanted to know anything about the republic (Leg. 1.39).⁹ Active involvement in political life, Plutarch writes in Whether an old man should engage in public affairs, ‘is a way of life of a tamed social animal living in an organized society, intended by nature to live throughout its allotted time the life of a citizen and in a manner devoted to honour and the welfare of mankind' (791C; transl.

Epicurus certainly criticized Epaminondas (Plutarch, Col. 1127AB), and apparently Miltiades and Themistocles (Cicero, De Re. 1.5; Plutarch, Pleasant Life 1097C). Plutarch notes, unfortunately without giving names, that Metrodorus mocked some wise men who tried to imitate Lycurgus and Solon and pretended to be legislators (Col. 1127B). In On Property Management col. 22, 10-48, Philodemus seems to refer to the rise among his Latin contemporaries of the fashionable Exempla and Vitae of great Greek and Roman militaries, politicians and men of action. Insofar as their lives reflect ‘thirst for fame' (δοξοκοπ(α; col. xxii, 24) they produce, in Philodemus' view, a negative echo in the lives of those who read them.¹³ Nevertheless, Philodemus, like Lucretius¹⁴ and in accordance with Epicurus' views (discussed in chapter 2), in no way condemns the activity of any politician.

Plutarch was well aware of both the Cynical and Stoic literature already mentioned, as well as the work of Theopompus; but by presenting the Epicureans' criticisms of politicians of the past as an expression of their selfish apoliticism, Plutarch omits any kind of link to a tradition that could easily be traced back to Socrates, one of ‘the ancients' par excellence in his estimation. The assessment of the motivations and ambitions of politics were, at least since Socrates, not marginal but inherent to the process of self-definition of philosophy in Greece. Cicero's and Plutarch's controversy with Epicureanism is a fundamental part of their defence of the assimilation of philosophy to the exercise of ordinary politics. Isolating Epicureanism from later Greek philosophy contributes to this purpose. There is, however, another argumentative procedure more surprising from today's methodological perspectives. Cicero and Plutarch absolutize the slogan ‘do not participate in politics' as a principle of conduct of the Epicureans, but they do not dedicate a single line to the specification of which text of Epicurus it comes from and what its original context was.

To do justice to Cicero and Plutarch, it must also be emphasized that both of them point out, albeit with clear polemical purposes, that the Epicureans acknowledge circumstances that imply reservations to the application of the slogan ‘do not participate in politics'. Again, these pass over the context in which these ideas were inserted in Epicurus' work. The exceptions face in two directions: external circumstances and personal situations. The former (Cicero, De Re. 1.10. Seneca, De otio 3.29) perhaps encompass those exceptional circumstances in which the security of society, and with it that of the Epicurean community and the sage, are compromised, such as war or states of emergency in which law and order are threatened. In such cases, prudence and sober hedonic reasoning would advise political participation. Cicero mocks this approach, since in his opinion it falls prey to the absurdity of recommending political activity, especially in difficult situations, to those who lack any experience in it. This first type of exception could also become manifest in cases where circumstances put the Epicurean community at risk and encouraged some of its members to engage in politics to safeguard, for example, the life of one of its members or the assets and continuity of the school. Roskam favours this understanding of exceptional circumstance.¹⁵

According to Plutarch's testimony, the exceptions referring to personal circumstances seem to indicate that Epicurus would have advised certain people, avid due to their constitution for fame and honour, to devote themselves to politics rather than to abstain from doing so, since to abstain would mean for them greater turmoil and deterioration (Plutarch, On peace of mind 465F-466A; see also Col. 1125C).¹⁶ Plutarch replies that it could then be said that Epicurus recommends politics not to the most skilful, but to those who are incapable of leading a quiet life. But there is another, more specific, explanation for these kinds of exceptions. Perhaps it would not be about individuals eager due to their character for fame and honour, but people who already have fame and honour because of their lineage. In their case, not participating in politics would be more inconvenient than the opposite.¹⁷ In addition to the exceptions mentioned above, there is another one recorded by Diogenes Laertius, who states that the Epicurean sage will pay court to a king (or rather will take care of him) when the occasion is appropriate (10.120).

The already indicated exceptions are illustrative of the weight that facts have in the Epicurean practical wisdom or prudence, as well as in the sober reasoning in which it is expressed. However, the documentary contribution of the just indicated exceptions, like that of Cicero's and Plutarch's considerations of the slogan ‘do not participate in politics', is disappointing, since they do not provide information about the actions of Epicurus and the Epicureans in political communities. As mentioned above, a rarely quoted passage from Epictetus is evidence of the kind of information absent in these texts by Cicero and Plutarch. In a speech in which Epictetus attacks the Academics and the Epicureans¹⁸ (an association that would probably have surprised the Epicureans), after referring to the antisocial opinions of the latter he writes:

And then people who talk in this way go on to marry, and father children, and fulfil their duties as citizens, and get appointed to be priests and prophets! Priests of whom? Of gods who don't exist! And they themselves consult the Pythian priestess, to know her lies and interpret the oracles to others? Oh what colossal impudence, what imposture!.

Diss. 2.20.27; transl. R. Hard

To be sure, the passage furnishes valuable information about striking public performances of Epicureans which, as we will show below, are confirmed by other sources. Two other discourses of Epictetus complement the information in the passage. In Dissertations 3.7, 1 a conversation is recounted between Epictetus and an Epicurean ‘inspector' (διορθωτης).¹⁹ Dissertations 1.19 contains remarks on the role of the priest of the imperial cult which, in a way, challenges the insults that Epictetus addresses to the Epicureans in the passage just quoted. One of his fellow citizens of Nicopolis, a city of special religious significance due to its imperial foundation, remarks to Epictetus that he wants to become a priest of the cult of Augustus. Epictetus asks him why he wants to incur such great expense, and he replies that he wants to wear a crown of gold and for contracts to be inscribed with his name when they are drawn up. Epictetus mocks this, and tells him that it would be preferable for him to crown himself with roses (Diss. 1.19.26-29). Two details are striking: on the one hand, it is evident from the conversation that the office of imperial priest required abundant resources, which presupposes that it was held by members of the upper classes. On the other hand, neither Epictetus nor his interlocutor appeal to anything resembling religious motivations for aspiring to the office of priest. The conspicuous motivation is honour, a natural aspiration of those who belonged to the upper classes of the polis. These are, as we shall see, relevant data when examining the testimonies concerning priests, prophets and other offices held by Epicureans in the poleis.

Plutarch, and especially Cicero, certainly knew more Epicurean politicians and prominent men than Epictetus. Some of these Epicureans, as is well known, were their friends. But when the authors polemically refer to Epicurean apoliticism, they remain on a rhetorical level and keep silent about the names and public actions of Epicureans whom they knew perfectly well. One could well apply a reproach that Cicero addresses to the Epicureans to Plutarch and Cicero: when they denigrate the attitude of the Epicureans towards the political communities, ‘history remains mute’.

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