Cicero on Gyges’ ring and how Plutarch deals with the Puzzles
As already indicated, Cicero was also interested in explaining the meaning of the story of Gyges. In fact, in On Duties 3.38-39; 77-78, he summarizes the story, noting that certain philosophers, not bad people nor particularly subtle (obviously referring to the Epicureans: see Fin.
2.80, and Tusc. 3.46),34 underestimate its value in that they consider the assumption illustrated by Gyges’ story to be impossible in the world of human actions. The Epicureans, who apparently criticized Plato for mythologizing like a poet,35 stubbornly resist considering the hypothesis and go no further because, according to Cicero, they do not truly understand the question.36 In their opinion, answering such a question would put them in a real predicament: if they answer that they would act against others knowing that they would not be discovered, they would reveal themselves as villainous, while if they answered to the contrary, they would admit that they must avoid bad actions. This is precisely the thesis of the preceding section of On Duties, where Cicero introduces the story of Gyges and the Epicurean interpretation.Goldschmidt insists on Cicero's blindness to Epicurus' position concerning what is impossible, although it seems that his peculiar solution of the puzzle sets aside - as do Cicero's rebukes - fundamental theses that the Epicureans could offer as an answer to the question contained in T1. By concentrating on the counterfactual conditional, as some late Epicureans ostensibly do, Goldschmidt implicitly seems to leave intact the thesis shared by Cicero and Plutarch that the only reason that Epicureans abstain from certain actions is the fear of punishment, from whose escape one can never be certain, an uncertainty that indeed already constitutes castigation (PD 34). To be sure, the Epicureans could begin by objecting to the expressions ‘intrinsically good or bad actions' and ‘actions performed by themselves or avoided by themselves', whose acceptance Cicero and Plutarch intend to force, declaring them fallacious.
In fact, Torquatus does so in O n Ends 1: Cicero, a skilful rhetorician, endeavours to embarrass him by opposing his hedonistic and utilitarian explanations of actions, the noble and heroic patriotic deeds carried out by Torquatus' own ancestors (Fin. 1.23-25). Unintimidated, Torquatus wonders whether they were thrown into these great feats, incidentally always performed before the viewing public, like animals without awareness of their effects and consequences. The obviously negative answer calls into doubt that the exclusive motivation of these patriotic heroes was the performance of intrinsically good actions (Fin. 1.34-36).37 Cicero attributes irrationality and animality to Epicurean hedonism. Torquatus throws this disqualification straight back: if the patriotic feats were carried out exclusively for the sake of duty, they constitute irrational, animal behaviours, unsuitable for rational beings.38Perhaps the best Epicurean argument would be to focus the issue on the Epicurean sage, as Plutarch ( Col. 1127D) and Cicero ( Off. 3.9) do, probably with the purpose of highlighting the ignominy of Epicureanism through the behaviour of its most qualified representative. The question, therefore, concerns the emblematic representative of the possession of ‘physiology' and prudence that Epicureanism advocates. This qualification is decisive, since it forces us to consider if the figure of the Epicurean sage is recognized in the motivations
alleged by Cicero to carry out bad actions knowing that they will not be discovered, and in the consequent way of deciding that it presents. Cicero reviews the first in these terms: ‘for the sake of riches, power, despotism or lust' ( divitiarum, potentiae, dominationis, libidinis causa; Off. 3.39, transl. M. Atkins).39 Regarding the second point, Cicero tries to show, as we have indicated, that either the Epicureans are villainous (because they act badly when they know they will remain unnoticed) or they act well (because they abstain from performing bad actions even knowing their bad actions will remain unnoticed) and, consequently, they accept that bad actions should be avoided.
The second point would mean that Cicero accuses the Epicureans of being inconsistent, the first point of being perverse. At the very beginning of the paragraph, he insinuates this, qualifying them ‘as not bad people but not very subtle.As we have already suggested in passing, Plutarch wants us to see that Epicurus' refusal to respond actually reflects hypocrisy and shame in recognizing that he will commit illegal actions, shame that implies accepting that he will perform actions knowing they are bad; that is, that they are bad actions regardless of whether they remain hidden.
The considerations of Cicero and Plutarch strip the Epicurean sage of his defining characteristics: ‘physiology' and prudence. One of the purposes of the former is to achieve what Epicurus calls, with an expression of his own convincingly interpreted by Erler,40 a ‘firm contemplation' (απλανης θεωρ(α; LM 128) that discriminates and hierarchizes desires while explaining and dispelling those that have their origin in fears and vain opinions. The latter refers to all choice and avoidance of what Epicurus calls, with an expression also coined by him, a ‘sober reasoning' (νηφων λογισμoς ; LM 132).41 Cicero does not even mention the role of ‘physiology' and prudence in the motivations and decisions of the Epicurean sage when analysing the Gyges passage. Nor did Plutarch do so while commenting on T1. Neither Cicero nor Plutarch capture the interesting conflation of theory and praxis that reflect the expressions ‘firm contemplation' and ‘sober reasoning', coined by Epicurus. They are obliged to do so, of course, because of their malicious identification of the Epicurean way of life with what tradition called a ‘life of enjoyment' (βiος απολαυστικoς; see Aristotle, EN 1095b17).
None of the motivations that Cicero alleges for those who carry out bad actions knowing that they will not be discovered (see Off 3.39, briefly commented on above)42 are taken to be valid in the hierarchy of desires that the ‘firm contemplation' of the Epicurean discriminates as fostering serenity, peace of mind and absence of pain. In other words, not only do these not constitute motivations of an Epicurean sage, but also they (especially the first three listed) are analysed by the Epicureans as vain desires aroused by fear, from which the Epicurean wise person has freed himself.43 Epicurus knows that the polis establishes legal channels for its satisfaction. However, in his opinion, this in no way accredits them as constituents of living prudently, honourably, and justly [ φρον(μως καi καλως καi δικα(ως] on which he focuses pleasant living; that is, tranquillity (LM 132; PD 5). Hence, the actions derived from the motivations listed by Cicero, whether just or unjust, legal or illegal, hidden or in plain sight, do not correspond to those of an Epicurean sage. The honourable and just living of the Epicurean sage does not take into account the fear of the punishment of laws, as is the case with many of his fellow citizens, but rather abides by necessary natural desires that not only do not promote unjust actions but even cause actions authorized by the law to be disregarded.
Plutarch's interpretation of Epicurus' answer to the puzzle posited in T1 assumes that the reason why the wise Epicurean does not commit crimes is the fear of being discovered and punished. Consequently, in Plutarch's view, as long as the Epicurean agent is certain that he will not be discovered, he will act illegally. As we have shown, a fundamental aspect of the malicious character of Plutarch's interpretation is the omission of the link that Epicureanism establishes between the study of nature and the actions of the sage.
There is, though, another aspect that evinces his deficient interpretation of Epicurus' answer. Plutarch understands Epicurus' implicit reply in T1 to be a rule of conduct (‘whenever the Epicurean sage is certain not to be discovered, he will act unlawfully'). However, Epicurus' answer points precisely to the impossibility of giving a categorical answer such as ‘yes, always' or ‘no, never'. Perhaps the reason for this is that the question, despite its appearance, is too general, i.e. it does not determine the singular circumstances in which the sage must make the decision. We do not know the context of T1, and we also do not know whether Epicurus provided any examples. Attempts by interpreters to supply them have certainly proved controversial.44 Epicurus, as we have shown above, stresses that unique circumstances constitute a fundamental ingredient of the Epicurean sage's decisions. In fact, none of the Principal Doctrines offers categorical rules of conduct and, not for nothing, Epicurus places prudence at the top of the doctrine (LM 132). In sum, Plutarch's interpretation of T1 omits the two fundamental items of Epicurean ethics: ‘physiology' and prudence, which clearly means leaving aside two decisive aspects of the Epicurean characterization of the sage.4