Gyges' ring and the Epicurean origin of justice
In the classical tradition before Epicurus, the most complete and best-argued discussion on the consideration of bad actions performed by a person without witnesses is Plato and his story of the Ring of Gyges (debated in Resp.
359c6- 360c5). In our view, it is evident that Epicurus' emphasis in T1 on the role that the possibility of passing undetected when performing an illegal act evokes the Platonic debate on the topic. The story of Gyges' ring is framed in the debate of the contractual origin of justice, such as it is presented by the character Glaucon. Now, the Epicurean genealogy of justice and the laws differs in several respects from that of Glaucon. To be sure, Gyges, with or without a ring, is certainly not an Epicurean sage. It is worthwhile, therefore, to dwell on Plato's text in order to analyse T1 and Plutarch's commentary, as well as Cicero's interpretation of the position of the Epicureans vis-a-vis the story of Gyges' ring.When discussing the issue of justice in Republic 2, the character Glaucon does not offer a clear definition of justice. At the end of his first speech, after presenting a contractual explanation of the genealogy of justice, he says that ‘this is the origin and the essence of justice' (359a5); this is incorrect, since he has only spoken of the origin [γενεσις] of justice and precisely not of its essence [ουσ(α]. If he had spoken of its essence, he would have given a true definition of justice. Glaucon argues that the origin and nature of justice is the product of a kind of social pact or agreement. His interest - or the position he represents if we are willing to believe that his view is not that the life of the unjust is better than that of the just28 - is directed towards the consequences of justice as a means of ensuring a kind of pact of mutual non-aggression among the members of society (cf.
Resp. 358e4-359b5). Justice would be a middle term between the greatest good (which is to commit injustice with impunity) and the greatest evil (which is not to be able to take revenge for injustice). In other words, human beings take refuge in justice not because it is a good thing, but because they are forced to respect it; otherwise, they will be punished (i.e. people cannot commit a crime without paying for it). In fact, as Glaucon goes on to argue, one who can commit an injustice without having to pay for it will refrain from making an agreement or pact with anyone to prevent injustices, neither to commit injustice nor to suffer it (Resp. 359b).29 The view that it is necessary to make such a pact explains why Glaucon (or rather, ‘what people say about justice, i.e. that to do injustice is by nature good and to suffer injustice bad'; Resp. 358e3-4) thinks that justice is not inherently good, but something necessary to avoid mutual aggression. If this is so, it is advantageous [λυσιτελεtν] to come to an agreement with one another neither to do injustice nor to suffer it (μητ' αδικεtν μητ' αδικεtσθαι; 359a1-2), and as a result people started to make laws and pacts [συνθηκαι], and what such laws commend they call lawful and just.It would be challenging (and highly questionable) to argue that Plato subscribes to a contractualist theory of justice, but it is clear from the Republic passages commented on above that he developed a line of reasoning that Epicurus and the Epicureans subsequently revisited and expanded in their own terms. Regarding this, Glaucon maintains as part of the strongest thesis that people are tolerant of the fact that those who practise justice do so involuntarily, not out of true goodness but out of necessity. Later in the text it is revealed that a person's opinion - any person, whether just or unjust - would always prefer to carry out unjust acts if he had some guarantee that injustice could go unpunished.
When Gyges turned the setting of the ring toward himself, the story goes, he became invisible to those sitting near him, and they proceed to talk as if Gyges had gone (Resp. 359e-360a). Thus, Gyges noted the extraordinary power he wielded, as turning the setting inward rendered him invisible and turning it outward made him visible again. The power of the ring tested Gyges' moral character and in fact revealed his awful moral disposition, as he used the powers of the ring to seduce the king's wife, attack the king with her help, commit regicide and assume possession of the kingdom.
Now if there were two rings of Gyges, Plato contends, and one was given to the unjust and the other one to the just, both would behave unjustly. The character Glaucon declares that this constitutes a ‘significant proof' (μεγα τεκμηριον; 360c5) that no one is willingly just [ ουδεtς εκων δtκαιος ] unless compelled to be so. This would also show, according to the theory of justice endorsed by ‘what people say', that what is truly valuable is not being just but simply appearing to be so. It is surprising that Glaucon (or the theory he claims to represent) finds this proof so significant; we believe there is reason to think that his conviction of widespread agreement that those who live a just life do so involuntarily is because he starts from the implicit assumption that there are certain things he takes to be goods (wealth and reputation, among others), which are not guaranteed during a just life but appear to be so in the case of an unjust life. Indeed, in many cases those who are just have no money, reputation, or other things conventionally recognized as goods. If we trust Glaucon and hence in good faith believe he would not dare to subscribe without further argument to the thesis that the life of the unjust is much better than that of the just, it is easy to discern the origin of his state of perplexity (απορω; Resp.
358c7). This perplexity may arise from the fact that the unjust person seems to do well in life; to take the example of Thrasymachus, if in an association between a just and an unjust person the latter defrauds the former and gets away with it (Resp. 343d-e), it is at least paradoxical to admit that it is much better to be just than unjust. Plato's implicit answer to this objection is that this is only valid in an explanation presupposing that wealth or reputation are real goods. The character Adeimantus suggests that Socrates leave aside reputation [τας δε δoξας ⅛φαtρει] ‘as Glaucon recommended' (Resp. 367b6; see also 361b-c). In other words, both Adeimantus and Glaucon believe that when Socrates argues that justice should be included within the kind of goods that are valued for their own sake and for their consequences, one of those consequences may be reputation, something they consider to be a good but which Socrates might not endorse. Our hunch is that neither Adeimantus nor Glaucon understand what Socrates believes the consequences of justice to be, and that this is so because they start from a conventional conception of the good. The consequences of a just life are that the just are wiser, morally superior (σοφωτεροι καi αμεtνους ; 352b8) and more effective in their actions [ δυνατωτεροι πραττειν], consequences that the conventional theory of good taken for granted by Glaucon and Adeimantus does not envisage as practical, and thereby does not see as advantages.Of course, these details are already part of the Platonic argument endeavouring to show that the life of the just (even lacking the conventionally recognized goods) is - always and in all cases - better than that of the unjust. Additionally, when considering the Platonic passages discussed above it is important to note that, like Plato, Epicurus also leaves aside conventional goods such as wealth or reputation.
Were this not the case, it would prove difficult to understand why, if one wishes to make someone wealthy, one should not give him more money but rather reduce his or her desires (Stobaeus, Anthology 3.17.23; Us. 153). Once more, this passage clearly illustrates the relevance of the idea that the highest good is a soul free of passions or appetites (Seneca, Ep. 9, 1; Us. 74).30 This also makes it clear why every possession is wealth if (and only if) it contributes to satisfying nature, and why even the greatest wealth (i.e. conventional wealth) is poverty when it is in line with unlimited desires (Porphyry, To Marcella 27; Us. 202).31 Surely this kind of redefinition of wealth can be seen as a mere desideratum, but it is undoubtedly a condition of the Epicurean sage, who not only cannot believe that money is a real good (Philodemus, On Property Management col. xv 31-xvi 18) but is also capable of applying this idea to everyday life. Indeed, this approach is helpful for better understanding why, strictly speaking, there is no difference between an extravagant meal and a bit of bread and water (Epicurus, LM 130-131; DL 10.11). After all, the fundamental purpose of food is to eliminate the pain of hunger; but, of course, the Epicurean sage is not a hermit who preaches a life of deprivation, and thus if hunger can be satisfied by an extravagant meal the sage will not refuse it.Coming back to the counterpoint we were making about the contractual model of Glaucon in Plato's Republic and the Epicurean one, it should be stressed that the formulae by which Glaucon (Plato, Resp. 359a1-2) and Epicurus (PD 31) specify the purpose of the pact are undoubtedly similar, although, as Kahn pointed out, this may be due to their coming from a common source.32 Both also base the pact on utility or convenience. However, Glaucon's contractualist model, despite its parsimony, allows for differences from the Epicurean model. The Epicureans divide, conceptually and temporally, the genealogy of justice from that of the laws, entailing, as we showed in the first two chapters, differentiated descriptions of the people involved in the respective pacts and, incidentally, of the hypothetical ‘presocial’ human beings.
As should now be evident, the description offered by Hermarchus and Lucretius of the nature of the human beings composing the first human groupings subject to pacts of justice is dissimilar to that posited by Glaucon. The background of the story of Gyges’ ring is Glaucon’s specific contractual model, in which advantage is the essential motivation of human nature (Plato, Resp. 359c3-5). By contrast, in Epicureanism the advantage is framed by the emergence of vain desires and fears that necessitate the establishment of laws and sanctions. Thus, it is a phenomenon subsequent to the establishment of the first covenants of justice, which implies that it is not attributable to presocial human beings either, as can be seen in Lucretius. The background of Gyges’ ring story is Glaucon’s specific contractualist model, grounded on a particular understanding of human nature, which, presumably, stems from what ‘people say’. In this model Gyges represents, as it were, the figure of a human being ante pactum living among human beings subject to a pact. Hence perhaps the fascination which Plato attributes to the common mind (Resp. 360b6) with the figure of one who, like Gyges, could do everything as if he were ‘equal to a god [tσoθεον] among men’ (Resp. 360c3). Certainly, as is well-known, Plato’s theology and agenda is quite different: the human being, he argues, should as far as possible assimilate himself to god or rather become like god insofar as is possible (i.e. cultivate his immortal soul).33 At the end of Letter to Menoeceus Epicurus seems once again to use Plato’s expressions to condense his own philosophy as well as his view of the gods. Epicurus states that whoever practices his philosophy - not Gyges or the Platonic philosopher, one might add - will live as a god among men (LM 135: ζηση δε ως θεoς εν ανθρωποις).3