The stoic and Epicurean sage, and the Epicurean's commitment to the city

The picture of the sage (both Epicurean and Stoic) had gained proverbial status in late antiquity. In Diogenes Laertius' summary, several explicit references point to the differences between Epicurean and Stoic sages.

By contrast, Epicurus rejects such a possibility; in fact, though all the formal institutions of society are no more than the result of a pact, such a pact must guarantee coexistence and avoid mutual aggression in order to facilitate a real human mode of existence. Institutions work as ‘tools', as it were, for civil security (as we argue in chapter 2), which is an essential condition for the existence of a political organization. But if this is so, and if marriage can be taken to be a sort of social institution, one might wonder why the Epicurean wise person will not marry and beget children (although ‘he may marry in accordance with special circumstances in his life'; DL 10.119).5 After all, the Epicurean sage, in spite of having certain special features (i.e.

The same contrast can be noted between Epicurus and the Stoics when it is said that the former had a friendly attitude towards his homeland (DL 10.10-11). In contrast, the Stoics (especially the Older Stoics) have no country or, more precisely, they are ‘cosmopolitan' citizens of the world who reject all conventions that have value only in a given region.⁶ It is arguable, we submit, that Marcus Aurelius, the emperor who in a certain way made Stoicism the official philosophy of an empire, transformed the idea of Stoic cosmopolitanism advanced by Zeno in his Republic into a political reality. If Stoic cosmopolitanism can be read this way, it is no longer a pointless ideal but the political appropriation of that ideal to the real state of affairs.

Nevertheless, there is another essential disagreement (focused on the issue of desire, so important for explaining how a person performs his actions) between the Epicurean and the Stoic sage: unlike the Stoic sage (who is emotionless; DL 7.117), Epicurus, according to Plutarch, held that the wise person ‘is a lover of sights and enjoys hearing and seeing Dionysiac performances as much as anyone' (Pleasant Life 1095C; Us. 20). Interestingly, Diogenes Laertius states that the Epicurean can be more delighted than others at festivals (DL 10.120; Us. 593); he can feel grief and gratitude toward his friends, present and absent alike, and can be more susceptible to emotion than other people (DL 10.117-120). However, there are some coincidences between the two models of sage: both the Epicurean and the Stoic wise person can earn money due to the exercise of their wisdom (DL 10.121).

Epicurus explicitly links wisdom to friendship and suggests wisdom is a property of every human being that is neither strange, difficult nor impossible to acquire. In other words, wisdom and its benefits are accessible by all human beings willing to understand and practice Epicureanism and to appreciate the link between friendship (correctly understood according to Epicurean patterns) and wisdom. Considering the issue from such a standpoint, one might even suggest that Epicurus was challenging the Stoic idea that becoming a sage is a rare and peculiar event. Moreover, as Plutarch ironizes, Chrysippus does not show himself or any of his acquaintances and teachers to be excellent or virtuous people. If this is so, what can we expect from other people? (Stoic. Rep. 1048E; SVF 3.662, 668).¹⁰ This doctrine imposed on the ancient Stoics the bad reputation of trying to establish an entirely impracticable ethics: the Stoic sage (with his characteristics of moral infallibility - since he is unable to make false assumptions -, rational perfection - his actions are always virtuous -, absolute coherence and the disposition of doing everything well, i.e. everything that he does) is an extremely rare person. It would not be strange if Epicurus were attempting to contrast this with the image of his model of a sage, i.e. a person who, for the sake of becoming wise, must fulfil specific requirements. It is noteworthy that such Epicurean requirements are susceptible to being fulfilled by practically any human being.

In the characterization of the Epicurean sage that is drawn from his contrast with the Stoic sage, respect for laws and institutions, as well as a friendly attitude towards his homeland, play an important role. In order to deepen this characterization, it is thus of particular interest to explore an issue that Epicurus raised in his Puzzles (DL 10.27). After referring to Metrodorus' mockery of the wise persons who vainly claim to be legislators, Plutarch stresses that the Epicureans are in fact at war not with lawgivers but with laws, as can be seen, in his opinion, from Epicurus' own writings.

T1 For in the Puzzles Epicurus asks himself whether the wise man will do some things which the laws forbid, if he knows that he will escape detection. And he answers: ‘the plain statement [of the answer] (τo απλουν επικατηγoρημα)¹¹ is not easy (ευοδον)'.

Col. 1127D; transl. Inwood and Gerson

There has been significant discussion about these lines which are probably taken out of context or whose context is hard to know in detail. Boulogne, for example, underlines that Plutarch was well aware of Epicurus' P uzzles, a work he refers to many times, and considers that Plutarch's omissions of the context as well as the response or other possible relevant elements in Epicurus' text were not due to a deliberate purpose, but derived from the full conviction that Plutarch had regarding the doctrinal continuity between what he presents as Epicurus' response and the fundamental theses of his philosophy about the laws.¹² This is actually extremely generous to Plutarch, particularly if one considers how he interpreted Epicurus' supposed answer. After quoting the declaration ‘the plain statement [of the answer] is not easy' Plutarch somewhat maliciously comments (putting words into Epicurus' mouth): ‘that is, I will do it, but I do not wish to admit it' (ου βουλομαι δ' δμολογεtν; Col. 1127 D; transl. Inwood and Gerson).¹³ Plutarch intends us to see that Epicurus' refusal to respond fully reflects hypocrisy and shame in recognizing that he would do them, shame that implies accepting that he performs actions that he knows are bad; that is to say, they are bad regardless of whether they remain hidden or not.

The passage from the Puzzles collected by Plutarch evokes the story of the Ring of Gyges, debated by Plato in Resp. 359c6-360c5. Cicero (Off. 3.38-39) summarizes this story and comments on the interpretation of it by ‘certain philosophers’. Such philosophers are easily identifiable with the Epicureans, so the passage of Cicero, although Gyges' case is not identical to that of T1, provides relevant elements to the analysis of this section of the Puzzles¹ Thus it is worth examining the main interpretative guidelines followed by scholars when analysing T1, as this passage has received more attention than the Ciceronian text of Off. 3.38-39. However, as we will see, these are entirely relevant considerations with regard to Cicero’s interpretation of the Epicureans’ position vis-a-vis the story of Gyges’ ring. In dealing with T1, interpreters have focused on the following aspects: (i) the distinction between just and unjust laws; (ii) the exceptionality of the situation concerning the satisfaction of necessary natural desires; and finally, (iii) the counterfactual character of the conditional clause ‘if he knows that he will not be discovered’. We will examine these three interpretive guidelines in turn. Einarson and De Lacy advocated a reading of T1, advanced in some way by Philippson too, that seemed to dissolve its difficulty.¹⁵ They argued that, since Epicurus stressed that the legal was not identified with the just, since to the extent that the legal ceased to be useful it also ceased to be just, the wise would have no problem in acting illegally in relation to laws that have ceased to be just.¹⁶ The disadvantage of this automatic response, as Goldschmidt observed, is that it did not explain why Epicurus himself seemed to emphasize the difficulty of the matter at the time and included it among the Puzzles.¹⁷ Further, one could object that this solution was nothing more than a refinement of the formulation of the problem, which could consequently be reformulated in these terms: ‘whether the wise person, knowing that he will not be discovered, will do something of what is forbidden by just laws’. In dealing with the difficulty posed by this passage neither Cicero nor Plutarch consider statements such as those of Einarson and De Lacy. Nor do they suggest that Epicurus or any of his disciples did so. Moreover, one could present another two objections to Einarson and De Lacy’s suggestion: (i) there is no case or situation in which it can be argued that an Epicurean sage - or indeed a sage belonging to any other school - is capable of acting illegally. If he is able to do so, and if in fact he does so, that person is not wise. (ii) Furthermore, laws that have ceased to be just due to the circumstances prevailing in any given moment do not entitle the wise man or any other citizen of the polis to act illegally.

For his part, Seel believes that it is worth wondering whether Epicurus could have taken into account the case where the sage is faced with situations in which the satisfaction of the necessary natural desires or the preservation of life implies committing injustice.¹⁸ As is well-known, the allegation of limit situations and casuistry played an important role in Hellenistic disputes in refuting ethical formulations.¹⁹ A famous example is the case of the two castaways who have only one float, which the adversaries of the Stoics considered as sufficient dismissal of Stoicism's foundation of justice in the theory of familiarization [οlκε(ωσις].²0 In Seel's opinion, such exceptionality is what explains the presence of the word ‘simple' (or ‘plane': απλουν) in the expression ‘the plain statement' [τo απλουν επικατηγoρημα], which he translates as ‘senza ulteriore precisazioni', in Epicurus' circumspect response, or more precisely, in what Plutarch transmits, as: ‘it is not feasible here [ουκ ευοδον] to make a categorical statement without further precisions' ( Col. 1127 D). Appealing as it is, however, this interpretation would weaken the Epicurean colour of T1 because, as Strauss stressed, the recognition (of Platonic filiation) that even natural law is subject to exception in extreme cases was a commonplace since Aristotle's meagre and marginal considerations on the subject (EN 1134b18-1135a5).²¹ Certainly it is also true that Epicurus was not at all blind to the facts, exceptions and singularities, all details that sober prudential reasoning must take into consideration.²²

Seel conjectures that, given his great recognition of friendship,²³ Epicurus might be thinking of the case of the wise person who, in order to save the life of a friend, has to act unjustly.²⁴ Vander Waerdt considers it more convincing that the conflict concerned the wise man's own preservation.²⁵ Additionally, he observes that since the Epicurean sage does not fear death, it is not easy for him to imagine the particular circumstances in which he would rather die than preserve his life by committing injustice. Perhaps, the possibility of this sort of exceptional case also motivated the reservation of Epicurus' answer to the question formulated by Plutarch. The fact that death poses no fear for the Epicurean sage cannot be neglected and is in fact an important point in working out the particular circumstances in which he would rather die than commit injustice to sustain his life. If you are an Epicurean sage, you are aware that death causes considerable anxiety to all those who are not willing to follow the Epicurean prescriptions for having a life of quality. Further, an Epicurean sage knows that the reasons provided by those who fear death (the concern with ingratiating themselves with the gods as they might punish them for their wrongdoings, the worry about total personal annihilation, etc.) are absurd. This is so because there is no evidence that gods are willing to punish us, and because one's soul dissipates when one dies and hence there is no sensation (Epicurus, LH 63). But if there is no sensation, there can be no pain either and as Epicurus argues in LM 126, the wise person neither rejects life nor fears death, for he is not contrary to living and he does not believe that not living is bad. However, if all this is so, the view that the wise person can be especially worried about his or her own preservation cannot be true: if ‘preservation' means ‘being alive', this cannot be the case since the Epicurean wise person (as Epicurus himself insists) does not see living as lamentable. Naturally, as we have shown above, the Epicurean sage, unlike irrational animals, can take precautions in anticipation of suffering ailments and provide beneficial or useful things.

Finally, Goldschmidt places the bulk of the passage on the impossibility of the conditional clause ‘if he knows that he will not be discovered'. Neither the wise, paradigm of knowledge, nor the unwise can achieve certainty in this respect. In fact, Epicurus places emphasis upon the fact that there is no possibility of future certainty (PD 34), and thus he cannot give a simple answer because the puzzlement incorporates presuppositions that are impossible. Still, this shows that the Epicurean sage is not as strange a person as the Stoic sage:²⁶ being an Epicurean sage does not confer extraordinary powers that other human beings lack. There is no doubt that an Epicurean wise person is one who is endowed with ‘special' skills. But no matter how wise an Epicurean may be, he cannot predict the future²⁷ and therefore cannot be certain about it.

2