The assessment of actions performed by a person without witnesses was a topic repeatedly addressed by Greek philosophers when dealing with justice and laws.
Suffice it to recall the fragments of Democritus (DK 244, DK B 264, DK 68 B 264), the preserved passages of Antiphon's On the Truth,1 and the well-known story of the Ring of Gyges in Plato's Republic (359c6-360c5; 612b).
The experience of a distance between crime and punishment was likewise a fundamental element of theodicy from the Homeric poems on, to which corresponds the gradual personification of time in poetry and tragedy as a scrutinizing witness who sooner or later reveals the truth.2 In the satirical drama Sisyphus, Critias (or Euripides) suggested that belief in the gods was invented precisely for deterring crime in the absence of witnesses (see Critias, DK B25). Lactantius offers a curious psychological account of the genesis of Epicurus' thought that focuses on the experience of the distance between crime and punishment. In his opinion, Epicurus was led to the denial of providence, and to all the consequent errors in his philosophy, by ‘the injustice of the facts' when he observed that crimes went unpunished and bad people won, while the good and innocent were made miserable (Div. Inst. 3.17, 8-16). Epicurean philosophy combines views that yield an interesting approach to this old topic of actions performed without witnesses. On the one hand, the Epicurean conception of the gods rules out the idea of providence, while also denying that the gods are capable of, or interested in, punishing us. An Epicurean god is a blessed and indestructible entity that has no troubles itself and does not trouble anyone else (PD 1). The gods are a model for the Epicureans whose piety aspires to an assimilation to god [δμο(ωσις θεω], which is reflected in living pleasantly, prudently, nobly and justly. On the other hand, Epicureanism upholds a contractualist genealogy of justice and laws that stresses, as one of the main factors of the effectiveness of laws, having internalized punishment. Suspicion, uncertainty and the fear of being discovered and condemned represent, in Epicurus' view, punishments triggered by the perpetration of an unwitnessed crime. The Epicurean sage is free from the vain desires responsible for most crimes. Thus, he is free from the disturbance represented by uncertainty and fear of discovery, just as he is free from the fear of death and the gods. Now, if the Epicurean wise person knows that he will not be discovered, will he carry out actions contrary to the laws? This was a question that Epicurus indeed asked himself in a passage from the Puzzles [ Διαπορfαι] transmitted by Plutarch (Col. 1127D). Cicero also refers (in Off. 3.38-39) to the Epicurean position vis-a-vis the story of the Ring of Gyges, which has clear similarities with the passage from the Puzzles just mentioned. Naturally, Cicero and Plutarch do not miss the opportunity to discredit Epicureanism. In the present chapter we will attempt to clarify, through the analysis of these polemical considerations by Cicero and Plutarch, as well as the reconstruction of the Epicureans' answer to the question above, the Epicurean characterization of one of the fundamental aspects of the proverbial pictures of the sage in late antiquity: the relationship between the sage, justice and the laws.The chapter proceeds thus: in section 1, we contrast the Epicurean and the Stoic sages and suggest that, contrary to the testimony of several indirect sources, the Epicurean sage was interested in maintaining a link with his polis. We begin our examination by considering the difficulties raised by the aforementioned passage from the P uzzles, where Epicurus wonders whether the wise Epicurean, knowing that he will not be discovered, will carry out actions contrary to the laws. In section 2 we argue that this passage from the Puzzles evokes the story of the Ring of Gyges in Plato's Republic; we present the contractualist model in which this story is embedded, and compare it with the Epicurean contractualist model to show that the advantage [πλεονεξfα] of Gyges is not attributable - according to the Epicureans - to the ‘presocial' human beings nor to the first human groupings subject to pacts of justice but, if anything, to later human beings who are forced to establish laws and sanctions.
The figure of Gyges represents neither a challenge nor a fascination for the Epicureans. In section 3, we stress the biased reading of Cicero in Off. 3.38-39 of the Epicurean view regarding the story of Gyges and Plutarch's malicious interpretation of Epicurus' reply to the relevant passage from the Puzzles. We note that both omit the role of the study of nature [or Epicurean ‘physiology': φυσιολογfα] and prudence [φρoνησις] in the motivations and decisions of the Epicurean sage in their analyses of the topics mentioned. Both suggest that the reason Epicureans refrain from crime is the fear of being discovered and punished. In section 4, we focus on the theme of punishment and draw on Plato's discussion of the topic in theGorgias. We argue that even if Epicurus does not state (as Plato does) that punishment makes the person better, he maintains that the suspicion that one will not escape the notice of those assigned to punish bad actions works as a sort of chastisement for the offenders (thereby evoking the Platonic therapeutic feature of punishment). The Epicurean sage, we argue, does not act out of fear of punishment, but, on the contrary, disregards behaviours authorized by the law and goes beyond what is required by law in social relations. In section 5, we return to the issue of friendship and justice and show how closely friendship is related to our rational condition. We also note the importance of self-sufficiency for the Epicurean sage and state that, far from being an egoistic property of the sage, self-sufficiency involves a social dimension and thereby an engagement with law. Finally, we show how friendship and justice occupy a central place in two fundamental doctrinal resources of Epicureanism: the biographical tradition of the ‘imitation of Epicurus' [imitatio Epicurei] and the practice of ‘becoming like god'. Section 6 provides an abstract of the chapter and some concluding remarks.
1