Cicero: The biased reading of a Roman rhetorician and politician
That Cicero did not generally agree with Epicurus is stated by Cicero himself and is thus not a point to be proved. This could be due to the fact that, unlike Epicurus, Cicero ‘passionately admires Plato';4 but there is ample textual evidence in Cicero's writings demonstrating he had deep reasons to disagree with Epicurus in almost every aspect of his philosophy.5 At the beginning of Fin.
(1.13) Cicero says that his presentation of the Epicurean stances is no less accurate than that given by the school's own members6 (maybe this preliminary warning is addressed against those who were objecting to Cicero's shortcomings regarding Epicurus). After this, he immediately introduces the Epicurean Torquatus, who is said to be learned in every philosophical doctrine. But the reason why Cicero is usually annoyed with the Epicureans is that they allege that their adversaries do not understand what they are arguing when they make an argument; for example, that pleasure is the final end. Thus, Cicero states that what he means by voluptas is the same as what Epicurus means by ηδονη and, even though Latin writers frequently must search for a Latin equivalent to a Greek term, no search is necessary in this case (Cicero, Fin. 1.15, and especially 2.12-13). In fact, there are several passages in the Ciceronian corpus in which Cicero defends the use of Latin as an appropriate language for discussing philosophical and literary topics (cf. Acad. 1.9-10; 25-27); although he is aware that Latin (or, in general, Latin literary culture) has a certain dependence on Greek (Fin. 1.1-4), he is interested in showing that, lest Latin writers be reduced to working as mere translators of Greek works, there is no reason for preferring the Greek language ‘to that which is written with brilliance and is not a translation from Greek' (Fin. 1.6).In Cicero's opinion, some turn away from the Latin texts because ‘they have tended to come across certain rough and unpolished works which have been translated from bad Greek into worse Latin' (Fin. 1.8; of course, the same could apply to texts originally written in Greek; the issue is not whether the texts are written in Greek or Latin, but whether they are well written). However, Cicero argues that this does not mean that one could not profitably read good works originally written in Latin, so long as such works are ‘written with well-chosen words, with dignity and style' (Fin. 1.8: verbis electis graviter ornateque dictas). Cicero is determined to try to prove that Latin is not only not poor [inops], as is usually thought, but also richer [locupletiorem] than Greek (Fin. 1.10).
Further, it is arguable that, even though Cicero apparently took pleasure to be an easy topic that anyone can relate to (Fin. 2.15), it is obvious that Epicurus did not consider it so straightforward. Cicero maintains in his own defence that the problem is not his misunderstanding of what Epicurus means when he says that he offers not to remove wickedness, but to rest content with a moderate degree of vice; he despises elegance in his speech [ contemnit enim disserendi elegantiam], Cicero insists, and speaks in a confused manner ( confuse loquitur; Fin. 2.27).7
Most of the time in contemporary scholarship, Cicero's testimony regarding Epicurus and Epicureanism has been taken to be unfair and hence not very reliable.8 In what follows we shall examine some passages where Cicero's readings of Epicurus and Epicureanism turn out to be debatable, inasmuch as his remarks overlook relevant details of Epicurean doctrine or are formulated against the backdrop of his own agenda. Of course, there is a sense in which no one can tackle a problem discussed by another person without reflecting on one's own assumptions. But if one is engaged in striving as much as possible to invest energy and effort into improving his countrymen's learning, like Cicero explicitly declares (Fin.
1.10), one is obliged to examine one's own biases and assumptions to provide a more believable explanation of the doctrine under discussion. This is what, we submit, Cicero often does not do; since the Ciceronian influence on the transmission of Epicurean philosophy has been so powerful, it is worth making the effort to highlight Cicero's shortcomings (and sometimes errors) in his understanding of Epicureanism.Cicero starts by observing that Epicurus' system is the easiest one to understand, and that most people are familiar with it (Fin. 1.13). Cicero sets out to show that the identification of good with pleasure is a view taken for granted by anyone, which means that his exposition of it cannot be less accurate than that given by the Epicureans themselves. In a very well-known passage of Fin. 2.88, Cicero presents Epicurus' tenet that pleasure should be tantamount to the supreme good. However, as Cicero notes, Epicurus claims that time adds nothing to the supreme good insofar as there is no greater pleasure in an infinite period of time than in a brief, limited one. But this, Cicero contends, is said in an extremely inconsistent way, since what Epicurus holds is that pleasure is the supreme good while at the same time claiming that pleasure does not increase with duration; it is the same pleasure in an infinite time as in a brief and limited one, which seems absurd. If this were the case, the same would apply to pain, which does not appear reasonable.
Cicero's attack against Epicurean theology is finely elaborated; he imagines a dialogue between Velleius and the Academic Cotta. Interestingly, Velleius observes that Epicurus ‘has freed us from superstitious terrors and has brought us back to freedom, so that we don't feel any fear towards some beings that... do not cause any discomfort to themselves and try not to cause any to others'. This, of course, does not depict anything strange in the dialogue between Velleius and Cotta, since the former is a supporter of the Epicureans.
Cotta, on the contrary, presents a demolishing set of arguments against Epicurus and finally suggests that the Epicurean view is an enemy of religion ( ND 1.57-115). The way in which Cicero presents Cotta is particularly interesting: he intervenes in the debate with his usual kindness (Cotta comiter, ut solebat; ND 1.57); Cicero adds that the reasons why a tenet should be true do not present themselves to Cotta's mind so readily as the reasons why it should be false. This is a way of saying that Cotta is a serious and unbiased arguer (his way of arguing is ‘kind'), even though he stresses that it is easier for him to conceive an argument to show that a thesis is false, which seems to anticipate the fact that his argument will try to show that Epicurean theology is false. The dramatic background in which Cicero presents the debate between Cotta and Velleius is also relevant: Cotta states that Velleius has discussed ‘an obscure and difficult matter clearly' [de re obscura atque difficili... dilucide], and that he has done so not only with fullness of expression, but also with more elegance of diction than is usual in the Epicurean school (ND 1.58-59).This last remark corresponds relatively closely to Cicero's view that Epicurean language sometimes is twisted (through his spokesman Cotta, Cicero remarks elsewhere that the Epicurean Zeno did not speak as most Epicureans do, but like Velleius did: clearly, weightily, and elegantly: distincte, graviter, ornate). At the beginning of his argument, Cotta describes the Epicurean statements as ‘vain and foolish' (tam leves, ne dicam in tam ineptas sententias; 1.59). Cicero has Epicurus say (through Cotta) that it is hard to deny that the gods exist if the question is debated in a public assembly, since through their adherence to common opinions almost everyone and, in particular, Epicurus himself (even though he is sometimes of the opinion that they do not exist) seems to endorse the view that the gods exist; by contrast, it is perfectly easy to make the denial in a conversation.
Cotta reasonably complains that the simple evidence that people of all races and nations are of the view that the gods exist is not enough to warrant us acknowledging the existence of the gods. In the first instance this is so because it is difficult to know that different peoples do hold the belief that there are gods, and Cotta adds that he suspects that there are many races so barbarously savage as to be without any suspicion about the existence of the gods ( nulla suspicio deorum sit; 1.62).Up to this point, one might argue, Cicero behaves philosophically by presenting a respectable objection to a set of central points defended by Epicurus.9 To be sure, he would have a reasonable reply to this kind of objection: ‘let's take a look at the objection concerning the existence of the gods'. The way in which Cicero presents Epicurus' view on the gods leaves this argument highly vulnerable, and the Epicurean point certainly looks trivial and foolish. But if one focuses on the texts of Epicurus that have come down to us, it seems that his argument was more robust and sophisticated. First of all, when Philodemus says in the fourfold remedy, surely inspired by what Epicurus states in the LM 123, that ‘god is not to be feared' (αφοβον î θεoς; Philodemus, Against the Sophists 4.7-14), this cannot mean that there is no god. What Epicurus and the Epicureans believe is that god is an indestructible and blessed living being [ζωον αφθαρτον καi μακαριον], and that this is so due to the common notion of god [κοινη του θεου νoησις], or rather due to the notion of god commonly held by everyone and even by those who do not believe in god: if an x in the world is god, such an x must be an indestructible and blessed living being. If it is indestructible, it must be entirely happy.
This is a relatively simple (and non-technical) way of saying that god is a ‘preconception' (this is what Cicero reiterates when he says that through the communia almost everyone thinks that the gods exist). Moreover, Epicurus is willing to claim straightforwardly that the gods do exist, although they do not exist as the many understands them to exist (LM 123; 134). This explains why Philodemus, certainly evoking this Epicurus passage, states that god is without fear. If god were an entity worthy of being feared, what one would be doing is transferring to god certain human attributes that, by its very nature, god cannot have. What is impious, Epicurus contends, is not to deny the gods of the many, but to ascribe to the gods what the many thinks about them, beliefs certainly based on false assumptions [υποληψεις ψευδεις] and not on preconceptions (προληψεις; Epicurus, LM 124).As is obvious, this conceptualization of divinity depends heavily upon Epicurean epistemology, and Epicurus' argument is certainly more sophisticated than the one presented by Cicero in ND 1.57-62. However, Cicero declares his awareness that some people believe that Epicurus, while in theory retaining the gods (to avoid the hostility of the Athenians), in practice did away with them (1.85). To prove his point, Cicero refers to Epicurus' Principal Doctrines and cites the first lines of PD 1.10 But what is striking is the way in which Cicero understands this passage: Epicurus' goal was to produce deliberately [ consulto] an impression which is explained due to his awkwardness of style [plane loquendi]. It is likely that Cicero is referring either to Epicurus' unrhetorical language or to his lack of attention to logic or dialectics. But PD 1 can be regarded as an additional argument for the position that god cannot be what most people think him to be.
In what follows, we would like to develop another point focusing on the way Cicero discussed some central Epicurean stances that were not irrelevant to the way in which he regarded the role of politics in the Epicurean project. As argued by Catherine Steel, Cicero's central motivation in his writings on this topic was often a concern for the nature of his public profile.11 This, we hold, is an attractive approach for considering Cicero's philosophical interests and developments, as well as the manner in which he responds to the arguments of other philosophers. In this vein, we suggest that the ‘political profile' of Epicurus and the Epicureans was crucial as well. Epicurus (and other philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and even the Stoics) had political interests, and though Epicurus himself was a philosopher and not a ‘professional politician' especially interested in his political profile as Cicero was, one of his main interests was providing a normative model of what a just society should be. Certainly, Epicurus' discussions of what law or justice are, were not merely descriptive of an actual situation, but also normative (as is the case in any other political and social model). To some extent, this is a truism, but it is helpful to turn to Cicero's De Finibus to better explain our point. In Fin. 4, 4-6 he discusses the Stoic division of philosophy into three parts; one of these is focused on shaping our character, he upholds (it is this section that deals with the highest good or what is truly good). Cicero announces that he will shortly be considering this part of philosophy as treated by the Stoics, but that for now he is concerned with mentioning the topic which, according to him, is correctly named ‘related to citizenry' (civilem recte appellaturi), what the Greeks call πολιτικoν. As usual, Cicero is translating from the Greek into Latin, and adds that both the Peripatetics and the Academics dealt with this topic carefully and fully (graviter et copiose; Fin. 4.5).
This comment is important to our purposes because, as is obvious, Cicero straightforwardly links the treatment of the ethical part of philosophy with politics or, more appropriately, with what affects (our fellow) citizens [civile]. Interestingly, when Cicero refers to the ‘account of nature' (de explicatione naturae; Fin. 4.11) developed by the Peripatetics, the Stoics and Epicurus, he stresses the fact that the latter recommended pursuing such a study ‘to drive out fear of the gods and religious superstition'. It is true that in these pages Cicero concentrates especially on the Stoics, but he also mentions Epicurus and his view that his ‘physiology' allows people to drive out fear of the gods and any form of superstition. For the sake of our argument, the most relevant point here is that Cicero is aware of the ‘interconnection', as it were, among the different parts of philosophy in view of our practical life, which naturally encompasses the political life.12
As just mentioned, Cicero acknowledges that in Epicureanism this interconnection concerns liberation from fear of the gods and religious superstition. In the case of the Peripatetics, the Stoics, and Cicero himself, from the ‘account of nature', he states, ‘we gain a sense of justice when we understand the will, the design and the purpose of the supreme guide and lord to whose nature philosophers tell us that true reason and the highest law are perfectly matched' (Fin. 4.11). He reiterates in On the Laws that the root of justice and law is nature, and, as Annas emphasizes, he draws primarily on the Stoic view of natural law in order to endorse the doctrine of the natural basis of justice.13 Cicero passionately admired Plato (in fact, he believes him to be the ‘god of philosophers' and ‘prince of philosophers'; ND 2.32; Fin. 5.7).14 He knew his work very well and writes O n the Laws with Plato's work of the same name in mind. In Laws 10 Plato refers to the harmful fusion of the physicalist cosmogony and the contractual theory (L aws 888b8), and condemns it as impious and subversive, perhaps with Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras, in mind. Epicurus may have been inspired by Archelaus, whom, according to Diogenes Laertius, he valued positively (DL 10.12). In any case, Epicureanism's response to the question ‘what are political communities, justice and the laws?' concurs with the fusion of physicalist cosmogony and contractualism that Plato emphatically condemned. The application of the Epicurean study of nature to the analysis of political communities is translated into a rationalistic genealogical approach of justice and laws. In this way the interconnection between the study of nature and political philosophy forms, as we have shown, a crucial part of Epicurean philosophy, and constitutes the framework of the Principal Doctrines focused on security, justice and the laws. The same thing applies to the genealogy of
Hermarchus' extract, the treatise by Polystratus, and Lucretius' On the Nature of Things Book 5. In these Epicurean texts the just is presented as a modality of usefulness, specifically as the useful for the sake of the pact and its basic rule (‘neither harming one another nor being harmed'; Epicurus, PD 33) for human groupings. Interestingly, in On the Laws Cicero criticizes the link between justice and utility defended by the Epicureans. He implies that the Epicureans equate utility with merely selfish gain. This is undoubtedly a mischievous interpretation, for in reality the Epicureans reiterate the traditional link between justice and common utility. The ‘common advantage' [τo κοινη συμφερον] is already for Aristotle the proximate end of law and serves as a criterion for assessing the correctness of constitutions and laws. The common advantage is a normative reason, identifiable with political justice.15 Justice and common interest ( utilitas), as Wood highlights, are also the two crucial characteristics of Cicero's definition of the state.16 Wood suggests that, for Cicero, the reason for the existence of the state is the common interest of those concerned (De Re. 1, 39: utilitatis communione sociatus), interest defined here in terms of security, protection and well-being.17
Like Aristotle and Cicero, Epicurus, through his famous formula ‘neither harming one another nor being harmed', conceptualizes the just with reference to a dimension common to the idea of utility. In fact, Hermarchus uses the expression ‘common utility' (τα κοινην εχοντα την ωφελειαν; Porphyry, Abst. 1.12, 19). In Epicureanism the just has a compelling normative or regulative character embodied in the preconception of the just (PD 37-38). Surprisingly, neither the sophisticated reflections of Epicureanism on the ontological status of the just nor the preconception of the just finds any articulation in Cicero's work. Perhaps it could be argued that these are very distant themes from the foundation of the Epicurean way of life and from the imperturbability [αταραξiα] it advocates. In fact, like the genealogical approach in which they are embedded, they form significant elements of the Epicurean way of life, such as the category of security and the genealogy of vain desires. Cicero does not comment on Epicureanism's rich reflection on security and vain desires. But such pertinent details, we hold, cannot have escaped Cicero, an attentive and critical reader of his philosophical and cultural past.
Cicero asserts that the ‘commonwealth' [res publica] is that which belongs to the people [ respublica respopuli]; but ‘people' in this formulation are not simply any group of persons gathered together in any which way. Rather, they are an assemblage of people associated by one and the same right [coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus], serving all equally.18 Cicero seems to be implicitly referring to the Epicurean contractual doctrine, and also departing from it (Cicero, De Re. 1.39; 3.23). But Cicero's objection is clearly based on the bias that human beings are political or social beings by nature. When we say that the view that humans are political by nature is a ‘biased approach', we are not implying that this tenet is biased in itself, but instead that Cicero's way of presenting it to argue against Epicurean contractualism looks like a shortcoming. On the one hand, the argument provided by Cicero to convince himself that political naturalism is better or more reasonable than contractualism is not clear. When he endorses naturalism, that position already had a long philosophical pedigree; but unlike Aristotle in Politics 1 and what the Stoics had written in support not only of political naturalism but also the existence of a universal natural law, Cicero seems to assume that this is the best approach. Sometimes he qualifies himself to say that nature has produced and shaped us for better things, or so it seems to him (Fin. 1.23). On the other hand, Cicero merely refers to Epicurean contractualism, i.e. he does not set out the Epicurean theoretical framework in which it is inscribed. Consequently, its specific features are ignored.
2