The Epicureans recognize that the polis offers security [ασφαλεια], but that it can also encourage models of life that produce unhappiness.
The study of nature that they advocate (the Epicurean ‘physiology': φυσιολογtα] frames their argument for security in naturalist and evolutionist explanations of the origin of justice, and tries to diagnose and respond to the paradoxical unhappiness that exists in the midst of living conditions in which people have achieved security (see Lucretius, RN 6.1-40).
The influential philosophical historiography of the nineteenth century saw in this claim an expression of the decadence of the polis and emphasized the reaction to extremely convulsed times that led to focus the philosophical activity of Hellenistic schools on the formulation of personal salvation ethics. It is undeniable, however, that in the last five decades or so there has been a change of appreciation.One of the major achievements in the modern study of Epicureanism has been the recovery of a balanced and respectful tone of analysis, one that has rejected the imprint made on the interpretative tradition by the aggression and contempt of Cicero, Plutarch and the Christian apologists. The works of historians of the Hellenistic world in recent decades have also contributed to a balanced tone of analysis. They have highlighted the vitality of the polis in the Hellenistic period, the persistence of its social relations and its mental world, and have also argued against the thesis of an exacerbated consciousness of the turbulence of the times which is often used to draw a sharp distinction between this period and other moments in the history of Greece.1
These new approaches have been favourable to a legitimate treatment of Epicureanism and to the recognition of both its connection with the traditional problems of Greek philosophy and of the particular interpretive guidelines and procedures, from which the main adversaries of antiquity, especially Cicero and Plutarch, refer to the political considerations of Epicureanism.
It is true that both Cicero and Plutarch are very important sources for our knowledge of Epicureanism; however, they certainly had their own agenda and hence sometimes avoided details in Epicurus' tenets, treated them superficially, or introduced biases that compel us to read some issues from a very partial perspective. The same can obviously be said of Lactantius, who, in addition to having his own agenda, is a Christian writer belonging to a completely different ideological world. Moreover, he is located in a historical-ideological framework where he wishes to show that ‘true wisdom' cannot be found in pagan philosophy, but only in the revealed word. This can at times make his testimony and assessment of Epicurean philosophy particularly virulent and negative.
The core of this chapter is focused on how Cicero, Plutarch, and Lactantius considered Epicurus and Epicureanism in general, and in particular their political views. We argue that Cicero's, Plutarch's and Lactantius' analyses, albeit partial and biased, are relevant because the traditional portrait of Epicureanism was forged to a great extent through their hostile testimonies. Our examination of these figures as readers of Epicureanism, we suggest, might eventually shed some light on the modes of transmission of Greek philosophy (and especially of Epicureanism) to posterity. Although we will focus mostly on the controversial aspects of these writers in their transmission of Epicureanism, thus pointing out their shortcomings as testimonies of that philosophical movement, we will also highlight some more interesting aspects of their readings of Epicurus' philosophy. Above all, we are interested in pointing out the relevance of Cicero, Plutarch and Lactantius in the formation of a certain forma mentis, already present in antiquity, that influenced the reading and understanding of Epicurus and his doctrines.
To illustrate this: Epicurus himself vividly describes the last hours of his own life, hours that he refers to as ‘a blessedly happy day'.
It is not difficult to imagine the terrible pains he would have suffered when he spoke of the urinary blockages and dysenteric discomforts that were affecting him (DL 10.22; Us. 138). But when Cicero reminds us of this episode, he states, while ascribing his reading of the event to ‘the sinister interpretation of the Stoics', that the urinary blockages and gastritis that afflicted Epicurus were due to gluttony, in the latter case, and, in the former, to a ‘still baser kind of self-indulgence' (Letters to Friends 7.26, 1). Perhaps Cicero was being honest and did believe that this biased reading of Epicureanism belonged to the Stoics, and thus he did not actually support it. But this kind of passage led many people in ancient times to associate Epicurean hedonism with a life of mere sensual pleasure and excess. Of course, Plutarch also contributes to the idea that Epicurean hedonism is nothing new, merely another form of crude hedonism. He provocatively suggests that, if someone removes the light of knowledge at ‘the symposium of life' [εκ του βfου καθαπερ εκ συμποσfου], so that people could do anything they choose for pleasure without being noticed, such a person can indeed say ‘live unnoticed' (λαθε βιωσας; Live Unnoticed 1129A-B). Or again, Plutarch polemically remarks that, if one proposes to live with his mistress, or if one ends days with Leontion, ‘spits on what is honourable,2 and says the good consists of ‘the flesh and its titillation’,3 one would like to live unnoticed (Live Unnoticed 1129B). This is clearly nothing more than a crude presentation of Epicurean hedonism, though, as we will show, Plutarch was entirely aware of the sophistication of the hedonistic position defended by Epicureanism.In section 1, we discuss some details of Cicero's reading of Epicureanism.
First, we will present some of Cicero's considerations about Epicurean terminology and his defence of Latin as an appropriate language for discussing philosophical or literary topics. Next, we shall examine some passages where Cicero's readings of Epicurean theology turn out to be debatable, inasmuch as they often overlook relevant details of Epicurean doctrine or are formulated against the backdrop of his own agenda. Finally, we argue that Cicero deliberately omits important details of Epicurean arguments on ethics and politics and includes some silences that are ‘clamorous'. In fact, Cicero omits the entire, crucial Epicurean interconnection between the study of nature and political theory. While he does include passing reference to Epicurean contractualism, he does not set out the Epicurean theoretical framework in which it is inscribed. Consequently, Cicero ignores its specific features.Section 2 of the chapter is devoted to examining how Plutarch deals with Epicurus. Starting from his Platonic premises, we claim, Plutarch argues that Epicurus' thesis that there is no providence or teleology in the cosmos is absurd, but does not provide a sound argument to show clearly that a world without providence is absurd. We also stress that Plutarch attempts to ridicule Epicurus by pointing out some elemental logical mistakes he would have committed. In this framework, we show that the effort to discredit some Epicurean views was noted already in antiquity (notably by the Roman jurist Aulus Gellius). We also underline the fact that Plutarch accuses the Epicureans of banishing laws and forms of government and so of banishing human life. However, his remark turns out to be a mischievous rhetorical exaggeration which, strictly speaking, evinces an eloquent silence: Plutarch, like Cicero, omits the rich Epicurean themes focused on security, justice and law and does not provide any testimonies or considerations on the elements of Epicureanism's political reflection that we have discussed in the first three chapters.
Section 3 of this chapter is devoted to Lactantius, who believed himself to have the mission to free people from the absurdities derived from pagan religion and philosophy. His objections, we claim, are based on the view that Christianity, insofar it is the only belief system that has set out to unite wisdom with religion, is the best doctrine both religiously and philosophically. But, of course, that was not part of the Epicurean project; therefore, we argue that it is clear that Lactantius' starting point is full of biases and inaccuracies, and that this determines the way he reads (and makes others read) Epicurus' hedonism. In section 4 we offer an overview of Cicero's, Plutarch's and Lactantius' testimonies. Finally, in section 5, we provide some brief concluding remarks.
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