Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia

In surveying the generally depressing condition of Ukrainians during the interwar period, it is heartening to focus on one, albeit tiny, fragment of this nation – the Ukrainians of Transcarpathia – whose fortunes improved markedly during that time.

Isolated from their compatriots by the Carpathian Mountains, the Carpatho-Ukrainians (or Rusyns as they still called themselves) were among the most politically, socioeconomically, and culturally underdeveloped of all Ukrainians. When the fall of Austria-Hungary brought an end to oppressive Hungarian rule, their region was incorporated into Czechoslovakia. In contrast to the forced annexation of other West Ukrainian lands, the Carpatho-Ukrainian association with Czechoslovakia was a voluntary one. As a result of an agreement concluded in Scranton, Pennsylvania, in November 1918 with Czech leaders, emigrants from Transcarpathia accepted incorporation of their homeland into the new Czech state on the condition of Transcarpathian autonomy.

Of all the newly formed states in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia was the most democratic. Consequently, it did not follow the openly discriminatory and assimilationist policies toward its minorities that Poland and Romania did. This is not to say that relations between the central government and the populace of Transcarpathia were devoid of conflict. The issue of autonomy, as we shall see, brought about serious tensions between Prague and its easternmost province. Nonetheless, the Czechs allowed the Carpatho-Ukrainians a greater degree of political and cultural self-expression than they had ever had before.

In 1921 there were about 455,000 Carpatho-Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia. Of these, 370,000 lived in the Czech part of the state, and 85,000 inhabited the area of Prešov in the Slovak part of the federation. Committed to modernizing all regions of their new state, the Czechs made an effort to raise the standard of living in Transcarpathia as well.

In the 1920s, the large Hungarian-owned estates were broken up and about 35,000 peasant households received additional plots averaging more than two acres each. In sharp contrast to Poland and Romania, the Czech government invested more in its Ukrainian-inhabited areas than it extracted from them. However, the investment was too small to relieve significantly the abject poverty in the region. When the depression of the 1930s set in, the populace of Transcarpathia suffered badly, at times experiencing widespread hunger and even starvation.

In terms of education and culture, Czech policies were a welcome change from the intense Magyarization the Hungarians had practiced. There was, first of all, a dramatic growth in the number of schools. Between 1914 and 1938, the number of elementary schools jumped from 525 to 851 and gymnazia increased from 3 to 11. Moreover, the Czech government allowed its population to use the language of its choice in the schools. Such liberalism led to the rapid growth of cultural societies, such as Prosvita and the Russophile Dukhnovych Society. Theatrical troupes and choirs flourished. Writers such as Vasyl Grendzha-Donsky, Andrii Karabelesh, and Aleksander Markush helped to ignite a modest cultural renaissance.

But the cultural life of Transcarpathia was not without its complexities and conflicts. As education became more widespread and the populace was exposed to a democratic political process, the issue of national identity, by this time already resolved in most Ukrainian lands, came to the fore in Transcarpathia. As usual, the resolution of this question became the concern primarily of the budding intelligentsia. And as was generally the norm in the early stages of nation-building, the intelligentsia was divided on this issue. Nationality issues

Among the older members, who were mostly Greek Catholic clergy, a Russophile tendency evolved in circumstances analogous to those that had obtained earlier in Galicia. Although the Russophiles, who included many leading local inhabitants, established numerous organizations and societies (the most notable of which was the network of reading rooms of the Dukhnovych Society), they suffered from a crucial drawback: try as they might, they could not negate the fact that in terms of language and folk culture they were not Russian.

This circumstance led to a growing sterility in their ideology and political orientation and explained why they had difficulty in attracting support among the educated youth.

Another tendency stressed localism, that is, the idea that the Slavic population of Transcarpathia was a distinct Rusyn nationality. Many of its supporters were Magyarized clergymen, who, with the arrival of the Czechs, found it prudent to camouflage their pro-Hungarian attitudes under the cloak of localism. However, the idea of creating a separate nationality out of several hundred thousand people was very tenuous, especially because the Transcarpathians were obviously and closely related to the Ukrainians who lived on the other side of the Carpathians. Consequently, the localist or Rusyn option was the weakest of all.

The Ukrainophile current, which predominated among the new, secular intelligentsia of teachers and students, was clearly the most dynamic. As in 19th-century Galicia, it first began as a populist movement in which the young intelligentsia sought to strengthen its links with the peasantry. As the similarity of language, folk culture, and Eastern Christian traditions between the populace on both sides of the Carpathians began to be felt, and as the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia grew stronger, the populists of Transcarpathia became Ukrainophiles.

Their burgeoning influence was reflected in organizational growth, especially in the 1930s. Led by Avhustyn Voloshyn and Mykhailo and Iulii Brashchaiko, the Ukrainophiles founded the Prosvita educational society, which soon overshadowed the Dukhnovych Society, its Russophile rival. Plast, the 3000-member Ukrainian scouting organization, became especially popular among the young intelligentsia. In 1934 the Ukrainian Teachers’ Association counted about 1200 members or two-thirds of all pedagogues in Transcarpathia. University and gymnazium students became especially avid supporters of Ukrainianism. Because the Ukrainians of Transcarpathia could express their political and national aspirations openly, the conspiratorial OUN did not have a strong presence in the region for most of the 1930s.

While most of the Ukrainophiles became supporters of Ukrainian integral nationalism, a significant segment adopted pro-Soviet positions. Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy

Dissension among the Carpatho-Ukrainians suited Czech interests and Prague used it as an excuse to delay granting autonomy to the region. However, in 1938, international developments greatly weakened the Czech government. As a result of the Munich Pact, Nazi Germany obtained a German-inhabited part of Czechoslovakia; with the silent acquiescence of the Western powers, it planned the further dismemberment of the Czech state. Backed by the Germans, the Slovaks obtained autonomy within the Czechoslovak republic. Seeing the Prague government faltering, the leaders of the three Transcarpathian factions united and also demanded autonomy. The Czechs had no choice but to agree. On 11 October 1938, Transcarpathia received its self-government.

Although Russophiles such as Andrei Brodii and Stefan Fentsik led the first autonomous administration, they were quickly discredited when it became known that they were agents of Hungary and Poland. To replace them, Prague appointed a new cabinet, headed by Voloshyn and consisting of Ukrainophiles. The Voloshyn government immediately commenced the work of transforming Transcarpathia, or Carpatho-Ukraine as it was officially called, into an autonomous Ukrainian state. The educational system, publications, and administration were Ukrainized. In February 1939, elections were held for the regional parliament and the Ukrainophiles received the support of 86% of all eligible voters. Meanwhile, a military organization, the Carpathian Sich, was organized and soon had about 5000 men in uniform.

There were pressing reasons for establishing a military force, for as Czechoslovakia slowly disintegrated, neighboring Hungary demanded the return of its former Transcarpathian lands. Indeed, just as the Carpatho-Ukrainian government was being formed, Hungarian troops occupied a southern portion of the region, forcing the Ukrainians to move their capital from Uzhhorod to Khust.

Throughout its brief existence, the Carpatho-Ukrainian government continued to face the threat of a Hungarian invasion.

The creation of a Ukrainian government in Transcarpathia had a great impact on the West Ukrainians, especially those in neighboring Galicia. Many saw it as the first step in the imminent creation of an independent, united Ukraine. Eager to protect the first Ukrainian land to gain its freedom, many young integral nationalists from Galicia illegally crossed the border and joined the Carpathian Sich. However, the OUN leadership was divided on what policy to follow. While the young radicals in Galicia demanded immediate and full involvement in Carpatho-Ukraine, their older, foreign-based superiors, aware of German plans, urged restraint.

The reason for the caution of the older integral nationalists soon became apparent. As a result of a secret pact, Hitler agreed to a Hungarian occupation of all of Transcarpathia. And on 14 March 1939, the Hungarian army moved into the region. Hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, the Carpathian Sich rendered brave but futile resistance. On 15 March, in a symbolic gesture, the Voloshyn government proclaimed the independent Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine. Only hours later it was forced to flee from its homeland.

The Carpatho-Ukrainian experience was paradoxical. Of all the West Ukrainian lands, it was among the least developed in socioeconomic, cultural, and political terms. Yet, it was the only region that achieved a measure of self-government. Brief as it was, the existence of a Ukrainian government in Carpatho-Ukraine had an impact similar to that of the Ukrainian governments in the 1917–20 period: it helped to turn much of the region’s population, especially the youth, into nationally conscious Ukrainians. The episode also had important implications for German/Ukrainian relations, for it served as a graphic illustration of how little Ukrainians could depend on the goodwill of Hitler.

National inequalities and socioeconomic difficulties, as well as the imposing growth of Nazi Germany and the USSR, led to a disillusionment with democracy and to the spread of political extremism throughout Eastern Europe during the interwar period.

This radicalization increasingly involved not only the intelligentsia, but also the traditionally passive peasantry. Limited though it was, modernization raised the peasants’ self-respect and expectations, making them less willing to accept national discrimination and the falling living standards of the 1930s. Moreover, it pushed them, as never before, to political activism, especially of the radical type.

Frustrated in their attempts to gain statehood or self-rule, the West Ukrainians were particularly susceptible to these general trends. Although they put much effort into “organic work,” it was clearly the integral nationalism of OUN that became their most dynamic movement, especially among the youth. In sharp contrast to their compatriots in Soviet Ukraine, the West Ukrainians did not experience dramatic socioeconomic changes. Yet, despite their dreary standard of living, it was not communism, which had been discredited by Stalinism, but integral nationalism that captivated them. It was, therefore, in the generation that reached adulthood in the 1930s in Western Ukraine that Ukrainian nationalism reached its high point, eliciting a mixture of fanaticism and idealism.