Ad Hominem: Direct

George Wrisley

Richard Nixon’s statements on foreign affairs policies in relation to China are untrustworthy because he was forced to resign during the Watergate scandal.

Douglas Walton, Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation

This chapter deals with ad hominem: direct.

An ad hominem argument is an argument “to,” “toward,” or “against” the person. The direct variety of the ad hominem goes directly against the person, particularly in regard to some aspect of character, as opposed to indirectly by, for example, pointing out some pragmatic inconsistency between a person’s actions and various commitments (as in the ad hominem: circumstantial). As with all of the ad hominem argument subtypes, the ad hominem: direct occurs in the context of some kind of dialogue or exchange, real (face to face) or imagined (in dialogue with a text, for exam­ple). That is, an ad hominem occurs in response (the respondent) to the stated argument/position of another person (the proponent). Instead of addressing the argument/position of the proponent, the respondent addresses the proponent’s character in such a way that his credibility is questioned in order to either question or refute his argument/position.

The central complication when dealing with the ad hominem: direct is that while ad hominem arguments are often fallacious, they are also often legitimate. Thus, a main question becomes: How do we differentiate the fallacious from the legitimate instances of ad hominem: direct arguments? This is particularly important because of how powerful ad hominem argu­ments can be in regard to the proponent’s ability to support her position in a meaningful way. Fallacious uses of the ad hominem argument type are pernicious, in part, because of how difficult it can be to respond to them in an effective way.

The basic form of the fallacy looks like this:

Proponent: Gives argument/position x.

Respondent: Questions/attempts to refute position x, not by attacking x, but by attacking the Proponent’s character.

Respondent: Concludes that the proponent’s argument/position x is less credible/refuted. (Walton 2006, 123)

One of the main issues with ad hominem arguments is telling which are falla­cious and which are not. To help identify whether an ad hominem: direct argument is fallacious, it will be helpful to ask the following three questions.

(1) How well justified are the allegations made against the proponent’s person?

(2) Are the details about the proponent’s person relevant to the argument/ position in question or the dialogical context?

(3) Is the conclusion of the respondent’s ad hominem argument that the proponent’s argument/position should be rejected outright, or is the conclusion merely that the proponent should be viewed with less credibility as a supporter of the original argument/position x? (Walton 2006,123)

Let us look at two examples to help illustrate the nature of ad hominem arguments and the use of these three critical questions. As we will see, since we are focusing on the ad hominem argument, the proponent’s side is often not given explicitly or in detail.

Example 1

Respondent: General Petraeus’s argument for aggressively pursuing ISIS can’t be trusted because it is likely that he gave classified documents to a reporter with whom he was having an extramarital affair.

Following our critical questions above, we should first inquire as to whether the allegations against Petraeus are well founded. If they are not, then to the extent that they are not, the ad hominem argument does not get off the ground as they do not give reason to impugn Petraeus’s character. If they are true, then we need to move to ask the other critical questions.

The second critical question concerns the relevance of the respondent’s allegations to the proponent’s argument/position and the dialogical context more generally. This first issue of relevance concerns whether his character is relevant to how well the premises of his argument support his conclusion. It is at the very least questionable that Petraeus’s giving classified documents to his mistress is relevant to whether his premises support his conclusion regarding ISIS. The main reason is that Petraeus has put forward an argu­ment in support of his position. If we interpret his argument deductively, then whether the premises of his argument actually support his conclusion to pursue ISIS aggressively depends on the form of the argument - for exam­ple, the deductively valid modus ponens is valid because of its form: If p, then q, / p. / Therefore, q. Alternatively, if we interpret his argument induc­tively, then whether the reasons of his argument support the conclusion will depend on their content, that is, what they say. Petraeus’s character is com­pletely irrelevant to whether his argument is an instance of a deductively valid form. Similarly, the inductive strength of his argument is completely independent of his character. This is further true because how well the prem­ises of an argument support the conclusion does not depend upon whether they are actually true. Thus, the respondent’s allegations are irrelevant in regard to whether the premises of his argument support his conclusion.

So, we’ve seen that the allegations regarding Petraeus’s personal life are not relevant to whether his argument supports his position. So, has the respond­ent committed a fallacy with her ad hominem argument? Before we can answer, we must address the third critical question. The third question requires us to clarify what exactly the respondent’s conclusion is. That is, is she claiming that the allegations are (a) sufficient to refute his argument/ position or (b) sufficient to at least bring Petraeus’s character into question as a supporter of his argument/position in such a way that we might have reason to question the truth of his argument’s premises and whether he may be leaving out pertinent information? That is, do the allegations reveal some­thing about Petraeus’s character that would justify calling for further evidence from another, untarnished, source? How we formulate the respondent’s conclusion will have implications for whether she has committed an ad hominem fallacy.

Do they do either? Well, as we have seen, since the allegations are irrele­vant to his argument’s validity and strength, they do not refute or give us reason to question whether the conclusion follows from what he says. But they also don’t give us reason to think that he has made an error in formu­lating the premises, that is, the allegations don’t speak to his competence. Since a part of the allegation is that he had an affair and another that he shared classified information with someone unauthorized, then we might have reason to question his integrity. But in what sense is his integrity relevant to the argument? Perhaps his motive is relevant, that is, if he were really a spy, then we might question his motives and thus his reasons for putting forward his argument. But, again, in this case the allegations don’t seem to pertain to his motive. Thus, it is difficult to see the allegations as relevant to questioning what Petraeus says, much less refuting it. Thus, the respondent’s ad hominem argument fails to be relevant for questioning or refuting Petraeus’s argument/position, and, thus, she commits the fallacy of ad hominem: direct.

In our General Petraeus example, the respondent commits an ad hominem fallacy if we read her argument along the lines of either questioning or refut­ing Petraeus’s argument/position. However, as we will see, it is possible for a respondent’s ad hominem argument to be fallacious read one way but not fallacious read another way. Usually, when there is a difference, it will be a matter of the argument being fallacious if read as refuting the proponent’s position but not if read as calling it into question.

Example 2:

An eyewitness is on the stand, testifying to the guilt of the accused. The defense attorney asks the eyewitness: “Isn’t it true that you’ve been convicted of perjury twice before, and, thus, you are a perjurer, a liar?”

Has the attorney committed an ad hominem fallacy? Let us consider our three critical questions.

Second, note that the eyewitness, the proponent, is committed to two things: (1) to being in a position to know what happened, and (2) to speak­ing honestly about what happened. As a position to know argument, the support for the eyewitness’s claims comes from the claimed position to know. This is in contrast to an argument with explicit premises whose truth and relevance for the conclusion we could examine independently of the proponent’s character. Thus, the proponent’s character and credibility are highly relevant in regard to whether his testimony supports what he says. For if he is untrustworthy, we do not have good reason to trust what he says.

Third, what is the conclusion of the respondent’s argument? Is it that what the eyewitness says is false or that we should question it and not assent to it without further evidence from another source since the witness’s char­acter is questionable? Well, being an untrustworthy liar does not mean that everything one says is false. At most, it means that one is not trustworthy and that others are fools if they uncritically accept what one says. Thus, if the respondent claims that the proponent’s testimony is false, then the respondent has argued fallaciously. However, if the respondent claims that the proponent’s testimony cannot be trusted, then we have been given reason to believe that is true given the truth of his being a perjurer. Thus, on this weaker reading, no fallacy has been committed. And since, in this example, it is a court case, the attorney need not attempt to show that the testimony is false; he merely needs to show that there is reason not to trust it.

Reference

Walton, Douglas. 2006. Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.