Ad Hominem: Circumstantial

George Wrisley

Mr. Lipperty advocates immediate desegregation of the schools, yet he himself sends his son to a private school to avoid the integrated school in his neighborhood.

Douglas Walton, Ad Hominem Arguments

This chapter deals with ad hominem: circumstantial. You perhaps should start with ad hominem: bias (Chapter 8), then read this one, as well as the other chapters on ad hominem: direct (Chapter 10) and ad hominem: tu quoque (Chapter 11).

The circumstantial variety of the ad hominem argument is distinct from the direct form in that instead of directly attacking the character of the arguer, one draws attention to an inconsistency in the personal circum­stances of the proponent (her commitments) and the content of her argument/ position as a way to question her sincerity or credibility. As with all of the ad hominem argument subtypes, the ad hominem: circumstantial occurs in the context of some kind of dialogue or exchange, real (face to face) or imagined (in dialogue with a text, for example). That is, an ad hominem occurs in response to the stated argument/position of another person (the proponent).

As Walton (2006, 99ff) notes, the scope of “circumstances” is quite broad and includes a variety of possibilities. For example, circumstances might be the arguer’s current or past actions, promises, jobs, relationships, ownership of material goods, and so on. The two important aspects of the circumstances for this argument type are: (1) that they indicate some kind of commitment to values, beliefs, courses of action, and so on; (2) the mark of what counts as a relevant circumstance in an ad hominem: circumstantial argument is that there is some sort of practical conflict with the proponent’s circum- stances/commitments and the proponent’s argument/position. The impor­tant issue is whether the practical inconsistency indicates the compromising of one’s character and, further, whether that is relevant to the issue in question.

As with all the ad hominem argument forms, the ad hominem: circumstantial has both fallacious and legitimate uses. Thus a main question becomes: How do we differentiate the fallacious from the legitimate instances of ad hominem attack? This is particularly important because of how power­ful an influence ad hominem arguments can have on the proponent’s ability to support her position in a meaningful way. Fallacious uses of the ad homi- nem argument type are pernicious, in part, because of how difficult it can be to respond to them in an effective way. Think about how hard it can be for someone to recover from accusations that paint him as a bad person or a hypocrite.

The basic form of the fallacy looks like this:

Proponent: Gives argument/position x.

Respondent: Questions or attempts to refute argument/position x, not by attacking x, but by drawing attention to circumstance y, where y demon­strates one of the proponent’s commitments which is in some way incon­sistent with argument/position x.

Respondent: Claims the proponent’s credibility in regard to argument/ position x is called into question.

Respondent: Concludes that the proponent’s argument/position x is less credible/refuted.

One of the main issues with ad hominem arguments is telling which are fal­lacious and which are not. To help identify whether an ad hominem: circum­stantial argument is fallacious, it will be helpful to ask the following four questions:

(1) Is there good reason to believe that the proponent has identifiable com­mitments and that the proponent is being practically inconsistent?

(2) If the proponent’s practical inconsistency has been correctly identified, could she give more details concerning the circumstances such that either (a) the appearance of inconsistency is lessened or (b) her credibility is not called into question by the inconsistency?

(3) How relevant are the proponent’s circumstances, character, and cred­ibility to the quality of her argument/position?

(4) Is the respondent’s conclusion the weaker claim that the proponent’s character is open to question, and thus her argument/position is in need of further support, or the stronger claim that the her argument/ position is refuted?

Let us look at an example to illustrate the use of these questions:

Example 1

parent: There is strong evidence of a link between smoking and chronic obstructive lung disease.

child: But you smoke yourself. So much for your argument against smok­ing. (Walton 1989, 141-142)

Regarding the first question, what exactly is the parent committed to with his smoking? Is he thereby committed to the claim that smoking is healthy? Presumably not, since we are all familiar with doing things that we know aren’t healthy, whether for sheer pleasure or because of addiction. We would thus need more information about whether the parent is committed to the view that smoking is a good idea. Hence, the parent could respond to the child’s allegations by saying that he is addicted to smoking, that he doesn’t want to smoke, and that he is trying to keep the child from being in his position. This would greatly mitigate the appearance of inconsistency. However, for the sake of analyzing this example, let us say we have reason to believe that the parent’s smoking reveals commitments that imply he is being inconsistent in telling his child not to smoke.

With our second question, if there is reason to think the proponent is practically inconsistent, we can still ask whether this reflects on his credibility. In this case, it will depend on the nature of his commitment to smoking and his reasons for arguing to the child that he should not smoke. Our answer above already touched on this issue to an extent. Further, perhaps the pro­ponent believes not that smoking is bad in general but that it is bad for children because they are still developing. If this were the case, then the appearance of inconsistency is lessened and so is the hit taken to his credibility. However, if it turns out that he is, for example, merely attempting to deprive the child of something enjoyable when there is nothing wrong with it, then this would presumably be a mark against his character and credibility. In such a case, he is both willfully depriving the child of something he thinks is harmless and enjoyable, and he is using dishonest means to do so as he apparently does not believe the evidence he has given the child.

With our third question, on the one hand, the parent’s actions and char­acter are irrelevant to the question of whether his argument against smoking is any good. If we interpret his argument deductively, then whether the reasons of his argument actually support the conclusion that the child shouldn’t smoke depends on the form of the argument - for example, the deductively valid modus ponens is valid because of its form: If p, then q. / p. / Therefore, q. That is, it does not depend on the parent’s actions and charac­ter. Alternatively, if we interpret his argument inductively, then whether the reasons of his argument support the conclusion will depend on their content, that is, what they say. The proponent’s practical inconsistency and even his poor character (if the practical inconsistency implies it is poor) have nothing to do with the form of his argument or with whether the premises inductively support his conclusion. However, on the other hand, because the respondent in this context is in a special position of dependence, as a child, on the parent, we should note that the parent’s inconsistency may well give the child a reason to question the truth of the reasons given against smoking. That is, the inconsistency gives reason for the child not to take the argument seriously since one of his main authority figures is not endorsing it, practi­cally speaking. From this point of view, the child’s ad hominem argument is not fallacious. However, whether it really is depends on the fourth critical question.

The fourth question forces us to clarify what exactly the respondent’s conclusion is. Does the child claim that the allegations are (a) sufficient to refute the parent’s argument/position or (b) sufficient at least to bring the parent’s character into question in a way relevant to question the propo­nent’s advocacy of the argument/position in question? How we formulate the respondent’s conclusion will have implications for whether she has committed an ad hominem: circumstantial fallacy.

Example 2

It is ridiculous to hear that man from Peru complaining about America’s poverty. Peru has twice as much poverty as America has ever had. (Hurley 2008, 146)

With this example, it is clear to see that the issue of commitments is impor­tant. Is the Peruvian man committed to the superiority of Peru over the United States simply by being Peruvian? Certainly not. But let us say for the sake of analysis that with further questioning, he is committed to the supe­riority of Peru over the United States in regard to poverty. Might he say something that lessens the blow to his credibility? It will depend in part on whether he is lying or ignorant in regard to Peru’s poverty.

How relevant are the proponent’s circumstances, character, and credibility to the quality of his argument/position? From the example, it is unclear whether in “complaining” the proponent has given an argument or merely stated an opinion. If he has given an argument, then the usual considerations apply, as demonstrated above in our first example, regarding the irrelevance of circumstances, character, and credibility to the validity or strength of an argument. If no argument was given, then the proponent’s character is cen­tral to whether we put any stock in his claims.

The real question, again, is whether the respondent’s claim is that the proponent’s argument/position should be taken to be refuted or whether the proponent’s credibility is in question such that there is reason to question his argument/position. If the proponent’s character has not been impugned via commitments that show problematic inconsistency, then it seems the respondent has succeeded in neither refuting nor calling the proponent’s argument/position into question. Thus, on either read­ing, the proponent has given a fallacious ad hominem: circumstantial argument.

References

Hurley, Patrick. 2008. A Concise Introduction to Logic, 10th edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Walton, Douglas. 1998. Ad Hominem Arguments. Birmingham, AL: The University of Alabama Press.

Walton, Douglas. 2006. Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.