Conclusion

This chapter attempted to offer an analysis of selected theoretical and practical discussions on obligations in some well-known classical Islamic treatises on law and legal theory.

Notes

1 On the conceptual complexity of ‘obligation’, John Finnis wrote that ‘Philosophers and moralists find the grammatical substantive form “obligation” convenient for signifying a wide range of no­tions: that there are things, within our power either to do or not to do, which (whatever we desire) we have to do (but not because we are forced to), or must do, which it is our duty to do, which it is wrong not to do, or shameful not to, which one morally (or legally) ought to do’. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 297.

2 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 114.

3 H. L. A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 167—80.

4 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 315.

5 For example, see Bernard G. Weiss, The Search for God’s Law: Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayf Al-Din Al-Amidi (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1992), 350—1.

6 Examples of these approaches are provided in the second section.

7 A theory most famously advanced in John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. Wil­frid E. Rumble (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 18—24.

The determination or hukm in that sense is primarily the pronouncement made by a jurist, a school of law or the community of jurists on a given action in general not concerning a particular legal subject. Case-specific determinations take the form of legal opinions issued in response to a par­ticular question (fatawa) or court judgments. The concept of hukm involves a degree of complexity shared generally by Islamic jurisprudential concepts inasmuch as it could refer to either God's determination on a certain matter (hukm Allah) or the jurist's opinion made after proper exertion of intellectual effort (ijtihad). Ebrahim Moosa suggests that the proper use of hukm in jurisprudence refers primarily to the rule in its divine ‘transcendent' form, and mentions that hukm is often more fully referred to as hukm Allah. I have not seen hukm referred to in this form in classical treatise on jurisprudence, and, in all likelihood, classical jurisprudents primarily used the term to refer to their own imperfect determinations made by engaging with the signs (adilla) of divine revelation. The long and complex process that links the theological concept of divine command to the formulation of a juristic normative proposition is beyond the scope of this chapter. For all purposes, hukm here will be a reference to practical determinations made by jurists through engagement with revelation using specific investigative methods.

In al-Mankhul, Ghazali explained that takllf is ‘derived from “burden” (kulfa) [... ] and means im­posing that which constitutes a hardship'. Abu Bakr al-Baqillani defined imposition of duty (taklf as ‘nothing other than the demand (mutalaba) to refrain from or commit [action], and the existence of reward, punishment [... ], praise and blame in its regard'. Given that discussions of takllf revolved primarily around the mental conditions of imposition of burden, the concept largely pertained to the legal subject's capacity. See al-Ghazali, Al-Mankhul min Taliqat al-Usul, ed. Muhammad Hasan Hitu (Damascus, 1970), 21. See also Muhammad b. al-Tayyib al-Baqillani, Al-Taqrib wa-l-irshad al-Saghir (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risala, 1993), 1:236. Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan fi Usul al-Fiqh, 2nd edn, Maktabat Imam Al-Haramayn (Cairo: Dar al-Ansar, 1980), 14.

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa min Im al-Usul (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tawfiqiyya, 2010), 8. Ibid., 80.

Muhammad b. Ali al-Basri, Kitab al-Mutamad fi Usul al-Fiqh, ed. Muhammad Bakr, Hasan Hanafi and Muhammad Hamidullah (Damascus: al-Ma'had al-'Ilmi al-Faransi li-l-Dirasat al-Arabiyya in Damascus, 1964), 8-9.

The internal disconnection between the deontic functions of law and ideas of value or reasonable­ness was noted by scholars including some of the most dedicated naturalists such as John Finnis. In that context, Finnis observed that ‘unlike the informal social practice of promising, the legal system does not allow an unrestricted feedback of such “value” or “policy” considerations from the justificatory level of straightforward practical reasonableness back into the level of practice'.

For example, see Baber Johansen, Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh (Leiden: Brill 1999), 35-6.

Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa, 94.

A. Kevin Reinhart, Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995).

Hart, The Concept of Law, 38-41.

Frederick F. Schauer, The Force of Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa, 39.

Ibid.

Al-Basri, Kitab al-Mutamad fi Usul al-Fiqh, 8.

Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa, 40.

Ibid.

For an analysis of reasons for action as an element of practical reasoning, see Joseph Raz, From Nor­mativity to Responsibility (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 85-106. Al-Basri, Kitab al-Mutamad fi Usul al-Fiqh, 9.

For example, Fakhr al-Din Muhammad b. ‘Umar al-Razi, Al-Mahsulfi "Ilm al-Usul, ed. Muham­mad 'Abd al-Qadir ‘Ata, 2 vols (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1999), 1:178.

Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa, 40.

Ibid., 94.

Ibid., 95.

For example, Knut Vikor writes that ‘the term Shan‘ah describes both Muslim practices that relate to law in Western understanding and others that do not. It is better understood as the Muslim conception of a life in conformity with God's will. Thus it includes both the rules that regulate the Muslim's relationship to God, such as the ritual practices of worship (prayer, fasting, pilgrim­age, etc.) and the rules that regulate the worshippers' relationships to one another and to society. The first are called ‘ibadat (“acts of worship”), the latter mu amalat (“transactions”). The divide largely coincides with the definition of legal as “concerning cases that are brought before a court of law”, which applies to the mu 'amalat’. Knut S. Vikor, ‘Shariah'. In The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics.

The assumption of a sharp divide between 'ibadat and mu'amalat is particularly convenient in the context of attempts to directly incorporate classical Islamic legal doctrines into modern secularized legal systems. For example, see Alfitri, ‘Expanding A Formal Role for Islamic Law in the Indone­sian Legal System: The Case of Mu'Amalat', Journal of Law and Religion 23, no. 1 (2007): 249—70.

‘Izz al-Din ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. ‘Abd al-Salam, Al-Qawa‘id al-Kubra: al-Mawsum bi-Qawa‘id al-Ahkam fi Islah al-Anam, ed. Nazih Hammadi and ‘Uthman Damariyya, vol. 2 (Damascus: Dar al-Qalam, 2000), 120.

Ibid.

Ahmad b. ‘Abd al-Halim b. Taymiyya, al-Qawa'id al-Nuraniyya al-Fiqhiyya, ed. Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi (Lahore: Idarat Turjuman al-Sunnah, 1982), 127-34.

Ibid., 133.

Ibid., 134.

Ibid.

Ibn ‘Abd al-Salam, al-Qawa id al-Kubra, 2:120.

Ibid., 2:121-3.

Ibn Taymiyya, al-Qawa‘id al-Nuraniyya al-Fiqhiyya, 134.

Ibn ‘Abd al-Salam, al-Qawa id al-Kubra, 2:123.

Ibid., 2:126.

Ibid., 2:125-6. This principle corresponds to what Khaled Abou El Fadl referred to as the separa­tion of temporal accountability from divine accountability. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, ‘The Place of Ethical Obligations in Islamic Law', UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law 4 (2004-2005): 1-40.

Ibn ‘Abd al-Salam, al-Qawa‘id al-Kubra, 2:125-6.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 2:133.

For an extended discussion of jihad in the form of fiqh prescriptions, see Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Al- Tabari’s Book of Jihad: A Translation from the Original Arabic (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007).

For a historical account of the evolution of the idea of mutual promises in the Near East and Islamic law, see Nabil Saleh, ‘Origins of the Sanctity of Contracts in Islamic Law', Arab Law Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1998): 252-64.

Abu al-Walid b. Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa-Nihayat al-Muqtasid (Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm, 1999), 79.

For salat as a ‘pillar of religion', see Wael Hallaq, Shari ‘a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 225-30.

Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, 204.

A similar debate arose with regards to sadaqat al-fitr, which combined characteristics of both an imposition on property (mu ‘na) and an act of worship (‘ibada). See Johansen, Contingency in a Sacred Law, 133. With regards to zakat, Johansen characterizes its position in Hanafi law as a ‘financial act of devotion' ('ibada maliyya), since it is an act of worship that consists of a transfer of property to another person. This hybrid nature meant that requirements of sanity and legal capacity more generally applied as prerequisites to the payer of zakat. Ibid., 137-8.

Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, 205.

55 Ibid., 205-6.

56 Q 2:183.

57 Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, 238.

58 Ibid., 246.

59 For example, see Frederick Schauer, ‘Exceptions', The University of Chicago Law Review 58, no. 3 (1991): 871-99.

60 Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, 247.

61 Ibid., 266. For the Quranic injunction, see Q 3:94.

62 For obligations of worship in general, see Hallaq, Shari 'a, 224-38.

63 Ibn Rushd, Bidayat, 496.

64 Ibid., 499.

Select bibliography and further reading

Sources in Arabic

Basri, Muhammad b. Ali al-. Al-Mu'tamad fi usul al-fiqh. Ed. Muhammad Bakr, Hasan Hanafi and Muhammad Hamidullah (Damascus: al-Ma 'had al- 'Ilmi al-Faransi lil-Dirasat al- Arabiyya bi- Dimashq, 1964).

Ghazali, Abu Hamid al-. Al-Mustasfa min ‘Um al-Usul (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Tawfliqiyya, 2010).

Ibn Abd al-Salam, 'Izz al-Din Abd al- Aziz. Al-Qawa"id al-Kubra: al-Mawsum bi Qawa"id al-Ahkam fi Islah al-Anam. Ed. Nazih Hammadi and Uthman Damariyyah, 2 vols (Damascus: Dar al-Qalam, 2000).

Ibn Rushd, Abu al-Walid. Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa-Nihayat al-Muqtasid (Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm, 1999).

Ibn Taymiyya, Ahmad b. Abd al-Halim. Al-Qawa"id al-Nuraniyya al-Fiqhiyya. Ed. Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi (Lahore: Idarat Turjuman al-Sunnah, 1982).

Sources in English

El Fadl, Khaled Abou. ‘The Place of Ethical Obligations in Islamic Law'. UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law 4 (2004-2005): 1—40.

Alfitri. ‘Expanding A Formal Role for Islamic Law in the Indonesian Legal System: The Case of Mu amalat'. Journal of Law and Religion 23, no. 1 (2007): 249—70.

Finnis, John. Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Hallaq, Wael B. A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-Fiqh (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Hallaq, Wael B. Shari 'a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge Uni­versity Press, 2009).

Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).

Johansen, Baber. Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh (Leiden: Brill 1999).

Kelsen, Hans. Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).