Ibn Taymiyya and “Quasi”-Muslims

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5.1.1 Mongol Control of Muslim Lands

To understand Ibn Taymiyyas (d. 728/1328) positions, an examination of the historical era from the fall of Baghdad and the rise of Mongol rule in the Mid­dle East is necessary.

The Mongols invaded the Muslim world after Mongol traders to the Mus­lim central Asian kingdom of Khwarizm were killed by the Muslim ruler Muhammad Khwarizm Shah (r. 596-616/1200-1220 in 614/1218, leading Ching- gis Khan (r. 602/1206-624/1227) to wage war against this kingdom and eventu­ally bring about its demise. According to Morgan, “Contemporary historians were unanimous when they wrote about the horrors that accompanied” the Mongol invasion.''i86 The Muslim heartland was exposed to this calam­ity first-hand through an influx of refugee survivors.i87 The effect on Muslim

183 Haffaq argues that this process, like other juristic tools, was never detached from social

a^ po⅛⅛tλ a∖⅛,⅛s. See Wael Ha‰¾ S a a: Theory, Practice, Transforrriattons

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 78.

184 David Morgan, The Mongols (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990), 6.

185 David Ringrose, Expansion and Global Interaction (New York: Longman, 2000), 5.

186 Morgan, Mongols, 74.

187 Muhammad alTji, alad al-Sham iban al-ghazw al-maghull (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al- 'Arabi 1998), 31.

consciousness is best illustrated by prominent Muslim historian Ibn al-Athir (d. 630/1233):

I have refrained for many years from mentioning this incident because of how grave I found it.... Who finds it easy to write the obituary of Islam and Muslim. ? I wish my mother had not given birth to me or that I had died and was long forgotten before it happened.188

After the death of Chinggis Khan in 624/1227, his successors carried on with the expansion of the empire. Eventually, Mongke Khan (r. (649-657/1251-1259) assumed power, and sent Hfilegfi (d. 663/1265) on a mission to Persia and Iraq, one of whose objectives was to eliminate the Nizarl Ismals, a sect of Shrism pejoratively referred to as the 'Assassins''!89 because of their alleged attempt to assassinate Mongke.190 Hfilegfi was also to demand submission from the Mus­lim caliph; if the caliph refused, he was to be eliminated.191 Finally, the mission included an attempt to invade Syria and Egypt.192 After taking over Persia and eliminating the Nizarl Ismalls, Hfilegfi headed to Baghdad in 656/1258.

After a fifty-day siege, Baghdad fell to the Mongols, marking the practical end of the Muslim caliphate, which had endured for six centuries. After his surrender, the caliph was murdered, the city was pillaged, and thousands were killed.193 Although Hfilegfi later estimated the death toll at two hundred thou­sand, al-Qazwlnl put the estimate at eight hundred thousand.194 After the con­quest of Baghdad, Hfilegirs army headed to Syria, swiftly taking Aleppo and Damascus, and “the crusader ruler of Antioch and Tripoli hastened to make his submission and tojoin forces with the all-conquering Mongols.''195 Mongke died in 657/1259 before the Mongol army could advance towards Egypt. In­stead, Hfilegfi returned home, handing over the mission to his commander, Kedbuqa, who was defeated by the Mamlfik army of Egypt at AynJalfit in

188 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamilfi l-ta'nkh, ed.

189 For more on the Nizarl Isma'llls see Farhad Daftary, “Assassins,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3rd ed., ed. Gudrun KrSmer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson, Brill on­line: accessed 22 December 2009.

190 Morgan, Mongols, 148.

191 Morgan, Mongols, 148.

192 Morgan, Mongols, 148.

193 Ringrose, Expansion, 5.

194 Morgan, Mo ngols, 151.

195 Morgan, Mo ngols, 155.

658/1260, the battle that marked the beginning of the end of Mongol expan­sion in the Middle East, as they were eventually forced to retreat from Syria.196

5.1.2 The Hkhanids

HtilegiTs successors ruled Muslim Persia and Iraq and were referred to as the Ilkhanids. With the exception of Teghder (r. 681/1282-683/1284), who was over­thrown shortly after assuming power, Ghazan (r. 694/1295-703/1304) was the first Mongol leader to convert to Islam, but his adherence to the faith was con­tested by some Arab sources, including Ibn Taymiyya, as detailed later. The Mongols are said to have adopted a pragmatic attitude to religion: “They were well aware that it was easier to rule a conquered country if the new rulers adopted the religion that justified their political authority.''197 There is evi­dence, however, that Ghazan was genuine, perhaps even fanatic, about his faith. He took it upon himself, for example, to destroy Buddhist places of wor­ship, and he ordered Mongol shaman clergy and Buddhist monks to either con­vert to Islam or leave Persia. 198 He also reinstated the payment of Jizya by Christians and Jews.199 Despite his conversion, Ghazan continued to attack Syria and attempt to annex it.2٥٥

5.1.3 Ibn Taymiyya's Early Life

Ibn Taymiyya was born to a family of scholars. Biographers do not address his lineage, stating simply that he was born in Harran, leading Abu Zahra to con­clude that he was of non-Arab lineage.2٥1 From a young age, Ibn Taymiyya proved his competence in religious sciences, succeeding his father as the direc­tor of the Sukkariyya madrasa (school) at the age of twenty-three and teaching Quranic exegesis at the Umayyad mosque from the age of twenty-four.

196 Morgan, Mongols, 156.

197 Ringrose, Expansion, 8.

198 Rajab Mulammad 'Abdul Halim, Intishar al-Islam bayn al-maghul (Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-Arabiyya, 1986), 194.

199 Denise Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilad al-Sham by Ghazan Khan and Ibn Taymiyah's Three 'Anti-Mongol' Fatwas,” Mamluk Studies Review 11, no. 2 (2007), 107.

200 'Abdul Halim, Intishar, 197.

201 Abu Zahra, Ibn Taymiyya: Hayatuh wa ’asruh, arauh wafiqhuh (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al- 'Arabi), 18.

202 Laoust, “Ibn Taymiyya.”

203 Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaya wa-l-nihaya (Cairo: Hajar, 1997), 18:298. interests, both in volume and in disciplines covered. Unlike other jurists, he was equally expert in ^cilm al-kalam (theology), Quranic exegesis, and other re­ligious disciplines^ As mentioned earlier, Ibn Taymiyyas authority in his life­time is contested. Seemingly, however, he enjoyed a devout following among a minority of Hanbali scholars, although according to Bori, most Hanbalis and Shafris perceived him as something of an embarrassment.205 Nevertheless, his commitment to jihad against the Mongols won him wide popular support.2٥6

5.1.4 Tension with the Political Authority

Initially, Ibn Taymiyya enjoyed a strong relationship with the Mamlhks. When, for example, he once entered Sultan al-Nasir's court (r.,1294-694-1293/396 741/1341-709/1309,708/1309-698/1299), “the Sultan broke out with established practice and walked across the room, took Ibn Taymiyya by the hand and walked with him before praising him to the group.”2٥7 In his analysis of Ibn Taymiyya's jurisprudence on evidentiary rules, Johansen argues that Ibn Taymiyya was a member of the Mamlhk legal elite and “was dependent on Mamluks and sultans... to whom he turned for help trying to carry out his pro­gram of implementing a Sunni state.”2٥8 However, al-Matroudi argues that Ibn Taymiyya's lack of interest in a public post is an indication of his independence from the ruling elite.209 What al-Matroudi seems to miss in his analysis is that Ibn Taymiyya's defiance of attempts by the authorities to alter his thought do not contradict the potential for a strategic alliance between the two to solidify “legitimate” Muslim authority, especially in its battle with other illegitimate rulers, and in light of his argument that the rulers, the ^culama^,, and the public needed to cooperate in order to achieve his “socio-political vision for the com­munity,” premised on rulers being subject to the shari^ta, as articulated by the udama’.2!٠

Ibn Taymiyya was extremely vocal in his criticism of and antagonism to­wards those who did not fit his criteria for proper Sunni Islam, including the Shi'a, the Christians and Jews, the Shfis, and the Mongols.

204 Abh Zahra, Ibn Taymiyya, 20.

205 Caterina Bori, “Ibn Taymiyya waJamS'atuhu: Authority, Conflict and Consensus in Ibn Taymiyya's Circles,” in Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, ed. Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 41.

206 Bori, “Ibn Taymiyya,” 43.

207 al-Matroudi, Hanball, 17.

208 Baber Johansen, “Signs as Evidence: The Doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1338) and Ibn Qayyim aljawziyya (d. 1351) on Proof,” Islamic Law and Society 9, no. 2 (2002), 180.

209 al-Matroudi, Hanbali, 18.

210 Ajurn, TayιιiyyanM0ment,26¾.

rejection of the “other” often got him in trouble with the political authority, whenever authorities failed to follow suit with his attacks against those groups. In 693/1293, he and another scholar heard of a Christian man from Suwayda' censuring the Prophet. After raising the matter to the deputy sultan, they en­countered this man together with a crowd of sympathizers. The Christian was injured by a member of the public. When the sultan heard of the incident, he imprisoned both scholars.211 During his imprisonment, Ibn Taymiyya wrote his famedbook.af^Urtrafraslr, CtlUshhti rafrasr,.2i2

In 699/1300, he was subject to an “inquisition” on account of a charge that his work titled al-Hammawiyya al-kubra was a form of “anthropomorphism (tashblh).”213 He was exonerated by the Shafrjudge who examined his case.214 Ibn Taymiyya was still relentless in his attacks on those he believed to have strayed from the true message of Islam, including the Sha of Kasrawan, fol­lowers of Ibn al-'Λrabi (a Muslim phlosopher),215 and a Jewish group attempt­ing to evade paying the jizya.216 According to Ibn Kathir, three Ihrther “inquisitions” were held in Damascus to examine his al-Wasittiya.2Y^, Accord­ing toJackson, the inquisitions were not triggered by al-Wasittiya. Rather, it was Ibn Taymiyya who referred to it as a counter-offensive tactic. The matter was not resolved, so he was sent to Cairo for further examination, where he was convicted of anthropomorphism and imprisoned in the Citadel for a year and a half.218 Even though he made strong arguments in Cairo, “Ibn Taymiyyas uncompromising position in the traditional/rational debate turned into a zero/sum game,” forcing his inquisitors to recommend imprisonment.

211 Ibn Kathir, Bidaya, 17:665.

212 Laoust, “Ibn Taymiyya.”

213 Laoust, “Ibn Taymiyya.”

214 Abu Zahra, Ibn Taymiyya, 31.

215 Laoust, “Ibn Taymiyya.”

216 Abu Zahra, Ibn Taymiyya, 37.

217 Ibn Kathir, Bidaya, 18:53-56.

218 Laoust, “Ibn Taymiyya.”

219 Sherman Jackson, “Ibn Taymiyyah on Trial in Damascus,” Journal of Semitic Studies 39, no. 1 (1994), 56.

220 Anjum, Taymiyyan Moment, 189.

contradicting reason,221 since according to him revelation and proper reason never contradict each other.222

After his release, the deputy sultan requested that the shaykh stay in Egypt so that people would benefit from his knowledge;223 in another version, he was prohibited from leaving Egypt as a condition for his release.224 According to Abfi Zahra, Ibn Taymiyya's third imprisonment in Egypt and later house arrest in Alexandria were triggered by his attack on Sufism, a creed popular among the ruling class.225 He was allowed to return to Cairo only when the dethroned al-Nasir, with whom he enjoyed a strong relationship, returned to power.226 In 712/1312, he returned to Damascus, where he spent some time on writing. When the sultan discovered, however, that Ibn Taymiyya had issued a fatwa on repu­diation that contradicted the predominant Hanbali view, the sultan wrote to Ibn Taymiyya instructing him to refrain from issuing thatfatwa (to those mem­bers of the public seeking it).227 Ibn Taymiyya briefly obeyed the sultan but soon returned to his original position. When the sultan was informed, Ibn Taymiyya was again imprisoned in Damascus, this time for five months.228 His final imprisonment was triggered by an old fatwa, dug up by his rivals, in 726/1326, which stated that Islam prohibited tomb visits. The sultan appointed a committee of jurists to examine the fatwa, in Ibn Taymiyya's presence in Da­mascus, and the jurists found that he had abused the sources to reach this con­clusion. He was accordingly imprisoned in Damascus, where he remained until his death in 728/1328.229

5.1.5 Promotion ofJihad

As mentioned earlier, Ibn Taymiyya's relationship with the Mamlfiks was not always tense. His popularity with the public and his keenness on jihad proved highly beneficial to the Mamlfik rulers of Egypt and Syria. He was appointed by Sultan al-Mansfir Lajin (696-1297/698-1299), for example, “to exhort the faith­ful to the jihad at the time of the expedition undertaken by the sultan against the kingdom of Little Armenia.''230 In 699/1300, Ghazan attacked Syria and

221 Anjumr, TayiiiyaMoiItiSL.

222 Anjvrn, Tay11ιiyya1ιM011t,20L.

223 Ibn Kathir, £idtexts are most relevant to this chapter:

- MajmhJat alfatawa: This is the most extensive compilation of Ibn Taymi- yya's work. Volumes 4, 28, and 35 are of special relevance to this chapter because they collectively address issues relating to rebellion and conflicts with non-Muslims. The fatawa were compiled initially by the Saudi scholar

248 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat alfatawa, 20:10.

249 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat alfatawa, 20:287.

250 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat alfatawa, 19:164.

251 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat alfatawa, 20:287.

252 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat alfatawa, 20:317.

253 Ibn Taymiyya,Jami’ al-masrtil, ed. Mulammad Aziz Shams (Jeddah: Majma'at al-Fiqh al- IslSmi, 1002), 2:186.

254 Ibn Taymiyya,Jami’al-masrtil, 2:186.

255 Wael Hallaq's introduction to Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), Hi.

'Abdul Rahman al-Qasim and his son. This text is relied upon as the primary text; other texts are compared against it for redundancy.

- Cd-Fatawacdkubraffoliowedbycd-Hhydrdtcd-'hiyya)'^56كهبةfatawain this compilation were published in MajmWat al-fatawa. However, addition­al material in al-Ikhtiyarat al-Hyya is examined in parallel.

- Kitab al-jihad:257 This book is a compilation of matters relevant to jihad in MajmWat al-fatawa. It was examined for reference and to ensure relevant fatawa from the compilation in volumes other than the ones referred to above are examined.

- QWidafi qital al-kufar:258 This is a controversial summary of a risala (trea­tise) allegedly written by Ibn Taymiyya, in which he supposedly argues against offensive jihad. Although the Risala is treated as authentic by prom­inent authors such as Abh Zahra,259 many other specialists, including 'Abdul Rahman al-Qasim, who compiled MajmWat al-fatawa, doubted his author­ship, to the extent that it was banned in Saudi Arabia in the 1940s. Whereas some contend that the treatise was not written by Ibn Taymiyya, due to its alleged prohibition of offensive jihad, others believe that the treatise was abridged by later scholars, an abridgement that stripped it of its original intention.260 To date, I have not come across any conclusive study on the attribution of the treatise. Apparently, those who are interested in expand­ing permissible acts in jihad dismiss the treatise without solid proof, where­as those advocating restriction employ it as a potential tool against the other camp. Unable to ascertain authorship, I decided to limit analysis of Ibn Taymiyyas work to matters relating to battles with “unfaithful” Muslims (i.e., to battles with Mongols and Shra). After all, Ibn Taymiyyas analysis of the conduct of armed conflict with non-Muslims in al-Fatawa and al-Risala is brief and seems to build on previously established traditions, without dedicating much attention to the elaboration of his chosen rulings. Never­theless, before moving on to addressing Ibn Taymiyyas approach to the abovementioned issues, the below paragraphs address the issue of contra­dictions between the treatise and the fatawa compilation.

256 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatawa al-kubra (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam, 1987).

257 Ibn Taymiyya, Fiqh al-jihad, comp. Zuhayr Shaftq al-Kabi (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi, ¹99²).

258 Ibn Taymiyya, Risalafl qital al-kuffar, ed. Sulayman al-Sani' (Riyadh: Jami'at al-Malik Sa'ud, 1946).

259 Abu Zahra, Ibn Taymiyya, 318.

260 Sulayman al-Kharashi, “Aqwal alulama' fi al-risala al-mansuba ila Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya fi al-jihad,” online:, ac­cessed 4 July 2011..

Both texts incline towards a targeting policy close to the Hanafi,26i Maliki,262 and Hanbal263 traditions - that those who are incapable of participating in combat are not to be targeted. The Risala argues that women, children, and anyone “unprepared for Hghting such as monks, the old, the infirm, the blind and the insane” are not to be targeted.264 In the fatawa, Ibn Taymiyya reiterates the prohibition of targeting those same exact categories.265 However, when ad­dressing killing monks and forcing them to payjizya, he argues that only monks who have deserted social life may not be targeted “because they are detached from people, locked up in the sawami^c, silos.''266 If monks offer support to the war with Muslims or if they live among other Christians and engage in activi­ties like trade and agriculture, they are to be killed during combat and payjizya during peacetme.267

His position on jizya payment is less consistent in both texts. In the fatawa, he is satisfied with stating the different scholarly views onjizya payment, with­out favouring a particular view. “People of the Book and the magi are to be fought until they become Muslims or pay the Jizya out of hand and in subjuga­tion. Jurists disagreed over others in terms of accepting the Jizya from them, but the majority do not accept it from Arabs.''268 In the Risala, he argues that the Qur'an, the sunna, and the practice of the Rightly Guided Caliphs indicate that there is no difference between the People of the Book and others, which means they are all entitled to pay the Jizya. To prove his argument, he relies on the fact that the magi were entitled to that “privilege” and refutes the claim made by al-Shafi'i and Ibn Hazm that the magi had been People of the Book who had strayed from their correct belief.269

261 al-Shaybani, The Islamic Law ofNations: ShaybanTs Siyar (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 14. 91-92, 101.

262 Malik, al-Mudawana, 1:499.

263 Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni, ed. 'Abdullah b. Abd al-Mulsin al-Turki (Riyadh: Dar 'Alam al- Kutub, 1999), 13:178.

264 Ibn Taymiyya, Risala, 1--.

265 Ibn Taymiyya, MaJmrtat al-fatawa, 28:210-11.

266 Ibn Taymiyya, MaJmrtat al-fatawa, 28:384.

267 Ibn Taymiyya, MaJmrtat al-fatawa, 28:385. The Arabic words used are al-qatl Tnd al- muharaba, wa bi-akhdh al-Jizya Tndal-Musalama. This could also be translated to indicate that they are to be killed when they fight and payJizya when they commit to peace. However, the above-mentioned translation is chosen because all Ibn Taymiyya's writings, including the treatise, incline towards the established juristic tradition that those who would not normally fight or those cannot fight (rather than those who don't actually fight) may not be targeted.

268 Ibn Taymiyya, MaJmrtat al-fatawa, 28:211.

269 Ibn Taymiyya, Risala, 11.

The above-mentioned examples from both texts are indicative of slight dif­ference, but they do not suffice to prove that al-Risala was not written by Ibn Taymiyya, because the different positions stipulated above can be perceived as elaborations of Ibn Taymiyya's view. One can argue, for example, that he be­lieves that those unprepared to fight are not to be targeted in general, and that the exception with regards to treatment of monks is an indication that he be­lieves monks residing in cities are prepared to fight. Similarly, his general state­ment on different juristic views with regards toJizya payment may be clarified through examination of the Risala to prove that he is inclined towards the po­sition deeming all non-Muslims eligible to dhimml status.

The most debatable aspect in both works, however, is his position on offen­sive Jihad. In the Risala, he argues that Muslims can only commit aggression against those who commit aggression against them, and that retribution may not exceed the initial aggression.270 He refutes arguments calling for offensive Jihad and offers an alternative interpretation of texts to support his argument. For example, in reference to the hadlth that allegedly states that the Prophet was ordered to fight people until they become Muslims (cited by al-Shafi'i to support offensive attacks), Ibn Taymiyya argues that the hadlth referred merely to incidents where fighting may be permissible for that purpose, not to clear instructions. He argues that interpretations like al-Shafi'i's contradict texts and consensus, since the Prophet “never did this, and his biography [shows that] he did not fight whoever was peaceful with him."27! However, the fatawa state that the objective ofJihad is for “religion to be all to God and for God's word to be the supreme and whoever resists that is to be fought according to the agree­ment of Muslims.''272 He also says that “sharVa obliged (awJabat) fighting unbelievers.''273 Those statements may be understood as indications of contra­dictions with al-Risala. However, a closer reading suggests that contradictions are exaggerated. In the Fatawa, Ibn Taymiyya also says, “Killing entails evil and corruption but Jitna [encouraging disbelief] by the unbelievers is greater. Yet, he who doesn't prevent Muslims from upholding and promoting [iqamat] the religion of God, then the damage of disbelief falls only upon himself.''274 At the same time, the non-offensive message is qualified in the Risala, where he argues that People of the Book may be fought to prevent Jitna and to ensure

270 Ibn Taymiyya, Risala, 2.

271 Ibn Taymiyya, Risala, 3.

272 Ibn Taymiyya, MaJmu'at alfatawa, 28:210.

273 Ibn Taymiyya, MaJmu'at alfatawa, 28:211.

274 Ibn Taymiyya, MaJmu'at alfatawa, 28:211. that religion is all to God.275 He also argues that an understanding that only those who Hght may be fought fails to comprehend the sources, since aggres­sors may be killed, whether they are engaged in fighting or not: “Whoever, from the people of combat, causes fear among Muslims and may fight, he is to be killed when he is fighting [qa^,im] or not [qa^tid], asleep or taken captive.”276

Both works thus conform to some extent to Ibn Taymiyya's approach to the objective of jihad. Sharif argues that “jihad, according to Ibn Taymiyya is the struggle to remove polytheism and persecution and to make way of a world with the Islamic system.”277 This argument misses the fact that the quotes mentioned above show that Ibn Taymiyya was less interested in the removal of polytheism than in its persecution orfitna. He appears to have been inclined to accept offensive jihad if waged against an enemy who transgresses on Muslims' divine duty to spread the religion of God, including its social and political sys­tem. Olfensive jihad thus differs from aggression, since the attacked commits aggression when it prevents the spread of religion. In conclusion, this reading shows that contradictions between the Risala and the Fatawa are less extreme when examined in detail. Whether or not they were both written by Ibn Taymi- yya is a complicated question that requires a separate study.

Ultimately, as noted above, Ibn Taymiyya's position on combat with non­Muslims is far less relevant to this book than his primary interest in armed conflict, that is, conflicts within the borders of Muslim territories, or in other words, conflicts with Mongols and heretical creeds. As noted by Abou El Fadl, “Ibn Taymiyya was preoccupied with the external threat posed to Islam by the Mongols and with the internal threat posed by what he considered to be he­retical ideologies.''278 Because Ibn Taymiyya was troubled by rising Shra influ­ence and the danger of the Mongol empire, he was particularly interested in addressing this issue in his writings on baghy and jihad. Contrary to his posi­tion on conflict with non-Muslims, which reiterated views from within the es­tablished jurisprudential tradition, and contrary also to his recognition of established regulations of baghy among warring Muslims relying on ta,wil,279 his approach to conflicts with Shra and converted Mongols offered innovative

275 Ibn Taymiyya, Risala, 2.

276 Ibn Taymiyya, Risala, 4.

277 Mohammad Farid b. Mohamad Sharif, “Jihad in Ibn Taymiyyah's Thought,” The Islamic Quarterly 49, no. 3 (2005), 188.

278 Abou El Fadl, Rebellion, 276. The below section dealing with Mongols shows how the perception that Mongols posed an “external” threat despite their conversion to Islam should be viewed with scepticism.

279 For a detailed examination of Ibn Taymiyya's position on rebellion by an acknowledged Muslim group, see Abou El Fadl, Rebellion, 275-79.

analysis of the sources. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, focuses pri­marily on his positions on conflicts with those groups, especially since militant works studied in the next chapter rely extensively on Ibn Taymiyya, primarily on his approach to rulers whose adherence to Islam was deemed unsatisfac­tory.

Before addressing Ibn Taymiyya's approach to the above-mentioned groups, a brief note on his legal reasoning is necessary. Unlike legal treatises dealing with abstract issues of law, Ibn Taymiyya's writings examined here, excluding the Risala, belong to the fatawa genre and are thus more explicit in their rela­tionship with existing context. Although he touches upon general issues when providing his fatawa, the compilation was, theoretically, a response to specihc questions rather than an exposition of elaborate theory applicable to other situations. Ibn Taymiyya's writings, however, differ signihcantly from Ibn Rushd's compilations, examined in the previous chapter. Ibn Rushd's com­mentaries are commentaries on Malikrfatdwa that seem to have been respon­sive to more general issues than Ibn Taymiyya's. It is impossible, at least for the purpose of this book, to ascertain if questions posed to Malik were different from those addressed to Ibn Taymiyya. One cannot thus conclude that Ibn Taymiyya was uniquely specihc in his approach. Nevertheless, what is clear is that Ibn Taymiyya invested much energy in examining the theology and prac­tice of existing “enemies” rather than offering abstract analysis that bears weight on existing reality.

5.3.2 The Mongols

As mentioned earlier, Ibn Taymiyya was troubled by the Mongol threat faced by Syria and dedicated much of his life and thought to fending off that threat. Unlike the early Mongols, however, who were easy to position as infidels at­tacking Muslims, most of the subjects of the Ilkhanids in Persia were Muslims, and with the conversion of Ghazan to Islam, the task of defining the conflict with that enemy became more daunting. The complexity of the situation is reflected in Ibn Taymiyya's legal analysis and categorization of the Mongols, which appears confused and often inconsistent. As mentioned earlier, most jurists categorized conflicts into three types: wars with non-Muslims, wars with apostates, and rebellion wars (baghy). Ibn Taymiyya's approach to the Mongols, however, draws from all categories and relies on another category, re­ferred to as khawarij, a term used initially to refer to the group of Muslims that rebelled against 'Ali b. Abr Talib, the fourth caliph, for accepting adjudication in his conflict with Muawiya b. Abi Sufyan, the fifth caliph.280 Ibn Taymiyya

280 In this chapter, the Khawarij refers to the group rebelling against 'Al, whereas khawarij refers to the legal category applied by Ibn Taymiyya.

argues that most early jurists distinguished between the Khawarij and the re­bels who relied in their rebellion on a legitimate, even if misguided, interpreta­tion of sharl⅛.28i Although Ibn Taymiyya does not identify those early jurists, he offers different sources to support this hypothesis. First, he relies on a pro­phetic hadlth reportedly transmitted by 'Al and similar to the ones relied on by Ibn Hazm, stating that young men with a fanatic, shallow commitment to religion will rebel and that they should be killed.282

He thus argues that because of their straying from religion, Ali was happy to fight the Khawarij and did not wait for them to commence fighting. His ap­proach to the Khawarij differed significantly from the position he took with Muawiya, whom he was reluctant to fight because Muawiya relied on a legiti­mate ta^,wll.283 Ibn Taymiyya, however, makes no attempt to reftite the claim made by earlier jurists like al-Shafi'i that Ali told the Khawarij he would not deny them access to God's mosques and would guarantee their share of the booty.284 Al-Shafi'i also reports that Caliph 'Umar b. Abdul Aziz instructed his companions not to fight the Khawarij until they initiated fighting.285 To further prove his point, Ibn Taymiyya argues that textual sources and consensus (of the Companions) show that there was always a distinction between Compan­ions rebelling against 'Ali and the Khawarij. He argues that 'Ali took the Khawarij's property as booty.286 Again, Ibn Taymiyya fails to refute or address the alternative claim made by al-Shafi'i - that Ali did not take the Khawarij's property and weapons as booty. Of course, Ibn Taymiyya cannot be expected to reftite every juristic argument. But he argues that the Hanafis and al-Shafi'i invented the tradition of a unified approach to rebellion and that their ap­proach to the khawarij had no legal basis.287 If that is the primary argument used by Ibn Taymiyya, then one should reasonably expect a refutation of the sources relied on to support this unified approach.

But Ibn Taymiyya's analysis is not limited to the category of khawarij, at least in terms of sources. He draws, for example, on traditional jihad (wars with infi­dels) sources. For example, he relies on the Quranic verse “[Believers], fight them until there is no more persecution,288 and all worship289 is devoted to

281 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu'at al-fatawa, 28:302.

282 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:303.

283 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 35:37.

284 al-Shafi'i, Umm, 4:309.

285 al-Shaβ'i, Umm, 4:309.

286 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:303.

287 Abou El Fadl, Rebellion, 62.

288 Fitna. Also translated as “encouragement” or “promotion of disbelief.”

289 The Arabic word is dln, also translated as “religion.”

God alone”290 to refer to the conflict. This verse was traditionally used to refer to conflicts with non-Muslims and interpreted to mean that those who prevent the religion of Allah from spreading across the globe should be fought until it does. However, in this context, Ibn Taymiyya argues the verse states that “all faith should be Allah's faith and the Mongols do not abide by ‘all of Allah's faith.”29i Accordingly, “if some aspects of the faith are Allah's and parts of it are not, fighting is imperative until all religion is Allah's religion.”292 This interpre­tation deviates to some extent from the interpretation adopted by Ibn Abbas and al-Hasan, among other Companions, as quoted by al-Tabari (d. 310/923) in his exegesis stating thatfitna in this verse refers to shirk (attributing partners to Allah).293

He also argued that the Mongols perceived Islam as one of many holy reli­gions that eventually lead to Allah and accordingly showed excessive tolerance of other religions like Christianity and Judaism.294 This tolerance, according to him, amounted to disbelief in Allah because “with the agreement of all Mus­lims, whoever justifies following any religion other than the religion of Islam or a shari^ta other than Muhammad's sharPa is an unbeliever, kcaliphate as a legally neces­sitated institution. He saw it more as a rational attempt to meet the demands of the Muslim community, that may possibly be replaced by alternative politi­cal institutions meeting such demands.304 Yet, Ibn Taymiyya does not provide an alternative criterion for determining a legitimate imam in the situation at hand, other than through vague references to adherence to Islam and, instead of thoroughly addressing this controversy, he inconsistently reverts to the re­gime of baghy. He argues that the Mongols have no ta^,wll,3°⁵ even though the aman granted by Ghazan to the people of Syria stated that the rulers of Egypt and Syria were not abiding by Islam and were vandalizing Muslim property.3٥6 He even goes as far as to argue that the Mongols are aware that the Mamlhks and their subjects are better Muslims than they are and that they do not claim to be Hghting in defence of Islam.307 Of course, one can argue that Ibn Taymi- yya was unaware of those communications and arguments. But, as Aigle notes, the fatawa of Ibn Taymiyya indicate strong knowledge of the Ilkhanids' politi­cal views.308 Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya's heavy involvement in the conflict and the truce with Ghazan suggest that he must have been aware of the Mongol ruler's claims, but he fails to make any reference to these claims, even to refute them.

He also argues that most of the Mongol army did not pray and that they did not have a mffadhdhin or an imam in their camp, using that as a Ihrther justifi­cation for accusing them of straying from Islam. However, other sources state that Ghazan never embarked on a battle without prayers.309 In fact, in his own

303 'Abdul Halim, Intishar, 200.

30y Ajum, Tay1iyyanM0ment,26⅛.

305 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:318.

306 'Abdul Halim, Intishar, 201.

307 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:318.

308 Aigle, “Mongol Invasions,” 106.

309 'Abdul Halim, Intishar, 196. words, Ibn Taymiyya refilled that argument in his previously cited interaction with Ghazan, where he claimed Ghazan came to Damascus with a judge and a prayer leader.310 Ibn Taymiyya also argued that the Mongols did not impose jizya on non-Muslims (i.e., they did not abide by established principles of Is­lamic law). However, it is also documented that Ghazan reinstated thejizya.311 Ibn Taymiyya acknowledged that himself in the Fatawa, where he states that Ghfizfins minister, Nawrfiz, imposed it on non-Muslims.312 He also claimed that the Mongols were fighting to force people to come under the banner of Chinggis Khan's empire and that they gave him a godly status similar to Jesus's in Christianity.3i3 This was despite the fact that Ghazan attempted to gain au­tonomy for his dynasty from the Khan, refirsing to inscribe the latter's name on coins because of his infidelity and replacing it with the Muslim shahada.3^γ4 Ibn Taymiyya's contradictory statements about the practices of the Mongols thus suggest that his dissatisfaction with Mongol Muslim faith led him to introduce novel legal arguments that deliberately conflated jihad against Muslims, apos­tasy, baghy, and the treatment of khawarj, which he claims to be distinct from the traditionally upheld regime of baghy, of which he was generally sceptical. This conflation of categories may be seen as a manifestation of Anjum's argu­ment fior Ibn Taymiyya's principled pragmatism and refiormist reorientation ofi Muslim jurisprudence,3i5 but Ibn Taymiyya's inconsistent approach to the Mongols' practice of Muslim faith, and his reluctance to develop a coherent reinterpretation of intra-Muslim conflict in a world of multiple authorities, in­dicates a commitment to predetermined rejection ofi Mongol rule.

Finally, he accuses the Mongols of being unfaithfil to the message of Islam because they relied heavily on the Shra in the conduct of their affairs, and he criticizes them for appointing Nasir al-Tfisi as a minister, which can be consid­ered a manipulation of Muslim sentiments against the Mongols through the insertion of a figure said to have encouraged Hfilegfi to kill the Muslim caliph

310 Abfi Zahra, Ibn Taymiyya, 34.

311 Aigle, “Mongol Invasions,” 106.

312 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:374. Apparently, the choice to attribute those acts to Nawrfiz was intended to evade the fact thatjizya reinstatement was under Ghazan's rule. Nawrfiz was a minister and a military commander under Ghazan. He is said to have played a major role in the Ilkhanids' conversion. However, after a power struggle, Nawrfiz was executed by Gh⅛z⅛n. See Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A Hisi^ory of Central Asia, trans. Naomi Walford, 8th ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, 2002), 380.

313 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:306.

314 'Abdul Halim, Intishar, 193.

3⅛ Anjum, TaymiyyanMomttSv

in the attack on Baghdad.316 But in reality, the reference to al-Ti, whose role in the early Mongol invasions is contested, does not affect the legal status of Muslim Mongols and the rules of conflict with them, because alTfisi died in 1274, whereas Ghazan converted to Islam in 1295.317 Moreover, it is hard to ar­gue that the appointment of a Shia minister rendered the entire ruling system unfaithful to Islam. The last 'Abbasid caliph had appointed a Shia minister, Ibn al-'Alqami, whom Ibn Taymiyya refers to as an example of Shi'a treason and cooperation with the Mongols,3!8 yet he does not seem to believe that this ap­pointment is cause for doubting the piety of the caliph.

Ibn Taymiyya's keenness on promotingJhad reflected also on his attitude to those who might claim they were coerced into fighting alongside the Mongols. In a response to a question about targeting and killing those who say they were forced to fight in the Mongol army, he argues that the Prophet ordered those who were coerced, to drop their swords and refrain from fighting, relying on the following hadlth:

There would soon be turmoil. Behold! there would be turmoil in which the one who would be seated would be better than one who would stand and the one who would stand would be better than one who would run. Behold! when the turmoil comes or it appears, the one who has camel should stick to his camel and he who has sheep or goat should stick to his sheep and goat and he who has land should stick to the land. A person said: “Allah's Messenger, what is your opinion about one who has neither camel nor sheep nor land?” Thereupon, he said: “He should take hold of his sword and beat its edge with the help of stone and then try to find a way of escape [if he can]. O Allah, I have conveyed (Thy Message); O Al­lah, I have conveyed (Thy Message); O Allah, I have conveyed (Thy Mes­sage).” A person said: “Allah's Messenger, what is your opinion it I am drawn to a rank in spite of myself, or in one of the groups and made to march and a man strikes with his sword or there comes an arrow and kills me?” Thereupon he said: “He will bear the punishment of his sin and that of yours and he would be one amongst the denizens of Hell.''319

316 Morgan, Mongols, 153.

317 Morgan, Mongols, 158.

318 Ibn Taymiyya, MaJmuat alfatawa, 28:310.

319 Sahlh Musl،m, 41:6896, online:, accessed 2 June 2011.

The hadlth instructs everyone not to engage in fighting in incidents of tur­moil and argues that anyone who kills another Muslim coerced into fighting would have sinned. However, Ibn Taymiyya selectively relies on this hadlth to argue that the one coerced by the Mongols should drop his sword and refrain from fighting and allow himself to be killed,320 even though the Prophet does not refer directly to refraining from defending oneself on the battlefield if es­cape is unachievable. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya fails to acknowledge the dual application of the hadlth to those fighting on both sides, which would include the Syrians and the Egyptians. However, Ibn Taymiyya is aware of the potential for the hadlth to limit the freedom of the Mamlfik army, and he tactfully avoids that limitation by claiming that the war with the Mongols is not a Jitna, but rather worse, because the side of the Mongols is not abiding by sharla, much like apostates. Accordingly, anyone coerced into fighting alongside the Mon­gols is under a stronger moral and legal responsibility not to fight, even in de­fence of his life.321 However, he does not pay attention to the fact that if one were to claim Mongols are apostates, then the hadlth would be irrelevant be­cause it refers to fighting between Muslims.

In order to further prove his argument, Ibn Taymiyya relies on another hadlth, according to which the Prophet told Ibn al-Abbas - after the latter claimed that he had been coerced into fighting the Muslims during the battle of Badr - that his appearance (Jahiruh) was against the Muslims and that his intentions were only evident before Allah, indicating that he did not accept his alibi.322 However, an analogy cannot be made between this hadlth and anyone claiming to have been coerced into fighting alongside the Mongols, because the hadlth refers to an infidel enemy, whereas the situation here involves a Muslim coerced into fighting under the banner of an officially Muslim army. Ibn Taymiyya also fails to recognize the possible application of another hadlth potentially leading to a contrary position, when Usama b. Zayd was repri­manded for killing a man who said the shahada and the Prophet instructed Ibn Zayd to trust the man's words rather than what he believed to be the man's in­tentions, telling him, “His tongue conveys what is in his heart.''323

5.3.3 Other Muslim Groups: the Shra

In addition to his position on the Mongols, Ibn Taymiyya was equally fervent about legitimizing and promoting conflict with the Shra Again, it is unclear

320 Ibn Taymiyya, MaJmrtat al-fatawa, 28:316.

321 Ibn Taymiyya, MaJmrtat al-fatawa, 28:316.

322 Ibn Taymiyya, MaJmrtat al-fatawa, 28:315.

3,23, SeeIbnAazm, Mulai,٦:.31٦. whether he perceived the Shia as khawarij or apostates. For example, he ar­gues that criticism of the early Companions of the Prophet is considered a deviation from the established (zahira) corroborated (mutawatira) Islamic sharPa, necessitating Hghting and jihad until they refrain from this act.324 In this case, criticism of the Companions is grouped with other acts normally treated as acts of apostasy, such as refraining from prayer, fasting, and payment of zakat. At the same time, he chooses on other occasions to refer to the Shia as khawarij, arguing that they are similar to the Khawarij in their refusal to abide by the sunna of the Prophet.325 The primary obstacle to understanding Ibn Taymiyyas position on the Shia is his vagueness with regards to whether or not khawarij are considered Muslims, as detailed in the previous section.

In addition to the employment of khawarij and apostasy language, Ibn Taymiyya resorts to hiraba in order to legitimize Hghting the Shia He argues that whoever refuses to submit to Allah and his Prophet is considered to have fought (harab) them. According to him, if jurists include bandits in their deh- nition of hiraba, then those who do not believe that Muslim blood and money are sanctified and who legitimize Hghting Muslims are closer to the hiraba verse and more deserving of being fought.326 By employing the regime of hiraba, Ibn Taymiyya, like Ibn Hazm, overrides a long tradition of treating hiraba as a non-political crime. Unlike Ibn Hazm, who expands hiraba to po­litical conflicts if methods that terrorize the public or threaten the vulnerable in a manner akin to methods employed in crimes traditionally falling under the hiraba regime are employed, Ibn Taymiyya allows for the application of hiraba if the group in question simply defies Islamic principles. To prove this point, Ibn Taymiyya relies on the hiraba verse, stating that “those who wage war against God and His Messenger and strive to spread corruption in the land should be punished by death, crucifixion, the amputation of an alternate hand and foot, or banishment from the land.''327 Despite the verse's theoretically de­fensive nature, Ibn Taymiyya uses it in a manner that allows for initiation of fighting against those who do not abide by God's obligations because their re­luctance to submit to the divine is an offensive act (hiraba) against God and his prophet. To further support this argument, he relies on a verse addressing new converts' reluctance to abandon riba (usury): “You who believe, beware of God: give up any outstanding dues from usury, if you are true believers. If you do

324 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:300.

325 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:240.

326 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:276.

327 ^q 5:33. not, then be warned of war from God and His Messenger.”328 Although the verse may be relied on as proof that those who fail to uphold sharPa may be fought, Ibn Taymiyya goes further, arguing that the warning of war from God and his Messenger is an indication that usurers commit an act of Hghting against God by persisting in the act.329 However, the verse does not indicate in any manner that usury is an act of hiraba against God. Ibn Taymiyyas assump­tion that a warning of war is an indication that the group warned has commit­ted an act of war is not supported by the above-mentioned verse. Thus, his conclusion that failing to abide by sharfa allows for applicability of hiraba and its established hudud, does not seem to have a solid foundation and is more reliant on fusion of different verses referring to the term harb or war in order to establish the applicability of the term hiraba, since it shares the same linguistic root.

It should also be noted that, in his analysis, Ibn Taymiyya commits the same “sin” that he attributes to the Sha, the sin of takfir, by accusing them of not being proper Muslims. As with his analysis of the Mongols, his categorization of the Sha is biased and slippery. For example, he criticizes them for consider­ing Jews and Christians better than Sunnis,330 whereas he himself refers to the Sha as infidels and literally states that they are worse than Jews and Chris- tians.331 He also denounces them for making it lawful to kill Muslims and take their property, but he argues that they are legitimate targets and that their property may be taken as booty.332

In addition to the expansion of the regimes of apostasy and khawarij, Ibn Taymiyya adopts a harsher approach to repentance from these “sins” for politi­cal leaders of the group, arguing that whoever promotes an innovation (bid^ca) in religion should be killed, even if he repents or is not found to be kafir. In order to justify his position, Ibn Taymiyya again resorts to hiraba, arguing that hiraba is not restricted to violent attacks against the religion, but includes propagation of a bid^ta, since such an act corrupts religion.333 Moreover, he ar­gues that the harsher treatment of the innovator is based on views of jurists like Ibn Hanbal who distinguish between the propagator of un-Islamic thought and his followers. For example, Ibn Hanbal deems testimony of the innovator

328 Q 2:278-79.

329 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:300.

330 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:276.

331 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:279.

332 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat al-fatawa, 28:240.

333 Ibn Taymiyya, Fatawa, 4:503. invalid and accepts the testimony of folowers.334 However, his reliance on Ibn Hanbal is at the least expansive qiyas. It is unclear how Ibn Taymiyya sees the rejection of testimony as a basis for execution simply because both rulings share the premise of the distinction between the innovator and his followers. If anything, one can argue that Ibn Taymiyya's ruling that an innovator must be killed contradicts Ibn Hanbal's rejection of the innovator's testimony, because the rejection of testimony is an indication that there is no directive in Ibn Hanbal's work to terminate that person's life. In other words, if an innovator comes forward to the court, and the court reffises his testimony and is silent on his status, this indicates the inapplicability of the death penalty.

IbnTayrniyyaandA InedconJlitConchidg Remarks

Ibn Taymiyya's work on conflict with the Mongols and Shra seems troubled by the potential for employment of baghy to limit warfare techniques available to the Mamlhks in their conflicts with the Mongols, so he attempts to limit the application of this legal regime. Whereas he acknowledges the protective regu­lations of baghy, such as lack of liability for deaths and destruction of property, as well as prohibition of killing once their danger is eliminated, “[i]t is likely that he affirms such paradigms and rules of conduct more out of deference to the inherited legal precedents than from conviction.''335 Confronted with this established legal tradition, he intelligently avoids its application to these groups and comes up with an alternative legal regime, drawing upon wars with infidels, apostasy, and his uniquely defined doctrine of khawarij, thereby ex­panding the powers of the more righteous sect in its conflict with other Mus­lims.

334 Ibn Taymiyya, Fatawa, 4:503.

335 Abou El Fadl, Rebellion, 275.