ISIS: the “Fear Doctrine”

The rise of ISIS has taken the world by shock and surprise. When it declared itself in 2006, very few observers expected that this “rogue” branch of al-Qa'ida would eventually eclipse the parent global jihadist network, let alone domi­nate and control at a certain point an impressive expanse of territory across Iraq and Syria.

145 'Abdul 'Aziz, “Tarshid” (22 November 2007).

146 al-Zawahiri, TabrCa, 5. His statements on Egypt during the Mursi regime indicate that unlike ISIS, al-Zawahiri showed greater tolerance for Muslim Brotherhood rule. as a reasonable alternative to Muslim hearts and minds. ISIS'S position is sig­nificantly different from al-Zawahiri, who despite his critique of the modern nation-state in the Arab world, still accepted this modern state as a reality and referred to Arab Christians as genuine Arabs who sometimes fight crusaders and defend the Prophet of Islam and the Islamic civilization, so are worthy of protection and toleration.147 ISIS, on the contrary, positioned itself as a caliph­ate, evoking imagery of the centuries-old Islamic political institution and its machinery and modality, including coinage and taxation systems. Most infa­mously, it claimed the revival of the institution of slavery.

Most analyses of ISIS's jurisprudence have portrayed the same shortcom­ings the discipline continues to suffer from, but with even more extensive brev­ity in dealing with the complex legal issues arising from the situation.

In this section, I focus on two issues that I believe to be significantly distinc­tive in comparison to ISIS's parent/predecessor, a!-Qa'ida. The first issue exam­ined in detail is the takfir of the ordinary Muslim residing in Muslim territories, and the second issue is the reinstitution of slavery and its closely associated denial of the protective status granted to non-Muslims in Muslim lands. De­spite the increased number of attacks in non-Muslim states and the relatively strong appeal that ISIS has enjoyed and utilized across Europe, this chapter does not focus on ISIS's jurisprudential approach to such attacks, due to the extensive coverage of the issue in the previous section and the relative similar­ity between the two organizations' positions on that mode of militant activity. But before addressing those two areas, a very brief history of ISIS is due.

147 al-Zawahiri, Tabrla, 171.

148 Sultan Muhamad Saad Ababakr et al., “Letter to al-Baghdadi,” online:, 16, accessed 24 May 2018. See also Ahmed Alda- woody, “ISIS and Its Brutality Under Islamic Law,” Kansai University Review of Law and Poittt cs>¾6f20r,5),VΛ--η.

149 Ababakr et al., “Letter to al-Baghdadi,” 15.

150 Ababakr et al., “Letter to al-Baghdadi,” 14-16.

HistOfyoflSIS

Many scholars rightly trace the recent history of ISIS to the well-known mili­tant hgure Abh Musab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006).

This sentiment was capitalized on by al-Qa'ida, as made evident in Bin Ladin's statement to the Iraqi people: “The ‘socialist infidels' of Saddam's Ba- athist regime, Bin Ladin said, were worthy accomplices in any fight against the Americans. To hurt the ‘far enemy,' jihadists were thus encouraged to collabo­rate with the remnants of a ‘near enemy' until the ultimate Islamic victory could be won.''155 Baath Party members' leaning towards militant Islamist groups was in all likelihood rooted in al-Hamla al-Imaniya (Faith Campaign) initiated by Saddam with his relative move towards Islamic revivalism in his later years.

151 Hassan A. Hassan and Michael Weiss, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 2nd ed. (New York: Regan Arts, 2016), 2.

152 Hassan and Weiss, ISIS, 10-11.

153 Hassan and Weiss, ISIS, 13-14.

154 Hassan and Weiss, ISIS, 17.

155 Hassan and Weiss, ISIS, 22.

against the regime.156 But the strongest driving force behind this alliance and the growth in popularity of a primarily sectarian mode of revolt was the estab- Iishment of the sectarian Shr regime of Nhri al-Malik who served as prime minister from 2006 to 2014 and reproduced much of Saddam's sectarian poli­cies against the Shi'a, with Sunnis at the receiving end. Nhri al-Malik aided by equally sectarian members of the judiciary and the security apparatus, man­aged to sabotage every attempt at including Sunni leaders, empowering Shra militant activity even if that would be detrimental to Iraqi stability, as evi­denced by his rash and callous handling of the leaders of al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (“The Islamic Awakening”), many of whom later fought at the side of ISIS and its predecessor, despite initial commitment to a relatively successful counter­terrorism activity against them. Al-Zarqawi and his successors were equally adept at utilizing and capitalizing on the discrimination policy against Sunnis, finally succeeding in creating an atmosphere ripe for Sunni militant activity against “infidel Western collaborating Shi'ites,” a narrative conveniently remi­niscent of Ibn Taymiyya's approach to the Shi'a and their relationship with the demise of the caliphate in Baghdad at the hands of the Mongol invaders.

After the death of al-Zarqawi in 2006, he was succeeded by Abh 'Umar al- Baghdadi, who declared ISIS in Iraq. Abh 'Umar was evenhially assassinated together with Abh Hamza al-Muhajir, his deputy, in April 2010, leading to the naming of Abh Bakr al-Baghdadi as the leader of ISIS in Iraq.

The Syrian regime, despite this fragility, has proven itself more capable of adapting to this vacuum. President Bashar al-Assad, who had long tolerated his state being a back door for militant destabilization in Iraq, met the protests in Syria with determined, brutal force. Contrary to claims made by al-Assad and his supporters, protests in Syria were, in their initial stages, economically and politically motivated. As noted by Gerges, protests started in rural areas like Dara'a that had been hit hard by the state's neoliberal shift away from the agrarian sector? With a sectarian regime traditionally staffed at elite levels by Alawite associates of the al-Assad regime, the Syrian protests were met by

156 Hassan and Weiss, ISIS, 25.

157 Fawaz Gerges, ISIS:A History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 170. heavy force that eventually radicalized protesters and pushed many to lean towards Islamism. Other factors contributed to that development, including amnesties granted by the regime almost exclusively to Islamists in Syrian pris­ons like Sednaya; the relative toleration by the regime of militant Islamist and Baathist mobility through Syria into Iraq; instability in neighbouring Iraq; and foreign involvement from Gulf states in support of Islamist members of the opposition. All these factors accelerated the Islamization of the protests, which eventually turned into full-blown internal war in Syria.158 This war, together with the deterioration of Iraqi politics along sectarian lines, created conditions ripe for the emergence, or perhaps rebirth, of ISIS under the leadership of Abh Bakr al-Baghdadi.

While the prison experience played an important role in radicalizing many Islamic militants, in al-Baghdadi's case it was more significant in allowing him to establish strong relations within the vast networks of militant Islam in Iraq. Born in the city of Samraa' in 1971, he belonged to a lower middle-class family and was educated at a local public school. The religious al-Baghdadi was radi­calized by the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was “a turning point for thou­sands of Sunnis who suspected the United States of offering Iraq on a silver platter to the Shia and their regional sectarian patron, Iran, consequently dis­inheriting the Sunni Arabs.”i59 Al-Baghdadi was eventually arrested and de­tained in the infamous Camp Bucca in Iraq, where he was said to have proven himself extremely apt at resolving internal tensions between Islamist militants held in the camp and at gaining the prison administration's Irust as a mediator in prison conflicts.^ This guaranteed him extensive mobility in the camp and allowed him the rare opportunity of cementing relations with former Iraqi army members, as well as with Islamists such as his spokesperson, Abh Muhammad al-Adnani (d. 2016). Al-Baghdadi's Camp Bucca experience was also a rite of passage for him, allowing him to rank himself alongside high- profile Islamist militants in Iraq.161 So when al-Zarqawi's successors were bombed in 2010, the leadership decided to place their trust in al-Baghdadi, a leader holding a Ph.D. in Islamic studies, a level of official religious education rarely arrived at by Islamist miltants.162

158 Gerges, ISIS, 170-75.

159 Gerges, ISIS, 131.

160 Gerges, ISIS, 134.

161 Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, ISIS: The State ofTerror, Kindle ed. (London: William Collins, 2015), loc. 753.

162 Stern and Berger, ISIS, loc. 764.

Around the same time, Nhri al-Malik whose targeting of al-Sahwa leaders eroded the potential for popular opposition to ISIS, was defeated in Iraqi elec­tions. He used several political and legal maneuvers, with the aid of the Su­preme Constitutional Court, to remain in power as prime minister, minister of interior, and, briefly, defence minister.163 His sectarian and divisive staffing of the security apparatus, his sabotage of the awakening movement, and his de­liberate targeting of Sunnis made it easier for ISIS to seize one-third of Iraqi territory in 2014 without a fight.164

Meanwhile in Syria, ISIS deliberately kept a low profile, providing support to al-Qa'ida-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. At that stage, Jabhat al-Nusra relied pri­marily on local Hghters to avoid alienating the Syrian opposition. Some schol­ars claim that the mastermind behind the Syrian expansion of ISIS was Hajji Bakr, a former lieutenant in Saddam's army who was killed in Syria in 2014.165 “ISIS went to great lengths to back al-Nusra's expansion in many towns in northern Syria, particularly in rural areas in the provinces of al-Raqqah, Idlib, Deir al-Zour, and Aleppo.''i66 However, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra - follow­ing alz wahiri's strategy of emphasis on local support and legitimacy - at­tempted to blend in with the Syrian opposition.i67 But in April 2013, al-Baghdadi announced the merger between ISIS in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra under his leadership, claiming a pledge of allegiance by Abh Mhhammad alJhlan, the emir of al-Nusra at the time, who denied the pledge and affirmed allegiance to al-Zawahiri, who equally rejected such an alliance and urged both groups to restrict themselves to their localities.i68

It is within this context that ISIS emerged and continues to play a key role in the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts, with varying degrees of territorial control. Con­sidering ISIS's emphasis on unwavering and uncompromising jihad, against unbelievers in comparison to other militant organizations such as al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, this chapter focuses on two primary and distinctive jurispru­dential manifestations of this claim in their conduct ofjihad, the expansion of takflr to include the average Muslim living under Muslim rule, and the claim to puritanism by allegedly restoring archaic practices such as slavery and eroding non-Muslim protections.

163

164

165

166

167

168

Gerges, ISIS, 113.

Gerges, ISIS, 113.

Hassan and Weiss, ISIS, 116.

Gerges, ISIS, 181.

Gerges, ISI S, 182.

Gerges, ISIS, 188--8.

The literature examined in this chapter includes the works of a prominent ISIS ideologue, Turkf al-Binali, and the English publications produced by ISIS, Dabiq and Rumiyah, until June 2017. Al-Binal a relatively young Bahraini scholar (he was born in 1984), went by several pseudonyms (e.g. Abb Khuzay- ma al-Mudari, Abb Human al-Athari Abb Sufyan al-Sulami, and interestingly, Ibn Hazm al-Salafi).19 He briefly lived and studied in Dubai but was arrested and deported to Bahrain. Thereafter, he travelled to Beirut and studied at al- Awzai University؛™ Until his death during a coalition attack in June 2017,171 he was considered persona non grata in Bahrain, after the termination of his citi­zenship. He authored several works on a prolific array of subjects such as beard letting, suicide bombing, and takflr. As noted by Bunzel, he also played a prom­inent role in refuting and attacking ISIS's adversaries, most prominently dis­crediting his former shaykh and the primary source of his legitimacy, al-Maqdisi.172 In this section, I focus on a!-Bin'ali's Sharh shurut wa mawani^c al-takflr (“The elaboration of the conditions and limitations to declarations of disbelief”) and his Muqararfll-tawhld li-l-mu^caskarat (“A curriculum in mono­theism for the camps”).

3.2 Takfir: Collapsing Categories

As explained in previous chapters, the pre-modern Islamic legal tradition on the regulation of armed conflict determines the permissibility of targeting on the basis of four primary factors: religious status, gender, age, and, in many cases, capability of participation in combat. These factors intersect constantly with each other to determine the permissible course of action with the indi­vidual or groups of individuals when engaging in combat. The underlying as­sumption behind this system is that you can, with relative certainty, navigate within it. However, with the Islamic world moving to the defensive rather than the offensive, jurists have attempted to reformulate this system to varying de­grees. Ibn Hazm, for example, determined that the baghy regime was incapa­ble of addressing the fluidity of the Ta'ifa state, so he expanded the scope of the hiraba regime. Ibn Taymiyya, on the other hand, confronted with the question

169 Cole Bunzel, “The Caliphate's Scholar in Arms,” Jihadica (9July 2014), online:, accessed 15 April 2017.

170 Abb Usama al-Gharib, al-Mukhta?ar al-jalliy bi-sirat shaykhina Turki a!-Bin'ali, online: Although there is no reference to the Prophet's words on the matter, al-Bin'alr claims that because Balta'a asserted that he had not com­mitted his acts out of apostasy, those acts must have been understood to con­stitute ku/r.179

The third lesson addresses impediments to takfir, which al-Bin'alr divides into heavenly impediments - meaning impediments outside the individual's control, such as insanity and age - and acquired impediments, which he fo­cuses the lesson on. The first such impediment is coercion, divided into debili­tating and non-debilitating coercion, or in his words kurh mulji’ (inevitable coercion) and kurh ghayr mulji’ (not inevitable coercion). Kurh mulji’ is in turn divided into fully forcible coercion (such as being carried by force to a place one swore not to go to) and coercion by threats (such as being threatened with death to go to said place).!8٥ Al-Bin'alr quotes Ibn Taymiyya to prove that both types constitute valid grounds for committing an act of kufr without being deemed a kafir only if the threat is serious and painful, such as threats of death, cutting of limbs, and burning.181 Such threats are valid as well only if: (1) the coercer is capable of fulfilling the threat, (2) the coercer is likely to fulfil the threat, (3) the threat is immediate, and (4) the coerced has no alternative other than to commit the act of kufr.↑82 Finally, the act of kufr cannot be committed if it is permanent or it entails supporting unbelievers, as per consensus. How­ever, it is worth noting that the consensus relied on in this case is a general consensus on the prohibition of killing another individual to save one's life.183 Al-Bin'alr further asserted the same claim when asked by a member of the au­dience about scholars who legitimize, for example, cooperating with French intelligence to fight those that such scholars deem as takfirls.184 He replied that such scholars are kafirs beyond doubt.185

The other impediment to takfir is when an act of kufr is committed uninten­tionally. Al-Bin'alr gives the example of a prophetic hadlth, where a man had said he was the lord and that Allah was his slave, and the Prophet said his slip was an act of confusion due to excitement rather than a pronunciation of

181

182

apostasy.186 But the error mentioned here is a minor error in the performance of the act rather than an error in the assumption that an act does not consti­tute kufr and performing it. AfBinah gives the example of a person who be­lieves in democracy or who believes that democracy is the path to justice without realizing that democracy entails deviating from God's laws and claims this person would still be a kfr.187

The fourth lesson examines the impediment of jahl (ignorance). AfBinalr quotes Ibn Taymiyya and states that ignorance precluding takfir is ignorance that cannot be alleviated through pursuit of knowledge.i88 He then addresses the issue of judges who ignorantly fail to apply God's laws, relying on a hadlth that a judge who judges on the basis of his ignorance would end up in Hell.189 He also quotes Ibn Qayyim stating that there are two types of kafir, a resolute one, who refuses to accept religion despite knowledge of its correctness, and an ignorant one.190 But minor ignorance of a branch of religion leading to a plausible interpretation (taWll mustasagh) is possibly a form of jahl that im­pedes takflr.↑9↑

In the last lesson, al-Bin'alr addresses several other issues, such as how obe­dience to a scholar does not preclude one's responsibility for an act of kufr.192 The most significant aspect of this lesson is al-Bin'alr's assertion that proof is necessary in the case of an individual over whom power is exercised, but not in the case of a person who possesses shawka, who may be automatically fought for acts of disbelief. He then quotes Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyya stating that the Companions of the Prophet did not question those who refused to pay the zakat (alms tax) to determine whether or not they deemed it an obligation under sharia. 193

Al-Bin'alr's other book examined here, Muqararfl l-tawhid li-l-mu^taskarat, focuses extensively on the notion of hakimiyya (divine sovereignty) and the legitimacy of human-made laws. According to him, a Muslim's foremost obli­gation is to disbelieve in the taghut (injustice and polytheism) and to believe solely in Allah. He quotes Ibn Qayyim stating that belief is not complete with­out animosity and hatred towards the enemies of God and that those enemies

must be fought to arrive at the satisfaction of the Divine.194 He defines the taghut as any entity obeyed or worshipped other than Allah and follows Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's classification of taghut into five types: (1) Satan, (2) an unjust ruler who deviates from Allah's laws, (3) anyone whojudges on the basis of anything other than Allah's laws, (4) anyone who claims knowledge of con­cealed matters, and (5) anyone who worships anyone other than Allah.195 He defines worship for Allah or monotheistic belief as not just belief in one God, which many religions adhere to, but ritualistic practice in accordance with monotheistic belief in Allah and belief in his qualities and attributes as stipu­lated in the Quran.196 But most of the book is dedicated to nawaqid al-Islam (nullifiers of Islam), based on Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's work. Of primary concern here to us are matters relating to governance.

In the first nullifier, a!-Bin'al asserts that average Muslims cannot use the excuse of following scholars or leaders against the will of Allah, following Ibn Taymiyya's arguments quoting the Quranic verse, “They take their rabbis and their monks as lords, as well as Christ, the son of Mary. But they were com­manded to serve only one God: there is no god but Him; He is far above what­ever they set up as His partners,''197 to claim that those who do so belong to one of two camps. The first camp are those who commit kufr or shirk by knowingly deviating from Allah's orders to follow their leaders out of belief in their lead­ers' deviations. The second camp are those who continue to believe in Allah's orders but follow their leaders, hence committing a sin rather than kufr.198

As for the second nullifier, a!-Bin'al claims that there is juristic consensus that whoever believes that mediators, alive or dead, can help their prayers answered with God have committed kufr. However, there is no explicit refer­ence to scholars taking that position, and there is no elaborate definition of what constitutes mediation and what doesn't. This statement is, of course, of significant relevance to the approach to the Shra and the position on their belief.199

The third nullifier is failure to designate unbelievers as kuffar. According to a!-Bin'alr, those who fail to do so with original unbelievers (i.e. non-Muslims) would be committing kufr themselves. Additionally, those who do not find acts by governors who deviate from shar7a as constituting kufr would also be

194 Turk! a!-Bin'all, Muqararfl l-tawhld ²²-l-mu’askarat, 2014, 4, online:, accessed 10 April 2017.

195 a!-Bin'all, Tawhld, 5.

196 a!-Bin'all, Tawhld, 14.

197 Q 9:31.

198 a!-Bin'all, Tawhld, 26.

199 a!-Bin'all, Tawhld, 29.

committing kufr. However, those who disagree on the designation of such rul­ers because of doubt, ignorance, or reliance on Ikhtilaf do not commit kufr, unless evidence has been provided to them and they continue with their argu­ment, in which case they still commit kufr.^[43]

The fourth nulliher is very close to the first, to some extent, because it as­serts that whoever believes that any rule other than the rule of Islam could be better would be committing kufr, hence following the laws of the taghut (any­thing or anyone other than Allah) constitutes kufr. To prove this argument, al- Binalr relies on general Quranic verses that prove that true religion is Islam, like, “Today I have perfected your religion for you, completed My blessing upon you, and chosen as your religion Islam: [total devotion to God]”;20i “True Reli­gion, in God's eyes, is Islam: [devotion to Him alone]”;202 and “If anyone seeks a religion other than complete devotion to God, it will not be accepted from him: he will be one of the losers in the Hereafter.''203 He also relies on the opin­ions of the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia in the 1960s and Mauritanian scholar al-Shanqt (d. 1970s).204 Ruling against God's laws includes (1) judging against God's laws due to bribery or interests, (2) drafting and implementing human-made laws, (3) following the predecessors' laws, (4) willingly uphold­ing a predecessor's human-made laws, (5) applying human-made laws due to coercion, and (6) applying human-made laws due to ignorance.205 Al-Binalr claims the first case is minor kufr that does not deem one a non-Muslim, be­cause according to Ibn Abbas, it was committed during the reign of the Umayy­ads. However, resorting to human-made laws not only constitutes kufr but also represents a significant deviation from the Islamic tradition, a deviation that had only been introduced with Mongol rule.206 He extensively examines the other five cases to prove that they all constitute kufr and that, as stated in his other works, coercion and ignorance do not constitute an impediment to es­tablishing an individual's kufr.207

In addition to other less relevant nullifiers of Islam (such as disdain and mockery for God's laws, the belief that some individuals are superior to ad­herence to those laws, and sorcery), two other nullifiers stand out: the eighth and the tenth. The eighth nullifier is support and assistance for unbelievers.

Al-Binal relies on both Ibn Hazm and Ibn Taymiyya's claims that such acts constitute ridda.208 Finally, he asserts the limited space for ignorance as an impediment to establishing apostasy.209

3.2.1.1 Dabiq and Rumiyah: ISIS^,S English Newsletters

Until recently, ISIS published an English propaganda newsletter, Dabiq, but it seems that the title has been replaced with Rumiyah. Both titles invoke apoca­lyptic prophetic hadlths relating to Muslim triumph at the end of times, a theme featured extensively in ISIS's propaganda.2io Collectively, eighteen is­sues were published up to April 2017, with much of each issue dedicated to celebrating ISIS's triumphs in Iraq, Syria, and other parts of the world. Per­sonal profiles of deceased fighters are often highlighted, and pieces criticizing ISIS's detractors are almost permanent content in the newsletters. Addition­ally, in many issues, we find brief and unelaborated references to jurisprudence justifying ISIS's operations against religious minorities, the Shia, and some Sunni groups, on the grounds of their apostasy (kufr).

¾.2..1-.2 TheShfa

A common theme in these ISIS publications is criticism of al-Zawahiri, his sup­porters, and Muslim clergy for failing to “acknowledge” that the Shia are apos­tates from Islam. Evidence to the apostasy of the Shra is gathered from al-Zarqawi's writings, and claims are made to consensus among scholars, in­cluding Ibn Hazm, Ibn Hanbal, and al-Shafi'i, to the apostasy of the Shi'a. How­ever, one interesting tactic employed is to assume automatically that Shi'i theology is dependent on slander of the Prophet's Companions. Ibn Hanbal, for example, who is quoted in support of such claim, is quoted as stating that whoever slanders Aisha, Abfi Bakr, and 'Umar commits apostasy.211 This claim is employed collectively against all Shi'a, including the Zaydi sect in Yemen.212 In continuation of Ibn Taymiyya's critique of the Shi'a, they assert that the Shi'a deem Muslims apostates and have targeted and persecuted Muslims throughout their history, as evidenced by their cooperation with the Mongols

208 a!-Bin'ali, Tawhld, 47.

209 a!-Bin'ali, Tawhld, 49.

210 W⅛⅛am McCants, Te ISIS Apocaiypse: TheHsstory,StagyadDoomisdayVtstonofthe Islamic State, Kindle ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2015), loc. 1761.

211 Dabiq, Issue 6, December 2014, 19, online:, accessed 1 April 1 2017.

212 Dabiq, Issue 6, December 2014, 21.

to bring about the downfall of the 'Abbasid caliphate.2i3 Another significant tactic is to claim that Shr thought had been meant from its onset to corrupt Muslim belief. Ibn Taymiyya, and others, for example, are relied on to prove scepticism of the Rafida^ls2i4 sincerity in conversion to Islam and that despite their reverence of 'Alr, he burnt them and their leader, 'Abdullah b. Saba), alive.215 This strategy of confusing the classical jurisprudential position on the Rafida with that on the Shr'a is carried on consistently throughout the newslet­ter. In addressing the conftrsion in terminology, ISIS is deliberately attempting to create a confident belief that Twelver Shr'a are and have always been seen as Rafida, drawing the conclusion that all Shr'a are apostates who maybe fought. 216

As for the name “Rafidah," then it comes from the word “rafad" meaning to reject. They were named so when they came to Zayd Ibn 'Alr b. al- Husayn Ibn 'Alr Ibn Ibi Talib (died 122AH) and asked him to declare bara’ah from Abti Bakr and 'Umar in exchange for their support. He re- Itised to do so and instead said, “May Allah have mercy upon them both." So they told him, “We then reject you." Henceforth, they were called “the rejecters." The scholars also called them so because the Rafidah rejected the imamah of Abti Bakr, 'Umar, and 'Uthman, because they rejected the Sahabah, because they rejected the Sunnah, and because they essentially rejected the Qur'an and the religion of Islam.

As for the name “Shiah," then it is from the root "shaya'a" meaning to support, as the Rafidah claimed to support 'Alr, preferring him to Abti Bakr and 'Umar.

As for the names "Ithnaashriyyah" meaning “Twelver," and “Ima- miyyah," from the root “imam," then it is due to their belief in a line of twelve imams whom they claimed were "ma'stim" (infallible). These twelve are 'Alr b. Abr Talib and... But none of these eleven was upon Rafd, except according to the fabrications propagated by the Rafidah.217

Shr'ah. is a label more general than that of the Rafidah, as it in­cludes those who preferred 'Alr to Abti Bakr and 'Umar and while still

213 Dabiq, Issue 11, September 2015, 17, online:, accessed 1 April 2017.

214 Derogatory term currently used to refer to the Shia.

215 Dabiq, Issue 13, January 2016, 33, online:, accessed 1 April 2017.

216 Dabiq, Issue 13, January 2016, 35.

217 Dabiq, Issue 13, January 2016, 34.

recognizing the Khilafah of Abu Bakr and 'Umar and their companion­ships. This is an extinct phenomenon.218

Additionally, laymen are deemed to have committed apostasy for allegedly committing acts that ISIS deems as constitutive of apostates, such as prostrat­ing to graves and worshipping shrines; considering the Companions of the Prophet apostates and slandering them, particularly Abu Bakr, 'Umar and Aisha; and “fanatical love of the twelve imams, preferring some of them to most of the Prophets [and] even attributing to them attributes of Allah's worship.''219 Yet, no evidence is provided from Shr scholarship to support these claims, unlike the evidence provided for reverence for the Mahdr (twelfth hidden imam) provided from several Shr'r works.220

At first instance, the arguments put forward by ISIS for the kufr of the Shr'a might seem convincing due to their extensive reliance on different juristic views from across Islamic history. But they do not withstand scrutiny, and they rely extensively on obfuscating the two terms used in classical jurisprudence: rafidland shn ISIS seems to be intent on leading the reader to believe in the similarity between the terms by insisting on glossing over the actual distinc­tion between the modern-day Shr'a and the Rahda, as evidenced from the deh- nitions provided above. When confronted with the fact that many scholars did not, in fact, deem the Shr'a apostates, they provide a very narrow definition for the Shr'a, arguing that Shr'r scholars talked about and believed to be Muslims are the ones who simply favoured 'Alr as the first caliph but recognized the cali­phate of Abu Bakr and 'Umar and are now extinct,221 and that scholars did not deem them collectively an apostate group, because they had concealed their rafd for centuries, until the rise of the ?afavid state.222

However, if one were to consult Ibn Hazm, a scholar quoted for his takflr of the ShraRfia we find that his definition of Shr'a differs significantly from the definition provided above by ISIS, where he defines the Shr'a as those who believe that 'Alr was the best of the Companions, that he and his descendants were entitled to the imama, and that anyone who does not accept those claims cannot be referred to as a Shr'r,223 which proves that ISIS's claim to an early perception of the Shr'a as limited to a mere preference for 'Alr over Abu Bakr

218 Dabiq, Issue 13, January 2016, 38.

219 Dabiq, Issue 13, January 2016, 35.

220 Dabiq, Issue 11, September 2015, 16.

221 Dabiq, Issue 13, January 2016, 38.

222 Dabiq, Issue 13, January 2016, 38.

223 Ibn Hazm, Fisal, 2:90. and 'Umar while recognizing their caliphate is not an accurate reading of such jurisprudence. True, in some sections of his book, Ibn Hazm criticizes the dif­ferent Shrr sects and makes claims as to their kufr, including Imamiyya. But in doing so, he goes through their different belief systems he believes to be here­tic, including their belief in the divinity of 'Alr b. Abr Talib and slander of the Companions.224 However, in the same book, he argues that a number of sects, including the Shr'a, claim adherence to Islam. He then states the closest of the Shr'a sects to the Sunnrs are the followers of al-Hamazanr, who believe in the right to imama of the descendant of 'Alr, while the furthest are the Imamrs. Other extremist Rafidis, ghallya, are not among the people of Islam, but are unbelievers as per the consensus of the nation.225 The contrast provided be­tween Imamrs and other extremist Shr'a, with one seen on the spectrum of Is­lam, while the other is cast outside the realm of Muslim belief, raises serious questions about the complexity of classical jurisprudential positions on the status of the Shr'a, as well as about claims of disbelief, especially by scholars like Ibn Hazm, known for harsh, relentless criticism of the other. In other words, if Ibn Hazm seems in some instances to recognize the Islamicity of cer­tain sects, while in other incidents to throw claims of kufr at them, how does one read his position? In this case, if one were to accept his accusations of kufr, how would one deal with the statement he once made of none other than Abfi Hanrfa and his companions, “There is no response to this view other than that it is the hukm of Iblrs, Satan. By God, we do not know how a Muslim's soul opened up to such a view that is defiant of God Almighty and his prophet,''226 knowing well that despite his disdain for Abfi Hanrfa's brand of jurisprudence, he still considered him a prominent Muslim jurist?

But aside from the need to read and examine complexity and potential in­coherence in classical jurisprudential texts, Ibn Hazm's approach and position on the Shr'a makes it clear that isis's attempt to claim congruency between jurisprudential positions on the Shr'a and the Rafida clearly oversimplifies the classical tradition. It might be counterargued that the essence of jurispruden­tial takfir of the Rafida is their slander of the Companions, and that while a claim to their belief in the divinity of 'Alr might be contested, their position on the Companions is clear, as is frequently stated in the Dabiq newsletter. How­ever, this again oversimplifies a very complex and rich theological tradition and, more important, it disregards the plentiful evidence that members of the Shr'r community in Iraq, including prominent religious authorities, have

224 Ibn Hazm, Fisal, 4:137-44.

225 Ibn Hazm, Fisal, 2:89.

226 Ibn Hazm, Muhalla, 11:114. expressed their respect for the Companions. For example, al-Najafi, the spokes­person for the Najaf marja^c, explicitly stated that it denounces slander or of­fence to any of the key hgures of Muslims and other eligions,227 and al-Sisttini, Nuri al-Malik and even Muqtada al-Sadr, albeit indirectly, have denounced slander of the Companions of the Prophet.228 Although ISIS does claim that the Shia hide their true belief under the pretext of Iaqlyya, its relying on a be­lief system of a particular group to deem them apostates, then rejecting their claims about their own belief system, is hardly an established tradition in Is­lamic jurisprudence.

3>.2,A.3 SumtiMushms

One significant - in fact, necessary - category for the targeting of non-Muslim categories are Sunni Muslims. Predictably, ISIS follows in the footsteps of many militant organizations that deemed Muslim regimes apostate ones. Building on a long tradition of insistence on the necessity of a state's applying Islamic law for it to be deemed Islamic, the Dabiq and Rumiyah newsletters reiterate the arguments put forward by al-Binali with regards to takflr and ap­ply those arguments to modern-day reality. ISIS thus argues that whoever be­lieves in “democracy, nationalism, and manmade laws''229 is an apostate. Anyone who participates in an electoral process, even by voting, or relies on the existing legal system is also an apostate.230 A Muslim who lives in such ter­ritories must resist those laws and abandon such acts of apostasy or otherwise be deemed a legitimate target by ISIS.231 Naturally, a group receiving the most abrasive criticism for their toleration of kufr and failure to accept the tactics of ISIS are either Islamic militants who have issued muraja^cat, like Sayyid Imam Abdul Aziz (who is curiously left out of a long list of “repenting” militants, despite his prominence in militant circles), or other militant “scholars” who deemed ISIS sinners for their splinter from a!-Qa'ida. The most prominent, and those focused on extensively in Dabiq, are al-Zawahiri, al-Maqdisi, and Abti Qatada. It is hardly surprising that significant attention would be given to these

227 “Marja'iat al-Najaf: Nufariq bayn al-Sahabi al-Jalil wa-l-Munafiq,” AlJazeera (26 Decem­ber 2014), online:, accessed 17 April 2017.

228 "al-Marja' al-Sistani: Sabb alalaba mustankar wa mudan wa yukhalif ma amar bih Al al-Bayt,” al-Sumaria TV, 10 October 2013, online:, accessed 17 April 2017.

229 Rumiyah, Issue 1, September 2016, 6.

230 Rumiyah, Issue 1, September 2016, 6.

231 Rumiyah, Issue 1, September 2016, 5.

three considering their credentials in Islamist militant circles and their strong jurisprudential or operational weight.

Aside from the issue of apostasy of the regime with all its complications, I will focus here on the attempt to deem Muslims living under rule by such re­gimes apostates, due to its serious implications on targeting in situations of armed conflict. It is clear that living in a territory where the laws of Islam are not implemented is one of the primary pretexts for deeming ordinary citizens who accept or interact with such a law kuffar. One of the strongest bases for this argument is the reliance on Ibn Hazm and his instruction to Muslims to emigrate from the territory of war, disregarding other alternative views such as al-Shaybani's, which deal pragmatically with Muslim travel to the territory of war and prevent treachery in this case.232 However, their selective reliance on Ibn Hazm fails to take account of his full view of the matter and his assertion that a Muslim has not committed kufr for submission to a state that may be deemed as apostate as long as it claims to adhere to Islam.

If he was there to fight the Muslims and assist the kuffar with a service... he is an infidel and if he was living there for a material interest and he is like a dhimml to them, then he is not far from infidelity and we do not exouseandpray for hm f^u^t^the situation^ is not the same with hoeer iives in submission to the people of infidelity from the Ghaiiya ^extremist Sha١ and whoever is ilke them, i^e^(^c^r^ι^e in E^c^١^T^t and al⅜yrawan and their like,Islamisthedominant١religion١andtheir Ieadersdespiteallthis, ClonotpubiiclydenounceIslam.R^c^thertheybelongtolsa^m,ev^en if theya^re truly kuffar.

As for the one who resides in the land of the Qaramita [a sect per­ceived to portray heresy], he is an infidel with no doubt, because they [the Qaramita] are known for their infidelity and abandonment of Islam, and we pray to God to spare us that.

As for the one who resides in a territory where some whims leading to infidelity are widespread, he is not a kafir, because the banner of Islam is the dominant [one] there at any rate, from monotheism, to acknowledge­ment of Muhammad's message, innocence from any religion other than Islam, holding of prayer and fasting during Ramadan.233

This sentiment is to some extent echoed in Ibn Taymiyya's famed Mardin fatwa, Mardin being a satellite statelet of the Mongols. Whereas Mardin was

232 Dabiq, Issue 11, September 2015, 23.

233 Ibn Hazm, Muhalla, 11:200 (my italics). not seen by Ibn Taymiyya as ruled by the laws of Islam, he stated that there is no automatic duty on a Muslim to emigrate from the territory of Islam unless he cannot uphold his religion.234 Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya stated that the city is not a land of peace, because it does not uphold ahkam al-Islam, but it is not a territory of war, because many of the inhabitants are Muslim. “Rather, it consti­tutes a third type [of domain], in which the Muslim shall be treated as he mer­its, and in which the one who departs from the Way/Law of Islam shall be combated as he merits.''235 As Michot rightly asserts, upholding one's religion may go beyond individual practice. “However, what is beyond doubt, is that, in the fatwa of Mardin, Ibn Taymiyya speaks of it in the singular, not the plural. Then, this giving practical effect to the religion, is in the first instance, an indi­vidual personal matter, not collective, not communitaιan.''236 To a great ex­tent, this appears to be in line with Ibn Taymiyya's views of Muslims under Muslim rule. When addressing the question of a Muslim coerced by Mongol rulers to fight other Muslims, he argues that this person may be killed, but he does not state that he ought to be killed for straying from Islam for the simple act of living under Mongol rulers, but because his apparent position is one of a Muslim waging war against other Muslims, hence he can be killed and if he were coerced, it would reflect on his appearance before God in the heeafter.237

3.2.2 Non-Muslims: Erosion of Jizya Protections

¾.2,.2,A UncontestedPeopLeof IheBookrtheCaseof Ch tlans

ISIS has long attacked Christian communities in Iraq, Syria, and, most recently, Egypt. The justifications provided for targeting Christians is a three-step pro­cess, whereby initially they are deemed as unbelievers (kuffar), hence they le­gitimately fall under the muharibun category, relying on an approach to Islamic law whereby non-Muslims may be targeted until they either convert to Islam, pay theJizya, or face death. The second step towards the legitimation of the targeting of Christians is an assertion that Christians are not dhimmls, due to their failure to pay theJizya to ISIS. This argument is closely connected to the argument that Sunni Muslim states are apostate states and that, in the pre­sent, the only legitimate authority in the Muslim world is ISIS itself. Failure to pay the Jizya to ISIS indicates that People of the Book may not be deemed dhimmls, so are considered harbls and may be attacked. Finally, ISIS also

234 Ibn Taymiyya quoted in Yahya Michot, Muslims Under Muslim Rule (Oxford: Interface Publishers, 2006), 63.

235 Michot, Muslims, 65.

236 Michot, Muslims, 18.

237 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmrtat, 28:316.

argues that Christians are closely affiliated with the current apostate regimes in their battle against Islam. For example, in reference to Egyptian Christians, they state “the Copts yesterday chose Jizyah, but today wage war against Islam.''238 Interestingly, Abh Khattab al-Yamani, who penned a statement on the slaughtering of tens of Coptic Christians at the hands of ISIS in Libya in 2015 refers to

what happens to Muslims at the hands of the Nasara,239 especially in Central Africa, from killing of Muslims, slaying, burning and mutilation of bodies.... All of that is not publicized by the agent Zionised Media be­cause the murdered is a poor helpless Muslim.. Someone might say what do the Nasara of Africa have to do with the Nasara of Egypt; we re­spond that the nation of disbelief is one [nation] and they fight Muslims in totality, so we fight them in totality in accordance with Allah's words.240

Aside from issues previously addressed in the section on al-Qa'ida with regards to the legitimacy of indiscriminate attacks, especially on places of worship or the issue of apostasy of the regime, there are two novel, core issues that are worthy of attention, the notion of loss of dhimml status due to living under apostate regimes, and the notion that all Christians may be fought collectively in return for actions committed by Christian groups anywhere in the world.

On the first issue, the primary challenge comes from the jurisprudence of Ibn Taymiyya himself, who despite claiming that Mongol rulers were kuffar, does not argue that Christians and Jews were not entitled to dhimml status. Although he uses his claim that the Mongol rulers either failed to or were re­luctant to collectJzya from Jews and Christians to prove their kufr, he is silent on the status of those groups and does not make any reference to their loss of dhimmlstatus. If ISIS is keen on reproducing Ibn Taymiyya's jurisprudence on residing in territory ruled by self-proclaimed but “unfaithful” Muslims, why are they innovating with the introduction of said ruling? That, however, does not mean that there is no challenge to claims of protection on the basis of dhimma in the absence of Jizya payment in modern times. There is no denial that the issue of dhimma portrays the limits of modern selective reliance on classical jurisprudence to make a claim for the treatment of non-Muslims as equal citizens considering that the juristic tradition was developed and articulated

238 Dabiq, Issue 15, July 2016, 19, online:, accessed 16 April 2017.

239 Traditional, but now derogatory, term for Christians.

240 Abu Khattab al-Yamani, “Li-madha a'damna na⅛ ra Mir?” al-Shaab, online: لد و لة'-الإسلامية-'دماذا-أءدمئا-ذصارى-مصر؟>, accessed 16 April 2017.

in eras when notions of citizenship did not exist.241 Nevertheless, al-Shahi, for example, seems to lean towards the sanctity of any semblance of a safety pledge given to non-Muslims in Muslim lands by the acquiescence of the imam. For example, he states that a breach of the dhimma pact, due to viola­tions by the dhimml, is not possible unless the said dhimml refuses to pay the Jizya or to subject himself to Islamic law after an agreement to pay it:

If he said, I will pay the Jizya but will not accept the rule [of Islam], he should be warned but not fought for it where he is. He is to be told, “You were given aman to [pay the] Jizya.... You will be given time to leave the territory of Islam.” Then, if he leaves and arrives at his place of safety, he may be killed.242

This approach, which one comes across with several other jurists, indicates a strong tendency to reject treachery. If non-Muslims residing in Muslim territo­ries believe that they are protected in Muslim territory, then it would be fair to assume that ISIS would follow al-Shafi^ti^ls logic and refrain from attacking in the territory they believe themselves to be immune in. It may be countered that when ISIS warned Christians in its newsletter that they must pay the Jizya or face death, it was a general warning, despite the serious deviation from evi­dentiary rules in Islamic law. But this brings us to the crux of the matter. Most jurists set two conditions for dhimml status - payment of the Jizya and subju­gation to the rule of Islam - in return for inviolability and protection in the territory of Islam. It is hard to envision how the violent operations against Christians outside territory controlled by ISIS, such as the ones conducted against Christian Egyptians, would ever Ihlhll that objective, considering that the group lacks control over Egyptian territory. Moreover, if an Egyptian Chris­tian is subjected to a threat by the so-called apostate regime, is ISIS capable or willing to rise to their defence as per the agreed upon conditions ofJizya? The only imaginable situation, in this case, would be to request that Christians emigrate to the territory of Islam in order to be able to pay the Jizya, which would indeed be a novel condition for Christians, whereby they are called upon for hiJra in order to be protected.

Perhaps the oddest claim made by ISIS is the claim that all Christians ought to be fought for crimes committed by Christians anywhere in the world,

241 Of course, any system, modern or premodern, tends to oppress, exclude/include on the basis of artificially understood modes of social cohesion like religion, ethnicity, or nationality.

242 a!-Shafi'I, „mm, 4:267.

regardless of proximity, position, and difference. This argument is contested by none other than the historical narrative ISIS relies on to explain the status of Christians, where they retell the communication between the kings of Ethio­pia, Egypt, and the Romans and how the first accepted Islam, the second por­trayed humility but adhered to his religion, and the third persisted in his animosity towards religion, leading to further battles with the Romans.243 If anything, this narrative indicates clearly that the Prophet did not treat Chris­tians as one unit. Moreover, Ibn Hazm, whose position on neighbouring Chris­tian polities and whose strict treatment of dhimmls in Spain is far from the most tolerant on the jurisprudential spectrum, does not at any point claim that Christians in Muslim polities may be targeted, despite his denouncing their ascent to power and his scepticism of their agenda. As a matter of fact, treating Christians as one polity, wherever they may be, deems theJizya regime moot and inapplicable, considering that no instance of acceptance of Jizya from a group belonging to any religion ever meant complete subjugation or voluntary acceptance by adherents of that religion. According to this logic, even Jizya taken from Christians by the Prophet and the early caliphs would indeed be seen as invalid, considering Roman enmity for the nascent Muslim polity.

3,. 2.^.2 YaztdtsisensationalistRevivalism

The Yazidis are members of a small religion in Iraq who have been vehemently targeted and utilized by ISIS to publicise its purity and revival of Islamic law. The practises of ISIS might be considered alien, archaic, and oppressive by modern standards, but these are standards that they claim reflect a significant deviation from God's laws and accepted practices in the early centuries of the application of Islamic law. ISIS claim that the Yazidis have been misunder­stood by some unnamed Muslim scholars and are deemed an apostate sect of Islam. However, upon further research, the group was found to adhere to an “original mushrik [polytheistic]” religion whose origin stems from Magianism, “but reinterpreted, with elements of Sabianism, Judaism, and Christianity, and ultimately expressed in the heretical vocabulary of extreme Sufism.''244 Since they are polytheists, they are to be treated in accordance with the (again un­named) majority views of scholars; unlike Christians and Jews, they are not

243 Dabiq, Issue 15,July 2016, 14. The claim that the Ethiopian king converted rather than simply hosted the Muslims is heavily contested in history and in jurisprudence deeming Abyssinian lands protected by virtue of the aman granted by the Ashamah to the Muslims.

244 Dabiq, Issue 4, October 2014, 15.

People of the Book, so they are not entitled to pay theJizya. Hence, their men must either convert to Islam or be killed, and their women may be enslaved.

ISIS hardly conceals its excitement in the English-language publication at the opportunity to reinstate slavery. First, the reinstitution of slavery is utilized to assert the apocalyptic narrative of a battle to end all battles. In order to do so, convoluted logic is employed to prove that their enslavement of the Yazidis is evidence for the apocalyptic fulfillment of a prophetic hadlth stating that towards the end of time, the slave girl would give birth to her own master.245 But more important, the reinstitution of slavery serves the purpose of casting ISIS as the saviour of the banner of Islam, lost over centuries of deviation from prophetic tradition and genuine Islamic practice. In an article penned by Umm Summaya al-Muhajira, a semi-permanent contributor to the newsletter, this objective is made evident:

Therefore, I further increase the spiteful ones in anger by saying that I and those with me at home prostrated to Allah in gratitude on the day the first slave-girl entered our home. Yes, we thanked our Lord for having let us live to the day we saw kufr humiliated and its banner destroyed. Here we are today, and after centuries, reviving a prophetic Sunnah, which both the Arab and non-Arab enemies of Allah had buried. By Al­lah, we brought it back by the edge of the sword, and we did not do so through pacifism, negotiations, democracy, or elections. We established it according to the prophetic way, with blood-red swords, not with fingers for voting or tweeting.246

But it is clear that ISIS was not simply attempting to adhere to Islamic law in its treatment of the Yazidis. In the paragraphs below, I discuss ISIS's distortion of the classical tradition in order to arrive at the conclusion that there is a clear consensus among jurists that groups like the Yazidis are not entitled to dhimml status. First, the newsletter claims a consensus among jurists that only Jews and Christians are allowed to acquire dhimml status. Evidently, this is a serious and deliberate deviation from the juristic traditions, which as a bare minimum accepted dhimml status for the Magians. This intentional obfuscation avoids the logical consequence of their claim that the Yazidi religion is, in essence, a fringe sect of Magianism. Thus, recognizing that the majority of jurists accept­ed dhimml status for the Magians would inevitably lead to the conclusion that Yazidis are entitled to the payment of the Jizya and dhimml status. More

245 Dabiq, Issue 4, October 2014, 16.

246 Umm Summaya al-Muhajira, “Slave Girls or Prostitutes,” Dabiq, Issue 9, May 2015, 47. important, even if ISIS were to argue that the Yazidis had deviated so severely from Magian belief that they could no longer be considered Magians, they would be left with an important challenge, which is that many scholars argued that non-Muslims outside the Hijaz were entitled to the payment of Jizya, re­gardless of their religion. As a matter of fact, the primary challenge comes from Ibn Qayyim, Ibn Taymiyya's student, who is heavily relied on by ISIS. Ibn Qa- yyim argued that all non-Muslims, regardless of ethnicity, were entitled to pay the Jizya. To prove his argument, he suggests that the narration used by al- Shafir to claim that Ali b. Abi Talib stated that the Magians were, in fact, Peo­ple of the Book had been found weak by hadlth collectors.247 Second, he relies on the general language of the hadlth examined earlier in a!-Shafi'i's work, where there is a general instruction to call on unbelievers to pay the Jizya, which al-Shafi'i claimed was specific to the People of the Book.248 Finally, he claims that the reason no Arab polytheists were allowed to pay the Jizya was that by the time the Jizya verse was revealed in the Qur'an, all Arab polytheists had already converted to Islam. 249

In addition to such jurisprudential views casting serious doubts over ISIS's claim to be allowed to exterminate Yazidi men and enslave Yazidi women and children,25٥ ISIS seems to disregard another challenging historical reality. As discussed in the section on the Shi'a, the group claimed that the Rightly Guid­ed Caliphs did not fight and exterminate the Shi'a, because their heretical rafldl beliefs surfaced only later, hence acquiescing to the caliphs' practice be­ing binding upon modern-day Muslims. With that in mind, an important and legitimate question that ISIS fails to address in this case is why those caliphs failed to exterminate polytheistic groups, which predated Islam, as they ac­knowledge. ISIS's failure to address this issue, coupled with its deliberate ma­nipulation of thejuristic tradition on dhimml status, leads the reader to the obvious conclusion that there is a premeditated desire to narrow this legal re­gime.

So, if one assumes that ISIS has deliberately attempted to excessively nar­row dhimmlstatus beyond classical jurisprudence, then why did ISIS target the Yazidis, despite their small numbers? On the one hand, as noted by other ex­perts on ISIS, Sinjar, home to this religious minority (representing only 1.5 per

247 Ibn Qayyim, Ahkam ahlal-dhimma (Dammam: Ramadi li-l-Nashr, 1997), 1:84.

248 Ibn Qayyim, Ahkam, 1:88.

249 Ibn Qayyim, Ahkam, 1:90.

250 It is interesting that in the attempt to claim that Yazidis are not entitled to dhimml status, they disregard a compelling argument that might be made in their favour, which is that many jurists argue that women and children from groups entitled to dhimml status may still be enslaved.

cent of the population of Iraq), was an important and strategic conduit be­tween Raqqa and Mosul. 251 More important, provoking religious, sectarian, and ethnic strife is a policy advocated for in one of ISIS's most prominent stra­tegic and military manifestos, as mentioned earlier. In this case, ISIS took ad­vantage of political rivalry between Masd Barzani, former president of Iraqi Kurdistan (2005-2017) and Jalal Talabani, former president of Iraq (2006-2014) and their respective peshmerga groups. Sinjar had been under the protection of Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party (kdp) ever since the takeover of Kirkuk, “but owing to localized political tribalism, only the most KDP-loyal corps of Yazidi residents of the town were armed by Barzani's paramilitary. The rest had to fend for themselves.''252 Inevitably, the failure of the KDP groups, their deser­tion, and their failure to return to the aid of the civilian population took its toll on ethnic and religious relations in the area.253 Arguably, ISIS saw in this ten­sion a golden opportunity for it to assume control of a strategic town and ce­ment civil strife in the region.

It is my contention, however, that there was another significant objective, other than a strategic interest in the area - the imagery of slavery, or what Mamdani and others refer to as “pornographic violence,” which Mamdani de­fines as the media's obsession with gory, gruesome, detailed descriptions of violence to provoke in their audience certain emotions, emotions charged with moral judgement rather than with reasoned political analysis.254 In this case, it is ISIS that seems so keen on this kind of pornographic violence, with its concurrent provocation of emotions. The display of severed heads, the cine­matographic and exceptionally violent execution of the captiiredJordanian pilot Muadh al-Kasasba, and the reinstitiition of slavery follow the manifesto penned by militant Abti Bakr Naji (d. 2008), Idarat al-tawahhush (“The man­agement of savagery”) and its instruction to militants to resort to extreme and excessive violence in order to instil fear in the enemy and to lionize Muslims after decades of fear and domestication.255 So, in other words, the more ex­treme and unimaginable the violence and brutal acts committed are, the more fear is instilled in the hearts of the enemy, and the more radical the paradigm shift is in the minds of its potential recruits across the world. Unlike al-Zawahiri, whose examined book and communiques with al-Zarqawi portray relative

251 Hassan and Weiss, ISIS, 229.

252 Hassan and Weiss, ISIS, 229.

253 Hassan and Weiss, ISIS, 229.

254 Mahmood Mamdamy Saviors andSurv⅛ors: Dc^rjt^i, Politics andte Wc^r on Terror fNew York: Random House, 2009), 66.

255 Abti Bakr Naji, Idarat al-tawahhush, 33--3, online:, accessed 1 April 2017.

self-restraint and political calculation premised on the fear of alienating sym­pathetic recruits still on the fence, ISIS's policy seems to sever those recruits' connections with the world they live in and create an alternate reality, where violence is glorified and celebrated, and where attempts to replicate a fantasti­cal, unreal but imaginable past is the name of the game. By doing that, ISIS proposes itself to its recruits as the ultimate path to rebellion, not just against un-Islamic laws or discrimination in Western countries but also against what they are gradually conditioned to see as the delusional and dysfunctional mor­al code of modern society.

4