Muslim women’s movements and women’s NGOs in Indonesia

Indonesia is not an Islamic state but a secular republic.¹⁷ However, with almost 90 per cent of the population identifying themselves as Muslims, Islam continues to influence Indonesian politics.¹⁸ As the major religion, Islam also plays its role in framing gender relations in Indonesian society.

Indonesia’s Muslim women’s movements emerged during the twentieth century and appeared alongside nationalist movements (Blackburn 2004; Martyn 2005; Soetjipto 2005; Robinson 2009; Suryochondro 2000).¹⁹ At an individual level there are famous names like Raden Ajeng Kartini (1879–1904),²⁰ a daughter of an aristocratic family in Java who was later depicted as a symbol of the emergence of Indonesian feminism for her struggle to liberate Javanese women from traditional Javanese and Islamic patriarchal practices, which included polygamy, forced marriage and limited access for women to education (Sadli 2002, 84; Blackburn 2001; Robinson 2009). Other Indonesian females fought against colonialism in the early twentieth century, such as Acehnese heroines Tjut Nyak Dien and Cut Mutia. These, according to Martyn (2005, 30–31), symbolized ‘women’s strength’ and ‘active Indonesian womanhood’.

In the early twentieth century, individual women such as Dewi Sartika from West Java and Rahmah El-Yunusiah from West Sumatra struggled for women’s equality through educational institutions. These two women founded schools for women in their areas. Inspired by the struggle of Kartini, Dewi Sartika built a school as her way to liberate women through education.

Indonesian Muslim women’s movements developed further through the establishment of various women’s organizations (Soetjipto 2005, xxi–xxii; Robinson 2009; Blackburn 2004). ‘Putri Merdiko’ (Independent Women) in Batavia is considered to be the first women’s organization struggling for women’s emancipation (Suryochondro 2000, 227). It provided scholarships for indigenous women to go to school. Other organizations were also found in other areas throughout Indonesia such as ‘Pawiyata Wanita’ (1915) in Magelang, ‘Wanita Hado’ (1915) in Jepara, ‘Wanita Soesila’ (1918) in Pemalang, and ‘Poetri Sejati’ in Surabaya. On other islands of the archipelago, Soetjipto (2005) has noted that ‘Keradjinan Amai Satia’ in Minangkabau was also established in 1914. Kartowirjono (1977, 5) has suggested that women’s organizations in that period were based either on the spirit of regionalism (kedaerahan) or of religion.

Indonesia’s women’s movements consolidated when women gathered at the First Women’s Congress held on 22 December 1928 in Yogyakarta, which in modern Indonesia is celebrated as Mother’s Day. The congress led to the creation of Indonesia’s Women’s Union or Perikatan Perhimpunan Indonesia (PPI). The congress was successful in outlining three requests, including a demand for the government to provide a penghulu (celebrant) to explain the meaning of conditional divorce following the marriage contract or nikah; a demand for an increase in the number of girls’ schools; and a call for the government to provide support for widows and orphans of civil servants (Kartowirjono 1977, 6; Burhanuddin and Fathurrahman 2004, 42; Robinson 2009, 43).

The establishment of PPII was followed by the creation of ‘Isteri Sedar’ in 1932, which consisted of women with different views from those at PPII (Burhanuddin and Fathurrahman 2004, 42). To ‘Isteri Sedar’ (Aware Women) the Women’s Congress was too heavily focused on family issues, and not enough on social issues. ‘Isteri Sedar’ suggested that Indonesian women’s movements should be directed towards more public issues and not just confined to family issues and religion. These two women’s groups also held slightly different views on polygamy. Istri Sedar radically opposed polygamy, arguing that Islam inherently forbids a man to take another wife, while PPII acknowledged that Islam indeed allows polygamy, but that difficult requirements make it impossible for Muslim men to have a polygamous marriage (Burhanuddin and Fathurrahman 2004, 42; Martyn 2005, 42).²¹

Polygamy remains a contested issue among Indonesian Muslims. Although the majority of Indonesian Muslims believe that polygamy is allowed in Islam, they also understand that Islam places very strict requirements on this practice, which are difficult for Muslim men to fulfil, financially and emotionally. The majority of Indonesian Muslims, therefore, do not respect those who practice polygamy. Polygamy in Indonesia is generally regarded as ‘morally reprehensible’ (Butt 1999, 126).

Throughout its history, Indonesia’s Muslim women’s movements have not only engaged in discourse on social and religious issues but have also played roles within the nationalist struggle for Indonesia to be independent. During the Dutch colonial period Indonesian Muslim women were heavily involved in the nationalist struggle, both through their affiliation with Islamic political parties, such as Sarekat Islam, or through women’s movements (Blackburn 2008, 85). The establishment of women’s wings within mass-based Muslim organizations make Islamic women’s organizations an important element in the broader women’s movements (Burhanuddin and Fathurrahman 2004, 11).

The modernist Muslim organization Muhammadiyah, for example, created Aisyiah in 1917 to emphasize the need for women’s education. Muhammadiyah believes that women must be given better access to education in order to modernize the society (Jahroni 2005, 602).

The nature of the struggle of Indonesian women’s movements is also shaped by the political development in post-independence Indonesia. Indonesia’s women’s movements were then framed, energized and constructed by two dominant paradigms: nationalism and development (Blackburn 2001, 12). The variety and diversity of strategies and platforms of women’s organizations are the result of how women’s movements have developed over the years and are reactions to the social, economic, religious and political constraints that surround it (Blackburn 2004, 12).

Under Suharto’s authoritarian government from 1966 to 1998, the development of Indonesia’s women’s movements was subject to the state’s gender ideology. Scholars observe that the New Order administration aimed to ‘domesticate’ Indonesian women through its gender policies (Tiwon 2000; Suryakusuma 1996; Robinson and Bessell 2002; Brenner 2005; Wierenga 2002; Blackburn 2004).

The domestication of women under the New Order government was intended to secure ‘family stability’, because it believed that the family has to serve as a building block for social and political stability and national development (Brenner 2005, 95). The 1993–1998 GBHN or Garis Besar Haluan Negara (General Outlines of State Policy), for example, defined women’s roles in development as to make efforts ‘to materialise a healthy, prosperous and happy family … within the framework of the development of the complete Indonesian human’ (Tiwon 2000, 73). This policy led to the enactment of the Marriage Law 1/1974. The Marriage Law does not only allow polygamy within the limit set by Islamic orthodoxy, but it also entrenched women’s position as ‘dependent housewives’ (Wierenga 2005, 2; Katjasungkana and Wierenga 2003, 65). The Marriage Law 1/1974 also discriminates against women because it obliges them to accept polygamy in cases where the Religious Court permits a man to take another wife (Blackburn 1999, cited in Nurmila 2007, 76).²³

However, according to Suryochondro (2000, 232) the passing of the Marriage Law 1/1974 should, in fact, be seen as one of the major achievements of the women’s movements in Indonesia. According to her, the new law was a response to women’s constant pressure on the government over the issue of divorce, polygamy and child marriage.²⁴ Likewise, Soewondo (1977, 285) argued that Law 1/1974 was the result of the joint efforts made by women organizations to improve the position of women in marriage and divorce. The majority women’s organizations saw Law 1/1974 as a step forward to improve the status of women. Katz and Katz (1978, 309–314) observe that the Marriage Law was effective in decreasing the number of divorce cases and polygamous marriages. In addition, although the law has not totally stopped parents from arranging the marriages of their children, the number of child marriages has decreased (Katz and Katz 1978, 314).

Women’s organizations under the New Order had a limited range of thinking on how to change society’s views on gender (Blackburn 2004, 9). This is because autonomous women’s organizations and women’s representative bodies were dissolved immediately after the New Order took office, and turned into ‘wives’ organizations, installed at all government offices (Sen 1999).²⁵ Wives of civil servants were obliged to join Dharma Wanita to support their husband’s work.²⁶ Dharma Wanita turned to be a state institution to promote New Order’s model of womanhood as supporters of their husbands’ careers and as procreators and educators of children (Budianta 2002, 36). At the village level, women were organized into PKK (Family Welfare Guidance), through which many of the government’s family welfare measures were delivered.²⁷ This institution was committed to the ‘five duties’ assigned by the government to women, which included roles as wife and mother. As part of the machinery of the New Order, the PKK was successful in reaching out to women nationwide, from remote village areas to those in the urban cities. One of its more famous programmes was Posyandu (integrated health service centres) for women in the village. In the Posyandu, young mothers regularly bring their babies to be weighed and obtain nutritional meals, such as its famous green bean porridge.

Despite the New Order’s extensive attempts to curb women’s movements and to systematically domesticate Indonesian women, some women established women’s organizations. The political setting surrounding the establishment of women’s movements in the 1980s was the result of a massive industrialization and modernization project promoted by the New Order. As Brenner (2005) demonstrates, despite political subordination of women, the New Order was, in fact, relying on women to join its massive industrialization project, which necessarily gave women access to join the workforce. New Order policies indeed brought betterment to women, as education become increasingly accessible, literacy rates for females improved, the middle class expanded, and standards of living rose (Brenner 2005, 97). As a result, Indonesia witnessed an increasing number of women who managed to enter the white-collar, middle-class professional jobs as women moved into higher education (Sen 1999). With higher education, women become more aware of their rights.

The increased awareness of women’s rights and gender issues, especially in public spaces, was not only the result of women’s increased attainment of education but also the result of the New Order’s dependence on global financial institutions that demanded that the government take into account gender issues in its development policies from the early 1980s (Sen 1999). As a result, Indonesia witnessed increased gender awareness among bureaucrats. In the early 1990s, for example, the New Order government required all public universities to establish Women’s Studies Centres (Pusat Kajian Wanita). The University of Indonesia established its graduate programme on Women’s Studies (Kajian Wanita) in 1992, and eight years later Hasanuddin University in South Sulawesi established a similar programme (Sadli 2002, 80–81). There were about 70 women’s studies centres in 27 provinces in Indonesia in 1997 (Suryochondro 2000, 237). These centres received support from the Minister of Women’s Role (Menteri Peranan Wanita), the Ministry of Education and Culture (Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (Menteri Dalam Negeri) in their efforts to improve the status of women.

At the level of civil society, new women’s non-government organizations (NGOs) began to emerge in the early 1980s, and continued to grow until the 1990s. They consisted of women who were not only wives and mothers but also working-class women, middle-class professional women, and democrats within government and semi-government institutions (Sen 1999). These women’s groups that emerged under repressive authoritarian rule played a key role in bringing down Suharto in 1998.²⁸

Women’s entrance to the labour force, modernization and industrialization were the causes of the changing of social norms within family and social structure. While men and women’s attitudes towards family and their society were changing, it was only women’s changing lifestyles that were being scrutinized. Women were blamed for neglecting their roles at home as mothers, daughters and wives. They were accused of spending too much of their time pursuing their career outside their homes. Women’s increasing demands for greater freedom, power and autonomy became sources of tension in society, especially among more conservative Muslim communities (Brenner 2005, 98). This development led to what Brenner called the emergence of a revivalist movement in the late 1980s. Similarly, Kandiyoti (1995, 23) argues that the call for a return to Islam is a result of failed promises of ‘post-independence developmentalism’, signified by the broader trends of Westernization, consumerism and changing gender relations in the family.

Indonesia women’s movements began a new chapter as Islamic resurgence gained supporters during the 1990s. The Islamic resurgence that began in the early 1990s awakened Muslim women and reform-minded Muslims to the need to introduce women’s rights in Islam, because of the Islamist claim that Islam requires women to dedicate their lives only to domestic roles, becoming obedient wives and dedicated mothers (Hasyim 2009).²⁹ Muslim conservatives felt that Western values have impinged on the life of Indonesian Muslims, eventually turning Muslims from reorienting their lives away from the upholding of Islamic moral standards, to upholding values coming from the West (Brenner 2005, 1998). Aside from returning women to the domestic sphere, women are also continuously reminded, and sometimes forced, to cover their hair and to wear appropriate Muslim clothing. Discourse on polygamy has also resurfaced, reminding Muslim women that allowing their husbands to take another wife is seen by conservatives as part of observing Islam.

Reformist Muslims, both male and female, have responded to these developments which then contributed to the emergence of a new feminist discourse (Doorn-Harder 2007; Feener 2007; Bowen 2007; Robinson 2009; Wierenga 2005, 5). They were prompted to become familiar with major concepts used by Muslim feminists in other parts of the world, such as ‘patriarchy’ and ‘women’s rights’. Indonesian Muslim feminist discourse is then built upon the idea of the reform of interpretation religious texts, in particular those that use gender-sensitive terms, such as patriarchy and equality. Activists look to international norms on women’s rights, for example the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Beijing Platform for Action. Muslim activists believe that the universal principles of women’s rights do not contradict those entrenched in the basic principles of Islam. These developments are also a result of literature produced by feminist Muslim scholars such as Fatima Mernissi, Amina Wadud, and Asghar Ali Engineer, which have been circulated widely since being translated into the Indonesian language (Robinson 2007; Doorn-Harder 2007; Jamhari and Ropi 2003).

Muslim activists and scholars have also long expressed the need for a contextualized interpretation of Islamic texts to counter conservative moves among Indonesian Muslims (Marcoes-Natsir and Meuleman 1993; Bowen 2003; Feener 2007; Robinson 2007). They discussed this matter during a seminar organized by the Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS) on Wanita Islam Indonesia dalam Kajian Tekstual dan Kontekstual (Indonesian Muslim Women in Textual and Contextual Analysis) in Jakarta from 2 to 5 December 1991. The Muslim men and women scholars and activists who participated in this forum were educated in a range of Islamic institutions from traditional pesantren to the State Institutes for Islamic Studies (IAIN). Women academics working at women’s centres in 14 IAIN throughout Indonesia also participated, along with representatives from various Muslim organizations. The seminar discussed a range of issues, from the position of women in Islamic texts (Qur’an, Hadith and Fiqh) and in the Indonesian legal system, to the history and the development of Muslim women’s organizations in Indonesia. At the end of the seminar, it was agreed that there was a need to reveal the egalitarian spirit of Islamic texts so that patriarchal tendencies might be eradicated (Marcoes-Natsir and Meuleman 1993, xii–xiii).

P3M, or Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat,³⁰ or the Society for Pesantren and Community Development, an NGO based in Jakarta, was a pioneer of this new activism. Under the leadership of Masdar F. Mas’udi, it introduced the rereading of Islamic teachings and the reinterpreting of the sources of Islamic law, the Qur’an and Hadith. Mas’udi published a book on Islam dan Hak-Hak Reproduksi Perempuan (Islam and Women’s Reproductive Rights) in 1997. This book is an attempt to reveal the rights of women in Islam, in particular, women’s reproductive rights (Arimbi 2009, 68). The publication of the book inspired many Muslim women to begin discussion on women’s reproductive rights, which was previously considered controversial.

With most of its activists being from a Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)³¹ background, P3M designed its activities to transform the pesantren curriculum to enable students to gain better understanding of social and religious issues, including discussing the teaching of Islam concerning women (Doorn-Harder 2007, 33). In 1995, it initiated a programme called fiqh an-nisa (or Fiqh on women), later named FN-P3M (Marcoes-Natsir 2002, 194; Bruinessen and Wajidi 2006, 25). P3M’s initiative to change the pesantren’s perspective on the role of women began by addressing texts used widely by the pesantren community that have been the source of negative opinions against women, including the Kitab Uqud-al-luj-jayn fi bayan huquq al-zawjayn (or Kitab uqud) written in 1874 by Ibn Umar al-Nawawi al-Jawi (Doorn-Harder 2007, 34).³² This text deals with the rights and duties of married women and Muslim activists considered it gender-biased, as it focused heavily on issues concerning women’s ritual purity; women’s obligation to veil; and women’s smaller share than men in inheritance, while ignoring matters such as women’s rights to work, the social status of widows, and women’s participation in education, politics and the economy (Bruinessen 1990b, 236; Bruinessen 1995, 182, cited in Doorn-Harder 2007, 35–36).

As part of its strategy, P3M included male Muslim scholars who have a strong knowledge of Islam and a pesantren background. This strategy was adopted because it was believed that it would be easier for P3M’s new ideas to be accepted by traditional communities if male Muslim scholars introduced them (Hasyim 2009). In later developments, Islamic organizations and NGOs continue to promote equality by engaging male Muslim scholars (Robinson 2007, 41–42). They include Kyai Husein Muhammad,³³ Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir, Lutfi Fathullah and Marzuki Wahid, all of whom are strongly based in pesantren and are familiar with traditional Islam. From the academic milieu, Nasaruddin Umar, a professor of Fiqh Science of the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and Director for Islamic Affairs in the Ministry of Religion, developed academic discourse on gender in Islam. He has published books on Argumen Kesetaraan Jender: Perspektif Al-Qur’an (Argument for Gender Equality: Qur’anic Perspective) and Qur’an untuk Perempuan (Qur’an for Women) (Robinson 2007, 42; Arimbi 2009, 68). They combined both Western-based and Islamic methodology in reading the Islamic texts to reveal a different interpretation, that is, one that protects the rights of women.

Following P3M, these Muslim activists also begin to critically read other classical religious texts taught at pesantren, known as Kitab Kuning or the ‘yellow books’.³⁴ These texts contain Fiqh knowledge, mostly written in Arabic. The Kitab Kuning are the main reading materials for all pesantren students, which are strongly influenced by misogynist perspectives and patriarchal character, and hence are heavily gender-biased (Hasyim 2009).

In recent years, a number of similar feminist Muslim organizations began to emerge in Java, such as Rahima, Puan Amal Hayati, Fahmina, Rifka An-Nisa and Balqis, all of which are involved in trying to deconstruct gender discourse within the pesantren tradition. These organizations chose Arabic words for their names as part of the strategy to gain the acceptance of pesantren and other traditional communities. In 1997, a group of progressive men and women activists, mostly graduates of the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN), formed a ‘Forum Kajian Kitab Klasik Islam’ (Forum for the Study of Classical Islamic Texts) (Doorn-Harder 2007, 37). With different educational backgrounds including sociology, anthropology, Islamic law, theology and gender specialists, activists at this forum sought to construct a less gender-biased and more balanced interpretation of classical Islamic texts (Marcoes-Natsir 2002, 194).

Musdah Mulia is a prominent Muslim woman feminist. A professor of Fiqh Science of the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, she is also a member of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission or KOMNAS HAM. Other leading figures include Lies Marcoes Natsir, Sinta Nuriyah (the wife of former Indonesian President K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid), Ciciek Farha, Badriyah Fayumi and Ruhaini Dzuhayatun. All are well-known Muslim women feminists who have actively worked on deconstructing Islamic patriarchal thought. Most of them are also graduates of the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN).