The Chapters

Each chapter of this volume consist of three parts: introduction, Arabic edition of the text and its detailed commentary in English. The introduction features the author’s biography, the position the author occupies in a particular Shi'i usul tradition, the topic under discussion in the edited passages and the manuscripts used for preparing the editions.

Careful consideration was given to the selection of these texts. They represent all the three Shi'i usul traditions: Twelver (Chapters 1-5), Zaydi (Chapters 6-7) and Isma'ili (Chapter 8). From the viewpoint of geographical locations, Zaydi and Isma'ili works (Chapters 6-8), for instance, were composed in Yemen whereas Twelver works belong to Safavid (Chapters 1 and 4) and Qajar (Chapter 3) Iran and the shrine cities of Iraq (Chapters 2 and 5). In reference to the dates of their compilation, the earliest text in this volume belong to the late 6th/12th century (Chapter 8) and latest from the mid-13th∕19th century (Chapter 3) - they all, nonetheless, belong to the post-clas­sical Islamic usul tradition. To represent the diverse Shi'i usul commentary tradition, four texts (Chapters 1, 2, 4 and 6) were chosen for this volume. These commentaries indicate that their base texts were essentially composed to be explicated by a teacher, discussed in class, and commented when appropriate. It should be noted that these four commentaries do not follow a single style. Chapter 6, for instance, is a hashiya (supercommentary or gloss) that contains interlinear and marginal notes embedded within the base text.

In reference to the themes, these eight texts deal with topics drawn from the key discussions in Shi'i usul literature: the validity of personal juristic reasoning (ijtihad'); linguistic interpreta­tions when the text is obscure; the qualifications of a jurist to perform ijtihad; the role of certain­ty in the deduction of law; the probative force of solitary reports (al-akhabar al-ahad); the (im) permissibility of using analogical reasoning in deducing laws; and the consensus of the progeny of the Prophet, and legal authority of the Imams. When read side-by-side, these texts indicate that not all themes are distinctively Shi'i. It is true, however, that some of these topics can only be understood within a Shi'i legal framework. The discussions concerning analogical reasoning (Chapter 6), consensus of scholars (Chapter 7) and personal juristic opinions (Chapter 8), for instance, are directly related to the discussion of the legal authority of the Imams - a key doctrine in Shi'i theology. Some Shi'a reject these hermeneutical tools because they undermine the role and position of the Imams (Chapter 5). The Imams (and their reports in their absence) claim, Twelver and Isma'ili Shi'i legal thinkers assert, the ultimate position of authority for interpreting the law.

Gleave’s chapter deals with two linked usul issues of personal juristic reasoning (ijtihad). The first is related to the ijtihad of the Prophet: can we say that Prophet Muhammad carried out ijti­hdd or did the rulings he declared come out of revelation? The issue is problematic for various theological and legal reasons laid out by Gleave. The second issue concerns the doctrine that all those who carry out personal juristic reasoning (mujtahids) are right (musιb). This doctrine (known as taswιb), Gleave demonstrates, was controversial and in the Zubda, al-Shaykh al-Baha’i asserts that it is false, arguing instead that only one of the mujtahids can be right and the others, however meritorious their juristic effort may have been, are wrong. By examining the texts of al-Shaykh al-Baha’i and al-Mazandarani (d. 1081/1670), Gleave highlights the nuances of matn- sharh tradition of postclassical Shi'i usul works which he defines as ‘a sort of compound work of the base text and commentary’.

Qazwini, Ali and Unal examine al-Tuni’s (d. 1071/1660) al-Wafiya and its commentary al- Wajl by al-A'raji (d. 1227/1812). The topic of discussion revolves around universal and particu­lar (al-^camm wa-l-khass) utterances of the Prophet and Imams: How do we understand their utter­ances when they are asked a legal question and, without requesting further clarification or details, they reply? Does the fact that they did not seek further clarification or detail (tark al-is- tifsal) mean that their statements should be considered universal? Would such utterances give rise to a universal legal directive? Qazwini, Ali and Unal present a detailed discussion of several possibilities, drawing on the opinions of al-A'raji’s Shi'i and non-Shi'i Usuli predecessors.

Ehteshami and Rezakhany analyse two passages from the Kawashif al-hujub ^can mushkilat al-kutub of the 13th∕19th century scholar al-Mazandarani (d.

Rafli and Abu-Alabbas’s chapter deals with the topic of solitary reports (al-akhbar al-ahad) and their role as legal sources; this topic is conventionally studied in the chapters of “probativity of solitary reports” (hujjiyyat al-akhbar al-ahad) and “methods of resolving contradictory and con­flicting reports” (al-ta^cadul wa-l-tarjih). The text studied in this chapter is yet another commen­tary on the Zubdat al-usul composed by the author’s own student, al-Kazimi (d. 1065/1655). The flrst section lists the conditions that are required for the reports of solitary transmitters in order to be considered legally binding proofs. The author enumerates five such conditions: adulthood (bulugh), sanity (^caql), uprightness (^cadl), accuracy (dabt) and belief (iman). The commentator delves deeper into each of these conditions, particularly uprightness. The question which al- Kazimi attempts to address, Rafli and Abu-Alabbas highlight, is whether Sunnis, or for that mat­ter non-Twelver Shi'a (such as the Fathiyya, the Nawusiyya, the Waqiflyya) are sufficiently up­right for their reports to be considered legally binding.

Drawing from the Fath al-bab of Mirza Muhammad al-Akhbari (d. 1232/1817), Rajani and Husayn present the Akhbari-Usuli debate concerning whether the “door to knowledge is closed” (insidad bab al-^cilm) during the occultation (ghayba) of the Twelfth Imam? By this the Usulis meant, Rajani and Husayn demonstrate, that certainty as to the content and the sources (primarily the reports from the Imams, the akhbar) of the law is no longer available to the qualifled jurist (i.e. the mujtahid). Mirza Muhammad, following the doctrines of the Akhbari school more gener­ally, rejects this doctrine. In the Fath al-bab, he sets to refute the doctrine by demonstrating that all the arguments the Usulis use to justify the loss of certainty are invalid. These arguments (which are in fact, counter-arguments to Usuli arguments and presumptions), Mirza Muhammad aims to demonstrate that the occultation of the Twelfth Imam (the ghayba doctrine) does not mean knowledge somehow is lost; the sources remain available, and they are not difficult to understand nor are they deliberately evasive (due to the Imams’ dissimulation - taqiyya), as the Usulis claim. Rajani and Husayn demonstrate Mirza Muhammad’s methodogical commit­ment to the fundamental Akhbari legal epistemology by highlighting his unwavering commit­ment to the akhbar of the Imams.

Islam and Thiele examine the Zaydi usul work Hashiyat al-Fusul al-lu³lu³iyya of Ahmad b. 'Ab­dallah Ibn al-Wazir (d. 985/1577). This work is a gloss on Sarim al-Din al-Wazir’s (d. 914/1508) al-Fusul al-lu^,lu^,iyya. In his commentary, Ahmad b. 'Abdallah explains points of interpretive dis­agreement among the schools of law and clarifles linguistic and terminological details of gen- re-speciflc vocabulary introduced by al-Wazir in al-Fusul. Islam and Thiele surmise that the brev­ity of al-Fusul and the Hashiya’s focus on foundational explanations suggest that these two texts were written for teaching purposes. The topic under discussion in this chapter is analogy (qiyas). Contrary to the Twelvers, Islam and Thiele demonstrate, Zaydi Usulis consider qiyas to be a valid juridical tool of interpretation.

Gleave and Rajani’s chapter present yet another Zaydi usul text Qantarat al-wusul ila ^cilm al- usul by the Yemeni scholar al-Mu³ayyadi (d. c. 1044/1634). Consensus is, for al-Mu³ayyadi (as for most Zaydi writers), a valid source of law (as Gleave and Rajani demonstrate) but when dis­cussed “generally” (Omm), it is restricted to the unanimous agreement of all mujtahids (and perhaps all members of the community, mujtahid or not). More significant for him (and for Zaydis more widely) is the consensus of the Family of the Prophet - by which he means, it becomes clear, the descendants of the Prophet (sayyid, pl. sada) who have reached the level of ijtihad. Gleave and Rajani illustrate that though much of the discussion is quite derivative from Sunni usul discussions, there is nonetheless a distinctive set of Zaydi concerns present in the text..

In the last chapter of this volume, Rajani examines Mukhtasar al-usul of the 5th Musta'li-Tayy- ibi Isma'ili da^ci mutlaq 'Ali b. Muhammad b. al-Walid (d. 612/1215). 'Ali b. Muhammad intro­duces his work as a concise book on usul that is set to refute the opinions espoused by other legal and doctrinal schools. Though not essentially a work of legal theory, Rajani illustrates, it con­tains discussions concerning theories of legal interpretation, legal hermeneutics and legal author­ity. In the Mukhtasar, 'Ali b. Muhammad highlights the importance of seeking religious guidanc­es from the Imams. In doing so, he refutes what he sees as the dubious and flawed theories of legal interpretations adopted by the Sunnis. 'Ali b. Muhammad lists four groups of people and explains their positions and approaches vis-a-vis Prophetic statements. They are Hashwiyya, Mu'tazilites, heretics and the People of Truth and Sound Beliefs (Ahl al-haqq wa-l-haqiqa, i.e. the Isma'ilis). The divine authority of the Imams and the successorship of the dais, Rajani demon­strates, are central to 'Ali b. Muhammad’s arguments.