The Ethical Assessment of Acts

Tying the definition of ‘bad' to the desert of blame and blame to the agent's ability to refrain from action stands in tension with ‘Abd al-Jabbar's descrip­tion of the grounds of blame in terms of harm. It leaves, for example, open how to assess a harmful act done involuntarily, such as rolling in one's sleep over a baby suffocating her. What is the connection between harm and bad? How to assess acts that are done involuntarily or absentmindedly has been a topic of debate among Mu‘tazilis. ‘Abd al-Jabbar follows in this question his Mu‘tazili predecessors Abu Ali al-Jubba’i (d. 303/915) and Abu Hashim al-Jubba’i (d. 321/933), instead of his teacher Abu ‘Abdallah al-Husayn al-Basri (d. 369/980). The latter, according to ‘Abd al-Jabbar, holds that if a person commits a harm­ful act in her sleep, the act is deemed bad; though it is unclear whether Abu ‘Abdallah al-Basri considers such a bad act to be deserving blamed⁶ Frank's study on the concept of motivation in ‘Abd al-Jabbar's thought confirms that for him the locus of human autonomy, and thus the ability to deserve blame, lies in intentional action.2⁷ Unintentional action is not ethically assessable and, hence, the harmful action of a person while sleeping does not deserve blame. When Heemskerk writes that ^tAbd al-Jabbar held that acts could be bad without deserving blame, she is referring to the assessment of all of a person's actions on the Day of Judgment.

By defining bad and good in terms of blame and of praise, tAbd al-Jabbar limits what type of acts can be considered truly good and praiseworthy. He contends that only that act is good that is done on account of its goodness (li-husnih), because it is an act for which the agent deserves praise. An act done simply for the benefit (naf) of oneself, such as breathing air and eating, he says, is not praiseworthy.2^[148] Ethically, it is not described as good or bad.

The reason for excluding self-benefitting acts from the category of ‘good' has to be sought in tAbd al-Jabbar's meta-ethics and underlying theological com­mitments. His initial definition of good and bad (or one may say non-good) takes the perspective of the divine as the starting point. In a way, this strength­ens Fazlur Rahman's argument that the primary concern of Muttazilis was God, not humans.^{[149] [150] [151] God's justice ('adl), tAbd al-Jabbar maintains, makes it inconceivable that He would commit an act of injustice (zulm), namely an act that constitutes harm without adding benefit greater than the harm inflicted or inflicting harm that is undeserved?1 Since God does not act senselessly (cabath), there is purpose in God's actions.32 God, who knows good and bad, who is insusceptible to need, pleasure or benefit, and is purposeful in His actions, cannot not act on account of the benefaction (nicma) and beneficence (Ihsan) He knows is resulting from the act. Since God is beyond any need, the benefit cannot be for Himself, but rather has to be directed toward His creation.[152] [153] [154] [155] [156] [157] [158] God is motivated to act because the act is good, namely on account of a benefit (naf) it bestows on somebody else.}

We see that ^tAbd al-Jabbar evaluates the ethical status of acts in light of the state of the actor and the configuration of the action. Although he directs these two perspectives to human as well as divine action, it is the latter that provides the basis for his taxonomy. Hence, a good act is one that, just like God's actions, is done freely, deliberately, and results in benefit for another. It deserves praise.

Assuming a continuous moral domain, tAbd al-Jabbar applies his ethical categories derived from the way he envisions divine acts, with some modifi­cation, to the human agent. In both realms, the intended consequences are crucial to determine the ethical value of acts, suggesting that tAbd al-Jabbar approaches ethics consequentialist. Such a reading would contradict Vasalou's contention that tAbd al-Jabbar holds a deontological position on ethics and attaches moral value to acts irrespective of their consequences.^{[159] [160] [161] [162] We arrive at a fuller picture of his ethical theory by taking into account his construction of right (haqq) and of legal norms (see below). Before doing so, I will lay out how tAbd al-Jabbar applies the critera of blame and praise to evaluate the status of all of human actions, be they rationally known or those informed about by Revelation. The path to their assessment differs slightly.}

ι.ι RationalAssessmentofActs

tAbd al-Jabbar says that the assessment of matters that the intellect evaluates without any input from revelatory information derives on account of an attri­bute that refers to the act itselfd¹ For some acts, this attribute is connected to the very definition of the act, in others it is based on the configurations in which the act occurs, which includes its consequences and are different for each act.4²

As examples of acts that are bad on account of something that pertains to the very definition of the act itself, tAbd al-Jabbar mentions injustice (zulm), lying (kadhib), wanting something bad (irddat al-qabih.), commanding the bad (al-amr bi-l-qablh), ignorance (jahl), denial of benefaction (kufr al-ni^cma), omitting the obligatory (tarak al-wcjib), imposing the impossible (taklfmd ld yutdq) as well as pointless acts (abatlfA'' As example of an act that is assessed in relation to its configuration, tAbd al-Jabbar refers to speech (kaldm). Speech, he says, is described as bad when it is a command to do something bad, is a lie, permits something bad and prevents something good, promises reward for something that does not deserve it or threatens punishment undeservedly, and the like. He similarly explains that volition (Irada) may be described as bad due to wanting something bad or something that cannot be done.^[163] Although ‘Abd al-Jabbar mentions a variety of grounds that lead to assess an act to be bad, there are common features in his assignments. The badness of an act derives primarily from being either senseless ('abaih} or undeserved harm^[164] Senseless, ‘Abd al-Jabbar says, is an act that is devoid of benefit or of averting harm/⁶ The absence of aiming at benefit and lack of preventing harm is the main reason that makes an act bad and, thus, blameworthy. In contrast to praise, which, as said, depends on actual outcomes/⁷ blame results from the actor's intention to do something harmful.

‘Abd al-Jabbar applies the same consequentialist perspective to acts that are rationally assessed as good. An act is good either on account of something that pertains to the act itself or on account of the configuration and conse­quences that are connected to it. As example of the latter, ‘Abd al-Jabbar men­tions speech. A speech act (kalam), he says, is good when it results in benefit or averts harm or other aspects of badness, as is the case with speech that is truth­ful, commands the good, prohibits the bad or is a maslaha.48 In the same vein, volition (irada)49 is good when it is connected to something good and averts aspects of badness. Even an act inflicting harm (darar) may be good when it results in benefit, averts greater harm or when inflicted in desert (see below).^{[165] [166] [167]}

As examples for acts that are rationally assessed as good by reference to themselves, ^tAbd al-Jabbar mentions beneficence (Ihsan) and self-benefitting (Intifa^e) that does not lead to harm.51 With the latter, tAbd al-Jabbar adds to rationally good acts those that do not result in harm and, thus, do not incur blame. He thereby is able to capture human acts that are neither bad nor directed toward the benefit of another - namely the category of ethically neu­tral (mubah). We see in the category of mubah, which tAbd al-Jabbar initially defined as being neither good nor bad, the difficulties that our theologian encounters in fitting his ethical categorization to the divine and the mun­dane realms, forcing him to lean heavily on the category of blame when clas­sifying human action. According to tAbd al-Jabbar’s initial definition of good, self-benefitting acts that do not bestow benefit on someone else, should be clas­sified as ethically neutral (mubah). Yet, by assessing acts ethically in relation to blame, he includes such acts, like eating and breathing, under the category of good acts. The absence or presence of blame, thus, is the primary criterion to evaluate acts rationally. It allows tAbd al-Jabbar to include all human action into assessable acts. Humans, who in contrast to God have needs, are motivated to act also for their own benefit. Self-benefitting acts, when lacking blame, can be categorized as good. We see that tAbd al-Jabbar approaches ethical norms from a consequentialist perspective. Acts are assessed on account of the ben­efit or harm they lead to. However, as already mentioned, in addition to blame the concept of desert factors into normativity. The notion of desert, as will be elaborated on below, arises out of tAbd al-Jabbar’s conception of right (haqq).

Before presenting tAbd al-Jabbar’s position on how to assess acts in light of revealed information, let’s probe whether his statements about acts that are assessed as bad in reference to the act itself, such as lying and injustice, are inconsistent with his initial definition that acts receive their ethical norm on account of attributes added to their existence and are evaluated in light of the status of the actor and the consequences of the act.

tAbd al-Jabbar does not explain in any detail why injustice and lying are bad by themselves. In her discussion of the evilness of lying, Vasalou points to the importance of deontological considerations, arguing that “it is in a teleological framework that the need for a non-teleological moral axiom is framed.’^² The need for people to trust God and His Revelation is the main reason that lying is always bad.^{[168] [169] [170] [171] [172] Leaman, likewise, contends that, as a Mu‘tazili, ‘Abd al-Jabbar holds consequences to be irrelevant to moral assessment^4 I suggest that both perspectives can explain the badness of lying and injustice. In combination, they illustrate that ‘Abd al-Jabbar again turns the analogy from this world to the unseen on its head, taking God as the starting point of his ethical theory. I will first present how lying can be evaluated as bad teleological, and below provide in addition a deontological explanation. Based on its consequences, we may say that the reason why lying is always bad is that it is, by definition, speech, a neutral act, to which is added falsehood, i.e., the deliberate presenta­tion of reality in a manner that does not correspond to the objective reality of what one speaks about.55 In this configuration, lying harms the addressee by knowingly providing false information and misleading her - on which the hearer of the falsehood potentially acts and, thereby, is disadvantaged by act­ing contrary to the reality of things and, thus, thwarting her motivation to act. Blameworthy acts, as mentioned above, do not have to result in harm but are assessed in light of the agent's intention. The very meaning of the act of lying, thus, is that it is an act that deliberately intends to harm the person being lied to. This analysis of lying corresponds to ‘Abd al-Jabbar's statement that truth-telling (sidq) is good as an act that leads to a benefit or to averting harm, and is free from aspects of bad.5θ Lying, thus, is not ontologically bad as a speech act but on account of the attribute of deliberate falsehood that spe­cifically qualifies this type of speech as potentially harmful. In this configura­tion, which defines the very act of lying (its macnd), it is always assessed as bad. The same applies to injustice. It, likewise, is an act that intentionally harms another for no deserved reason without adding benefit greater than the harm inflicted and by its very meaning and definition is bad.57 A consequentialist approach, thus, can explain why lying and injustice are always bad. (How to explain them deontological will be addressed below.) Let's turn to how ‘Abd al-Jabbar assesses acts pertaining to the religious Law.}

1.2 Religious Assessment of Acts

Similar to rationally assessable acts, the status of acts pertaining to religious matters derives from evaluating the consequences of what committing or omitting the act leads to, however, in the Afterlife.^{[173] [174] For tAbd al-Jabbar, Revelation informs primarily about how to worship God by providing indica­tions that promise reward and threaten punishment for doing or omitting an act. 59 Where rational ethical assessment is directly related to what is rationally knowable about the state of the agent and the act's mundane consequences, the status of acts informed about by Revelation is assessed in relation to how the act enables the religious accountable person (mukallaf) to attain benefit and/or avert harm in the Hereafter, in terms of divine reward and punishment.[175] [176]}

Acts that are known to be bad from Revelation (qaba¹ih shar^ciyya), ^tAbd al-Jabbar says, are so on account of their otherworldly consequences, insofar as one knows that choosing to commit the act is threatened with punishment in the Hereafter, or that refraining from something commanded is preventing one­self from receiving divine reward. 61 Although Abd al-Jabbar does not expressly say so, underlying the assessment of acts informed about in Revelation are not only the consequences of reward or punishment but, in addition, obedience factors into their assessment. Being obedient to the divine impositions leads to absence of punishment/harm and, thus, absence of blame. Divine com­mands and prohibitions are, for Abd al-Jabbar, an opportunity for people to act in an obedient manner that enables them to reap the promised reward in the Hereafter.

Acts that lead to reward and punishment are only knowable from Revelation. For example, Abd al-Jabbar says that the ritual slaughter of animals is good and praiseworthy only due to being a form of assistance (Iutf), in that performing the slaughter assists the believer in discharging a religious duty and, thus, receiving benefit in the Hereafter.^{[177] [178] [179] [180] [181] The act of ritual slaughter is ‘good’ because, by making it a religious duty, God provides people with the opportunity (lutf) of attaining benefit upon compliance. The believer, however, acts out of a combination of obedience to God’s command, which leads to the absence of blame (and constitutes a good act) and of the anticipated benefit of other­worldly reward promised for obedience. It seems that for ‘Abd al-Jabbar the state of the agent (being obedient to God) is the primary criterion to evaluate religious actions. Hence, hypothetically, a person who refrains from drinking wine because she does not like its smell, would not perform thereby a good and praiseworthy act that receives reward in the Afterlife. Only when done out of obedience to God’s prohibition is not drinking wine assessed as praiseworthy because it then enables the actor to discharge a religious imposition and attain reward in the Hereafter.}

Preventing divine blame by performing religious impositions is, from the human perspective, good because it results in the benefit of avoiding other­worldly punishment. Yet, one may say, that it is only benefitting the person her­self and, thus, deviates from ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s initial definition of good. Acting upon religious impositions can only be explained to be good as a deontic act of obligatory obedience, with disobedience as a deliberate will of punishment for oneself, which ‘Abd al-Jabbar declares to be bad.6³ As Heemskerk puts it, it is “bad to expose oneself voluntarily to punishment.’^⁴ We see here that in addition to consequentialist calculations of benefit and harm, ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s ethical theory has a deontological dimension, to which we turn next.6⁵

1.3 Ethical Values and Right (Haqq)

The deontological dimension in ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s ethical theory is key to under­standing his assessment of legal norms. As Vasalou diligently teases out in her study on desert, Mu‘tazili ethical theories, like ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s, that determine good and bad on account of praise and blame have to be understood in light of the concept of ‘right’ (haqq)fⁱ' For ‘Abd al-Jabbar, the formulation haqq lahu refers to an act that somebody else has to do for the right-bearer, an obligatory act. The counterpart is haqq 'alayhi, a claim against oneself that one has to dis­charge in favor of someone else.^{[182] [183] [184] [185] [186] [187] [188] [189] [190] Fulfilling such a right is expected/obligatory. Moreover, tAbd al-Jabbar states that if an obligation “concerns another's claim (haqq), failure to fulfill it must constitute an injustice (zulm)."6s Injustice, as mentioned above, is defined as an act that constitutes harm without adding benefit greater than the harm inflicted or inflicting harm that is undeserved.69 Violation of another person's right, thus, is bad because it is harmful and unde­served, and therefore deserves blame?0}

In order to understand how rights are established, I suggest to look at tAbd al-Jabbar's underlying theological commitment to God's justice, which for illustration is here envisioned as a balance. As a defining attribute of the divine, God's justice exists prior to and independent of His acts. As Vasalou puts it, “God both is moral and acts morally."7¹ An act is described as just (^radl),7^{2 t}Abd al-Jabbar states, only when it is benefitting or harming someone else according to a configuration that is good?³ God is only ever acting with justice, i.e., not with the intent of inflicting undeserved harm. His very act of creation is a benefit directed toward humans. It establishes a right in favor of God and tilts the balance against humans, who, on account of this voluntarily bestowed benefit, are indebted to thank Him for His munificence (tafaddul)™ Thanking the Benefactor is a rational obligation upon the recipient, who, upon discharging this obligation, restores the balance of justice to its proper state. Fulfilling an obligation, however, is not an act that tAbd al-Jabbar considers just. He states that acts that are done in order to attain a benefit for oneself or avert a harm, such as eating and drinking as well as performing obligatory and recommended acts, are not described as just?⁵ The latter two are good (see below) but ultimately only repay a benefit received, i.e., a debt incurred; they are done in expectation of benefit for oneself, which includes averting blame or punishment.

God's act of beneficence toward His creation, thus, tips the balance in His favor and establishes right as well as desert. Desert on part of God is the right to, on the one hand, be thanked and praised for His good act and, on the other hand, to set the balance straight Himself should the obligation not be ful­filled. He has the right to punish non-compliance for violating His right to be thanked. Punishment of the violator is not only deserved but good, by equal­izing the transgression committed against the right-bearer and restoring the balance. Looking at punishment as part of God's justice, i.e., part of His nature, addresses Vasalou's complaint that Basran Mu‘tazilis are unable to discover the grounds justifying the necessity of punishment.^{[191] [192] [193] [194] ‘Abd al-Jabbar maintains that God punishing us “is described as justice and wisdom, even if we do not describe it as charity (khayr) and munificence (tafaddul), insofar as it is not a benefit, even if it is good.''77 In order for the universe to be just (in balance), God, by His very nature of being just, must punish somebody who willfully is violating His right to be thanked and obeyed.}

God's act of creation imposes upon the created the obligation to thank the Benefactor. Humans are, even prior to Revelation, in a state of culpabil­ity (takllf) of gratitude. Thanking the Benefactor is a rational obligation that, upon discharge, is good because it prevents blame from oneself. It is good on account of deontological considerations, not on account of receiving any reward in the Afterlife, since prior to Revelation one does not know about the promise and threat?⁸ Fulfilling the obligatory act (on part of the human actor, the debtor) or exacting restitution (on part of God, the debtee) sets the balance straight and is a good act, namely one that does not deserve blame - absence of blame makes the human act good, not presence of praise. The same can be said of mundane punishment, though in this case it restores a right possessed or incurred by another human?⁹

We see that ^tAbd al-Jabbar actually applies two criteria for designating something as good.^{[195] [196] [197] An act is good either Consequentialist on account of ben­efit directed toward another, or deontological as an act of restituting a claim. Both are born out of God's justice. God's justice self-obliges Him to act for the benefit of His creation (He cannot not act with justice). As benefaction vol­untarily bestowed upon creation, God's act is good and establishes a right for God and a claim (obligation) upon the recipient (i.e., the created) to restitute the beneficence received by thanking the Benefactor^1 The divine act of cre­ating has at once teleological and deontological dimensions, and establishes ethical as well as legal normativity. Through revealing His Law to humankind, God again establishes a claim in His favor and against humans by providing them with opportunities (altaf) to attain benefit for themselves by obeying His Law, as well as offering specific information of how to thank or rather worship Him. In the inner-Muttazili debate, detailed by Zysow, over whether people are obliged to obey the Law out of gratitude or assistance, tAbd al-Jabbar seems to be holding both positions. Gratitude is the reason to thank the Benefactor and it is based on humans' rationality, which enables them to know about the exis­tence of their Creator. This obligation exists prior to Revelation and continues afterward.82 Yet, with Revelation, people are additionally obliged to obey on account of the opportunities of divine reward it indicates. Obedience is simul­taneously deontological and consequentialist.}

The same dual structure holds for bad acts, which disturb the balance of justice in two ways. From a consequentialist perspective, acts that intention­ally lead to undeserved harm are bad and blameworthy; they tip the balance against the agent. From a deontological perspective, an act is bad when it vio­lates a right of somebody else. Hence, inflicting undeserved harm is a failure to fulfill another person's claim, namely the right not to be harmed, i.e., that the balance of justice remains undisturbed. Likewise, not expressing gratitude for a benefaction received (kufr al-ni^cma) is bad on account of violating that person's claim to be thanked.

Looking at blame through the lens of violating a right can also explain the badness of lying. It violates a right or claim possessed by the person being lied to. Such a right would be something like ‘mental soundness', constructed in parallel to the right to bodily integrity, which makes lying, i.e., misrepresenting reality, a violation of one's sound mental state, the state of rationality in which God created humankind. Creating them in justice bestows upon them the right to remain in this state. Looking at ‘Abd al-Jabbar's conception of rights in light of God's justice brings out the relationship between the establishment of rights, their violation, and obligation. In addition, we see that there is no fun­damental difference between ethical norms pertaining to the divine realm and this world. The same criteria that pertain to God also apply to human beings - with the difference that God, given His different nature, does not do anything but good. Moreover, ethical norms are not different prior and after the coming of Islam; at all times acts are evaluated according to teleological and deonto- logical considerations.

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