The Legal Assessment of Acts

^tAbd al-Jabbar further divides obligatory acts into inflexible (mudayyaq) and flexible (mukhayyar). Inflexible obligations, he says, deserve blame when the very act is not done, such as the obligation to differentiate between the doer of good and the evildoer and thank the benefactor. A flexible obligatory act only deserves blame when neither it nor its substitute is done, whereas no blame is deserved when the actor performs the appropriate substitute for the act, like carrying out one of the different forms of scriptural penances (kaffdrdt) or repaying a debt in a different currency.^{[215] [216] [217] In short, an act is obligatory (wajib) when performing it averts harm from oneself by preventing the desert of blame (or punishment), irrespective of whether the blame and punishment is meted out in this world or the Hereafter.}

In tAbd al-Jabbar’s discussion of obligation, we also see the Muttazili confi­dence in a correspondence between the mundane and divine realms. It not only leads him to state that there is no difference between the intellect and the Law in their ability to impose obligation,^ω2 he also applies the label of obligation to God. Were God, he says, not to provide reward (thawab), assistances (altaf), and enable the religiously culpable (tamkln al-mukallaf) to pursue these, He would deserve blame, and, hence, doing so is obligatory upon God - an obli­gation He puts upon Himself due to His very nature of being just. According to ‘Abd al-Jabbar, providing assistance (Iutf) is an inflexible obligation (wajib mudayyaq fih) on God, whereas giving reward is a flexible obligation fwajib mukhayyar fih).^{[218] [219] [220] [221] [222] [223] God's justice also imposes on Him the obligation to punish the evildoer and anyone who is violating His right to be thanked and obeyed. Only by punishing the violator of His right can God escape the blame of not fulfilling an obligation He himself imposes.ω4}

When describing the legal categories that attach to bad acts, ‘Abd al-Jabbar is rather undifferentiated.10⁵ He only says that those acts for which the agent deserves blame, should not be done (laysa lahu an yaf^calahu).^w6 He does not clearly distinguish between the legal status of prohibited and reprehensible, only saying that religiously reprehensible acts (makruh) are included in the cat­egory of bad acts because what God reproaches (karaha) must be bad (qabih.).^ω7 Similar to the category of commendation (nadb), reprehensible acts apparently are not rationally assessable but only known from Revelation. ‘Abd al-Jabbar's main interest when discussing bad acts is laying out the grounds that make something bad, namely their harmfulness and senselessness.

2.1 Correspondence of Rational and Religious Legal Normativity

Determining the ethical and legal value of acts in light of harm and benefit, and the resulting blame and praise, raises the question why Revelation is nec­essary. ^tAbd al-Jabbar admits that human reason and the divine Law do not always correspond in the assessment of acts, neither with regard to their ethi­cal nor their legal status. This misalignment encompasses all legal norms.^{[224] [225] [226] For example, he says that the Law makes prayer obligatory (= good), though the intellect finds it bad (= prohibited); similarly, supererogatory acts of worship are desirable (muraghghab fih) (= good and recommended) in the eyes of the Law, whereas rationally they may be seen as bad. Giving alms (zakat) and dis­pensing penances (kaffarat) are scripturally obligatory, yet rationally they are simply good (hasan), i.e., not obligatory because omitting them does not incur blame rationally. Fornication (zina) and eating on the first day of Ramadan are bad acts according to the Law (= prohibited), whereas the intellect consid­ers them permissible.}

This rather stark difference between rational and scriptural assessment of acts at first sight disproves the Muttazili emphasis on continuity between the mundane and divine realms. It is, however, only a matter of insufficient infor­mation on part of the human intellect. The reality (haqlqa) of rulings does not change by the revealed Law because, tAbd al-Jabbar states, when Revelation refers to an act, it does so as an affirmation of its rational assessment or to provide knowledge that can only be known from RevelationJⁿ He emphasizes that the intellect would be in agreement with the Law in its assessment of good and bad were (law) we to know, for example, of the enormous benefit (naf 'azlm) of prayer. Rationally, we would choose an obligatory act for which we deserve praise and reward if we knew about it. Would we know rationally that fornication leads to corruption, he says, then we would know its badness. The role of the Law, ‘Abd al-Jabbar stresses, is not to impose obligation, but rather to reveal (kashafa) the status of the act through indication.^{[227] [228] [229] [230] [231] [232] [233]}

Is there a connection between an act being prohibited and its badness? In other words, is God's prohibition grounds for its badness? The answer for ‘Abd al-Jabbar is a clear ‘no'. Being prohibited is not grounds for an act's badness. He maintains that not only does one person prohibit what another person com­mands, yet even divine prohibition per se does not make something bad but only indicates that it leads to bad consequences (J'asdd), in the same way as divine command indicates good consequences (sα∕αA).^π3 ‘Abd al-Jabbar sup­ports his view by pointing out that a minor who is committing a bad act is not prohibited from doing so.^π4 He argues that the connection is not, as Ash‘aris claim, between command/prohibition and good/bad. Rather, goodness and badness are necessarily entailed (Iqtada) from their configurations. It is impos­sible, ‘Abd al-Jabbar says, that grounds of badness obtain without necessitat­ing the act to be bad; they occur in the same manner as necessary causes (^cilal mujiba).11⁵ This stability of norms, for him, holds true for acts known from Revelation as well as those known rationally.^π6 Something that is bad ratio­nally does not become good unless its state or configuration changes, and vice versa.11⁷

Nevertheless, there is a connection between command and good and prohi­bition and bad. Yet, not in the way that Ash‘aris envision. ‘Abd al-Jabbar main­tains that since God is just and wise, He does not command to do something harmful. God, being omniscient, commands an act in accordance with the state of good or bad Jald hal al-hasan wa-l-qablh.).^π8 He does not act without purpose or in vain. Acts are commanded or prohibited by God for their state of goodness or badness, a state not necessarily discernable to the human intellect without Revelation.^{[234] [235] [236] t}Abd al-Jabbar’s emphasis that the state (hal) of an act determines its assessment also implies that, contrary to Ashtari claims, it is not God’s command that makes the act good but rather the grounds of good­ness of the act, as known to God, is what is prompting Him to command it. Similarly, God only prohibits acts of which He knows that they result in harm; they do not become bad on account of divine prohibition. Hence, somewhat counterintuitively, tAbd al-Jabbar’s ethical theory implies that whatever God commands or prohibits is known to be good or bad, irrespective of whether the intellect by itself arrives at the same assessment. They are good and bad in rela­tion to their consequences for the religiously accountable based on obedience and disobedience to the command and prohibition, respectively. Obedience to the Law, in turn, is based on the knowledge of God’s justice, namely that all of His acts, commands and prohibitions, are good and imposed for people’s benefit.

In tAbd al-Jabbar’s discussion of ethical and legal norms, consequentialist and deontological considerations motivate and are the intentions of human action. Acts are done for a purpose or reason, namely on account of their ben­eficial consequences or out of obligation, which, one may say, is also a way to avert bad consequences from oneself and, thus, is beneficial. If an act is not intended toward these goals, then the action is bad. tAbd al-Jabbar maintains that “when we know that the act is bad and that we have no need for it, then we do not choose it.’⁴²⁰ This calculation of benefit against harm is the same for acts the consequence of which are enjoyed in this world or the Hereafter. The prospect of reward and fear of punishment in the Hereafter motivates human obedience to the revealed Law. 121 tAbd al-Jabbar further expands the notion of motivation in his discussion of the procedure of analogy (qiyas) and the ^ril.la, to which we will turn next.

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