The Ethical and Legal Value of Acts

Human reason evaluates acts that result in harm as ‘bad’. For al-Basri, acts that are harmful either to oneself or others are rationally considered bad (qabth).

Throughout his work, one notices that al-Basri constructs norms dominantly in consequentialist terms. This preference for consequentialist assessment extends to cases in which he mentions right (haqq). When al-Basri elaborates that transgression against another's property is bad, he argues that it is bad “because it harms him, not just because he owns it.”^{[318] [319] [320] [321] It is bad because the owner, he says, has more right (Aaqq) to benefit from it than the non-owner.24 Infringing on someone else's property/right is harmful and, thus, bad by dimin­ishing his benefit. In this instance, al-Basri constructs rights not so much in deontological as in consequentialist terms. The grounds for the badness of violating somebody else's right are consequentialist, though it is possible that al-Basri deems them prefaced on the right to ownership?5}

1.2 ReligiousNormativity

Assuming a uniform moral universe leads al-Basri to apply the same rationale of attaining benefit and harm to assess acts informed about by Revelation, though with noteworthy shifts in terminology and in the grounds on which acts receive their religio-legal status.

Several times throughout the Mu^rtamad, al-Basri provides definitions of good and bad acts with regard to the religious Law, each time with slightly different wording. His most detailed, and most convoluted, definition is as fol­lows: Bad is an act that a person capable of it (qadir ^calayhi) and able to know (mutamakkin min al-4lm) its state (hdl) of badness (qablh) should not do, and when he does it, his act is effective (mu^,aththir) on deserving blame (istihqdq al-dhamm). Good, by contrast, is an act that a person, who is capable of it and knows its state, should do, and when he does, his act does not have the effi­cacy (ta^,thlr) of deserving blame?⁶ Acts, thus, are evaluated ethically as well as legally, on the one hand, in relation to the knowing and capable intentionality of the agent and, on the other hand, by their consequences.

Stipulating knowledge, al-Basri maintains that acts of people who are not culpable, such as the person who is forgetful, sleeping, insane (majnun) or a child, are not related to praise or blame. However, while their acts do not deserve blame from a religious perspective, he argues that they still are bad and may incur financial liability for damages. Moreover, al-Basri says that “our associates”^{[322] [323] hold that even beasts can do acts that are bad, but they do not deserve blame.28 In contrast to tAbd al-Jabbar who holds such acts as not ethi­cally assessable, al-Basri explicitly differentiates between the badness of an act and the desert of blame. While harm is the criterion on which an act is ratio­nally assessed, it does not translate directly into being religiously evaluated as blameworthy, though something that is blameworthy is also bad.}

In al-Basri's classification of religious acts, the absence of blame means that an act is good, which comprises the legal categories of permissible, recom­mended, and obligatory. An act is permissible (mubah) when it has no attri­bute adding (sifa zd^,ida) to its goodness that would incur the actor to deserve praise (madh.) and reward (thawab). The lack of blame, praise or reward for engaging in an act is known when there are neither indications of a restriction (Iiazr) and prevention (man^r) in form of deterrence (zajr) nor a promise (wad) of reward (thawab) for its performance^^[324] Al-Basri clearly includes permissible acts into religious acts, saying that the term ‘permissible' “informs (yufid) that God permitted to engage in the act in that He let us know or indicated to us that it is good.”^{[325] [326]}

When, however, the act has an attribute adding to its goodness that is a gateway (madkhal)"'' to deserving praise and reward, then the act belongs to the category of recommendation (nadb) as long as omitting it does not incur blame.^{[327] [328] [329] [330] [331] [332] [333] Like tAbd al-Jabbar, al-Basri further divides recommended acts into those that are either a benefit (nafr) and beneficence (Ihsan) directed to some­one other than the agent - which he calls generosity (J'adl) - or those for which the benefit is restricted to the actor - which he calls recommended (mandub) or desirable (muraghghab).33 Al-Basri clearly displays his teleological outlook when he maintains that it is the promise of reward (thawab) that motivates the agent to perform recommended acts?4}

Legally obligatory (w>djib) are those acts that one should not fail to fulfill and that when omitted are a doorway (madkhal) to deserving blame, though, when performed deserve praise and reward?⁵ Al-Basri further divides obligatory acts into those that are obligatory upon the individual (wdjib ^cala l-a^cydn); those that incur blame when omitted by the community as a whole (w>ajib ^cala l-kifaya), such as JihadJ' and those acts which, while incurring blame when omitted, the actor has a choice among performing different obligatory acts (w>ajib ^cala l-takhyir), as is the case with penances (kaffarat)J⁷ The differentiating fac­tor between obligatory and recommended acts is blame, which results from disobedience. Failing to perform a religiously praiseworthy act only deserves blame when a divine command, i.e., an obligation, is disobeyed, because only command (amr), he says, entails (yaqtada) obligation?⁸

Al-Basri defines religiously bad acts as having an attribute (sifa) that is effective (mu^,aththir) on the agent deserving blame. This effective attribute is recognized when there is a prevention (man') against performing it, which customarily means that God issued a prohibition (nahy), threat of punish­ment (w>a^cld), and deterrence (zajr) against it. Such acts receive the legal status of prohibited (mahzur) or forbidden (muharram).^[334] Confidence in a shared human and divine moral normativity allows al-Basri to apply the language customarily used among people to convey that an act should not be done, to being blameworthy in the eyes of God.^{[335] [336] [337] [338] [339] The attributes that make an act a gateway (madkhal) to blame are those that are deemed to be a form of disobe­dience (macsiya) to God, that are proscribed (mahzur), forbidden (muharram), a sin (dhanb) for which one expects to be censured and punished, that are deterred from (majzur) or threatened with punishment (mutacawwad).41 Al-Basri’s reliance on linguistic conventions to understand the divine word is apparent here. Differentiating between something that is prohibited and something that is only discouraged from is done in accordance with what is conventionally understood to convey these meanings.}

As the above shows, different from norms assessed by the intellect alone, al-Basri’s defines religio-legal norms in relation to blame and praise. Praise and blame are related to obedience and disobedience, respectively, not just to ben­efit and harm, and suggest a deontological perspective in al-Basri’s ethico-legal theory. This deontological outlook is also noticeable in his definition of obli­gation (rational and religious) as acts that one should not fail to do. To better understand al-Basri’s conception of blame, we need to look at how he con­ceives of Revelation.

Through Revelation, al-Basri says, God informs people about their maslahas and mafsadas. God being wise (hakim), having knowledge of ‘bad’ and ‘obliga­tion’, and having no need for doing anything bad makes it inconceivable that He would fail to let His creation know about their maslahas and mafsadas. Al-Basri displays his Muhazili stance when saying that it is obligatory for God to inform about the divine assistances (altaf).4² This is a logical obligation, al-Basri contends, since in order for a person to be accountable for following God’s imposition (taklif), he has to know the goodness of the act prior to engag­ing in it.43 The knowledge that God neither commits something bad nor fails to fulfill an obligation entails that He does not prohibit something that is good and that He does not command something that is bad.44 The meta-ethical commitment to God doing only what is good, thus, informs al-Basri’s position that God’s impositions are, by definition, good and a maslaha.

Maslaha, however, is not the same as a rationally assessable benefit. Al-Basri emphasizes that although the intellect is able to know that maslaha is good and mafsada is bad, it is not able to establish a religio-legal maslaha or maf- sada by itself.^{[340] [341] This is done exclusively by the divine Law. Only God, al-Basri insists, informs humans about their religious maslahas and mafsadas and what is connected to them, namely through the divinely revealed rulings. The role of reason is to determine whether or not a particular instance is addressed by a religious ruling and to establish the means by which one recognizes valid religio-legal rulings.4? The religious assessment is based on analysis of the word of God. God's command (amr) informs that acting upon the commanded is a maslaha. Killing an idolator is only known to be good by God's command “kill the idolators.’[342] [343] [344] [345] [346] God's prohibition (nahy) of performing an act indicates to the religiously accountable person that this act is bad (qablh) and a source or a sign for mafsada.48 Through Revelation is it known, for example, that prayer is obligatory, drinking wine is prohibited, that not fasting on the first day of Ramadan is blameworthy as opposed to the previous day, or that it is pro­hibited to trade wheat usuriously.49 Since matters of the Law (sharciyydt) are maslahas, al-Basri maintains that people are rationally obliged to obey God's commands and prohibitions in order to attain maslaha and avert mafsada.'0 Yet, as he points out, it is not the commanded itself that is a maslaha.' Rather, as a request, command is a motivating factor (haith) to do the commanded, in the same way as divine prohibition motivates to omit the prohibited.[347] [348] [349] [350] These religious maslahas and mafsadas, according to al-Basri, are acts the status of which cannot be assessed rationally by considering praise and blame deserved for the action, rather they are “acts by the performance or omission of which we worship God in accordance with the Sharita.,,53 Blame and praise, thus, are a function of obedience to the divine Law, not of rational considerations of benefit and harm. One's trust in God commanding only what is good (benefi­cial consequences) and prohibiting only what is bad (harmful consequences) suffice to motivate to obedience.}

Complying with God's command, as an act of worshipping Him, attains maslah.a.54 Although al-Basri does not spell it out, it is clear that by maslaha he means the believer's otherworldly reward (thawab) for complying with God's commands and mafsada is the punishment (^ruquba) that He threatens for transgressing His prohibitions. 55 Structurally, al-Basri equates people's ratio­nal obligation to procure benefit and avert harm with their obligation to act upon God's commands as a way to attain maslaha and stay away from what God prohibits to avoid mafsada. Divine commands are good, performing them is obligatory because it leads to otherworldly benefit in form of reward and, upon obedience, is praiseworthy; and His prohibitions are bad, and upon per­formance incur harm in form of punishment. Obedience to God is a rational consideration. In matters known from Revelation, just as in matters that the intellect alone informs about, people act upon that which they think probable to attain benefit/maslaha and avert harm/mafsada. The religio-legal value of an act is determined in relation to obedience to God's impositions. Obedience is the criterion that ultimately determines praise and blame, respectively, which depend on the divine promise of reward and threat of punishment for performing or omitting an act. The desert of blame, thus, is not a function of harm but of disobedience to the acts God imposes. Al-Basri's approach to nor­mativity, thus, displays a predominantly consequentialist perspective, though with an implicit underlying deontological dimension.

The dominance of a consequentialist approach to ethico-legal normativity is also noticeable in that for al-Basri acts that are effective on deserving blame are so cumulatively. A single act is not decisive for the desert of eternal divine blame.^{[351] [352] [353] [354] [355] Al-Basri specifically rejects to define ‘bad’ in terms of desert of blame, because blame is deserved by weighing a person’s good acts against her bad ones. A person who deserves more praise than blame for her actions, he says, would disprove such a definition^7 The cumulative aspect of deserving blame also explains al-Basri’s use of the term madkhal - gateway. Performing the indi­vidual actions that the Law imposes is a gateway to praise and reward upon obedience, and to blame upon disobedience. Weighing good against bad acts is also evident when al-Basri differentiates between major (kablr) or minor (saghlr) bad acts. A minor bad act is one for which punishment and blame “does not exceed” reward and praise for the actor.58 A major bad act means that its performer deserves more punishment than reward. The punishment deserved may be severe (ciqdb 'azlm), for example for unbelief (kufr), or a lesser degree of punishment for a sinful offense (fisq}.5 In al-Basri’s vision of human conduct, good and bad acts are weighed against each other to determine whether the agent deserves blame or not. Each individual act of the religiously accountable person, thus, has an attribute that is effective on or has the poten­tial of the agent deserving blame. It seems that for al-Basri blame (dhamm) is the final verdict on the Day of Judgement that the agent deserves on account of her cumulative actions.6°}

Does al-Basri use two different standards for rational and religious assess­ment of norms, thereby contradicting the Mu^ttazili emphasis on the continu- tity of realms? If it is obedience and disobedience that result in praise and blame, respectively, what is their relation to benefit and harm? Slightly dif­ferent from ^tAbd al-Jabbar, in al-Basri’s conception, obedience to God’s Law is not driven primarily by deontological considerations but by the objective to thereby attain benefit/reward/mas/aAa and avert harm/punishment/ma/- sada. This Consequentialist approach is confirmed by Vasalou's analysis of the concept of desert in Mu^ttazili thought, where she argues for a consequen- tialist perspective to determine the desert of blame. She maintains that the underlying assumption of the Basran Mu^ttazilis is that people desire praise and shun blame because blame is an act of belittling, of insult and deroga­tion, which results in the individual to lose honor and repute. Being subjected to blame, thus, constitutes harm, and avoiding blame means averting harm from oneself - which, as mentioned above, is for al-Basri a rational obligation. Vasalou explains the desirability of praise by being a form of exaltation and honoring, which leads to increasing one's honor, and, thus, constitutes a ben­efit.^{[356] [357] [358] [359] Considering blame as a (social) harm and praise as a (social) benefit has some support in al-Basri's work. When he speaks about the prohibition to say ‘fie' to one's parents, he explains that verbally abusing them dishonors them, and thereby constitutes harm.62}

The consequentialist outlook in al-Basri's thought is also at display in his conceptualization of ‘right'. In al-Mu^rtamad, al-Basri rarely mentions ‘right' (haqq). One of the few times he references it is, as mentioned above, when he explains that transgressions against another's property is bad because the owner has more right (haqq) to benefit from it than the non-owner. He also mentions that it is obligatory to not damage or destroy another person's property. 6³ In both cases it is not ownership by itself but preventing the right­ful owner of benefitting from his property that makes transgressing against it a harmful and bad act. The right to property, thus, is connected to benefitting from it. In contrast to ^tAbd al-Jabbar, al-Basri does not explicitly relate the right of another to one's obligation to act, but only to refrain from acting. When list­ing thanking a benefactor as rationally obligatory, he no further elaborates^⁴ This suggests that al-Basri looks at rights through a consequentialist lens as the right to benefit, though perhaps with some deontic dimension implied. Taking, again, the image of justice as a balance, it seems that God's justice is understood by al-Basri as God weighing people's good acts (benefit, obedience) against their bad (harm, disobedience). God is the just Judge. Whereas in ^tAbd al-Jabbar’s conceptualization, God Himself is the standard of justice.

1.3 Combined Rational and Religious Normativity

Some acts, al-Basri maintains, receive their assessment from a combination of rational investigation and revealed information. It is known rationally, for example, that engaging in sale (bay^e) is good and, hence, permissible (mubah). The conditions surrounding sale, however, like the prohibition of usury (riba), are informed about by the Law.^{[360] [361] [362] [363] [364] Another such ruling is the qur’anic prohibi­tion to say ‘fie’ to one’s parents. It is known rationally that respecting (taczlm) parents is good, and abusing them is a harmful offence and, thus, bad and prohibited.66 In this case, intellect and Law both prescribe the same ruling.}

The confidence that al-Basri displays toward people’s rational ability to assess the ethical and legal value of acts, however, does not mean that he gives priority to rational evaluation over what the Law reveals. The intellect’s capac­ity to assess the moral and legal status of acts is limited - or else there would be no need for Revelation. The purpose of Revelation is to inform about the assessment of those acts for which the rational and religious assessment dif­fers. Attaining benefit that is free from harm is only obligatory^⁷ al-Basri states, as long as God does not inform that the act is a mafsada - which He inevi­tably does. 6⁸ What Scripture does not address must be rationally assessable based on weighing the consequences.6⁹ He, thus, accords a significant role to the intellect in ordering the laws of society - laws that would fall beyond a person’s religious culpability. Yet, human reason is also al-Basri’s tool to expand the realm of taklf namely by analogizing the revealed Law to situations not expressly covered. In other words, analogical reasoning is the tool to delineate which actions have otherworldly consequences.

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