Working in the field of legal theory, one quickly recognizes the influence of theology on the way jurists approach and interpret the divine Law.

After all, most jurisprudents are also theologians. How they think about the nature of God and His relationship to His creatures, and how humans know what they know about this world and the divine impacts the way they interpret the divine word and how they ‘translate’ it into categories relevant to the sphere of Law.

While, as mentioned, there is no fixed relation between adherence to theologi­cal school and legal doctrine, there is a certain logic that connects basic theo­logical positions with basic legal view. Eissa convincingly demonstrates that holding a particular theological doctrine does not translate into a particular legal position. Still, as his presentation of the Before Revelation debate shows, theological doctrine is related to holding a particular legal position because the former affects the hermeneutical framework in which a jurist operates.^[51] The impact of theological school affiliation on a jurist’s legal thought can only be fully understood if one were to examine all possible lines of influence on his positions. Wide varieties existing within each theological and legal school pre­vent the feasibility of such an endeavor in any comprehensive fashion. I nev­ertheless argue that there are dominant theological commitments that shape legal interpretation - not as a causal relation but, similar to Syed’s findings, as one of explanation. This explanatory relationship is at play when it comes to ethical and legal norms, and the role of the religious Law in society - the topics of this study. In order to facilitate my presentation of ethical and legal norms and legal analogy in the work of our five jurisprudents, I will provide here a basic and, admittedly, simplified outline of how Muhazilis and Ash^taris, as the two dominant schools of theology during the 5th∕11th century, think about epistemology and ethics, and about God’s speech.

This is followed by a short Abriss of al-Maturidi’s theological commitments, which, though much less detailed, highlights some of the main overlaps and differences of his thought with Muhazilism and Ash^tarism. The positions here presented are meant to facil­itate tracing the rudimentary ideas and arguments around which our scholars construct their variations. It is likely that no individual scholar holds the line of argumentation presented below in exactly that way. This sketch, nevertheless, highlights the key theological commitments that underlie the construction of ethical and legal normativity in the thought of our five jurists. Each school of theology, despite the multiplicity of positions among their adherents, is char­acterized by a dominant commitment. Mu^ttazili thought is permeated by their commitment to God's justice ('adl); Ash^tari argumentation safeguards God's omnipotence (qudra) and otherness; and Maturidi approaches to law and eth­ics reflect their alligiance to God's wisdom (hikma). The dominant commit­ment of a school of theology shapes, or in Syed's words constrains, the options of its members in articulating their varied solution to particular questions.^[52] Syed lists three core positions that explain the “character of reasoning” in both Mu^ttazili and Ash^tari thought: their moral epistemology, their position on the nature of God's justice, and on the character of voluntary human action.^[53] I would argue that their respective position on the nature of God is the primary explanatory factor, from which the other two positions flow, which seems to bear out in Syed's presentation of the Mu^ttazili and Ash^tari solutions to moral agency and responsibility.^{[54] [55]} These preeminent loyalties to God's justice, omnip­otence, and wisdom, respectively, are part of the meta-ethics that help explain scholars' ethical theories and the impact they have on their legal thought.

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