Assertion and humility

Let's now connect the previous two sections; in particular, in what follows, we outline two distinct ramifications that valuing intellectual humility might have for debates about epistemic norms governing assertion.The first concerns polarisation and KNA-Suff and the second con­cerns the social-epistemic value of forbearing from asserting.

29.4.1 First ramification

Let's assume, for the sake of argument, the Whitcomb et al. view that a central element of intellectual humility involves being “appropriately attentive to” and “owning” one's intellectual limitations (2015, p. 516).

Within the class of intellectual limitations, it will be helpful to distinguish between two varieties: individual intellectual limitations and social intellectual limitations.The former, which Whitcomb et al. are principally concerned with, include various ways that individuals fall short in their capacity as inquirers (e.g., gaps in knowledge, cognitive mistakes, unreliable processes, deficits in learnable skills, etc.). Owning our individual intellectual limitations, however, may be only part of the story for what is needed to own our intellectual limitations in a way that a characteristically intellectu­ally humble person should aspire to. Along with intellectual limitations that impede our capacity as inquirers, we also have intellectual limitations that impede our capacity to share and exchange information or rely on others. Call these social intellectual limitations.

Within the class of social (rather than merely individual) intellectual limitations, some are socially inherited and others are socially triggered. In socially inherited cases such as testimonial injustice (e.g., Fricker 2007), one's being regarded as having a certain negatively perceived epis­temic property (e.g.,“X is a minority”“X is a woman”) is (unfortunately) often enough in itself to problematically limit a thinker in her capacity to communicate and exchange information.¹⁴ Such individuals are on account of being perceived in this way not believed as they should be, even if they believe (and assert) as they should.

What will be of interest for us, however, are social intellectual limitations that fall in the socially triggered category. These are more complicated. Consider, for example, what happens in cases of group polarisation, which is the tendency of groups to incline towards more extreme positions (post deliberation) than those initially held by their individual members. When one is imbedded within a polarised group, one becomes unable to communicate information one knows to those with opposing views, though not because of any particular perceived property of the individual per se (as in cases of testimonial injustice) but rather because the dynamics of group polarisation function so as to counter the persuasive force of what one is arguing.¹⁵

A virtuously intellectually humble person will be suitably attuned to this kind of social intellectual limitation—and to the conditions under which it's triggered in group dynamics— and not merely to her individual intellectual limitations. Compare: the intellectually arrogant individual fails to appreciate that (in contexts of group deliberation) she is socially intellectually limited as she is. Imagine here your misguided friend who is shocked to see what happens when she attempts to debate politics on Facebook. She initially expects her friends (regardless of viewpoint) to be more deferential to her own testimony, assertions and viewpoint than they are. She falsely assumes her testimony will, in that context, carry epistemic weight that it turns out to lack almost entirely.

This is an example of a serious kind of social intellectual limitation,¹⁶ one whereby a subject is severely limited in her capacity to share and exchange information.Virtuously humble indi­viduals, by owning this social intellectual limitation just as they might own other individual intel­lectual limitations, do not expect their assertions, in such contexts, to perform the function that their assertions would ordinarily perform: the function of imparting knowledge (see, e.g., Kelp 2018).¹⁷ Consequently, they are better at avoiding assertoric misfires: assertions that fail to fulfil their function of imparting knowledge.

At this point, it is helpful to make explicit an important connection between (i) the demands of virtuous intellectual humility; and (ii) the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion. KNA-Suff (no less than KNA-Nec) is in the business of describing one specific sense in which our assertions are normatively epistemically constrained, one where the con­straint is keyed to the epistemic position of the asserter vis-a-vis the truth of the proposition asserted. KNA-Suff says that, in the case of this normative epistemic constraint, “knowledge is enough” to satisfy it.

That might well be right.¹⁸ But to the extent that we are inclined to the plausible idea that the function of asserting is (a la Kelp) to impart knowledge in the hearer, knowledge that the propositions one asserts are true won't be enough to ensure that function is fulfilled. Consider again the plight of the individual engaged in a fruitless and polarising Facebook political discus­sion, who is (unlike many of us who know better) surprised to find that her assertions seem to carry little weight in that context; even if she is asserting (by posting) knowledgeably, her asser­tions unreliably fulfil their aim; she is mostly asserting in vain.

What the knowledgeable asserter lacks in the above scenario, we submit, is a very specific form of intellectual humility: one whereby one suitably owns her social intellectual limitations and, in doing so, is attuned to the way in which she is limited in her capacity to communicate and impart knowledge to others. By owning social and not merely individual intellectual limi­tations, one is better positioned to avoid assertoric misfires in contexts where the risk of such misfires is higher than average and, in doing so, becomes a better asserter, one whose assertions more reliably fulfil their aim as assertions.¹⁹

Cultivating intellectual humility is, accordingly, valuable to the practice of asserting in a way that is not ‘swamped' by the value of complying with the norm that one should assert only when one knows. In this way, we maintain, the ramifications humility has for our practice of asserting are important and worthy of further exploration.

29.4.2 Second ramification

In this section, we outline a further way in which valuing intellectual humility has ramifications for how we should conduct ourselves as asserters. Here we take as a starting point Priest's (2017) idea that essential to intellectual humility is not seeing oneself as intellectually entitled (2017, 479). One way an individual might see herself as intellectually entitled is by regarding herself as deserving of what is in fact an inflated level of credibility, either relative to what would be an accurate assessment of her own capacities, or relative to others' capacities. Compare, here, the successful CEO who, at a dinner party, expects others at the table to listen attentively when they speak on matters of politics and policy, while not affording others the same respect or attention.

With respect to the doxastic triad of belief, disbelief and the withholding of judgment,²⁰ those who have an inflated sense of entitlement will be prone to inflated levels of self-trust. A consequence of this kind of self-trust is that intellectually arrogant individuals will be inclined to believe on the basis of their initial intellectual assessments of things when they should with-

hold (or disbelieve) as well as withhold when they should disbelieve.²¹ In this respect, intellectual arrogance (viz., the lack of intellectual humility) can harm us in our capacity as inquirers.²²

But there is a flip side to this coin. Just as one who sees herself as intellectually entitled will believe when, instead, they should withhold judgment, they will also be inclined to assert when they should forbear from asserting; both of these mistakes flow naturally from a vicious sense of intellectual entitlement, as both are different ways of manifesting a regard of oneself as deserving of an inflated level of credibility.

KNA-Nec already offers a simple explanation for why we should refrain from asserting in those cases where our epistemic position with respect to what we are asserting is impoverished; we should assert only if we know.

CPR:Aria is lying by the pool, nonresponsive.The only person close enough to assist is her aunt Kara, who does not know what to do to apply CPR. Fortunately, there are many friends standing on the balcony above (too high to safely jump down). One of these friends is an experienced paramedic.Another is Aria's uncle Jimmy. Jimmy knows what to do to do CPR only because the paramedic had told him the night before. Kara calls up to the balcony asking for instructions, noting that time is of essence.The paramedic begins speaking, but Jimmy interrupts and begins shouting the instructions.

Cases like CPR are importantly different from cases in which the capacity to inform is not a ‘zero-sum game'. Compare, for example, Jimmy's situation as an asserter in the CPR case with his situation as an asserter as, say, student in a three-hour graduate seminar when everyone has an opportunity to wax expansively. In the grad seminar, Jimmy's asserting is not at the expense of others' assertions; in CPR, it is.

For the present purposes, let's assume for the sake of argument that KNA-Suff is correct, and thus, that Jimmy is properly epistemically positioned to assert what he does precisely because he knows what he says.There is a clear sense in which, even so, Jimmy's assertion is criticisable; once he made it, it passes epistemic scrutiny. And yet, epistemically speaking, he shouldn’t have made it. He should have forbeared from asserting, deferring in his capacity as an informant to an expert. Epistemic norms governing proper assertion, like KNA-Nec and KNA-Suff give us no guidance as to when to forbear and when to assert within the class of cases where, if we assert, our assertion will pass epistemic scrutiny.

What prevents Jimmy from forbearing from asserting, as he ought to, is not any defect he has, epistemically, with respect to the truth of what he says. He knows what he says. The problem instead lies with his sense of intellectual entitlement; he views (like the CEO at the dinner party) his assertion as deserving of an inflated weight relative to others' assertions, and this leads him to refrain from forbearing from asserting on occasions when he ought to forbear.

The antidote to Jimmy's defect as an asserter is intellectual humility. One who lacks the sense of entitlement the lacking of which is (on Priest's view) at the core of virtuous intellectual humility, will not be inclined to overweight her own capacity to inform in relation to others, especially in cases where asserting comes at the expense of blatantly silencing known experts. Here again, we find a way in which cultivating intellectual humility is valuable to the practice of asserting in a way that is not ‘swamped' by the value of complying with the norm that one should assert only when one knows.

29.5