Conclusion

The value of intellectual humility has been well explored, though thus far, not yet in its con­nection with the practice of assertion. Meanwhile, debates about the norms governing assertion have principally concerned themselves with describing how assertion is normatively epistemi- cally constrained, where the constraint of interest is keyed to the epistemic position of the asserter vis-a-vis the truth of the proposition asserted.

Notes

1 For some representative recent work, see, for example,Whitcomb et al. 2015; Church and Samuelson forthcoming; Samuelson et al. 2015; Priest 2017; Gregg and Mahadevan 2014; Kallestrup and Pritchard Forthcoming; Spiegel 2012;Tanesini 2016a; Kidd 2016; Hazlett 2012.

2 See Brown and Cappelen (2011) for a notable collection of essays.

3 For discussion, see Beall, Glanzberg, and Ripley (2017).

4 See, for example, Pagin (2016) and Stalnaker (1978).

5 For further discussion, see Turri (2016).

6 This picture is embraced by Williamson (2017).

7 See Benton (2015) for a helpful overview of Moore-paradoxicality and the knowledge norm of asser­tion.

8 The infelicity of asserting that one’s lottery ticket is a loser, even when odds are astronomically high that this is true, is another popular line of argument in favour of a knowledge norm on assertion. See, e.g., Hawthorne (2004).

9 For a defence of the truth norm of assertion, see Dummett (1959) and Weiner (2005).

10 For proponents of the view that one should assert that p only if p is rational or justified for one, see for example Lackey (2007), Douven (2006) and Kvanvig (2009).

11 Of course, sometimes we assert things in a way that is perfectly epistemically responsible, but and yet, what we assert nonetheless falls short of knowledge.This might happen on occasions where one asserts on the basis of misleading evidence, or in cases of‘Gettiered’ assertions, viz., where one’s assertion is jus­tified and true but still fall short of knowledge.While critics of the knowledge norm of assertion appeal to such cases to argue that something weaker than knowledge is the norm of assertion, proponents have a ready diagnosis for these alleged problem cases: they are examples of blameless norm violations. For recent discussion on this point, see Williamson (Forthcoming).

12 For criticisms of the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion, see for example Lackey (2011) and Carter and Gordon (2011).

13 Note that a further position one who accepts the KNA-Nec and KNA-Suff pair might embrace is that being subject to these norms is that it is constitutive of something’s being an assertion that it is governed by the (relevant) knowledge norms. This is Williamson’s (2000) own position. One needn’t embrace the further constitutive claim by simply embracing KNA-Nec and KNA-Suff. For recent criticism of the position that there is one and only one norm that is constitutive of assertion, see Kelp and Simion (2016).

14 Consider, for instance, testifiers from marginalised groups whose assertions are not given appropriate evidential weight. Such individuals, in virtue of having a kind of unjust credibility deficit, are intellec­tually limited; such a perceived credibility deficit limits their ability to share and exchange information normally. It’s debatable whether and to what extent one with virtuous intellectual humility should own this particular form of limitation, apart from simply recognising it.

15 It is debatable within social psychology what explains group polarisation. There are three principal views here. These include pervasive arguments theory, social comparison theory and social identity theory. For an overview of these differing accounts of the mechanisms of group polarisation, see Broncano-Berrocal and Carter (2020).

16 To be clear, this kind of intellectual limitation described here is not an example of an individual intel­lectual limitation, as we've defined it earlier. One might be, individually, operating perfectly well despite being severely limited in her capacity to share and exchange information. Nonetheless, we submit that having one's capacity to share and exchange information subverted or undermined (including by environmental factors) is a kind of social intellectual limitation.

17 See, for example, Kelp (2018) for a sustained development of the view that the etiological function of assertion is to impart knowledge.

18 We have elsewhere challenged this idea, e.g., in Carter and Gordon (2011, 2016b, 2016a) and Carter (2017), though taking issue with KNA-Suff substantively is beyond the scope of what we aim to do here.

19 It's worth noting that not all failures to own this particular kind of social intellectual limitation impli­cate arrogance, even if owning them corresponds with a kind of intellectual humility. After all, one might potentially simply misjudged (albeit, in a responsible way) the group dynamics at play.Thanks to Alessandra Tanesini for raising this point.

20 See Feldman (2006); cf.,Turri (2012).

21 Note that withholding, with respect to some proposition, p, might not be best described as a mere absence of any positive or negative epistemic attitude toward p; on some views, e.g., Friedman (2017), withholding, or suspending, judgment is a distinctive kind of inquiring attitude in its own right, one that is important to positive inquiry.

22 We are using ‘intellectual arrogance' here simply as a contrast point to intellectual humility understood along Priest's (2017) lines. For some positive discussions of intellectual arrogance and what it might involve, see for example Tanesini 2016a; 2016b; Goldberg 2016; Gregg and Mahadevan 2014;Tiberius and Walker 1998.

23 This is a case of what Lackey (2011) calls isolated second-hand knowledge. Lackey appeals to cases of isolated second-hand knowledge to argue against KNA-Suff. Crucial to Lackey's argument is the idea that certain institutional roles carry with them certain epistemic expectations on the part of the asserter which are such that merely possessing second-hand knowledge will not always suffice to satisfy. In the present case, these kinds of considerations are not relevant, and for that matter, we are not appealing to the case in an attempt to challenge KNA-Suff. We are, however, sympathetic to Lackey's argument in this case (see, e.g., Carter and Gordon 2011). For opposition to the line that cases of isolated second­hand knowledge undermine KNA-Suff, see Simion (2016) and Benton (2014).

24 Thanks to Alessandra Tanesini for helpful feedback on a previous version of this chapter.

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