Oppressed persons and the virtue of liberatory humility

We have carved out conceptual space for a virtue of liberatory humility, which consists in liberatory motives and a disposition to be appropriately attentive to and own one's libera- tory limitations.

15.3.1 Dalmiya on liberatory humility

Dalmiya contends that liberatory humility is a virtue for privileged persons, but warns against claiming that it is a virtue for oppressed persons in their interactions with the privileged.Though Dalmiya and I disagree about this (and some other details), our two analyses of liberatory humil­ity enjoy significant overlap.

On Dalmiya's view, ‘relational humility' involves both a humility component, i.e., an aware­ness of one's own limitations and ignorance, and a relational component, i.e., an awareness of the strengths and knowledge of other people. In her words, it involves “other-regard... because of a realistic self-regard” (2016: 119). Dalmiya argues that although relational humil­ity on its own is not a liberatory virtue, historicized relational humility is a liberatory virtue. Historicized relational humility includes (1) an awareness of one's own, and others' limitations and strengths. It also involves (2) understanding that one's own, and others' limitations and strengths are embedded historically—they are influenced by the social location of one's group and the unequal distribution of social power.

Dalmiya intends historicized relational humility to be a liberatory virtue that is for the privi­leged, and for the oppressed in their interactions with other oppressed persons. On her view, it is important to recommend liberatory virtues for privileged persons since “stability of reform require[s] reworking the dispositional apparatus of those in power so that they accept. change and not push back” (2016: 146).Agreed: liberatory humility is a virtue for privileged persons. Is it also a virtue for oppressed persons? In carving out space for an affirmative (albeit qualified) answer, Dalmiya rightly points out that humility is neither diffidence nor humiliation (2016: 146). Here, too, we agree: the virtue of humility is not the vice of servility. Dalmiya likewise recommends humility for oppressed persons in their interactions with peers “who are differ­ently located within the periphery” (2016: 147). But, she warns against recommending it for oppressed persons in interactions with the privileged, suggesting that “we should be mindful of who we are being relationally humble towards. It could well be unproductive for the margin­alized to defer to the knowledge of those at the center” (2016: 147).

Though Dalmiya and I agree about much, here, we part ways. Below, I suggest that libera- tory humility can be a virtue for oppressed persons in interactions with oppressors. First and foremost, the virtue of liberatory humility enables oppressed persons to avoid servility in these interactions and can help them stay on the path of resistance.

Avoiding servility. The liberatory vice of servility is, roughly, a disposition to over-own one's liberatory limitations and, in so doing, to subvert one's ability to contribute to liberatory ends, including the end of resisting oppression. Simply put, over-owning limitations can make it harder for one to resist.

Oppressed persons are susceptible to over-owning their limitations. This is no accident— interactions with oppressors (and with dominant culture) encourage oppressed persons to focus on and over-emphasize their own weaknesses, to distrust their own abilities, and even to dehu­manize themselves.To explicate, it is easier to dominate people who over-own their limitations, particularly liberatory limitations which already hamper their resistance.

Consider an oppressed person whose liberatory limitations include gaps in confidence, which themselves result from oppression, and which impede her resistance to some extent (they slow it down or make it harder). Now, add the susceptibility to over-owning. Oppressed persons who constantly focus on, over-emphasize, and care too much about such gaps in confidence over-own them and thereby manifest servility (non-culpably). Arguably, oppressed persons who are servile in this way will be even less likely to resist oppression and less likely to flourish in the future, since servility further erodes their confidence.

The virtue of liberatory humility can help oppressed persons appropriately attend to and own gaps in confidence when interacting with oppressors, and to that extent can help them stay on the path of resistance. Recall that the virtue of liberatory humility involves the motivation to resist oppression and the disposition to be appropriately attentive to and own the limitations that prevent one from resisting it.Accordingly, oppressed persons with this virtue will be aware of their liberatory limitations—e.g., their gaps in confidence—without being overly focused on them or overwhelmed by them.

Arguably, oppressed persons are at greater risk for servility than arrogance, since their ser­vility is systematically encouraged. We can thus expect the virtue of liberatory humility to be especially important for oppressed persons in reigning in servility. Privileged persons are cor­respondingly at greater risk for arrogance than servility. Accordingly, we can expect liberatory humility to be especially important for them in combatting arrogance.That said, the virtue also has a role to play in combatting arrogance, when it arises, in oppressed persons.

Avoiding arrogance.The liberatory vice of arrogance is, roughly, a disposition to under­own one's liberatory limitations and, in so doing, to subvert one's ability to contribute to liberatory ends, including the end of making flourishing more possible for all. Simply put, under-owning one's limitations can make it harder for one to contribute to the future flourish­ing of the formerly oppressed and former oppressors alike.

Consider a particular oppressed person who tends to jump to the conclusion that her oppressors are inhuman monsters, or whose anger at them is hardened against their human­ity (Whitcomb et al.

The virtue of liberatory humility enables agents to appropriately own such tendencies, and, to that extent, can keep them striving toward ‘flourishing-apt societies.'An agent who has the virtue of liberatory humility will recognize that her tendencies to dehumanize her oppressors are limitations that impede progress toward the future flourishing of all. She will also appro­priately own these limitations by acknowledging them to herself and trying to change them. This does not mean that she won't be angry at (former) oppressors, or won't believe that they are vicious, or won't endorse punishment for their crimes! It merely means that she will try to prevent her beliefs from outstripping her evidence—she can believe that (former) oppressors are vicious and should be punished for crimes, while simultaneously resisting the temptation to conclude that they are inhuman and should be treated as such. She will likewise take steps to prevent her anger toward oppressors from being dehumanizing, though she can do so while being extremely and intensely angry.This brings us to Dillon's argument that arrogance can be a liberatory virtue.

15.3.2 Dillon on arrogance

Dillon conceives of humility as a kind of lowliness and submissiveness, what I have called ‘ser­vility.' She argues that humility as lowliness is not a virtue for anyone, least of all for oppressed persons (2015: 45), and she takes self-respect, rather than humility (as lowliness), to be the virtue opposed to arrogance (2015: 43).

Let's begin with some background. Dillon's analysis of arrogance is inspired by both Kantianism and feminism. ‘Unwarranted claims arrogance' is a disposition to claim rights or entitlements for oneself that are in fact unwarranted, based on an inaccurate and inflated view of one's own importance, knowledge, and abilities (Dillon 2004: 198). Though Dillon's analy­sis of arrogance differs from the analysis in section 2.1, they are correlated: the person with unwarranted claims arrogance will under-own limitations and over-own strengths. On Dillon's view, unwarranted claims arrogance usually undermines ‘agentic recognition self-respect,' which entails appropriately valuing oneself as a moral agent and committing oneself to live in accord­ance with the moral law (2004: 206). But, Dillon (in press) argues that arrogance doesn't always undermine self-respect. Unwarranted claims arrogance in interactions with one's oppressors will sometimes manifest or facilitate agentic recognition self-respect.

Dillon uses the examples of Antigone and Sethe (from Toni Morrison's Beloved) to argue that unwarranted claims arrogance can enable oppressed persons to protest injustice, refuse subordi­nation, and carve out space for agentic self-respect. She contends that Antigone, the protagonist of the eponymous play by Sophocles, manifests both unwarranted claims arrogance and agentic self-respect in her interactions with Creon (in press). In burying her brother, Antigone violates an edict issued by Creon, the ruler of Thebes, which expressly prohibits his burial. Upon dis­covering this violation, Creon accuses Antigone of hubris—of aspiring beyond her station and unwarrantedly claiming the role of ‘the man'—and condemns her to death.

Let's assume that in refusing to defer to Creon's edict, Antigone is manifesting self-respect. The problem, I submit, is that she is not manifesting arrogance. Instead, she is manifesting the virtue of pride and, perhaps also, the virtue of humility. In refusing to defer, Antigone avoids servility. She does not under-own her strengths, e.g., her knowledge, agency, and abilities. She

appropriately owns them—she manifests the virtue of pride. Perhaps, she also avoids seeing limi­tations in herself where there are none, and avoids internalizing Creon's inaccurate view of her. Perhaps, she has an accurate picture of her limitations, and manifests the virtue of humility. Nor, importantly, is she claiming entitlements that are ««warranted; she is, after all, right about her knowledge, agency, and abilities, and she is right to protest Creon's unjust edict. In these ways, Antigone avoids servility, while also avoiding arrogance.

What we have, in the case of Antigone, is misperceived arrogance rather than actual arro­gance. Creon incorrectly perceives Antigone's pride and self-respect as arrogant. Dillon doesn't take this tack,¹⁴ though she has argued to similar effect elsewhere (2004: 210): “what is in fact self-respect can seem like arrogance to those whose moral outlook is itself perverted by arro­gance, and so to some, virtues of self-respect will appear to be vices of arrogance.”When argu­ing in that vein, Dillon contends that persons who are both privileged and arrogant are likely to misperceive the self-respecting acts of oppressed persons engaged in liberatory struggles. She cites, for instance, the inclination to label Black Lives Matter as arrogant and uppity (in press). Dillon is right about the ways in which pride and self-respect in oppressed persons can be misperceived. She is also right that pride and self-respect, misperceived as arrogance, can con­tribute to resistance and be liberatory virtues. But, what we need to know for present purposes is whether actual arrogance is a liberatory virtue.

Dillon likewise contends that Sethe, the lead character in Beloved, gains a sense of her own agency through the arrogant action of killing her daughter. By way of background: Sethe had escaped slavery with her children. When they were all confronted with recapture, Sethe attempted to kill her children in order to prevent them from returning to the horrors of slavery. She succeeded in killing her daughter, insisting that she was justified in doing so.

This case is difficult to judge. Let's assume that Sethe's actions are arrogant. Do they carve out space for agentic self-respect, as Dillon argues? Sethe's actions violate Kantian moral law, and to that extent undermine agentic self-respect. But, more importantly, we might worry that the tragic dilemma Sethe faces will impede, rather than facilitate, her ability to develop self-respect. In this vein,Tessman (2005: 89) has argued that tragic dilemmas can haunt one, ruining one's life and impeding one's character. Relatedly, we might wonder whether Sethe's actions contribute to, or detract from, the liberatory goals of resisting oppression, making progress toward libera­tion, and making flourishing more possible for all.We might worry that Sethe's actions are not liberatory.

Whatever we conclude about the examples above, Dillon is onto something. It is worth considering whether occasional arrogant actions can help oppressed persons resist the vices that oppression would have them develop. Perhaps, the occasional under-owning of limitations and over-owning of strengths can help an oppressed person resist servility and make progress toward the virtues of humility and pride. Oppressed persons are systematically pressured to develop servility. Given that downward pressure, it is important to explore whether occasional over-correction could help oppressed persons make eventual progress toward the mean. In Aristotelian language, combatting servility might involve “dragging” oneself “to the contrary extreme” (Aristotle 1998: NE.II.9.1109b5).This brings us to Dillon's final claim: that arrogant actions can be used strategically by oppressed persons to combat vices in the privileged; they can be used in the service of liberatory motives, to shock the privileged into recognizing their own arrogance. This, too, is worth exploring.

To be clear, I am not recommending that oppressed persons develop arrogance as a stable disposition, since consistent under-owning of liberatory limitations will subvert, rather than sup­port, liberatory ends. In the short term, consistent under-owning will lead to unsuccessful acts of resistance (one won't realize or won't care that one, e.g., lacks key pieces of knowledge that are needed for successful resistance). In the long term, once power has shifted to the formerly oppressed, it could result in further cycles of oppression, and in any case, would be difficult to dislodge as a stable disposition. Rather, the argument suggests that occasional arrogant acts, in interactions with oppressors, might serve liberatory ends. It recommends that oppressed persons occasionally and knowingly act the same way an arrogant person would act—i.e., mimic the actions of an arrogant person. It does not recommend that oppressed persons develop a dis­position to act this way, nor does it recommend that oppressed persons develop the cognitive, affective, or motivational dispositions of an arrogant person. In short, it does not recommend that oppressed persons become arrogant. It merely acknowledges that occasional under-owning of limitations and over-owning of strengths might serve liberatory ends, even though the stable disposition of arrogance will not.

Where does this leave us? I have argued that liberatory humility can be a virtue for oppressed persons in interactions with oppressors. It enables oppressed persons to avoid servility and stay on the path of resistance and, where applicable, avoid arrogance and keep striving toward flour­ishing for all. But, I have likewise acknowledged that occasional arrogant acts might serve the liberatory motives of oppressed persons. This means that: (i) it is appropriate for oppressed persons to have the virtue of liberatory humility, which is hard enough to get on its own, and (ii) it is simultaneously appropriate for them to be ready to occasionally perform arrogant acts, which can make it even harder to acquire the virtue of liberatory humility. I wish my conclu­sions were more optimistic. My hope is that the analyses in this chapter have provided a map for the further exploration of liberatory virtue, liberatory humility, and the liberatory vices of servility and arrogance.¹⁵

Notes

1 She argues that lying and manipulation are “not virtues; they are failures of other-regarding virtues” (2005: 69).

2 Silvermint emphasizes the eventual production of human flourishing (2017: 470), whereas Tessman emphasizes the motive for flourishing (2005: 165).

3 https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/what-we-believe/.

4 We should also consider whether groups can have liberatory virtues.

5 Though we shouldn't expect liberatory virtues to look exactly the same in oppressed and privileged persons. Because context matters, a single liberatory virtue can (and often will) call for different actions from oppressed persons and privileged persons.

6 Silvermint (2017: 462) is describing a view that he rejects.

7 But, she acknowledges that there are other virtues of resistance, such as pride and perseverance, that are virtues in ideal conditions (2005: 115).

8 Kwong (2015) might disagree.

9 On the motivational component of the intellectual virtues, see Zagzebski 1996: 176.

10 Arguably, they manifest the vice of liberatory servility, at least insofar as such attentiveness and owning involves misattributing those prejudices to themselves.

11 Would it manifest the quality of humbling oneself, where this is distinct from humility and involves taking on a limitation that does not belong to one in order to be effective in an oppressive environ­ment? See Baehr (ms).

12 Tessman (2005: chapter 3) argues that privileged persons are at greater risk for callousness and coward­ice, whereas oppressed persons are at greater risk for hopelessness and vindictiveness.

13 It helps us envision flourishing-apt societies.

14 She argues instead that it is reasonable for Creon, from within his own socio-moral perspective, to regard Antigone as arrogant. She acknowledges that, from our perspective, Antigone is not arrogant. But, she suggests that since there is no view from nowhere, we theorists cannot assume that our per­spective is authoritative.

15 Thanks to Mark Alfano, Jason Baehr, Nora Berenstain,Teresa Blankmeyer Burke, Paul Bloomfield, Charlie Crerar, Nancy Daukas, Heidi Grasswick, Raja Halwani, Allan Hazlett, Dan Howard-Snyder, Tracy Llanera, Michael Lynch, Heather Muraviov, Gregory Peterson, Louise Richardson-Self, Barbara Stock, Alessandra Tanesini, Lisa Tessman, Kirk VanGilder, Dennis Whitcomb, Chase Wrenn, and audi­ences at the Bled Epistemology Conference, South Dakota State University, Syracuse University, and the University of Connecticut. Work on this paper was supported by John Templeton Foundation Grant 60622,“Developing Humility in Leadership.”

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