Resolving the paradoxes

Of these two different conceptions of virtue, my objective is not to reject one over the other. Christen, Alfano, and Robinson (2014, 2017) employ a psycholexical method to analyze intel­lectual humility and find both conceptions in how a thesaurus tracks usage of the concept.This method is meant as a proxy for folk usage, indicating that it is common to understand and talk of humility in both ways.

Nevertheless, it can be fruitful to consider how each view handles the knot of prima facie paradoxes of humility previously discussed.This analysis is not meant to settle which of the two views is meant by ‘humility,’ but rather which of the two is perhaps more conceptually robust by avoiding or resolving the paradoxes.

Of the two general views on humility, the inattentive view is better equipped to handle each of these paradoxes. Sidgwick notes the shortcomings of the low self-assessment account of humility. Just before laying out his explanation of humility as inattention, he writes,

For it is generally said that Humility prescribes a low opinion of our own merits: but if our merits are comparatively high, it seems strange to direct us to have a low opin­ion of them. It may be replied, that though our merits may be high when compared with those of ordinary men, there are always some to be found superior, and we can compare ourselves with these, and in the extreme case with ideal excellence, of which all fall far short: and that we ought to make this kind of comparison and not the other kind, and contemplate our faults of which we shall assuredly find a sufficiency and not our merits. But surely in the most important deliberations which human life offers, in determining what kind of work we shall undertake and to what social functions we shall aspire, we must necessarily compare our qualifications carefully with those of other men, if we are to decide rightly.And it would seem just as irrational to underrate ourselves as to overrate: and though most men are more prone to the latter mistake, there are certainly some rather inclined to the former.

(Sidgwick, 1874, p. 312)

Sidgwick is objecting to the low self-assessment account of humility as inherently paradoxical. What exactly he considers to be the problem with this view is hard to formulate precisely, but perhaps we can help him out now that we have more clearly delineated the different paradoxes of humility. The central question is whether one’s humble self-assessment must be accurate or not. As we saw, various thinkers have advocated for two versions of the low self-assessment theory, where the low self-assessment is either accurate or inaccurate. On the one hand, if one’s humble self-assessment is (or must be) wrong—because one’s merits are actually “comparatively high”—then we run into the epistemic paradox. One’s belief, in this case, that one has low merits or status is false; therefore, one can never know that one has humility. Sidgwick considers this “irrational” and detrimental, since we need accurate self-assessment to determine what we should do with our lives and how to function in society. On the other hand, if one’s humble self-assessment is accurate, then we run into the axiological paradox. In this case, one’s self­assessment is correct, but it is unclear what is good or virtuous about being in and aware of this state.To these points, we can add an extra consideration Sidgwick does not address. Either way, the paradox of self-attribution still applies. If my self-assessment must be inaccurate to be true and I say that I am humble, then I have not inaccurately assessed my own meritorious character. Alternatively, if my self-assessment must be accurate to be true and I say that I am humble, then I am bragging about my lowliness.

Sidgwick was not alone in seeing trouble for the low self-attribution views. Nadelhoffer et al. make a similar point when they remark, “One of the driving forces behind people’s unease about humility is the (we believe mistaken) assumption that being humble requires us to under­value (even loathe) ourselves and underestimate our own capabilities” (2017, p.

Your patient has become humble; have you drawn his attention to the fact? All virtues are less formidable to us once the man is aware that he has them, but this is specially true of humility. Catch him at the moment when he is really poor in spirit and smug­gle into his mind the gratifying reflection, “By jove! I'm being humble,” and almost immediately pride—pride at his own humility—will appear. If he awakes to the dan­ger and tries to smother this new form of pride, make him proud of his attempt.

(Lewis, 1942, p. 58)

In addition to expressing the paradoxical nature of the low self-assessment views of humility, this passage also points to how the inattentive view of humility can unravel the Gordian knot of paradoxes. The key is to begin with the epistemic paradox. We will assume that humility amounts to inattention to one’s merit. In that case, it is not impossible for a humble person to know that she is humble. Such a belief will not typically occur to her, so she will typically lack the occurrent belief that she is humble. Still, as Robinson and Alfano (2016) argue, she is disposed to believe (and know) that she is humble (since she is).This dispositional belief, however, rarely becomes occurent; it usually does not occur to her that she is humble.When this does occur to her, it typically is due to external prompting by a third party. A humble person does not typi­cally spend much time considering her merit and praiseworthiness. If, for some reason, you are determined to convince her that she is humble and point to ample behavioral evidence of her humility, she can truthfully, occurrently believe and know that she is humble. But then she will quickly move on and go back to being merely disposed to believe she is humble (when told by others that she is).The paradox is resolved.The knowledge of one’s own humility is not impos­sible; it just rarely occurs.

From here, the self-attribution paradox follows the same path. If a humble person does not attend to her own humility (because she is typically only disposed to believe she is humble), then she will not say that she is humble. This is not to say she never can accurately attribute humil­ity to herself. Again, if you go to great length to prove to her that she is humble, then she can reluctantly admit that she is humble without a paradox. As Robinson and Alfano (2016) point out, however, such self-attribution usually has to be first prompted by a third party. The main point though is that for the inattentive theory of humility, this paradox is resolved. It is not that a humble person cannot truthfully attribute humility to herself; it’s that she typically would not.

Two paradoxes down, three to go. The inculcation paradox raises the problem of how to train people to be humble. If they try to become humble, it would seem they would necessarily fail.This paradox, I think, remains the most problematic, but it is not intractable. Robinson and Alfano (2016) have considered this problem at length, drawing lessons from the Chinese virtue of wu-wei, which roughly translates as “dynamic, effortless, and unselfconscious state of mind of a person who is optimally active and effective” (Slingerland, 2014, p. 7). Almost by definition, one cannot try to achieve wu-wei, yet Confucian and Doaist thinkers developed several indirect strategies to achieve this virtuous state. In the same way, Robinson and Alfano (2016) argue part of the solution is to develop and promote rituals of demurring when praised by others and to encourage praising of others. Such rituals indirectly inculcate humility and simultaneously discourage false modesty by making false modesty too costly to be worth the social benefit of seeming to be humble.

Regarding the agentic paradox, it is correct that one cannot intend to be humble, just as one cannot try act humbly, just as one cannot try to try.

Lastly, we can consider perhaps the most important of paradoxes of humility, the axiological paradoxes. Why is humility good? On the low self-assessment view, we are forced to say one of three things: that it is good to have an accurate self-assessment of one's lowly status, that it is good to falsely believe one has a low status, or humility is not good. The inattentive concep­tion of humility offers a different, non-contradictory resolution to the paradox. Humility is good because it is the inattention to our own merit or status. If we are not paying attention to ourselves and our own praiseworthiness, we are freed up to pay attention to more morally important considerations, such as the needs or praiseworthiness of others.

Notes

1 There are special cases in which a humble person can be induced to utter, “I'm humble,” without producing a paradox of self-attribution. I will address these below.

2 I suspect that there may be a separate, sixth paradox regarding motivation, specifically regarding an apparent lack of motivation to be humble (or to be humbled, which appears to be necessary to be humble), even granting that humility is good or a virtue.This paradox would likely assume some form of motivational externalism. Attempts to formulate the paradox have so far, however, collapsed into standard problems with motivational externalism (and therefore are not problems unique to humility) or collapsed into one of the other five paradoxes.

3 Burch (1975) disputes this claim, arguing that Hume (at least in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals) considers humility to be a passion, not a character trait.

4 Driver does draw a distinction between humility and modesty.A humble person, she argues, can accu­rately assess his or her lowly state, while a modest person must underestimate her merit.

5 See (Robinson and Alfano, 2016) for the distinction between humility, modesty, and false modesty.

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