Two theories of humility

Unfortunately, our problems with humility do not end with these paradoxes. There is also a lack of consensus on the basic nature of humility. For many (if not most) virtues, there is gen­eral agreement as to what the virtue essentially amounts to.

One of the earliest discussions of humility as a virtue outside of the New Testament comes in the epistle 1 Clement, which was likely composed toward the end of the first century ce and has traditionally been attributed to Clement of Rome (Holmes, 2007, pp. 33—34), stating:

For Christ belongs to those who are humble-minded, not to those who vaunt them­selves over the flock.The scepter of God's majesty, the Lord Jesus Christ, did not come with an ostentatious show of arrogance or haughtiness—even though he could have done so—but with a humble mind, just as the Holy Spirit spoke concerning him.

(1 Clement 16.1—2)

While insufficient to extrapolate a theory of morality, Clement says enough for a few points to be noteworthy. First, humility isn't mentioned per se, but being humble-minded appears to be a positive state or characteristic. Second, humility is in some way intellectual in nature, since Clement speaks of being “humble-minded.” Lastly, a clear contrast is drawn with the vice of arrogance.A few centuries later, St.Augustine likewise lauded humility in several passages.While one may be able to reconstruct an Augustinian account of humility, doing so would require considerable textual exegesis and theological discussion beyond the scope of this paper.

A clearer account emerges in Aquinas (though perhaps earlier) and up through the present day. I will now briefly review some of the ancient, modern, and contemporary views on humil- ity.Though we cannot here review in detail the historical development of theories of humility, the various accounts of humility can be, I think, grouped together into two general camps. In the rest of this section, I will canvas some of the views presented on humility, providing exam­ples of thinkers in each group. This canvassing will by no means be an exhaustive account of all the philosophers and theologians to have discussed the virtue. Furthermore, by no means do I mean to suggest that there is unanimity regarding the nature of humility within these two groups; in fact, considerable debate continues within them to this day. Nevertheless, within each group there is consensus regarding the central aspect of what humility amounts to.

2.3.1 First theory: low self-assessment

The first, and perhaps oldest, theory of humility is that it primarily consists in accurately view­ing oneself as lowly. Aquinas is one of the chief proponents of the low self-assessment view of humility. He asserts, for example, that “humility, in so far as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place” (ST II-II, Q 161,A 1, ad. 2).To be humble, as Aquinas sees it, is to see oneself as low, base, beneath God, and other humans. Others are supe­rior, either generally or in some specific ways. This low self-assessment is not, however, some mere delusion. “It is possible, without falsehood” he contends, “to deem and avow oneself the most despicable of men... [and] avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of one's own capability” (ST II-II, Q 161,A 6, ad. 1; emphasis mine).The humble person correctly assesses her or his lowly status in relations to others.

Not surprisingly, this view of humility is widespread and perhaps is the most common. Hume—though rejecting humility as one of the “monkish virtues” that “serve no purpose” (EPM 9.1)—is generally taken to regard humility in a similar manner, since he speaks of one's idea of oneself as “dejected with humility” (Treatise 2.1.2) and appears to think humiliation is necessary for humility (c.f., Davie, 1999, p. 146).3

Other contemporary theories limit the focus, shifting from one's low status in general to something more specific, such as one's limitations. Snow, for example, takes this view, arguing,

To be a humble person is to recognize your limitations, to take them seriously, and thereby to foster a realism in attitudes and behavior regarding self and others. Humility can be defined as the disposition to allow the awareness of and concern about your limitations to have a realistic influence on your attitudes and behavior.At the heart of this realism is a perspective gained through accurate appraisal of your limitations and their implications for your circumstances, attitudes, and behavior.

(Snow, 1995, p. 210)

Whitcomb, Battaly, Baehr, and Howard-Snyder focus on intellectual humility specifically, which the regard as “proper attentiveness to, and owning of, one's intellectual limitations” (2017, p. 12). Prima facie, these accounts of humility make it look different than Aquinas's or others in this group, since they do not require one to have a low self-assessment in comparison to someone or something else. For Aquinas, for instance, one should be humbled and humble before the great­ness of God. For Whitcomb et al., however, the comparison is instead with some idealized ver­sion of oneself, one without the limitations one actually has. So according to Whitcomb et al., my humility consists primarily in recognizing that I'm not as physically strong as I might wish or that I am prone to certain errors in thinking that I might otherwise delude myself in deny­ing.

Another noteworthy variant of this view agrees that humility requires low self-assessment, but this self-assessment is mistaken. The humble person underestimates herself. Spinoza, for example, appears to espouse an inaccurate, low self-assessment view of humility. First, to estab­lish how a humble person views herself, Spinoza says, “Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind” (E III, P 26).The inaccuracy of this self­assessment becomes clear when we consider what, according to Spinoza, humility gives rise to.

We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an emotion which I will call self­abasement, for as from self-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs self­abasement, which I will accordingly thus define: Self-abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self by reason of pain (E III, P 28, Exp — P29).

The inaccuracy and pain are precisely why Spinoza then concludes that “humility is not a vir­tue” (E IV, P 53). More recently, Driver calls modesty a virtue of ignorance, where “a modest person underestimates self-worth” (2004, p. 16).Though her theory is purportedly about mod- esty,“humility is closely akin to modesty,” she notes (Driver, 2004, p. 114).⁴

2.3.2 Second theory: inattentive

More recently, an alternative conception of humility has begun to emerge. It is distinct from the first since it does not require one to regard oneself as lowly or limited. Rather, humility consists in being inattentive to one's own status, i.e., not engaging in self-admiration of one's merits or status or accomplishments because one does not spend much time thinking about oneself at all.

The farthest back I have been able to trace this inattentive theory of humility is to Sidgwick's The Method of Ethics (1874). First, he considers the low self-assessment view of humility—which he dubs the “common sense” view—and rejects it.

Humility is regulative of two different impulses, one entirely self-regarding and inter­nal, the other relating to others and partly taking effect in social behaviour.The inter­nal duty relates, strictly speaking, not to the opinions we form of ourselves (for here as in other opinions we ought to aim at nothing but Truth), but to the emotion of self­admiration, which springs naturally from the contemplation of our own merits, and as it is highly agreeable, prompts to such contemplation.... [T]he duty of Humility needs enforcing because most of us have a tendency to indulge this feeling [of self­approbation] overmuch. Humility prescribes such repression of self-satisfaction.

(Sidgwick, 1874, pp. 312-313)

Humility, as Sidgwick understands it, is about limiting one's sense of self-satisfaction or self­admiration, regardless of one's status or merit about which one could admire.

Since Sidgwick, the inattentive view has appeared to grow in popularity. C. S. Lewis espoused it when he writes,

[The humble man] will not be thinking about humility: he will not be thinking about himself at all. If anyone would like to acquire humility, I can, I think, tell him the first step.The first step is to realise that one is proud. If you think you are not conceited, it means you are very conceited indeed.

(Lewis, 1952, p. 71)

More recently still, this view is endorsed by Tangney (2000), Roberts and Wood (2003, 2007), Garcia (2006), and Robinson and Alfano (2016). Similarly, Nadelhoffer et al. assert, “[B]eing humble doesn't require us to hold ourselves in low regard (or in a lower regard than is merited). Instead, humility merely requires us to avoid thinking too highly of ourselves” (2017, p. 10). They call this the “decentered and devoted” view of humility, the idea being that humble people are both not centered on themselves (and their own praiseworthiness) and also devoted to oth­ers. This second component is typically absent in the other inattentive views, which focus only not being centered on oneself. Whether devotion to others is a central component of humility or merely a very likely consequent of it remains an open question, but the key point is that a clear family resemblance between these views exists to warrant grouping them together despite underlying differences.

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