The Diplomat Warrior
The requirements of military legitimacy in the new strategic environment call for a new style of leadership that depends more upon knowledge and the power of persuasion than on command authority.
Leaders in operations other than war must be able to motivate others, both military and civilian, without arousing hostility - a Webster's Dictionary definition of diplomacy. Diplomacy is out of place in combat, where success is synonymous with hostility. But proficiency as a combat leader is not a sufficient qualification for leadership in operations other than war.A former military advisor to Saudi Arabia has compared the contrasting leadership skills required in peace and war, and defined diplomatic leadership as leading from behind. General William H. Riley, Jr. noted that:
Leadership is defined as making it happen. Obviously, an aggressive, confrontational, results-at-any-cost mentality would be counterproductive with our Saudi counterparts. A General Patton would probably be a miserable failure in developing rapport and achieving progress with the Saudis. A take-the-hill kind of attitude that attempts to tally quick results will not work well in the Saudi environment. We should lead from behind and encourage our Saudi counterparts to take the prominent role in planning, co-ordinating, directing, and controlling their projects.8
While the diplomatic style of leadership required of the military advisor contrasts sharply with the leadership traits required in combat, the two are not mutually exclusive; both styles of leadership are right (and legitimate) for their respective environments. Many combat leaders are versatile enough to be both great warriors and diplomats, but some are not; others, like Colonel David H. Hackworth, do not care to be diplomats and should not be put in a position to jeopardize military legitimacy.
Colonel Hackworth, the most highly decorated combat soldier alive, is the quintessential undiplomatic warrior. His heroic but unabashedly brash military exploits have been chronicled in his book About Face. Colonel Hackworth recalled an earlier effort by the Army (circa 1954) to develop a
... new breed [that was] kind of a warrior-diplomat; as bloodless ballistics seemed to be phasing out the role of fighters on future battlegrounds, the emphasis increased on the diplomatic side of soldiering.9
Colonel Hackworth and his rowdy warriors wanted no part of military diplomacy. When Hackworth served as a MACV advisor in Vietnam he was openly cynical of his ARVN counterparts. His leadership style was direct and forceful, if not intimidating; and he had little use for the finesse required in diplomacy. In fairness to Colonel Hackworth, however, there was little comparison between the environment in Vietnam after 1968 and that of Saudi Arabia in the 1980s.
One officer who exemplified the qualities of the diplomat warrior in an advisory role was never a combat leader. Major General Edward Lansdale nevertheless had the confidence and respect of those he advised, including Ramon Magsaysay who was Defense Minister and later President of the Philippines. Lansdale helped Magsaysay successfully counter the Huk insurgency in the Philippines during the 1950s. Their counter-insurgency operations reflected a commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law that remains relevant today. Lansdale's successful counter-insurgency philosophy was based on a sensitivity to the human, or social, dimension of conflict:
Lansdale had real concern for insurgents and a great deal of sympathy for their goals. He was at one with his old friend, Magsaysay, who once said, 'When a man is prepared to give up his life to overthrow his own government, he must first have suffered greatly.' Lansdale was likewise in agreement with Magsaysay's position that 'those who have less in life must have more in law'.10
Lansdale's moral principles were the foundation of his concept of military legitimacy, and they exemplified those of the diplomat warrior.
He considered any deed 'which makes the soldier a brother of the people, as well as their protector', a worthy one. And he cited the ancient Chinese general, Sun Tzu, who considered military humanitarian assistance as 'moral law'. It was Sun Tzu who observed that 'to fight and conquer is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence is to conquer without fighting'. Lansdale also cited a later Chinese leader, Mao Tse-tung, who required his soldiers to act in accordance with orders, not to take anything from the people, and not to allow private interests to injure public interests. Lansdale used these principles to illustrate his belief that in political warfare 'the paramount object was to gain the loyalty of people who inhabit the land'.11Lansdale combined the best qualities of the military ethic and professionalism with a respect for divergent views and a strong belief in individual rights and responsibility as a measure of integrity. He was equally at home in a military or civilian environment and was outspoken in his criticism of narrow-minded military leaders. Criticizing the emphasis on body count as a criterion for mission success and insensitivity to collateral damage in Vietnam, Lansdale challenged myopic military leaders to look at the moral dimension of their actions:
True Americans, Lansdale warned, would avoid such actions. 'Open your eyes where you serve', he ordered. Be good soldiers. Win over local populations. See that troops behave with true military courtesy. Keep always a high code of honor. Prize integrity. Accord others the dignity that is their birthright. Act as a friend. Have empathy and humility. Offer a smile and a greeting in the language of the host country. Practise what you preach. Only those who act in such ways are true Americans. This strength we must have, or all else we possess and do will be without lasting meaning.12
Lansdale applied the above qualities in operations other than war before they were known as such.
Their success demonstrated how the values of the Army ethic - duty, loyalty, integrity, selfless service and even compassion - can help make the military a positive and constructive force in achieving US foreign policy objectives during peacetime and conflict. When applied to civil-military relations, these traditional military values provide a context for ethical decision-making.Vietnam was a crucible for the diplomat warrior, and until 1965 the Special Forces advisor reflected the Lansdale ideal. As late as 1969 there were diplomat warriors in remote hamlets of Vietnam still trying to salvage military and political legitimacy. One of these diplomat warriors wrote of his experiences in Once a Warrior King. He was invited back to Fort Bragg, where he once received training as a military advisor, to reflect on his experiences:
I have seen the term in some of the materials here, the 'Diplomatic Warrior', and I suppose the things we did might be covered by such a term. On the civilian side, we worked for the American embassy on rural development, and on the military side we were tactical advisors for MACV. Almost every day and night we conducted military operations; two of us on the team were almost always away on an ambush or daylight operation. During the day we also provided advice and guidance for the civilian leaders.
The former 'warrior king' provided some timely advice to the civil affairs audience:
I would say, yes, weave yourself into the local society if it helps the mission, but do not become lost in it. That is a danger. Remember who you are, where you are going, and why you are going there.
He emphasized that modern diplomat warriors should know the language, the culture, the objective, the resources available, and respect the people in their area of operations; but he noted that a belief in the democratic ideal is also required to sustain diplomat warriors:
... out there in those remote, unheard of villages around the world, in those lonely nights when no one seems to care, in those difficult times when the bullets fly and the bombs explode, in those days when the heat and bugs and the inefficiency of it all seem almost to have the victory; in those times that spirit within must still be able to guide you and to help you guide others.
You and those you have been sent to help must be able to see out there in front of you the gleam of freedom rising, the faint flicker of justice awaiting. If you can help lead a people, even in small steps, toward those objectives you will have served your country and humanity well.13The lessons of the former 'warrior king' have been as relevant in Haiti as they were in Vietnam. One Special Forces commander was described in 1994 as 'the contemporary version of a Roman procurator, the sole authority over the lives of three hundred thousand people living under primitive conditions in a mountainous, isolated four-hundred-square-kilometer administrative district'. In spite of many frustrations, Special Forces troops in Haiti have exemplified the spirit of the diplomat warrior:
They know why they're in Haiti, even if the folks back home don't. Without guile or quixotic naivete, and with a growing, if not yet full, appreciation for the political and moral ambiguities of the mission, they say it: 'We're here to free the oppressed.' De Oppresso Liber is the motto of the Special Forces.14
That motto exemplifies military legitimacy in operations other than war, and gives meaning to the national values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. But as a leadership model the Special Forces soldier has been the exception rather than the rule. During the Cold War most civil-military operations overseas were considered special operations in LIC, the domain of Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. While new Army doctrine incorporates peacetime civil-military activities into conventional operations other than war, the Army leadership model and the paradigm of the soldier and the state have not kept pace with that doctrine.