CASE 114: Through Whom Do We Acquire?
Gaius, Institutiones 2.86-87
class=a3 style='margin-left:0cm;text-indent:0cm'>(86) Adquiritur autem nobis non solum per nosmet ipsos, sed etiam per eos quos in potestate manu mancipiove habemus; item per eos servos, in quibus usumfructum habemus; item per homines liberos et servos alienos quos bona fide possidemus....(87) Igitur liberi nostri quos in potestate habemus, item quod servi nostri mancipio accipiunt vel ex traditione nanciscuntur, sive quid stipulentur, vel ex aliqualibet causa adquirunt, id nobis adquiritur; ipse enim, qui in potestate nostra est, nihil suum habere potest.
et ideo si heres institutus sit, nisi nostro iussu hereditatem adire non potest; et si iubentibus nobis adierit, hereditas nobis adquiritur proinde atque si nos ipsi heredes instituti essemus; et convenienter scilicet legatum per eos nobis adquiritur.(Gaius in the second book of his Institutes)
(86) Moreover, we acquire (ownership of property) not only through ourselves
but also through those whom we have in our potestas, manus, or charge (mancipium). The same is true for those slaves whose usufruct we have, as well as for free persons and slaves belonging to others if we possess them in good faith....................................................................................
(87) So whatever our children-in-power and slaves take through formal conveyance or handover, or whatever they stipulate for or acquire on any basis whatsoever, becomes our property. For a person in our power can own no property of his own.
For this reason, if he (our son-in-power or slave) is appointed heir (by a third party), he cannot accept the inheritance unless we order him to do so, and if he accepts an inheritance upon our order, the inheritance becomes our property just as if we had been appointed heirs ourselves. In consequence, a legacy of course also accrues to us through them.
1. The Household Circle. In section 86 Gaius attempts an exhaustive list of the persons through whom a pater familias can acquire property. They fall into two broad classes. The first class consists of free family members, of which natural descendants (but also adopted children; see below, Part C.2) are the major examples; but the class also includes a wife in manus (Chapter II.C.1; virtually obsolete in classical law) and free persons held in a state of civil bondage called mancipium (see the introduction to section 4 below). The second class consists of the slaves of the pater familias, including not only his own slaves (held in his potestas) but also slaves who are owned by a third party but whose labor he profits from under a property arrangement called usufruct. Finally, and by analogy (as it seems), the head of the household also acquires through persons (whether actually freemen or slaves belonging to another) whom he holds in the honest but mistaken belief that they are his own slaves; the freeman may successfully assert his free status, or the true owner may reclaim the slave, but in the meantime the holder in good faith can acquire through them. Despite the complexity of these various classes (some of which were controversial among the jurists), the two essential groups are the children and the slaves of the pater familias.
2. Agency? Agency is a legal relationship in which one person acts for or represents another by the latter's authority. In its most fully developed form, the agent becomes effectively an extension of the principal, who alone acquires legal rights and duties as a result of the agents transaction.
Agency is today one of the most common legal phenomena, a building block of modern commercial enterprises. In Roman law, however, as the next Case shows, agency is rarely permitted outside the immediate legal context of the household. If children and slaves can acquire for a paterfamilias, can they be correctly described as his agents? What distinguishes them from modern agents is that they were entitled to act on another's behalf by reason of a separate and preexisting legal relationship. A paterfamilias has children in his power, just as he owns slaves, and it is because of patria potestas or ownership (and not because of an authorization) that his children and slaves can acquire for him. Is this difference crucial? As we shall see, children-in-power and slaves are much less than full agents in the modern sense.3. Three Kinds of Acquisition. Papinian mentions three distinct ways in which the pater familias can acquire. The first is mancipation, a formal ceremony whereby the ownership of property of certain kinds (res mancipi: principally land, slaves, and large farm animals) is transferred from one person to another. The second is physical handover (traditio), whereby the possession of property is transferred; in the case of property other than res mancipi, handover also usually transfers ownership if this is what the parties intend. The third is stipulation, whereby one person (called in Roman usage the stipulator) receives another person's formal promise that he or she will act, usually to the stipulators benefit; see further Case 117. Thus, a pater familias can acquire both property and contractual claims through his children and slaves.
4. Acquiring and Owning. The persons who acquire for another cannot own property of their own. Is this necessarily true? Consider the following example: A son-in-power, while plowing his fathers field, uncovers a treasure trove buried long ago by an unknown party Does his pater acquire the treasure? See Tryphoninus, D.
41.1.63 pr. (yes). Why shouldn't the son be allowed to keep the treasure for himself? Does the Roman rule encourage deception or slacking on the part of the son?5. Bequests. The last portion of this Case deals with a situation in which a third party dies and leaves his or her estate, or a legacy from that estate, to someone else's child-in-power or slave. This seems to have been common; why might it have occurred? Gaius indicates that the heir or legatee is allowed to “approach” (adire; i.e., accept) the bequest only after receiving the “order” (ius- sum) of the paterfamilias (see also Tit. Ulp. 19.19). The bequest then becomes the property of the pater. Why must the child-in-power receive the permission of the pater? As we shall see (in Case 116), a fathers knowledge, at least, may also be required in the case of other acquisitions; but inheritances are arguably more delicate. Why?
More on the topic CASE 114: Through Whom Do We Acquire?:
- In the previous section we saw how a child-in-power (like a slave) can acquire both property and obligations for a paterfamilias.
- “Nowhere else did repressions, purges, suppressions, and all other kinds of bureaucratic hooliganism in general acquire such horrifying scope as in Ukraine, in the struggle against powerful forces concealed in the Ukrainian masses that desired more freedom and independence.” —Leon Trotsky (Trotsky, 2021)
- One issue that marriage always raises centers on property: if two persons from different families form a household, what effect will that have not only on the property they each own at the time the marriage is contracted but also on what they acquire during the marriage?
- Analogical reasoning case to case
- Case H: Ministry Certificate
- Case B Non Agricultural Use
- CASE 38: The Wife's Property
- Case Management
- CASE 8: The Ability to Procreate
- AIDS case definitions and staging of HIV disease
- CASE 39: Acquisitions by a Wife in Manus
- Case D: Remediable Breach of Tenancy
- Chekists under Fire: The KPK Case
- Case E: Irremediable breach of tenancy
- Case Reports
- Case law as intermediary and source of certainty
- Case F: Insolvency of tenant