Conclusions
In general, in the attempt to explicate epistemological notions, there is a sort of trade-off between epistemological and logical values. That is, the more a notion is logically articulated, the less it is epistemologically relevant.
This happens for instance to the standard logical treatments of verisimilitude. On the contrary, the more an explication is epistemologically adequate, the less it is logically articulated. This occurs perhaps in our perspective.Therefore, maybe, we have been able to provide a reasonable definition, quite accurate, substantially language independent, of a better cognitive situation in Agazzi’s sense, namely, a definition able to capture a greater number of reality determinations. However, its weak point is that, being in a sense just a conceptual approach providing neither calculations, nor precise estimates, it cannot be concretely used as an effective measure of the verisimilitude of theories.
Acknowledgments We thank Claudio Calosi, Gustavo Cevolani and Theo Kuipers who read attentively drafts of this paper, giving us very useful suggestions and corrections.