COTENT

EDITORIAL PREFACE IX

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF JOSEPH AGASSI XVII

PREFACE XXI

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XXV

1. A prologue: On stability and flux 1

References 8

2. Science in flux: Footnotes to Popper 9

I.

IL The Empirical Support of Some Scientific Theories Requires

Explanation 14

III. The Desire for Stability Makes Us See More of It than

There is 19

IV. Popper’s Theory Presents Science as an Endless Series of

Debates 24

V. Popper Makes Additional Assumptions 29

VI. Rationality is a Means to an End 31

References 39

Appendix: The Role of Corroboration in Popper’s Philosophy 40

Notes 50

3. On novelty 51

I. On the Novelty of Ideas in General 52

II. Science and Truth 59

III. Popper’s View of Science 67

Notes 73

Appendix: On the Discovery of General Facts 73

4. Replies to Diane: Popper on learning from

EXPERIENCE 81

Note 89

Bibliography 89

Appendix: Empiricism Without Inductivism 90

5. Sensationalism 92

1. Sensationalism vs. Theoretical Knowledge 93

2. Sensationalism vs. Empiricism 98

3. Sense-Experience vs. Experience 101

4. Sensationalism vs. Common Sense 105

5. Explanation vs. Consent 110

6. The Roots of Scientific Realism 116

7. Conclusion 119

6. When should we ignore evidence in favour of a

hypothesis? 127

I. Can Observation Reports be Revoked? 127

II. Can Refutation be Final? 132

III. A Simple Issue Obfuscated 138

IV. A Criterion for Rejection of Observation Reports? 143

V. Does Popper Offer a Rule of Rejection? 144

VI. Do We Need a Rate of Acceptance of Observation Reports? 146

Bibliography 150

Appendix: Random Versus Unsystematic Observations 151

7. Testing as a bootstrap operation in physics 155

First Introduction: Reliability is not a Matter for Pure Science 155

Second Introduction: The Duhem-Quine Thesis has a New Significance 158

I.

II. Popper is Ambivalent Regarding Goodman’s Problem 165

III. Bootstrap Operations in Testing 168

IV. The Need for Constraints is Quite Real 172

V. Science Constraints Itself by Auxiliary Hypotheses 174

VI. Revolutions Occur when Bootstrap Operations Fail 178

VII. Conclusion 182

Appendix: Precision in Theory and in Measurement 183

8. TOWARDS A THEORY OF ‘AD HOC’ HYPOTHESES 189

I. Ad hoc Hypotheses Which Become Factual Evidence 189

IL The Conventional Element in Science 193

III. Reducing the Conventions 196

IV. Metaphysics and ad hoc Hypotheses 198

V. What is a Mess? 201

Appendix: The Traditional ad hoc Use of Instrumentalism 204

9. The nature of scientific problems and their roots

in metaphysics 208

I. Scientific Research Centers Around a Few Problems 208

II. The Anti-Metaphysical Tradition is Outdated 211

III. A Historical Note on Science and Metaphysics 213

IV. Pseudo-Science is not the Same as Non-Science 215

V. Popper’s Theory of Science 217

VI. Superstition, Pseudo-Science, and Metaphysics Use

Instances in Different Ways 221

VII. Metaphysical Doctrines are Often Insufficient Frame­works for Science 226

VIII. The Role of Interpretations in Physics 229

IX. The History of Science as the History of Its Metaphysical

Frameworks 231

Appendix: What is a Natural Law? 233

10. Questions of science and metaphysics 240

I. How Do we Select Questions? 240

IL We Select Questions Within Given Metaphysical Frame­works 244

III. The Literature on Questions 244

IV. The Literature on the Logic of Questions 246

V. The Instrumentalist View on the Choice of Questions 251

VI. Collingwood’s Peculiarity 253

VII. The Logic of Multiple-Choice-Questions 255

VIII. Bromberger on Why-Questions 257

IX. The Need for a Metaphysical Theory of Causality 260

X. Collingwood in a New Garb 262

Appendix: The Anti-Scientific Metaphysician 267

Notes 269

11.

THE STANDARD HISTORIES OF SCIENCES 270

Appendix: Reply to Commentators 280

12. The confusion between science and technology in

THE STANDARD PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE 282

Appendix: Planning for Success: A Reply to Professor Wisdom 299

Notes 303

13. Positive evidence in science and technology 306

I. Kant’s Scandal 307

II. Whitehead’s Scandal 308

III. The Facts About Induction 310

IV. Success and Rationality 313

V. The Sociology of Knowledge 316

Appendix: Duhem’s Instrumentalism and Autonomism 318

14. Positive evidence as a social institution 322

Appendix: The Logic of Technological Development 334

15. Imperfect knowledge 338

I. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Science is

Questionable 338

II. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Rational Belief is an Error 343

III. Imperfect Knowledge-Claims are Qualified by Publicly

Accepted Hypotheses 347

Notes 351

16. Criteria for plausible arguments 353

Note 363

Appendix: The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepticism 364

17. Modified conventionalism 365

I. The Problem 366

IL Science and Society 370

III. Popper’s Problems of Demarcation 379

IV. The Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge Revisited 388

Appendix: Bartley’s Critique of Popper 398

Notes 401

Bibliography 401

18. Unity and diversity in science 404

Abstract 404

I. Ambivalence Towards Unity: An Impression 406

II. The Ethics of Science as a Unifier of Science 411

III. Proof as the Unifier of Science 420

IV. Manifest Truth as the Unifier of Science 424

V. Unity of Science as a Dictator of Unanimity on All

Questions 429

VI. A Theory of Rational Disagreement 435

References 440

Appendix on Kant 464

19. Can religion go beyond reason? 469

I. Religion and Reason 469

II. Dissatisfaction with Science and Religion 474

III. Reason and Faith 476

IV. The Question of Complementary Relationship 479

V.

VI. Possibilities of Cooperation 483

VII. Defects of Both Rationalism and Religion 486

VIII. Standards of Rational Thought and Action 491

IX. Enlightenment and Self-Reliance 496

X. The Sophisticated Religionists: Buber and Polangi 500

XI. Science and Universalistic Religion 509

Notes 512

Appendix on Buber 513

20. Assurance and agnosticism 515

I. The Compleat Agnostic 515

II. The Image of Inductive Science 516

III. Empirical Facts About Assurance 517

IV. The Non-Justificationist Mood 518

V. Conversion to Autonomism 520

VI. The Assured Agnostic 521

INDEX OF WORKS CITED 525

INDEX OF NAMES 527

INDEX OF SUBJECTS 535

‘Duhem versus Galileo’, Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 8 (1957).

‘A Hegelian View of Complementarity’, Ibid. 9 (1958).

‘Koyre on the History of Cosmology’, Ibid. 9 (1958).

‘Corroboration versus Induction’, Ibid. 9 (1959). ‘Epistemology as an Aid to Science’, Ibid. 10 (1959).

‘Methodological Prescriptions in Economics’, with K. Klappholz, Economica, 1959.

‘How are Facts Discovered’, Impulse 10 (1959), 1-3.

‘Jacob Katz on Jewish Social History’, Jew. J. Soc. 1 (1959). ‘Methodological Individualism’, Brit. J. Soc. 11 (1960).

‘The Role of Corroboration’, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1961), 8-91.

‘An Unpublished Paper of the Young Faraday, Isis 52 (1961).

‘Between Micro and Macro’, Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 14 (1963).

‘Empiricism without Inductivism’, Philosophical Studies 14 (1963), 85-86. Towards an Historiography of Science, Beiheft 2, to History and Theory, March 1963 (117 pp.).

‘The Nature of Scientific Problems and Their Roots in Metaphysics’, in The Critical Approach, Essays in Honor of K. R. Popper, ed. M. Bunge (New York and London: Free Press and MacMillan, 1964), pp. 189-211.

‘The Confusion Between Physics and Metaphysics in Standard Histories of Science’, in Ithaca: Proceedings of the Xth International Congress for the History of Science, ed.

‘Sensationalism’, Mind 75, (1966), 1-24.

‘The Confusion between Science and Technology in Standard Philosophies of Science’, Tech, and Culture 7 (1966), 348-66.

‘Planning for Success: a Reply to Professor Wisdom’, Tech, and Culture 8 (1967), 78-81

The Continuing Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).

‘Science in Flux: Footnotes to Popper’, in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. Ill, eds. R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, 1968), 293-323.

‘On Novelty’, International Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1968), 442-63.

‘Precision in Theory and in Measurement’, Phil. Sci. 3 (1968), 287-90. ‘The Logic of Technological Development’, in Akten des XIV. Inter- nationalen Kongr esses fur Philosophic, Vol. 2 (Vienna: Herder, 1968), 134-37.

‘Comments: Theoretical Entities Versus Theories’, in R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky, (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 5 (Dordrecht, Holland and Boston: Reidel, 1969), 457-59.

‘Replies to Diane: Popper on Learning from Experience’, Am. Phil. Quart., Special Monograph Series, No. 3 (1969), 162-70.

‘On Privileged Access’, Inquiry 12 (1969), 420-26.

‘Unity and Diversity in Science’, in R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky, (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 4 (Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, 1969), 463-522.

‘Can Religion go Beyond Reason?’, Zygon 4 (1969), 128-68.

‘Positive Evidence in Science and Technology’, Phil. Sci. 37 (1970), 261-70.

‘Duhem’s Instrumentalism and Antinomism’, Ratio 12 (1970), 148-50.

‘Positive Evidence as Social Institution’, Philosophia, Israel 1 (1970), 261-70.

Faraday as a Natural Philosopher (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971).

‘What is a Natural Law’, Stud. Gen. 24 (1971), 1051-56.

‘The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepticism’, Phil. Stud. 22 (1971), 49-50.

‘Imperfect Knowledge’, Phil. Phenomenol. Res. 32 (1972), 465-77.

‘When Should we Ignore Evidence in Favor of a Hypothesis?’, Ratio 15 (1973), 183-205.

‘Random versus Unsystematic Observations’, Ratio 15 (1973), 111-13. ‘Testing as a Bootstrap Operation’, Z. Allg. Wiss. 4 (1973), 1-25. ‘Criteria for Plausible Argument’, Mind 83 (1974), 406-16.

‘Modified Conventionalism’, in P. A. Schilpp, (ed.), The Philosophy of Sir Karl Popper (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974), pp. 693-96.

‘On Pursuing the Unattainable’, in R. J. Seeger and R. S. Cohen, (eds.),

Philosophical Foundations of Science (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol. XI), Reidel, Dordrecht and Boston, 1974, pp. 431-44. Towards a Philosophical Anthropology. Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation Series (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1975).

‘Assurance and Agnosticism’, to appear in A. Michelos et al.₉ (eds.), PSA 1974 (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XXXII), Reidel, Dordrecht and Boston, 1975.

‘The Lakatosian Revolution’, to appear in P. Feyerabend et al., (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XXXIX), Reidel, Dordrecht and Boston, 1975.

‘Can Adults become Genuinely Bilingual?’, to appear in A. Kasher, (ed.), Language in Focus: Foundations, Methods and Systems; Essays Dedicated to Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XLIII) Reidel, Dordrecht and Boston, 1975.

Science in Flux (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XXVIII) Reidel, Dordrecht and Boston, 1975.