NOTES

Chapter 1. Logic and Science

1. See the discussion in Ball and Coxeter, Mathematical Recreations and Essays, pp. 243-250. There are many problems without known logical solu­tions.

2. Hume’s legacy is the realization that the future cannot be logically in­ferred from the observed properties of the past. See Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, for a discussion of this legacy and a strategy for dealing with consistency in projection.

3. Levi has discussed this extensively, but remains optimistic about quan­tifying epistemic utilities. See Levi, The Enterprise of Knowledge.

4. Newcomb’s puzzle is introduced in Nozick, “Newcomb’s Problem.” For a development, see discussion of the puzzle in Cargile, “Newcomb’s Para­dox,” Levi, “Newcomb’s Many Problems,” Olin, “Newcomb’s Problem,” and Skyrms, Causal Necessity.

5. Cartesian described the philosophy of Descartes as well as the philo­sophical tradition based on his work, a tradition whose analyses are restricted to the content of conscious ideas.

6. The metaphor is given in Popper, Objective Knowledge, p. 121. Popper’s original evolutionary metaphor involving falsifiability is later confounded with a view of verisimilitude that he uses to combat relativism. See Ackermann, The Philosophy of Karl Popper, for a general discussion, and Miller, "Pop­per’s Qualitative Theory,” and Tichy, “On Popper’s Definition of Verisimili­tude,” for a discussion of verisimilitude.

7. See the extended discussion in Bellone, A World on Paper. I feel that I should apologize to Bellone for using his examples to support philosophical points.

8. Such claims have frequently been described as synthetic a priori judg­ments in the literature.

9. The example of free fall is Cartesian, but not to my knowledge to be found in this form in Descartes’ writings. Suitability as applied to this case means that the objects bear only physical relationships to each other. Other­wise a slower object might move faster out of love, for example, when coupled to an object of desire. Descartes was brilliant at making such reducing as­sumptions. It should be noted also that bodies do not fall parallel without constraint when dropped, but this refinement was not a factor in the relevant debate.

10. See the discussion of Husserl in Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science, pp. 111-130.

11. If theory is tied too closely to what has already been observed, it must lose its vital speculative component. For an example of the difficulties in­volved, see Carnap, “The Methodological Character,” and the discussion in Scheffler, The Anatomy of Inquiry.

12. In Logical Foundations of Probability, Carnap was forced to the con­clusion that general theories must have a probability measure of zero. He therefore reduced scientific inference in most cases to next-case probabilities. According to the features of positivism that have been singled out, an ac­ceptance of determinism is not an essential feature of positivism. There is, however, a pronounced tendency for positivists to accept some form of de­terminism. In its stronger versions, determinism entails that the microstates of the universe are arbitrarily precise and that transitions between them are mediated by fixed causal processes. Indeterministic theories are now thought to be essential in many areas of science. Bastin, Quantum Theory, Bohm, Causality and Chance, and Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, will introduce the issues. A determinist must hold these theories to be provisional, one day to be replaced by deeper deterministic theories. If determinism were true, ex­planation and prediction would be symmetrical, as many positivists believe.

13. For examples of interesting developments, see Bressan, A General In­terpreted Modal Calculus, and Skyrms, Causal Necessity.

14. The two models are presented with great clarity in Hempel, “Deduc- tive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation.”

15. See the discussion of explanations and explanation sketches in Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation.

16. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, is a classic exposition. The full model has various technical aspects that are simplified in our treatment without essential loss.

17. Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague, “Hempel and Oppenheim on Expla­nation.” Consider a theory T and a fact E to be explained. Using a plausible syntactical construct of what a theoretical sentence is, the authors showed that another theory T* could be derived from T, so that E could be explained on the Hempel model from T* and a fact whose truth was assured by E. Since T and E can be arbitrarily chosen in the construction, T and E can seemingly be arbitrarily linked by a Hempelian explanation.

18. Proposals for restricted models are surveyed with great insight in Steg- muller, Probleme und Resultate.

19. This is a real incident, slightly altered to protect the living.

20. See Popper, Objective Knowledge, and the discussion of falsifiability in Ackermann, The Philosophy of Karl Popper.

21. This example is taken from Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability. For more sophisticated systems and defensible Bayesian strategies, see Car­nap and Jeffrey, Studies in Inductive Logic, and Rosenkrantz, Inference, Method, and Decision.

22. Our effort to avoid technicality runs into difficulties here. In the case of all heads, there is only one sequence.

23. A similar point holds for heads, obviously, and if there are more than 500 tails in both of two sequences with a different number of tails, that with the greatest number is most likely. Our example involves two specific cases, but no priors for the utilization of Bayes’ Theorem. For the mathematical treatment that will evaluate all possible cases and calculate the relevant prob­abilities and confirmation functions, see Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, or the brief introduction in Ackermann, The Philosophy of Karl Popper, pp. 105-113.

24. Normal science is described in Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Rev­olutions.

25. Revolutionary science, the contrast to normal science, is also developed in Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

26. Feyerabend, Against Method, pp. 17-53, passim.

27. Feyerabend prescribes a dash of anarchism in Against Method.

28. For a sophisticated defense of this view, see Goodman, Ways of World­making.

29. The unified science hypothesis is that one language can, in principle, suffice for the development of all of science. Historically, the language of choice must be adequate to physics.

30. The research reported in Knorr-Cetina, “Social and Scientific Method,” shows this dramatically. A technician not expecting to see a phenomenon writes as follows in the absence of guiding theoretical considerations (p. 340):

A murky, possibly imaginary interface appeared after about ninety min­utes, separating an opaque, purplish upper layer which did not clear from a blackish lower layer.

31. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems, p. 116, makes an interesting comparison betwen Lavoisier’s ‘discovery’ of oxygen and the dis­covery of America by Columbus that is well worth pondering.

32. That it is the weight of objects that is important to their rate of fall, and not their color or shape, is a bold insight that narrows the range of logical possibilities to be made. Experience could not by itself rule out all of the bizarre functions that logic might suggest.

Chapter 2. Social Structure in Science

1. Hanson, The Concept of the Positron and Patterns of Discovery. Han­son, influenced by Wittgenstein, attempted a context-sensitive philosophical description of scientific practice.

2. Merton, The Sociology of Science. Mulkay has suggested that Merton’s norms provide a repertoire of moral rhetoric that scientists can use to estab­lish their work as proper. See Mulkay’s remark in Barnes and Edge, eds., Science in Context, p. 18.

3. Barnes and Dolby’s “The Scientific Ethos’’ discusses changes in the norms over time.

4. Mitrolf, The Subjective Side of Science, p. 12, provides this useful sum­mary.

5. Watson, The Double Helix..

6. This problem is discussed with great insight in Ravetz, Scientific Knowl­edge and Its Social Problems.

7. Martin, The Bias of Science, analyzes some specific papers by scientists on the expectation of damage to the ozone layer by supersonic transport emis­sions. The opposing scientists chose models whose development led to pre­dictions in line with the national priorities of their countries with respect to the transport plane, a fact that Martin thinks cannot be accidental. Another stimulating account of conflicting scientific judgments apparently based on differing social factors of institutional arrangement for making decisions is given in Gillespie, Eve, and Johnston, “Carcinogenic Risk Assessment.” See also the relevant history in MacKenzie, Statistics in Britain.

8. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems, p. 194.

9. Whitley, “Types of Science,” p. 434.

10. Kuhn, The Essential Tension and The Structure of Scientific Revolu­tions. The influence of the latter book has been enormous, and many authors have attempted to find science through locating paradigmatic consensus and revolutions where Kuhn himself never expected his ideas to apply. See Ack­ermann, “Methodology and Economics,” for the case of economic history. Loose characterizations of Kuhn are often used to support this process of legitimization in otherwise coherent attempts to write the history of a field. See, for example, Rosnow, Paradigms in Transition, p. 4:

Kuhn defined a paradigm as consisting of scientific achievements that were sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adher­ents away from competing modes of activity.

11. See Hacking’s review of Kuhn’s Structure, Kordig, The Justification of Scientific Change, Kruger, “Die systematische Bedeutung,” Lakatos and Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, and Shapere, “Meaning and Scientific Change,” for a survey of philosophical attitudes toward Kuhn’s views.

12. Crane, “An Exploratory Study.” For an argument that research com­munities are sociological artifacts that have no explanatory value, see Knorr- Cetina, “Scientific Communities.” See also the account in Stokes, “The Dou­ble Helix.”

13. The notion of an exemplar, as well as the notion of a paradigm, has undergone some change. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 174-210, and Kuhn, The Essential Tension, pp. 293-319. An application of the notion of exemplar to the charm-color debate in high-energy physics may be found in Pickering, “Interests and Analogies.”

14. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 62-65.

15. See the important discussion of this point in Martins, “The Kuhnian ‘Revolution.’ ”

16. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 151. Perhaps young should refer to freshness in a discipline rather than to chronological age. See the discussion of this point in Stokes, “The Double Helix.”

17. Hull, Tessner, and Diamond, “Planck’s Principle.” I apologize to the authors for stealing their irresistible joke.

18. See Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, for a general account. It is inter­esting in this connection that the notion of paradigm plays no explicit role in Kuhn’s own history of these developments in Kuhn, Black-Body Theory.

19. Kruger, “Die systematische Bedeutung,” p. 218.

20. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 205-207.

21. This is, of course, a wild simplification. Only those parts of classical physics assumed to contrast with relativity theory and quantum theory are being considered here. The so-called second revolution in physics, brought about by the expansion of classical theory into thermodynamics, radiation effects, electromagnetic theory, and statistical mechanics, and not at first sub­ject to a fit with data, is ignored here. See the superb account in Bellone, A World on Paper.

22. Garfield, Malin, and Small, “Citation Data,” and Griffith et al., “The Structure of Scientific Literatures.”

23. Cole, Cole, and Dietrich, “Measuring the Cognitive State.”

24. Mullins, “A Sociological Theory. ”

25. See the interesting discussion of polycentrism in Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems, especially pp. 260-288.

26. Blume and Sinclair, “Aspects of the Structure.”

27. Beyer and Stevens, “Forschungsaktivitat und Produktivitat.”

28. Ibid.

29. Whitley, “Types of Science,” p. 438.

30. Baldamus, “Relevanz und Trivialitat,” and Knorr, “The Nature of Sci­entific Consensus.”

31. Elsasser, Atom and Organism.

32. Knorr, “The Nature of Scientific Consensus.”

33. Popper, Objective Knowledge, especially chaps. 2 and 3.

34. Nowotny, “Controversies in Science,” and Pinch, “What Does a Proof Do.”

35. Bourdieu, “The Specificity of the Scientific Field.”

36. Nowotny, “Controversies in Science,” and Pinch, “What Does a Proof Do,” p. 174.

37. Bellone, A World on Paper, discusses private dictionaries for some famous scientists.

38. There are many examples supporting this in scientific history. Olby, The Path to the Double Helix, makes interesting reading in this connection.

39. Gilbert, “The Development of Science.”

40. Taylor, “Understanding in Human Science.”

41. Pinch, “What Does a Proof Do,” p. 181, and Whitley, “Changes in the Social and Intellectual Organization,” p. 157.

42. Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life, pp. 168-174.

43. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmil­lan, 1958), p. viii.

44. Lakatos, Philosophical Papers, Laudan, Progress and Its Problems, and Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 205-206.

Chapter 3. Science and Nonscience

1. Collins and Pinch, “The Construction of the Paranormal,” Collins and Pinch, The Social Construction of Extraordinary Science, and Pinch, “Nor­mal Explanations of the Paranormal.” Collins and Pinch, The Social Construc­tion of Extraordinary Science, pp. 22-24, reports how easy it is to find para­psychology a normal science when one is interacting with parapsychologists, an interesting comment on the notion of normal science.

2. Wynne, “Between Orthodoxy and Oblivion” and “C. G. Barkla and the J Phenomenon.”

3. Mulkay, The Social Process of Innovation.

4. Clavelin, The Natural Philosophy of Galileo, and Feyerabend, Against Method.

5. Wright, “A Study in the Legitimisation of Knowledge.” Hannaway, The Chemists and the Word, is also interesting in its explanation of how formulae in chemistry became detached from the personality of individual chemists and could be transferred to the public domain of controversy, unlike the formulae of Paracelsian physicians.

6. This picture has been presented by Carnap, for example, and can be found in Logical Foundations of Probability.

7. Ziman, The Force of Knowledge, pp. 8-36. See the discussion revolving around a newer concensus in Barnes and Edge, eds., Science in Context, especially pp. 147-154.

8. Hounshell, “Edison and the Pure Science Ideal.”

9. Ibid., p. 612.

10. Evenson, Waggoner, and Ruttan, “Economic Benefits from Research.”

11. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, p. 269.

12. Ferguson, “The Mind’s Eye,” and Ivins, Prints and Visual Communi­cation, pp. 51-71.

13. An effective argument that the information in visual presentations can­not be explicitly paraphrased into statements can be found in Goodman, Lan­guages of Art.

14. Popper, Objective Knowledge, Lakatos, Philosophical Papers, and Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

15. It has been possible for the adherents of various methodological schools to write the history of science from their own perspectives without residue. Apparently the facts of scientific history allow themselves to be interpreted in a variety of ways.

16. Popper has always worried that political intrusions could ruin the free criticism required for scientific progress in his view, a theme whose implica­tions are worked out in some detail in Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems, as well as in Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery.

17. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery.

18. The problem is examined in the case of curve fitting in Ackermann, “Inductive Simplicity.” For the general constraint of the past, see the ap­proach through thematics in Holton, Thematic Origins, and the special case of high-energy physics in Koester, Sullivan, and White, “Theory Selection.”

19. Ehrlich and Feldman, The Race Bomb, is a good popular presentation of the issues, but see also Urbach, “Progress and Degeneration,” and the discussion of Urbach by Tizard in BJPS for philosophical perspective.

20. Shapin, “The Politics of Observation.”

21. See the discussion in Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, pp. 48­73.

22. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems.

23. Pfetsch, “The ‘Finalization’ Debate,” and Barnes and Edge, eds., Sci­ence in Context, pp. 187-195, along with papers on this topic reprinted in the same volume.

24. This disappearance has been traced by Bachelard, who argues that dis­placed concepts may still have an effect on creative reasoning in science on the unconscious level. Most of the important texts have not been translated, but the outline of Bachelard’s thought can be gathered from LeCourt, Marx­ism and Epistemology.

25. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, presents scientific edu­cation in terms of such an acculturation model.

26. See the discussion of Bachelard’s “epistemological break” in LeCourt, Marxism and Epistemology.

27. Ronchi, New Optics.

28. Widdowson, Explorations in Applied Linguistics, pp. 51-61. More re­cently, the rhetorical style of science has been studied in comparison with that of other disciplines. The scientist may rely on consensus to argue effec­tively without self-assertiveness, by letting the subject matter do the talking when his or her audience is familiar with the context. See Bazerman, “What Written Knowledge Does,” Yearley, “The Relationship between Epistemo­logical and Sociological Cognitive Interests,” and Yearley, “Textual Persua­sion,” for an analysis.

29. Conant, “The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory,” and Toulmin, “Crucial Experiments,” present the standard recognized facts about this set of experiments.

30. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, p. 128.

31. Historians generally recognize at present that the older narrative style of history contains questionable assumptions, but this point has not yet gained much of a foothold among philosophers of science. For a discussion, see Col­lins and Cox, “Recovering Relativity,” and Lefebvre, “What Is the Historical Past?”

32. This event is well known to historians of biology. For a discussion featuring the philosophical aspects, see Brannigan, “The Law Valid for Pisum,” or the similar treatment in his The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries. Bran­nigan’s book is a stimulating discussion of the social aspects of scientific dis­covery.

33. Holton, “Can Science Be Measured?,” p. 43.

34. Kuhn, “The Halt and the Blind.”

35. Ibid., p. 183. Kuhn observes this point in practice in that no mention of the apparatus of The Stucture of Scientific Revolutions occurs in Black­Body Theory, which might have been written without awareness of the dis­tinction between normal and revolutionary science, and the role of paradigms in the former.

Chapter 4. Scientific Facts and Scientific Theories

1. Negotiation is explained in Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, pp. 117-140. The strong program with which it is associated is developed in this book and in Barnes, Scientific Knowledge. See the relevant discussion of the strong program in Woolgar, “Interests and Explanation.”

2. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems, pp. 69-240.

3. Holton, The Scientific Imagination, pp. 25-83.

4. Fleck, Genesis and Development, p. 118.

5. Ibid., p. 72.

6. Ibid., p. 81.

7. Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life, especially pp. 105-150.

8. Ibid., p. 129.

9. Ibid., p. 130.

10. Ibid., p. 134.

11. Ibid., p. 138.

12. Elkana, et al., eds., Towards a Metric, frontispiece, with appropriate woodcut.

13. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery.

14. Popper, Objective Knowledge, especially chap. 4.

15. As is reported in many histories of astronomy, some early observers saw Saturn as though it were a sphere with two handles attached, like those on a teacup. It was some time before these early guesses were eliminated by considerations of theory and better evidence.

16.There is a good example in Fleck, Genesis and Development, 135.

17.Clavelin, The Natural Philosophy of Galileo, pp. 393-403.

18.Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, pp. 100-102.

19. Collins, “The TEA set,” and Collins and Harrison, “Building a TEA Laser.”

20. Collins, “The Seven Sexes.”

21. Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations.

22. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, pp. 269-270.

23. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, and Klein, Greek Mathemathical Thought.

24. The foundational disputes in set theory, on the other hand, are a sign that this domain hasn’t been settled.

25. Kuhn, The Essential Tension, pp. 340-351.

26. Gablik, Progress in Art.

27. See Steinberg, Other Criteria, especially pp. 55-93.

28. Kuhn, “The Halt and the Blind.”

29. Fisher, “The Death of a Mathematical Theory,” and “The Last Invar­iant Theories.”

30. Fisher, “The Death of a Mathematical Theory,” p. 138.

31. Kuhn suggests in “The Halt and the Blind” that theories are replaced only in science; Fisher makes a similar point in “The Last Invariant Theories,” p. 222. The greater precision of border of domain may assist preservation in mathematics, and make it more like the overt cases of preservation in science, like the longevity associated with Newton’s theory.

32. Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life, pp. 176-180.

33. Zahar, “Einstein, Meyerson, and the Role of Mathematics,” pp. 2-8.

34. See Ackermann, “Confirmatory Models of Theories,” and the discussion of Boltzmann in Bellone, A World on Paper.

35. The prediction suggested that Neptune could be found within a certain distance from a calculated point. Such predictions are part of the history of all sciences.

36. Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life. See also the discussion of lan­guage in Gilbert and Mulkay, “Warranting Scientific Belief.”

37. Gay, “Radicals and Types,” pp. 14-15.

38. Fleck, Genesis and Development.

39. Heisenberg, “Der Begriff‘abgeschlossene Theorie.’ ”

40. Ibid.

41. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery.

42. Fleck, Genesis and Development, p. 30.

43. The unified science hypothesis is the view that all of science is poten­tially reducible to physics, according to rules that would translate any state­ment in any science into a statement of physical theory or observation, or both, for this purpose.

44. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, and Ackermann, “An Alternative Free Will Defense.”

45. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.

46. Themata are discussed in Holton, Thematic Origins. For examples of themata in scientific history, see also Gruber, “Darwin’s ‘Tree of Nature,’ ” Wise, “The Mutual Embrace,” and Finocchiaro, “Scientific Discoveries.”

47. That metaphor and analogy are important is widely recognized, but analysis has proved difficult. For an interesting application, see Darden, “Theory Construction.”

48. Hattiangadi, “The Vanishing Context of Discovery.”

49. Gruber, “Darwin’s ‘Tree of Nature.’ ”

50. Wise, “The Mutual Embrace.”

51. Miller, “Visualization Lost and Regained,” and Hanson, Patterns of Discovery.

52. Neptune was predicted as an additional planet. For the positron, a new particle, see Hanson, The Concept of the Positron.

53. See the discussion of cosmological principles in North, The Measure of the Universe.

54. Barber and Fox, “The Case of the Floppy-Eared Rabbits. ”

55. Carter, “The Germ Theory.”

56. Webster, “The Discovery of Boyle’s Law.”

57. See ibid., for details.

58. Gay, “Radicals and Types.” This is a particularly stimulating essay in terms of its philosophical implications.

59. White, Sullivan, and Barboni, “The Interdependence of Theory and Experiment.”

60. Ibid.

61. See Gay, “Radicals and Types,” pp. 25-26, as well as White, Sullivan, and Barboni, “The Interdepencence of Theory and Experiment,” p. 323.

Appendix. The Human Sciences

1. The human sciences are here opposed to the natural sciences, rather than opposing the behavioral sciences or the social sciences to the natural sciences. These latter oppositions often involve the introduction of a meth­odological point of view. We do not which to exclude history, textual criti­cism, and related activities as outside the scope of scientific activity. We also avoid the assumption that a methodological break occurs when man is the object of study. In opposing the human sciences to the natural sciences, we are trying to hold various possibilities open during the preliminary discussion. See Goldmann, The Human Sciences and Philosophy, for a related point of view.

2. The relationships between the natural and the social sciences have been examined in the special case of physics and sociology in Chapter 2 in the section on scientific disciplines. It was argued there that substantive differ­ence between physics and sociology could not be found through sociological means. This point is being reconsidered here now that our general account of theory and experiment has been concluded.

3. Values cannot be used (in general) to differentiate human from natural sciences, since the craft nature of scientific work means that valuations are inextricably involved in basic experimental research. But human values are also involved in a different sense, even in physics. The value of human un­derstanding and control of physical nature is presupposed as something that is in the interests of all human beings.

4. These differing relationships may or may not be thought subject to fur­ther analysis. For an analytic treatment, see von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, and the discussion in Manninen and Tuomela, Essays on ‘Ex­planation and Understanding.’ Van Parijs, Evolutionary Explanation, also presents an interesting analysis of social science explanatory models. Like Popper’s attempt to introduce the rationality principle, these analytic ap­proaches have the practical consequence of assimilating parts of the human science domain to the natural sciences, in effect extending the analytical boundaries of natural science methodology by favoring areas of the social sciences that are closest to the natural sciences, given the methodologies in question. More hermeneutical accounts motivated by an intuition of decisive break are discussed in Dreyfus, “Holism and Hermeneutics,” Taylor, “Un­derstanding in Human Science,” and Rorty, “A Reply to Dreyfus and Taylor.” Within the traditional accounts of methodology, the distinction can always be drawn. See Lammers, “Mono- and Poly-Paradigmatic Developments,” for the derivative Kuhnian claim that the social sciences are poly-paradigmatic and the natural sciences mono-paradigmatic, which seems to ignore the presence of real controversy in the natural sciences.

5. Thiel, Grundlagenkrise und Grundlagenstreit, provides interesting doc­umentation that foundational disputes in the social sciences threaten data back to the beginning of the disciplines. In the natural sciences and mathe­matics, this retrogression is blocked by the last secure data domain, meaning that less damage accrues from foundational upheavals. Instruments are not available in the social sciences to break the connection between theory and fact.

6. The theories are too large in scope in the human sciences to suggest suitable instruments to embody their perceptions of reality. Theory thus reaches to fact, and colors it too strongly for the purposes of dialectical progress. Under these circumstances, the call for more data or more theory, or more middle-level theory, within the present context is to ensure the status quo. This is also true of versions of Marxism that attempt to develop discourse independently of the constraint of fact, a development that can elaborate, but not criticize, its own starting assumptions no matter how corrosive its attack on alternatives. See Hindess, Philosophy and Methodology for an example. For discussions of relationship of theory to data in the social sciences, see Hindess, The Use of Official Statistics, and Turner, Ethnomethodology. Men­zies, Sociological Theory in Use, deserves special study. Menzies shows that the attempt to circumscribe empirical research by intuitive theorizing results in research data that usually bear little specific imprint of the restricted the­ories, with the result that the data cannot sharply confirm or falsify the theo­retician’s claims. This is the other side of the inability to determine sharp data domains within the human sciences.

7. I am indebted for this point to a conversation with Margaret Nash.

8. The location of the boundary between the individual and society is at least partly a matter of convention. Clearly psychological structure is in some sense a process of acculturation, and social structure may in turn be jarred by nonassimilated aspects of individuality. Various attempts to synthesize Freud and Marx, such as those of the Frankfurt School, confront this situation, but usually with quite differing insights.

9. This is obscured by treatments that attempt to associate neoclassical and Marxist ideas with philosophies of the natural sciences, instead of with the natural sciences directly. Although neoclassical economists often defend themselves methodologically by positivist arguments, a refutation of positiv­ism is not a refutation of classical theory. See Hollis and Nell, Rational Eco­nomic Man, for the association, and Ackermann, “Methodology and Econom­ics,” for a brief discussion. There is no methodological reason why Marxists can’t be positivists in terms of economic methodology, unless very coercive definitions are introduced to define the possible parameters.

10. Durkheim’s attempt to find an empirical realm of social fact should also be mentioned as an attempt to create a data domain for the social sciences. Habermas has recently attempted to mediate between Adorno’s holism and analytical empiricism by finding a distinction between cognitive interests and sciences that pursue these interests. See Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests. This permits a distinction between natural science methodology and hermeneutics to be drawn, to which is added a notion of critical science based on an analytic theory of communicative competence. See Habermas, Com­munication and the Evolution of Society, for a sketch of the project. Haber­mas must distinguish himself from natural science methodological imperialism (see the debate in Habermas and Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie) as well as from the holism of critical theory. The price that he has paid is to be seen from each camp as belonging to the other, and to some extent he therefore pays the price of mediation earlier paid by Weber. This situation is too delicate for detailed treatment here.

11. An explicit relationship between neoclassical theory and physical theory is described in Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics.” It is completely defensible from the methodological point of view. See the discus­sion in Diesing, Patterns of Discovery, Nagel, “Assumptions in Economic Theory,” Rosenberg, Microeconomic Laws, and the overview in Ackermann, “Methodology and Economics.” Becker, The Economic Approach, illustrates analogies between extending the scope of theory in natural science and the extension of neoclassical theory.

12. See Gide and Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines, for the relevant history of early failure of prediction, and attempts to correct the problem.

13. Komai, Anti-Equilibrium.

14. Leibenstein, Beyond Economic Man.

15. See Ackermann, “Methodology and Economics.”

16. See Sraffa, Production of Commodities, and discussion of its significance in Pasinetti, Lectures on the Theory of Production, and Steedman, Marx after Sraffa.

17. For tame versions of verstehen as a mere heuristic, see Abel, “The Operation Called Verstehen,” and Truzzi, Verstehen.

18. Weber, of course, assumed a questionable view of the natural sciences, but assumed that the methodology of ideal types could mediate the territory between precise refutation in the natural sciences and the problematic nature of data in the social sciences. See Giddens, Positivism and Sociology, p. 26, where Weber is quoted this way:

If a hypothetical ‘law of nature’ definitely fails in only one instance, it collapses once and for all as a hypothesis. The ideal-typical constructions of political economy, however, do not—correctly understood—claim general validity, whereas a ‘law of nature’ must make this claim if it is not to lose its significance. A so-called ‘empirical’ law in the end is an empirically validated rule, having a problematic causal interpretation. A teleological schema of rational action, on the other hand, is an interpre­tation with a problematical empirical validation: the two are thus polar opposites. But both schemata are ‘ideal typical’ conceptual constructions.

Weber’s conception here has an obvious relationship to our conception of the relationship as based on entry points of understanding.

19. See Stammer, Max Weber and Sociology Today, pp. 27-88.

20. The hold of this distinction is clearly seen in such sources as Meissner and Wold, “The Foundations of Science,” especially p. 127.

21. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, and Jay, The Dialectical Imagi­nation, provide general introductory accounts of critical theory.

22. Stammer, Max Weber and Sociology Today, p. 66.

23. The major documents of the Positivismusstreit are collected and trans­lated in Adorno et al., The Positivist Dispute.

24. Ibid., pp. 288-289.

25. Ibid., p. 106.

26. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 342. See Moon, “The Logic of Political Inquiry,” p. 157, and Ackermann, The Philosophy of Karl Popper, p. 171, for examples of Popperian generalizations in the social sciences.

27. Discussion of these matters begins with Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities.

28. The general thesis is expressed in Adorno, Negative Dialectics. Ador­no’s work is, however, concerned with general historical theses, as in Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, as well as with empirical data. Adorno’s encounter with empirical data and his position that they can only be grasped through careful theoretical reflection can be located in Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality, Adorno, Quasi una Fantasia, “Scientific Experiences,” “The Stars Down to Earth,” and “Uber Jazz.” See the com­ments of an empiricist on Adorno’s work in Lazarsfeld, “An Episode.”

29. Adorno et al., The Positivist Dispute, p. 105.

30. Ibid., p. 106.

31. Ibid., pp. 112-113.

32. Ibid., p. 77.

33. Ibid., p. 85.

34. See the important survey in Menzies, Sociological Theory in Use.

35. See Adorno et al., The Positivist Dispute, pp. 131-257.

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