Notes

1. Numerous books on the general topic of critical thinking make this point: Caleb W Lack and Jacques Rousseau, Critical Thinking, Science, and Pseudoscience (New York: Springer; 2017) and Galen A.

2. Henri Poincare, Science and Hypothesis (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform; October 11, 2013), preface.

3. Kinds of cognitive bias: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases.

4. Gerd Gigerenzer, Rationality for Mortals: How People Cope with Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2008), is an accessible entree into Gigerenzer’s oeuvre and you’ll find copious experimental details in the collection of research-re­lated papers by him and members of his school of thought in Gerd Gigerenzer, Ralph Hertwig, Thorsten Pachur (Eds.), Heuristics: The Foundations of Adaptive Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2011).

5. G. Gigerenzer and H. Brighton, “Homo-Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Decisions,” in G. Gigerenzer, R. Hertwig, and T. Pachur (Eds.), Heuristics: The Foundations of Adaptive Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2011), pp. 2-26.

6. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 2011). This book provides a good overview of Kahneman’s thought as it has evolved beyond the seminal work he did with Amos Tversky; e.g., Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slover, Amos Tversky (Eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

7. Kahneman, Thinking, p. 98.

8. G. Gigerenzer and H. Brighton, “Homo heuristicus” ibid.

9. Nicholas Nassim Taleb, Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Market, 2nd ed.

10. The term “bounded rationality” was coined by the Nobel Prize-winning political sci­entist, psychologist, economist, and artificial intelligence pioneer, Herbert Simon; see Bryan D. Jones, “Bounded Rationality,” Annual Review of Political Science 2:297-321, 1999, for a concise introduction. Simon also introduced the term “satisficing” (i.e., satisfying and sufficing) to the American public.

11. Gigerenzer and Brighton, “Homo Heuristicus” pp. 6-9.

12. Ibid., pp. 10-12.

13. Kahneman, 'Thinking, “Prospect Theory,” chapter 26, pp. 278-299. The program that Kahneman and Tversky initiated is sometimes called “heuristics and biases” but all opposing programs, including “fast-and-frugal,” also deal with heuristics and biases. To avoid pointless confusion, I’ll refer to all of Kahneman and Tversky’s ideas under the rubric of Prospect Theory and, when necessary, Kahneman’s more recent work done since Tversky’s death as his “two-system” approach.

14. Kahneman, Thinking, “Two Systems,” part I, pp. 19-105.

15. If the bat and ball together cost $5.50 and the bat costs $5.00 more than the ball, the bat must cost $5.25 and the ball must cost $0.25.

16. Expected Utility Theory (Hypothesis). See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expected_ utility_hypothesis. An accessible discussion of rational economic theory is found Reid Hastie and Robyn M. Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE; 2010).

17. Gerd Gigerenzer, Ralph Hertwig, Thorsten Pachur (Eds.), Heuristics: The Foundations of Adaptive Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 153.

18. The area of overlap must be smaller than either of the two main circles, provided, of course, that the circles are not exactly the same size and totally overlap (i.e., I assume that all feminists are not bank tellers and all bank tellers not feminists). In this case, class of feminist bank tellers would be the same size, though not larger, as the class of bank tellers.

19. Number of “tellers”; most, not all, are in banking: 345,709 in the United States in 2015 (https://datausa.io/profile/soc/433071/). Total number of tellers, 502,700 (https:// www.bls.gov/ooh/office-and-administrative-support/tellers.htm); 5 of 6 are women (http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/NELP-Data-Brief-15-Minimum-Wage-for- Bank-Workers.pdf). Putting the two together, approximately 418,000 bank tellers are women.

20. H. P. Grice (who also published as H. Paul Grice and Paul Grice) was a British phi­losopher who studied word meaning in conversational contexts. He named the con­cept of “implicature,” essentially, unstated word meaning; https://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/implicature/.

21. Ralph Hertwig and Gerd Gigerenzer, “The ‘Conjunction Fallacy’ Revisited: How Intelligent Inferences Look Like Reasoning Errors,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12:275-305, 1999.

22. C. F. Chick, V. F. Reyna, and J. C. Corbin, “Framing Effects Are Robust to Linguistic Disambiguation: A Critical Test of Contemporary Theory,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 42:238-256, 2016.

23. C. Badcock, “Making Sense of Wason: Parallel Mentalistic/Mechanistic Cognition Resolves the Controversy,” Psychology Today, The Imprinted Brain, posted May 5, 2012; https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-imprinted-brain/201205/ making-sense-wason

24. Some people feel that, strictly speaking, we should turn over the F card as well, since we weren't told that each card had a number and a letter. The main point, however, is that most people choose the 3 card instead. For an overview and critique of the four- card test, see https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-imprinted-brain/201205/ making-sense-wason.

25. L. Cosmides and John Tooby, “Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange,” in Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby (Eds.), The Adapted Mind: Evolutional Psychology and the Generation of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press; 1992), pp.

26. Badcock, “Making Sense of Wason.”

27. E. Brandstatter, G. Gigerenzer, and R. Hertwig, “The Priority Heuristic: Making Choices Without Trade-Offs,” Psychological Review 113:409-432, 2006.

28. Ibid., p. 4.

29. Kahneman, Thinking, “Anchors,” pp. 119-128.

30. Ibid., p. 124.

31. Raymond Dingledine, “Why is it so hard to do good science?” eNeuro, September/ Octorber, 2018, 5(5), e0188, 1-8.

32. R. Samuels, S. Stich, and M. Bishop, “Ending the Rationality Wars: How to Make Disputes About Human Rationality Disappear,” in Renee Elio (Ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning & Rationality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 236-268.

33. R. H. Thaler and C. R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New York: W H. Norton; 2015).

34. B. Seymour, N. Daw, P. Dayan, T. Singer, and R. Dolan, “Differential Encoding ofLosses and Gains in the Human Striatum,” Journal of Neuroscience 27:4826-4831, 2007.

35. Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (but Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts (New York: Harcourt; 2007).

36. Ibid., chapter 4.

37. P. C. Wason, “On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task,” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 12:129-140, 1960.

38. Kahneman, Thinking, p. 368.

39. Gerd Gigerenzer, Simply Rational: Decision Making in the Real World (New York: Oxford University Press; 2015), pp. 1-106. A recent example of health statistics given as frequencies rather than probabilities indicates that Gigerenzer's call for more user-friendly language is having an effect; see https://www.cancer.org/ cancer/prostate-cancer/about/key-statistics.html

40. Michael Bond, “Decision-Making: Risk School,” Nature 463:1189-1192, 2009.

41. Samuels et al., “Ending the Rationality Wars.”

42. Richard H. Thaler, Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics (New York: W H. Norton; 2015), p. 18.

43. Rodney Dangerfield was the stage name of a well-known American comedian whose standard tag-line was “I don't get no respect.” See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Rodney_Dangerfield.