Notes

Introduction

1. Transcribed from a video recording of the Rogers Commission press conference. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZOzoLdfWyKw, accessed November 15, 2019.

2. Richard P.

3. See Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans. Philip P. Weiner (1906; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954); W V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1961); and Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

4. Feynman, in Thomas F. Gieryn and Anne E. Figert, “Ingredients for a Theory of Science in Society: O-Rings, Ice Water, C-Clamps, Richard Feynman, and the New York Times” in Theories of Science in Society, ed. Susan E. Cozzens and Thomas F. Gieryn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 77.

5. Feynman obituaries cited in Gieryn and Figert, “Science in Society,” 70, 72.

6. Robert Boyle, in Rose-Mary Sargent, “Learning from Experience: Boyle's Construction of an Experimental Philosophy,” in Robert Boyle Reconsidered, ed. Michael Hunter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 68; and Rose-Mary Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist: Robert Boyle and the Philosophy of Experiment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 198, 201-2.

7. Feynman, Character of Physical Law, 156-57.

8. Feynman, What Do You Care What Other People Think? (New York: Norton, 1988), 148-49.

9. Freeman Dyson, in John and Mary Gribbin, Richard Feynman: A Life in Science (New York: Dutton, 1997), 238.

10. Feynman, What Do You Care, 124.

11. Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 391.

12. Steven Weinberg (2010), in Ian Sample, Massive: The Missing Particle That Sparked the Greatest Hunt in Science, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 214-15.

13. Jim Baggott, The Quantum Story, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 409-10.

14. Wilbur Richard Knorr, The Ancient Tradition of Geometric Problems (Boston: Birkhauser, 1986).

Chapter 1

1. Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates, trans. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 9.

2. See G. E. R. Lloyd, “The Hippocratic Question,” Classical Quarterly 25, no. 2 (1975): 171-92.

3. 3. G. E. R. Lloyd, The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 40-41; Guido Majno, The Healing Hand: Man and Wound in the Ancient World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 495 n. 192, 178.

4. Lloyd, Revolutions of Wisdom, 70n, 88.

5. Lloyd, Revolutions of Wisdom, 127.

6. Hippocrates, On Ancient Medicine, chap. 1, trans. Francis Adams, https://ebooks. adelaide.edu.au/h/hippocrates/medicine/index.html. On methodological accounta­bility, Mohan Matthen, “Empiricism and Ontology in Ancient Medicine,” Aperion 21, no. 2 (1988): 99-121.

7. Hippocratic On Sterile Women, in Lesley Dean-Jones, “Autopsia, Historia, and What Women Know,” in Knowledge and the Scholarly Medical Traditions, ed. Don Bates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 55. I also draw from Jacques Jouanna, “Water, Health, and Disease in the Hippocratic Treatise Airs, Waters, Places” in Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, trans. Neil Allies, ed.

8. Ludwig Edelstein, “Empiricism and Skepticism in the Teaching of the Greek Empiricist School,” in Ancient Medicine, trans. C. Lilian Temkin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 201n.

9. Jouanna, Greek Medicine, 64, 106; The Genuine Works of Hippocrates, trans. Francis Adams (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1939), 355-56; Philip J. van der Eijk, “The ‘Theology’ of the Hippocratic Treatise On the Sacred Disease” in Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 45-73.

10. Vivian Nutton, “The Fatal Embrace: Galen and the History of Ancient Medicine,” Science in Context 18, no. 1 (2005): 111-21.

11. Thomas S. Hall, Ideas of Life and Matter: Studies in the History of General Physiology 600BC-1900 AD, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 1:73.

12. Michael Frede, “Philosophy and Medicine in Antiquity,” in Human Nature and Natural Knowledge, ed. Alan Donagan, Anthony N. Perovich, and Michael Wedin (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986), 213. That philosophy influenced medicine more than vice versa is also the argument of Ludwig Edelstein, “The Relation of Ancient Philosophy to Medicine,” in Ancient Medicine, 349-66. Conversely, as Frede observes, the argument between empiricism and rationalism was long restricted to the doctors, with rare references to it in philosophical literature. “Galen's Epistemology,” in Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 283, 286.

13. On Pythagorean healing and philosophy, see Peter Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic: Empedocles and the Pythagorean Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

14. On Alcmaeon, see Theodore James Tracy, Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle (The Hague: Mouton, 1969), 22-23; and James Longrigg, “Philosophy and Medicine: Some Early Interactions,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 67 (1963): 147-75.

15. Alcmaeon, in Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), fr. 1. Some fifty years later, Herodotus wrote of judging the unknown (me ginsokomena) from the known (toisi emphanesi). The Persian Wars, trans. George Rawlinson (New York: Modern Library, 1942), 2.33.

16. James Longrigg, Greek Medicine: From the Heroic to the Hellenistic Age (1998; rpt. New York: Routledge, 2010), 98, 106. Empedoclean theses abound in Plato's Timaeus. On Empedocles's so-called experiment with a clepsydra, see David J. Furley, “Empedocles and the Clepsydra,” in Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, ed. R. E. Allen and David J. Furley, 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 2:266-67.

17. Attributing this “philosophy of history” to Democritus is a surmise and not provable from the extant fragments. See Thomas Cole, Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology (Chapel Hill, NC: American Philological Association, 1967).

18. Lloyd, Revolutions of Wisdom, 128, 129-30.

19. Lloyd, Revolutions of Wisdom, 116; and R. J. Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 59.

20. Hippocrates, in Jouanna, Greek Medicine, 53, and Hall, Life and Matter, 1:74-75. Plato, Laws, 857d. This and all further quotations from Plato are from Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997).

21. Hippocrates, On Ancient Medicine, quoted in John M.

22. Hippocrates, On Ancient Medicine, quoted in Cooper, “Method and Science,” 34. This is also the point of the Great Fragment on Method by Diocles (§6).

23. Hippocrates, On Ancient Medicine, chap. 1.

24. Hippocrates, On Ancient Medicine, 9.17; Cooper, “Method and Science,” 35-36.

25. Hippocrates, On Ancient Medicine, 19.3; and Mario Vegetti, “Culpability, Responsibility, Cause: Philosophy, Historiography, and Medicine in the Fifth Century,” in Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A. A. Long (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 284; see also G. E. R. Lloyd, Methods and Problems in Greek Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 49; and Frede, “The Original Notion of Cause,” in Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 125-50.

26. Plato, Phaedrus, 270c. That Hippocratics conceive of medicine as an approach to nat­ural philosophy is an argument of Owsei Temkin, “Greek Medicine as Science and Craft,” Isis 44, no. 3 (1953): 213-25.

27. Frede, “The Empiricist Attitude towards Reason and Theory,” Aperion 21, no. 2 (1988): 79-97.

28. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946), 1.2; Galen, Three Treatises on the Nature of Science, trans. Richard Walzer and Michael Frede (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1985), 4.

29. Galen, Three Treatises, 5; Vivian Nutton, Ancient Medicine (London: Routledge, 2004), 149.

30. Frede, “An Empiricist View of Knowledge: Memorism,” in Epistemology, Companions to Ancient Thought, vol. 1, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 225-50.

31. Alcmaeon, in Plato, Phaedo, 96b, and Frede, “Empiricist View of Knowledge,” 238, 245, 246.

32. Frede, “Empiricist View of Knowledge,” 247.

33. Lloyd, Revolutions of Wisdom, 128, 129-30.

34. Lloyd, Revolutions of Wisdom, 124-25, 126.

35. On Epidauros, Majno, Healing Hand, 201, and referring to Stele B22 of the Epidaurus Inscriptions, the case of Hermon of Thesus.

36. See Frede, “The Ancient Empiricists,” in Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 243-60.

37. Heinrich von Staden, Herophilus: The Art of Medicine in Early Alexandria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 141; and “Experiment and Experience in Hellenistic Medicine,” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 22 (1975): 183. Also Majno, Healing Hand, 330; Longrigg, Greek Medicine, 210-11; Nutton, Ancient Medicine, 126, 134-36. The propriety of describing what Galen did as an experiment is questioned in Katerina lerodiakonou, “Ancient Thought Experiments,” Ancient Philosophy 25, no. 1 (2005): 125-40.

38. Von Staden, Herophilus, 10. Egyptians enjoyed the reputation in antiquity as the best physicians, and Middle Kingdom medical texts are the oldest in the world. Their influence on Greek medicine is not limited to Alexandria, being already ev­ident in the Hippocratic Corpus, where Egyptian medical terminology appears in transliterated Greek. See Warren R. Dawson, “Egypt's Place in Medical History,” in Science, Medicine, and History: Essays on the Evolution of Scientific Thought and Medical Practice, ed. E. Ashworth Underwood, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 1:47-60; and Robert K. Ritner, “Innovations and Adaptations in Ancient Egyptian Medicine,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 59, no. 2 (2000): 107-17. On Greek and Egyptian physicians of the Ptolemaic era, Philippa Lang, “Medical and Ethnic Identities in Hellenistic Egypt,” Apeiron 37, no. 4 (2004): 107-31. On char­acteristics distinguishing Greek from Egyptian and Babylonian medicine, Ludwig Edelstein, “The Distinctive Hellenism of Greek Medicine,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 40, no. 3 (1966): 197-225.

39. Von Staden, Herophilus, 19, also 16-17. He errs to say that Egyptian pharmaceu­tical quantification was specious. Ritner (“Innovations and Adaptations”) finds con­sistent use of volumetric notation and graduated measuring spoons. I do not mean to say that Greeks did not get into magic, but only that their doctors refused it a place in their techne. See Hans Dieter Betz, ed., The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); and on Greco-Egyptian exchanges, Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical Approach to the Late Pagan Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

40. Von Staden, Herophilus, 181, 250.

41. Von Staden, Herophilus, 127, 116-17, 122, 118, 119-20. For an alternative interpre­tation of the Herophilus fragment even more suggestive of fallible empiricism, see Hankinson, Cause and Explanation, 299.

42. Celsus, in Heinrich von Staden, “Celsus as Historian,” in Ancient Histories of Medicine, ed. Philip J. Van der Eijk (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 273, 275, 278, 279.

43. Celsus, in Lloyd, Revolutions of Wisdom, 163-64.

44. Celsus, in von Staden, “Celsus as Historian,” 272.

45. Galen, in Lloyd, Revolutions of Wisdom, 167. See also Vivian Nutton, “Humanist Surgery,” in The Medical Renaissance of the Sixteenth Century, ed. A. Wear, R. K. French, and I. M. Lonie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 75-99.

46. Hall, Life and Matter, 1:163; and Galen, On the Natural Faculties, 3.4, trans. Arthur John Brock, https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/gZgalen/g15nf/index.html.

47. Galen, in Frede, “Galen's Epistemology,” 290.

48. Galen, Three Treatises, 27.

49. Galen on the Therapeutic Method, trans. R. J. Hankinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 2.6.13, 2.7.2; On Medical Experience, trans. R. Walzer (London: Wellcome Institute, 1944), 153; and in Jonathan Barnes, “Galen on Logic and Therapy,” in Galen’s Method of Healing, ed. Fridolf Kudlien and Richard J. Durling (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 72.

50. Galen, in Barnes, “Logic and Therapy,” 77.

51. Frede, “Galen's Epistemology,” 295; and Luis Garcia-Ballester, “Galen as a Medical Practitioner,” in Galen: Problems and Prospects, ed. Vivian Nutton (London: Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, 1981), 25.

52. Galen, “On Medical Experience,” in Three Treatises, 49.

53. Plato, Phaedrus, 270b-e.

54. Galen, in Jouanna, “Galen's Reading of the Hippocratic Treatise The Nature of Man” in Greek Medicine, 330.

55. Pappus of Alexandria, Sumagoge (circa 320 ce), in Richard B. Carter, Descartes’ Medical Philosophy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 89.

56. Galen, in van der Eijk, Ancient Histories of Medicine, 54-55.

57. Galen, 'Three Treatises, 49; and Diocles, in Robert James Hankinson, “The Growth of Medical Empiricism,” in Bates, Scholarly Medical Traditions, 61. See also van der Eijk, “Diocles and the Hippocratic Writings,” in Medicine and Philosophy, 74-100.

58. Galen, in van der Eijk, “Galen's Use of the Concept of Qualified Experience,” in Medicine and Philosophy, 199; see also Hankinson, Cause and Explanation, 295-97.

59. Galen, in van der Eijk, “Qualified Experience,” 281n, 285n.

60. Galen, in van der Eijk, “Qualified Experience,” 290n.

61. Galen, Three Treatises, 74.

62. Galen, Three Treatises, 33.

63. Galen, in Owsei Temkin, Galenism: Rise and Decline of a Medical Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973), 30; in Phillip De Lacy, “Galen's Platonism,” American Journal of Philology 93, no. 1 (1972): 39; and in Nutton, Ancient Medicine, 134. Galen attributes a comparable sentiment to third century bce Alexandrian phy­sician Erasistratus, from whom he cites these words: “One who is accustomed to in­vestigation, worming his way through and turning in all directions, is unrelenting in the search not only day and night but all his whole life long until he arrives at the solution of his problem.” Ludwig Edelstein, The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 150. Mario Vegetti suggests Galen took a more pessimistic view of progress. “Tradition and Truth: Galen's De Placitus” in van der Eijk, Ancient Histories of Medicine, 356. See also G. E. R. Lloyd, The Ideals of Inquiry: An Ancient History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 58.

64. Galen, Therapeutic Method, 113. “It is to be expected that those who know will pass their time more pleasantly than those who inquire.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1178b, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941). Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Aristotle are from this source. See also Matthew D. Walker, Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

65. Owsei Temkin, The Double Face of Janus (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 178, 191, 193, 202, 204; and Temkin, “Science and Craft.”

66. Temkin, Galenism, 59, 61, 97, 98; H. P. Bacon, “The Masters of Salerno and the Origins of Professional Medical Practice,” in Underwood, Science, Medicine, and History, 1:203-19; Jerome Bylebyl, “The School of Padua: Humanistic Medicine in the Sixteenth Century,” in Health, Medicine and Mortality in the Sixteenth Century, ed. Charles Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 335-70; and Andrew Wear, “Galen in the Renaissance,” in Nutton, Galen: Problems and Prospects, 229-62.

67. Aristotle, Politics, 1264a; Hippocrates, in Jouanna, “Rhetoric and Medicine in the Hippocratic Corpus,” in Greek Medicine, 45. In the language of the twelfth century, be­fore the recovery of Aristotle, ars and scientia were very close, provided ars was qual­ified as disciplina. “Knowledge (scientia) can be called an art (ars) when it comprises the rules and precepts of an art.” Hugh of St. Victor, The Didascalion of Hugh of St. Victor, trans. Jerome Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 61. See also M.-D. Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, trans. Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little (1957; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 280.

68. On interactions between Arts Faculty natural philosophy and the Medical Faculties, see Luis Garcia-Ballester, “Artifex Factivus Sanitatis: Health and Medical Care in Medieval Galenism,” in Bates, Scholarly Medical Traditions, 127-50. On the early tra­dition of such interaction at Padua, see Nancy G. Siraisi, Arts and Sciences at Padua (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1973).

69. Ian Maclean, Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renaissance: The Case of Learned Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 92, 182-83.

70. William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover, 1956), 14.

71. Charles H. Kahn, “Democritus and the Origin of Moral Psychology,” American Journal of Philology 106, no. 1 (1985): 8.

72. Traditionally the atom theory is credited to Leucippus, from whom Democritus learned it. Cyril Bailey summarizes the evidence for Leucippus; see The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (New York: Russell & Russell, 1928), 66-67. On the Phoenician patri­mony of atomism, see Danton B. Sailor, “Moses and Atomism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 25, no. 1 (1964): 3-16. Indian atomism is documented from the twelfth cen­tury bce; see Leopold Mabilleau, Historie de la philosophie atomistique (Paris: Alcan, 1895). There is a substantial review of this work which emphasizes and expands on the author's claims about Indian atomism by William A. Hammond, Philosophical Review 5, no. 5 (1896): 531-36. Boyle occasionally refers to corpuscularianism as the Phoenician hypothesis.

73. Aristotle, Physics, 252a-b; Generation of Animals, 742b.

74. Democritus, fr. 118, in Mi-Kyoung Lee, Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 191; see also 192.

75. Democritus, in Freeman, Ancilla, fr. 241; Hippocrates, in Jouanna, Greek Medicine, 25-26, 244; von Staden, “Celsus as Historian,” 264, 317. On Democritus and Hippocratic medicine, Nutton, Ancient Medicine, 49-50, 54; and Temkin, “Greek Medicine.”

76. On Democritus's Pythagorean association, see Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, 327, 344. On his reputation as “the laughing philosopher,” Stephen Halliwell, Greek Laughter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 341-71. The story of Democritus and Hippocrates originates in an anonymous epistolary novel of the first century bce. See Thomas Rutten, Demokrit, lachender Philosoph und sanguinischer Melancholiker (Leiden: Brill, 1992).

77. Kurt von Fritz, “Democritus's Theory of Vision,” in Underwood, Science, Medicine, and History, 1:83-99.

78. Theophrastus, De Sensibus, in Lee, Epistemology after Protagoras, 202; and Kelli Rudolph, “Democritus' Ophthalmology,” Classical Quarterly 62, no. 2 (2012): 496-501.

79. Democritus, The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus. Fragments, trans. C. C. W Taylor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), D17 (= Diels 9), 11; Theophrastus, in Lee, Epistemology after Protagoras, 211.

80. Democritus, in Freeman, Ancilla, fr. 125.

81. Hippocrates, in Jouanna, Greek Medicine, 202; and in Tracy, Physiological 'Theory, 63.

82. Sextus Empiricus, in Lee, Epistemology after Protagoras, 233.

83. Democritus, in Freeman, Ancilla, frs. 4, 125.

84. Democritus, in Freeman, Ancilla, fr. 11; Kurt von Fritz, “Noos, Noein, and Their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy. Part 2: The Post-Parmenidean Period,” Classical Philology 41, no. 1 (1946): 12-34; and Lee, Epistemology after Protagoras, 230-32.

85. Democritus, in Gregory Vlastos, “Ethics and Physics in Democritus,” in Allen and Furley, Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, 2:381.

86. W K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 419-24. See also Robin Reames, “Heraclitus' Doublespeak: The Paradoxical Origins of Rhetorical Logos,” in Reames, Logos without Rhetoric, 63-78.

87. Citations of Heraclitus follow the fragment numbers established by Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 8th ed. (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1957), with translations from John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 3rd ed. (London: A & C Black, 1920), who made an alternative arrangement of the fragments and num­bered them differently. I cite his translation with the Diels-Kranz reference.

88. Muthos is interchangeable with logos in Homer, Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Parmenides, in the sense of a story not necessarily fiction. Gerard Nadaff, “Allegory and the Origins of Philosophy, in Logos andMuthos, ed. William Wians (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), 101.

89. Edward Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos, 2nd ed. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 97, 199, 162, 198; Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1062b.

90. Plato, Cratylus, 386d-e; Protagoras, in Freeman, Ancilla, 125; and Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos, 129. On the Measure Statement, see also von Fritz, “Noos, Noein, and Derivatives.”

91. “Belief is in its nature veridical.” Donald Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 146.

92. Friedrich Solmsen, “Aisthesis in Aristotelian and Epicurean Thought,” Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie, ns. 24, no. 8 (1961): 245; Hippocrates, in Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a Sensation (New York: Zone Books, 2009), 23; see also Frede, “Perception in Plato's Later Dialogues,” in Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 3-8. In a study of Greek theories of cognition John I. Beare observed, “No psychologist has ever been able to answer satisfactorily the question where sense-perception ends and thinking commences.” Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), 260.

93. Von Fritz, “Noos, Noein, and Derivatives,” 24. “Plato is for us the first—or very nearly the first—to employ the word aisthesis as the common denominator of the perceptions.” Solmsen, “Aisthesis,” 247.

94. John M. Cooper, “Plato on Sense Perception and Knowledge,” in Knowledge, Nature, 43-64; and Frede, “Perception in Plato,” 4-5.

95. Brooke Holmes, The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in Ancient Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 102, 103, 108, 118.

96. Plato, Theaetetus, 153e-54a.

97. Plato, Theaetetus, 184d, 185b, 186d.

98. Plato, Sophist, 264b; Timaeus, 28a. On is and is true in ancient Greek, see Charles H. Kahn, The Verb “Be” in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973).

99. Plato, Timaeus, 52a.

100. Plato, Phaedo, 65a-c; Republic, 529b-c.

101. Plato, Symposium, 211e; and James I. Porter, The Origins of Aesthetic Thought in Ancient Greece: Matter, Sensation, and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 87, 91.

102. Andre Laks, “Soul, Sensation, and Thought,” in Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, 253.

103. David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 8.

104. Aristotle, De Anima, 424a.

105. Aristotle, De Anima, 416b, 418a.

106. Aristotle, De Sensu et Sensibilibus, 449a; De Somno et Vigilia, 455a; De Anima, 432a.

107. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 100a-b.

108. Aristotle, De Anima, 432a; G. W Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. and trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 211; and Richard Sorabji, “Body and Soul in Aristotle,” in Aristotle’s “De Anima”in Focus, ed. Michael Durrant (London: Routledge, 1993), 170.

109. Pierre Gassendi, in Fred S. Michael and Emily Michael, “The Theory of Ideas in Gassendi and Locke,” Journal of the History of Ideas 51, no. 3 (1990): 392; John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. N. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 2.1.23; and Paul F. Cranefield, “On the Origin of the Phrase Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius furit in sensu” Journal of the History of Medicine 25, no. 1 (1970): 77-80.

110. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 87b.

111. Aristotle, De Anima, 429b; and Lloyd P. Gerson, Ancient Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 73.

112. Aristotle, De Sensu et Sensato, 436a; see also G. E. R. Lloyd, “Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece,” in Principles and Practices in Ancient Greek and Chinese Science (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 259-60; and Nutton, Ancient Medicine, 118.

113. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 981a-b.

114. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 99b-100a; Metaphysics, 980b-81a.

115. David Bloch, Aristotle on Memory and Recollection (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 71, 75, 80, 82-83, 117-18; Pavel Gregoric and Filip Grgic, “Aristotle’s Notion of Experience,” Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (2006): 1-30. See also Peter King, “Two Conceptions of Experience,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 11, no. 2 (2003): 203-26.

116. Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 663b.

117. W D. Ross, Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 116; and Frede, “Aristotle’s Rationalism,” in Rationality in Greek 'Thought., ed. Michael Frede and Gisela Striker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 158-73.

118. Frede, “Aristotle’s Rationalism,” 169-70.

119. Frede, “Aristotle’s Rationalism,” 172.

120. Plato, Phaedrus, 249b-c; Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 87b-88a, 100b; and Julius R. Weinberg, “Historical Remarks on Some Medieval Views of Induction,” in Abstraction, Relation, and Induction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 121-53.

121. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71a, 81b, 100a.

122. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 68b; Rhetoric, 1355a.

123. Jonathan Barnes, “Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration,” in Articles on Aristotle, vol. 1: Science, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1975), 65-87. On the variety of scientific demonstration in Aristotle’s works, see Mariska Leunissen, “Demonstrating Natural Processes,” Apeiron 43, no. 2 (2010): 31-60.

124. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 760b; Prior Analytics, 46a; On the Heavens, 306a. The phainomena may be observations or things people believe, which Aristotle ap­parently tended to treat alike. G. E. L. Owen, “Tithenai ta Phainomena” in Barnes, Schofield, and Sorabji, Articles on Aristotle, 1:113-26.

125. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 743b, 739b; Parts of Animals, 652b-53a; and L. Bourgey, “Observation and Experiment in Analogical Explanation,” in Barnes, Schofield, and Sorabji, Articles on Aristotle, 1:175-82.

126. Aristotle, On the Heavens, 359a.

127. Aristotle, History of Animals, 560a; Generation of Animals, 752a.

128. Empedocles, in Freeman, Ancilla, fr. 84; Aristotle, De Sensu, 437b-38b. Plato solved the problem. At night, the ray of light from the eye meets darkness and is extinguished. The important likeness is eye and daylight, not eye and object of vi­sion. The eye and the sun, the medium of vision, are made of the same gentle fire. See Plato, Timaeus, 45d; and Thomas Kjeller Johansen, Plato’s Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 111-12.

129. Francis Bacon, “Refutation of Philosophies,” in Benjamin Farrington, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 130.

130. Frede, introduction to Frede and Striker, Rationality in Greek Thought, 19.

131. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 99b-100a; Metaphysics, 980b-81a.

132. Aristippus, in Voula Tsouna, The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 31; Cicero, in Kurt Lampe, The Birth of Hedonism: The Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure as a Way of Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 37.

133. Sextus Empiricus, in Tsouna, Epistemology, 26; Aristippus, in Tsouna, Epistemology, 27.

134. Sextus, in Ugo Zilioli, The Cyrenaics (Durham, UK: Acumen, 2012), 37, 38, 59.

135. On so-called adverbial theories of perception, see Michael Tye, “The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience,” Philosophical Review 93, no. 2 (1984): 195-225.

136. Zilioli, The Cyrenaics, 62; also Tsouna, Epistemology, 9-10; and David Wolfsdorf, Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 13-17.

137. Democritus, in Kahn, “Democritus,” 13; Hippocrates and Democritus, in Vlastos, “Democritus,” 386, 384.

138. Pierre-Marie Morel, “Epicurean Atomism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, ed. James Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 65-82.

139. Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, in The Epicurus Reader, trans. Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), 6.

140. Alcmaeon, in Freeman, Ancilla, fr. 1; Herodotus, Histories, 2.33; Hippocrates, On the Art, 11, in Holmes, Symptom and Subject, 177; Anaxagoras, in Freeman, Ancilla, fr. 59; and Elizabeth Asmis, Epicurus’ Scientific Method (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 12, 217, 219, 337.

141. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1104a; Amis, Epicurus’ Scientific Method, 206, 349-50.

142. My account draws from Asmis, Epicurus’ Scientific Method, 112-45; and C. C. W Taylor, “All Perceptions Are True,” in Pleasure, Mind, and Soul: Selected Papers in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008).

143. Bailey, Greek Atomists, 252.

144. Bailey, Greek Atomists, 244, 245; Frede, “Empiricist View of Knowledge,” 240, 242.

145. Epicurus, Principal Doctrines, in Epicurus Reader, 22.

146. Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, in Epicurus Reader, 33.

147. Karl Marx, in Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (1976; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), 158; Epicurus, in Bailey, Greek Atomists, 262.

148. Zeno, in Samuel Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), 125. The wax-tablet trope begins with Plato, Theaetetus, 191c-d, and recurs in Aristotle, De Anima, 424a, and On Memory and Reminiscence, 450b.

149. Diogenes Laertius, in A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, eds., The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 40C; and Frede, “Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions,” Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 164-65.

150. Malcolm Schofield, “Epilogismos: An Appraisal,” in Frede and Striker, Rationality in Greek Thought, 221-37; James Allen, “Experience as a Source and Ground of Theory in Epicureanism,” Apeiron 37, no. 4 (2004): 89-106; and Asmis, Epicurus’ Scientific Method, 209.

151. Epicurus, in Bailey, Greek Atomists, 266.

152. Philodemus: On the Methods of Inference. A Study in Ancient Empiricism, trans. Phillip Howard De Lacy and Estelle Allen De Lacy (Philadelphia: American Philological Association, 1941). See also Estelle Allen De Lacy, “Meaning and Methodology in Hellenistic Philosophy,” Philosophical Review 47, no. 4 (1938): 390­409; and von Staden, “Experiment and Experience.”

153. Hermogenes, in Philodemus, Methods of Inference, 133.

154. Hankinson, Cause and Explanation, 234.

155. Philodemus, Methods of Inference, 21, 16, 32; and Frede, “Empiricist View of Knowledge,” 241.

156. Philodemus, Methods of Inference, 28-29, 33, 35, 32. See also J. L. Stocks, “Epicurean Induction,” Mind 34, no. 134 (1925): 185-203.

157. James Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before Pascal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 199-200. This was still Descartes’s attitude. “I consider as almost false whatever is only likely” (quoted in Franklin, 219).

158. Marc van de Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks: The Pursuit of Truth in Ancient Babylonia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); and Francesca Rochberg, “Empiricism in Babylonian Omen Texts,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 119, no. 4 (1999): 559-69.

159. Francesca Rochberg, The Heavenly Writing: Divination, Horoscopy, and Astronomy in Mesopotamian Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 166; and Before Nature: Cuneiform Knowledge and the History of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 194. Babylonian data and celestial scholarship, circulating in Greek from circa 500 âñå, spurred the development oftheir astronomy. See Asger Aaboe, “Observation and Theory in Babylonian Astronomy,” Centaurus 24, no. 1 (1980): 14-35; and Kathryn Stevens, Between Greece and Babylonia: Hellenistic Intellectual History in Cross- Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

160. Ulla Susanne Koch, Mesopotamian Divination Texts: Conversing with the Gods (Munster: Ugarit Verlag, 2015), 27.

161. Rochberg, Before Nature, 143, 168, 244; and Diviner’s Manual, in Rochberg, Heavenly Writing, 202.

162. Van de Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks, 41, 53, 222; Rochberg, Before Nature, 111.

163. Anaxagoras and Heraclides, in Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 17.

164. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1178b; see also Trevor Curnow, Wisdom in the Ancient World (London: Duckworth, 2010).

165. Aristotle, Physics, 247b; and Tracy, Physiological Theory, 274.

166. Emile Meyerson, The Relativistic Deduction: Epistemological Implications of the Theory of Relativity, trans. David A. and Mary-Alice Sipfle (1925; Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), 155, 156. I draw extensively from Sylvia Berryman, The Mechanical Hypothesis in Ancient Greek Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

167. Aristotle, Physics, 196b; see also Hankinson, Cause and Explanation, 136.

168. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 78b (compare Metaphysics, 1078a); Physics 199a. See also Jean De Groot, Aristotle’s Empiricism: Experience and Mechanics in the 4th Century BC (Las Vegas, NV: Parmenides Publishing, 2014).

169. Berryman, Mechanical Hypothesis, 55-56.

170. Ps.-Aristotle, Mechanica, 847b, in Mark J. Schiefsky, “’lheory and Practice in Heron's Mechanics” in Mechanics and Natural Philosophy before the Scientific Revolution, ed. Walter Roy Laird and Sophie Roux (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008),

22. On the methodology of the treatise, see Monte Ransome Johnson, “Aristotelian Mechanistic Explanation,” in Teleology in the Ancient World, ed. Julius Rocca (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 125-50.

171. Heron, in Schiefsky, “Heron's Mechanics” 45-46; and in Bertrand Gille, 'll'ie History of Techniques, vol. 1: Techniques and Civilizations, trans. P. Southgate and T. Williamson (1978; New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1986), 300. See also Karin Tybjerg, “Hero of Alexandria's Mechanical Geometry,” Apeiron 37, no. 4 (2004): 29-56 (n.b., Heron = Hero).

172. Robert Boyle, 'I lie Origin of Forms and Qualities According to the Corpuscular Philosophy (1666), in Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle, ed. M. A. Stewart (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1991), 71.

173. Leibniz to Herman Conring, March 19, 1678, in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), 189; Leibniz to De Volder, in G. W Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1989), 175.

174. Daryn Lehoux, What Did the Romans Know? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 13, 95; Aldo Schiavone, 'll'ie Invention of Law in the West, trans. Jeremy Carden and Antony Schugaar (2005; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 37.

175. Lehoux, What Did Romans Know?, 111. On Ptolemy's understanding of error and methods to control it, see Franklin, Science of Conjecture, chap. 6.

176. Galen, in Lindberg, theories of Vision, 11, 10.

177. Lehoux, What Did Romans Know?, 122.

178. Claudius Ptolemaeus, “On the Kriterion and the Hegemonikon,” in The Criterion of Truth, ed. Pamela Huby and Gordon Neal (Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 1989), 203; and Lehoux, What Did Romans Know?, 124, 126-28. On the authenticity this work, see Jacqueline Feke and Alexander Jones, “Ptolemy,” in 'lue Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, vol. 1, ed. Lloyd Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 197-209. Not only is it by Ptolemy; it predates the rest of his works. See Jacqueline Feke, Ptolemy’s Philosophy: Mathematics as a Way of Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).

179. Ptolemaeus, “Kriterion and Hegemonikon,” 191.

180. Ptolemaeus, “Kriterion and Hegemonikon,” 201.

181. Galen, in Lehoux, What Did Romans Know?, 124-25.

182. On skepticism, see Miles Burnyeat, “’Hie Skeptic in His Place and Time,” in Philosophy in History, ed. Richard Rorty et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and Richard H. Popkin, Vie History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

183. William H. Stahl, Roman Science (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962; rpt. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1978), 126.

184. John Walbridge, God and Logic in Islam: The Caliphate of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 56; Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture (London: Routledge, 1998), 99, 176-77; Richard Walzer, Greek into Arabic (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1962), 6.

185. F. E. Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam (New York: New York University Press, 1968), 14.

186. Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs, 22, 74, 76, 89, 157, 163-64; Gutas, Arabic Culture, 124.

187. Lindberg, Theories of Vision, 58, 78, 86; and John Freely, Light from the East: How the Science of Medieval Islam Helped to Shape the Western World (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 85-86. See also Elaheh Kheirandish, “The Many Aspects of Appearances: Arabic Optics to 950 AD,” in The Enterprise of Science in Islam, ed. Jan P. Hogendijk and Abdelhamid L. Sabra (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 55-83.

188. See A. I. Sabra, “Ibn al-Haytham's Revolutionary Project in Optics,” in Hogendijk and Sabra, Enterprise of Science, 85-118.

189. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Science (n.p.: World of Islam Festival Publishing, 1976), 131-33; Bernard R. Goldstein, “Theory and Observation in Medieval Astronomy,” Isis 63, no. 1 (1972): 39-47; Freely, Light from the East, 59-60; and Gutas, Arabic Culture, 110.

190. Liba Chaia Taub, Ptolemy’s Universe (Chicago: Open Court, 1993), 116, 117, 121-22.

191. George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 85; also 92, 94, 101, 211, 212, 231, 232.

192. Peter E. Pormann and Emilie Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2007), 7, 70; Oman Bakar, The History and Philosophy of Islamic Science (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1999), 108, 109. On pharmacology, Albert Dietrich, “Islamic Sciences and the Medieval West: Pharmacology,” in Islam and the Medieval West, ed. Khalil I. Semaan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 50-63; and Martin Level, “Methodology and the History of Science,” in Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. George F. Hourani (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 136-46. On contagious diseases, Temkin, Double Face of Janus, 460.

193. Pormann and Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine, 88; also 82, 96-97, 98, 100, 101; and Freely, Lightfrom the East, 100-101.

194. Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 240, 241.

195. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 30, 31, 32, 44.

196. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 77, 83, 194.

197. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 163-64, 168, 169, 300-301, 303.

198. Al-Farabi, in Robert Pasnau, “Science and Certainty,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Robert Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 366. See also Deborah L. Black, “Knowledge (Ilm) and Certitude (Yaqin) in Al-Farabi's Epistemology,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 16, no. 1 (2006): 11-45.

199. I have the proverb from The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition, ed. Shahid Rahman, Tony Street, and Hassan Tahiri (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 10.

200. Saliba, Islamic Science, 209; Walbridge, God and Logic, 98, 126. On Copernicus and Arabic astronomy, Freely, Light from the East, chap. 17; and Hassan Tahiri, “The Dynamics of the Arabic Tradition and the Development of Science,” in Rahman, Street, and Tahiri, Unity of Science, 183-225.

201. Gutas, Arabic Culture, 20-21.

202. Franz Rosenthal, “On Some Epistemological and Methodological Presuppositions of Al-Birundi,” in Science and Medicine in Islam (Aldershot: Variorum, 1990), 145-56.

203. Saliba, Islamic Science, 128, 275 n. 91; Hippocrates, in Lloyd, Revolutions of Wisdom, 127. The commentaries are translated by Franz Rosenthal, “‘Life Is Short, the Art Is Long': Arabic Commentaries on the First Hippocratic Aphorism,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 40, no. 3 (1966): 226-45.

204. Rosenthal, “Arabic Commentaries,” 233.

205. Rosenthal, “Arabic Commentaries,” 237, 238.

206. Rosenthal, “Arabic Commentaries,” 238, 239.

207. Rosenthal, “Arabic Commentaries, 238-39.

208. Avicenna, in Jon McGinnis, “Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 41, no. 3 (2003): 318. Scammony (Convolvulus scammonia) is a plant whose taproot produces a milky juice used medically.

209. McGinnis, “Scientific Methodologies.” On methodical experience, see Jon McGinnis, Avicenna (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 50-52.

210. Deborah L. Black, “Psychology: Soul and Intellect,” in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 308-26.

211. Muhammed Iqbal, in Mustansir Mir, “Muhammed Iqbal,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, ed. Khaled el-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 613. Iqbal completed a Cambridge phi­losophy PhD, published as The Development of Metaphysics in Persia (1908), and belongs to the leading nineteenth-century lineage of reform. His philosophical work is described as “a convergence between Quranic cosmology and Bergsonism.” Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Open to Reason: Muslim Philosophers in Conversation with Western Tradition, trans. Jonathan Adjemian (2008; New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 93.

Chapter 2

1. Philoponus, in G. E. R. Lloyd, The Ideals of Inquiry: An Ancient History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 83. It is ironic that Philoponus should author these words. While chiefly an Aristotelian commentator (and a Christian), he knew how to test claims experimentally, and refuted Aristotle’s theory of free fall.

2. The Manual of Harmonics of Nichomachus the Pythagorean, trans. Flora R. Levin (Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press, 1994), 83-106.

3. G. E. R. Lloyd, Greek Science after Aristotle (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973), 17- 18.

4. Lloyd, “Experiment in Early Greek Medicine and Philosophy,” in Methods and Problems in Greek Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 70­99; Philoponus, in Lloyd, Ideals of Inquiry, 88; Lloyd, Greek Science after Aristotle, 133-34. On Philoponus’s scientific work, see also Jurgen Sarnowsky, “Concepts of Impetus and the History of Mechanics,” in Mechanics and Natural Philosophy before the Scientific Revolution, ed. Walter Roy Laird and Sophie Roux (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 121-145.

5. Philo, in Lloyd, Greek Science after Aristotle, 97-99; also Sylvia Berryman, The Mechanical Hypothesis in Ancient Greek Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 70-71; and Bertrand Gille, The History of Techniques, vol. 1: Techniques and Civilizations, trans. P. Southgate and T. Williamson (1978; New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1986), 293-98. On parameter var­iation as a method in engineering, see Walter G. Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know It (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), and my Artifice and Design: Art and Technology in Human Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 117-19.

6. Lynn White Jr., Machina Ex Deo: Essays in the Dynamism of Western Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968), 70-71; and Medieval Religion and Technology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 12, 13, 15, 218. See also Elspeth Whitney, Paradise Restored: The Mechanical Arts from Antiquity through the Thirteenth Century (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1990).

7. Steven Weinberg, To Explain the World: The Discovery of Modern Science (New York: HarperCollins, 2015), 30.

8. On the sweeping transformation of European legal traditions from the eleventh cen­tury, see Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). On the bearing of these changes for the prehistory of the scientific revolution, see Toby E. Huff', The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). On the origin of Justinian’s Law, see Aldo Schiavone, The Invention of Law in the West, trans. Jeremy Carden and Antony Schugaar (2005; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). Universities are a European innovation but colleges are Islamic in origin and borrowed in Europe from Islam. See George Makdisi, “Origin and Development of the College in Islam and the West,” in Islam and the Medieval West, ed. Khalil I. Semaan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 26-49.

9. Berman, Law and Revolution, 152, 153.

10. James Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before Pascal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 1, 18, 43-44, 327-30, 350, 352­53, 357, 358.

11. Charles M. Radding, A World Made by Men: Cognition and Society, 400-1200 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 6, 243.

12. Franklin, Science of Conjecture, 30, 31, 44.

13. George Polya, in Franklin, Science of Conjecture, 329.

14. R. W Southern, Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 36.

15. Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (1961; New York: Dorset, 1986), 241-42. On changing attitudes toward scientific curiosity, see Hans Blumenberg, “The Trial of Theoretical Curiosity,” in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), Part 3.

16. Robert Grosseteste, De lineis, angulis, et figuris, in James McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 168, also, 178; and Steven P. Marrone, William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 9, 13-14.

17. McEvoy, Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, 165, 181, 182, 187-88, 196-97.

18. Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on Posterior Analytics, in Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 1274-1671 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011), 130.

19. Southern, Robert Grosseteste, 107; also McEvoy, Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, 333. On the astrolabe in medieval England, see Katherine Park, “Observation in the Margins, 500-1500,” in Histories of Scientific Observation, ed. Lorraine Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 15-44.

20. Grossteste, Commentary on Posterior Analytics, in Marrone, Auvergne and Grosseteste, 274. “Red bile” is another term for yellow bile, also called choler, a fluid produced by the gall bladder. On medieval usage of the word experimentum, and the to us curious indifference between this word, which looks like our “exper­iment,” and experientia, which looks like our “experience,” see Charles B. Schmitt, “Experience and Experiment,” Studies in the Renaissance 16 (1969): 80-138; and Ian Maclean, Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renaissance: The Case of Learned Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 196-98.

21. Avicenna, in Deborah L. Black, “Avicenna and Averroes,” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, ed. Sven Bernecker and Kourken Michaelian (London: Routledge, 2017), 451; and Avicenna’s Psychology, trans. Fazlur Rahman (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 30; Robert E. Hall, “Intellect, Soul, and Body in Ibn Sina,” in Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam, ed. Jon McGinnis (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 68. See also Dimitri Gutas, “Intuition and Thinking: The Evolving Structure of Avicenna’s Epistemology,” in Aspects of Avicenna, ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2001), 1-38; Jari Kaukua, “Avicenna on the Soul’s Activity in Perception,” in Active Perception in the History of Philosophy, ed., J. F. Silva and M. Yrjonsuuri (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2014), 99-116; and Simo Knuuttila, “Aristotle’s Theory of Perception and Medieval Aristotelianism,” in Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Pekka Karkkainen (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 1-22.

22. Deborah L. Black, “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Translations,” Topoi 19, no. 1 (2000): 59-75.

23. A. C. Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science, 1100-1700 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 116, 195-200, 260, 273-76, 317; and Bruce E. Eastwood, “Medieval Empiricism: The Case of Grosseteste’s Optics,” Speculum 43, no. 2 (1968): 306-21. On methodological parallels between Grosseteste and Gratian, twelfth-century founder of canon law, see Berman, Law and Revolution, 586 n. 73.

24. Richard C. Dales, “Robert Grosseteste’s Scientific Works,” Isis 52, no. 3 (1961): 381-402.

25. He was “too bookish” for experiments (McEvoy, Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, 18), and never contrived an experiment for the explicit purpose of testing a hypothesis (Dales, “Grosseteste’s Scientific Works,” 401). A prominent experimentalist in the generation after Grosseteste is Theodoric of Freiberg. “The most perfect use of the experimental method during the century following Grosseteste.... A model example of the thirteenth century theory of experimental science in practice, and a model of experimental procedure for all time.” Crombie, Grosseteste, 233. He carried out de­tailed experimental confirmation of hypotheses on the theory of color, enrolling as apparatus prisms and spherical flasks filled with water. See William A. Wallace, The Scientific Methodology of Theodoric of Freiberg (Fribourg, Switzerland: University Press, 1959).

26. Albert the Great, Book of Minerals, trans. Dorothy Wyckoff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 153; and Luke Demaitre and Anthony A. Travill, “Human Embryology and Development in the Works of Albertus Magnus,” in Albertus Magnus and the Sciences, ed. James A. Weisheipl (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1980), 411, 412. See also John M. Riddle and James A. Mulholland, “Albert on Stones and Minerals,” in Weisheipl, 203-34.

27. Bacon was too young to have studied with Grosseteste. He obviously admired the man and studied his manuscripts, but probably never met him. McEvoy, Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, 14, 348-49. See also Amanda Power, “A Mirror for Every Age: The Reputation of Roger Bacon,” English Historical Review 121, no. 492 (2006): 657-92. “Far from being forgotten, every generation throughout this period thought it neces­sary to have an impassioned argument about him” (661).

28. Edgar Zilsel, “The Origin of William Gilbert’s Scientific Method,” Journal of the History of Ideas 2, no. 1 (1941): 1-32. On Bacon’s mathematics, see N. W Fisher and Sabeti Unguru, “Experimental Science and Mathematics in Roger Bacon’s Thought,” Traditio 27 (1971): 353-78.

29. Petrus Maricourt, Epistola de magnete, in Crombie, Grosseteste, 207-8; and The Letter of Petrus Peregrinus on the Magnet, trans. Brother Arnold (New York: McGraw, 1904), chap. 1. Most prominent experimentalist in the thirteenth century, Crombie, Grosseteste, 205; see also E. J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, trans. C. Dikshoorn (1959; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 153.

30. Roger Bacon, in Crombie, Grosseteste, 205; and in Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), 311.

31. Roger Bacon, The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon, trans. Robert Belle Burke, 2 vols. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), 2:627. On the expression scientia experimental, Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 311. It first appeared in English in John Dee’s “Mathematicall Praeface” to Euclid, Elements, trans. H. Billingsley (London, 1570): “Bycause it proceedeth by Experiments, and searcheth forth the causes of Conclusions, by Experiences, it is named of some, Scientia Experimentalis, the Experimentall Science.” Quoted in Peter Anstey and Alberto Vanzo, “The Origins of Early Modern Experimental Philosophy,” Intellectual History Review 22, no. 4 (2012): 508.

32. Bacon, Opus Majus, 2:627-28, 587. On Bacon's reputation as a magician, see A. G. Milland, “Roger Bacon as Magician,” Traditio 30 (1974): 445-60; and Power, “Mirror for Every Age.”

33. Bacon, Opus Majus, 2:587, 633-34; and Roger Bacon, Letter Concerning the Marvelous Power of Art and of Nature and Concerning the Nullity of Magic, trans. T. L. Davis (Easton, PA: Chemical Publ. Co., 1923). The text is accepted as authentic by A. C. Crombie and J. D. North, and is believed to have been the earliest of Bacon's works to be printed.

34. Crombie, Grosseteste, 235; David C. Lindberg, Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 71, 73; A. C. Crombie, Medieval and Early Modern Science, 2 vols. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959), 2:11; and Power, “Mirror for Every Age,” 667, referring to Bacon, Opus Majus, 2:211-12.

35. On the condemnations and their aftermath, see David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (New York: Vintage, 1962), 226; Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 443-46; and Edward Grant, “The Condemnations of 1277: God's Absolute Power and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages,” Viator 10 (1979): 211-44.

36. A selection of the condemned propositions is included in Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. A. Hyman and J. J. Walsh, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987), 584-91. The condemnations were rescinded in 1325.

37. Blumenberg, Legitimacy of Modern Age, 347. Pierre Duhem made a comparable point earlier. “If we had to assign a date to the birth of modern science, we should undoubtedly choose the year 1277, when the Bishop of Paris solemnly proclaimed that there could exist many worlds and that the ensemble of celestial spheres could, without contradiction, be moved in a straight line.” Etudes sur Leonardo da Vinci, in Benjamin Nelson, On the Roads to Modernity, ed. Toby E. Huff (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), 126-27. Blumenberg refers to Duhem as a champion of the fictionalist view of scientific theory, but not to his view of 1277.

38. William J. Courtenay, “The Academic and Intellectual Worlds of Ockham,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 17-30. “Ockham's unnamed adversary, for whom he has little sympathy and less respect, is the communis opinio modernorum” Ernest Moody, “Ockham and Aegidius of Rome,” Franciscan Studies 9, no. 4 (1949): 442. Ockham expressed this response to the condemnations of1277: “Especially physical assertions, which do not pertain to theology, are not to be solemnly condemned or interdicted by anyone; because in such assertions everyone ought to be free, and say frankly what he pleases. And clearly, because the said archbishop damned and interdicted grammatical and logical as well as physical opinions, his judgment was considered rash.” Nelson, Roads to Modernity, 148 n. 12. Here and throughout I draw on Calvin Normore, “Some Aspects of Ockham's Logic,” in Spade, Companion to Ockham, 31-52; “The Tradition of Medieval Nominalism,” Studies in Medieval Philosophy 17 (1988): 201-17; and Stephen Chak Tornay, “William of Ockham's Nominalism,” Philosophical Review 45, no. 3 (1936): 245-67.

39. See John F. Boler, “Abailard and the Problem of Universals,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 1, no. 1 (1963): 37-51; Y. Iwakuma, “Twelfth-Century Nominales: The Posthumous School of Peter Abelard,” Vivarium 30, no. 1 (1992): 97-107; and Christopher J. Martin, “The Logic of the Nominales” Vivarium 30, no. 1 (1992): 110­

26. Abelard and the Nominales a loosely defined movement: Calvin G. Normore, “Abelard and the School of Nominales,” Vivarium 30, no. 1 (1992): 80-96; and“Nominalism,” in Routledge Companion to Sixteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Benjamin Hill (New York: Routledge, 2017), 121-36. A good text for sampling Abelard's nominalism is Glosses on Porphyry, in Selections from Medieval Philosophers, ed. Richard McKeon, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), 1:208-58.

40. William J. Courtenay, Ockham and Ockhamism: Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 24-25, 71.

41. Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 83-88; and Henrik Lagerlund, “Trends in Logic and Logical Theory,” in Lagerlund and Hill, Sixteenth-Century Philosophy, 99-120.

42. Gyula Klima, “Nominalist Semantics,” in Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Robert Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 171-72. See also T. K. Scott, John Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth (New York: Appleton­Century-Crofts, 1966), 13; and Jack Zupko, John Buridan: Portrait of a Fourteenth­Century Arts Master (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2003), 15, 146, 348 n. 111. On nominalism's contribution to legal thought, see Berman, Law and Revolution, 141-42.

43. Claude Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 10, and Ockham, in Panccio, Ockham on Concepts, 147.

44. Ockham, in Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 225, also 226-27. Ockham's under­standing of categories was probably not Aristotle's. “The Categories is not prima­rily or explicitly about names, but about the things that names signify.” J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle’s “Categories” and “De Interpretation” Translated with Notes and Glossary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 71. “Aristotle tends to think of predicates as the non-linguistic items introduced by predicate-expressions.” Michael Frede, “Categories in Aristotle,” in Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 35.

45. Ockham, in Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 175.

46. Panaccio, “Semantics and Mental Language,” in Spade, Companion to Ockham, 53-75.

47. Buridan, in Zupko, Buridan, 40, also 53, 146-49; and Peter King, “John Buridan's Solution to the Problem of Universals,” in The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan, ed. J. M. M. H. Thijssen and Jack Zupko (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 1­

27. “Abelard simply shifts all the problems regarding the status of universal entities onto the plane of semantic theory.” Roberto Pinzani, The Problem of Universals from Boethius to John of Salisbury (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 275.

48. Ockham, in The Concept of Matter, ed. Ernan McMullin (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1963), 330.

49. Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1987), 537-38, 53, 67.

50. Pasnau, Metaphysical 'Themes, 86, 83; Albert the Great, in Normore, “School of Nominales,” 93; Leibniz, in Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 87.

51. Christoph Luthy, “The Fourfold Democritus on the Stage of Early Modern Science,” Isis 91, no. 3 (2000): 448; and Ian Maclean, “The ‘Sceptical Crisis' Reconsidered: Galen, Rational Medicine and the Libertas Philosophandi” Early Science and Medicine 11, no. 3 (2006): 247-74.

52. Aristotle, Physics, 202b; De Anima, 426a; Metaphysics, 1050a; Mark G. Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories, 1250-1325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); and Julius R. Weinberg, “The Concept of Relation: Some Observations on Its History,” in Abstraction, Relation, and Induction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 61-119.

53. Aristotle, Physics, 225b. On relation as least extra-mental, Metaphysics, 1088a.

54. Avicenna, in Weinberg, “Concept of Relation,” 94.

55. William Ockham, Commentary on the Sentences, Book 1 (Ordinatio), Distinction 30, in Hyman and Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 681, 680, 683.

56. Spinoza and Locke, in Henninger, Relations, 184-85; Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and trans. L. E. Loemker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), 609; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 1.2.4, 1.3.1; Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933), B135.

57. Ockham, in Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 789 n. 27, and in Crombie, Grosseteste, 174.

58. Ockham, in Zupko, Buridan, 68. Ockham and the nominalists “give a theological sanction to the empiricism to which their philosophical criticism of knowledge had led.” Ernest A. Moody, “Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval Philosophy,” Philosophical Review 67, no. 2 (1958): 158.

59. Ockham, in Adams, William Ockham, 750, 788; Peter King, “Two Conceptions of Experience,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 11, no. 2 (2003): 203-26. On the com­parison with Hume, Adams, “Was Ockham a Humean about Efficient Causality?” Franciscan Studies 39 (1979): 5-48.

60. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 98b; Ockham, in Julius R. Weinberg, “Historical Remarks on Some Medieval Views of Induction,” in Abstraction, Relation, and Induction, 144; and in Crombie, Grosseteste, 173, 174. See also John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, 10th ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1879), 2.8.

61. Andre Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), 223, 217.

62. Buridan, in Zupko, Buridan, 194, 192, 196; and in Anneliese Maier, On the Threshold of Exact Science, trans. Steven D. Sargent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 168.

63. Crombie, Grosseteste, 175.

64. Julius R. Weinberg, “The Problem of Sensory Cognition,” in Ockham, Descartes, and Hume (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977), 33-49; Andre Laks, “Soul, Sensation, and Thought,” in Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A. A. Long (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 264; Aristotle, De Anima, 424a, 431b; and Epicurus, in Weinberg, “Problem of Sensory Cognition,” 35. Against describing Ockham's position as “antirepresentationalism,” see Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 16.

65. Ockham, in Dominik Perler, “Seeing and Judging: Ockham and Wodeham on Sensory Cognition,” in Knuuttila and Karkkainen, 'Theories of Perception, 159.

66. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 160, 147; Ockham, Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 665.

67. Roger Bacon, in David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 113; and Katherine H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 10-11, 16-19, 26.

68. Ockham, in Adams, William Ockham, 504, and in Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 121-22. On intuitive cognition, see Richard Cross, Duns Scotuss Theory of Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 201.

69. Ockham, in Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 132, and in Elenore Stump, “The Mechanism of Cognition,” in Spade, Companion to Ockham, 184.

70. Ockham, in Adams, William Ockham, 541, 543; Democritus, in Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-S ocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), fr. 9; Gassendi, in Barry Brundell, Pierre Gassendi: From Aristotelianism to a New Natural Philosophy (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1987), 100.

71. On Ockham and skepticism, Adams, William Ockham, 594-601.

72. Lynn Thorndike, History of Magic and Experimental Science, 8 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1923-58), 1:2.

73. Theodosian Code, in Valerie I. J. Flint, The Rise of Magic in Early Medieval Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 17.

74. Isidore of Seville, in Flint, Rise of Magic, 53; also 240, 250, 348.

75. Pseudo-Aristotle, Secretum Secretorum, in William Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature: Books of Secrets in Medieval and Early Modern Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 46; and W F. Ryan and Charles B. Schmidt, eds., Pseudo-Aristotle, “The Secret of Secrets”: Sources and Influence (London: Warburg Institute, 1982). “Gerber” is a legendary author somewhat like Hippocrates. See Pamela O. Long, Openness, Secrecy, Authorship: Technical Arts and the Culture of Knowledge from Antiquity to the Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 146-47.

76. Roger Bacon, in Eamon, Secrets of Nature, 51-52.

77. Thorndike, Magic and Experimental Science, 2:730. See also The Book of Secrets of Albertus Magus, ed. Michael R. Best and Frank H. Brightman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

78. Paracelsus and a Danish follower, in Eamon, Secrets of Nature, 161-62. On the im­portant contributions of Paracelsus to early modern thinking about space and body, see Ivor Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972), 139-40.

79. Alessio Piemontese, in Eamon, Secrets of Nature, 139, 142-43, 391 n. 25.

80. Bernardino Telesio, De rerum natura (1586); in Leen Spruit, “Telesio on Spirit, Sense, and Imagination,” in Image, Imagination, and Cognition, ed. Christoph Luthy, Claudia Swan, Paul Bakker, and Claus Zittel (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 94.

81. Girolamo Ruscelli, in Eamon, Secrets of Nature, 157. Later, Eamon decides that Piemontese is Ruscelli's creation. The Professor of Secrets (Washington, DC: National Geographic, 2010), 189.

82. Pico della Mirandola, in Eugenio Garin, Astrology in the Renaissance: The Zodiac of Life, trans. C. Jackson and J. Allen (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 91.

83. Gambattista Della Porta, Natural Magick (English trans., 1558), in Eamon, Secrets of Nature, 215, 217, 220. On Della Porta's lifelong concern with the description and production of experiments to testify to his ability as a natural magician, see Sergius Kodera, “Della Porta's Histrionic Science,” California Italian Studies 3, no. 1 (2012): 1-27.

84. Della Porta, in Nadine F. George, “Albertus Magnus and Chemical Technology,” in Weisheipl, Albertus Magnus and the Sciences, 245; and Albert, Book of Minerals, 133. Quenching lore appears in Pliny and Isidore, though this particular recipe seems unique to Albert.

85. Della Porta, Natural Magick, in Eaman, Secrets of Nature, 229; see also 231.

86. Plato, Republic, 504c.

87. Nancy G. Siraisi, Arts and Sciences at Padua: The Studium of Padua before 1350 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1973), 9, 132; John Herman Randall, “The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua,” Journal of the History of Ideas 1, no. 2 (1940): 177-206; and Nancy G. Siraisi, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 64, 192.

88. A 1589 edition of Della Porta's Natural Magic contains one of the earliest printed ac­counts of the telescopic effect of combining convex and concave lenses. “If you know how to combine both types correctly”—a secret he does not disclose—“you will see remote as well as nearby objects large and clear.” Toby E. Huff, Intellectual Curiosity and the Scientific Revolution: A Global Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 75.

89. Lunar observations with a telescope were made before Galileo in England by Thomas Hariot, a member of the circle around Henry Percy, Wizard Earl of Northumberland. He began telescope observations of the moon in July 1609, recorded the first observa­tion of Jupiter's moons in January 1610, and of sunspots, which he reported the same year, anticipating Galileo's observations by three years. See Robert Hugh Kargon, Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 20.

90. Galileo, Letters on Sunspots, in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, ed. and trans. Stillman Drake (New York: Anchor Doubleday, 1957), 135, 118. A fragment of Democritus says the moon looks “earthy” (geodes) because of “the shadow ofthe lofty parts in it; for the moon has glens and valleys”; in Cyril Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (New York: Russell & Russell, 1928), 151. Leonardo also made this observa­tion without a telescope. “If you keep the details of the spots of the moon under ob­servation you will often find great variation in them, and this I myself have proved by drawing them”; in Ralph M. Blake, “Natural Science in the Renaissance,” in Theories of Scientific Method: The Renaissance through the Nineteenth Century, ed. Edward H. Madden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960), 14.

91. Harold I. Brown, “Galileo on the Telescope and the Eye,” Journal of the History of Ideas 46, no. 4 (1985): 487-501. On the changing uses of instruments in science, see Thomas L. Hankins and Robert J. Silverman, Instruments and the Imagination (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

92. Galileo and Kepler, in Ofer Gal and Raz Chen-Morris, “Empiricism without the Senses: How the Instrument Replaced the Eye,” in The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science, ed. Charles T. Wolfe and Ofer Gal (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 130, 141, 139; and Kepler, in Lindberg, Theories of Vision, 187.

93. Martin Rees, Before the Beginning: Our Universe and Others (Reading, MA: Perseus Books, 1997), 99.

94. Lloyd sees “no shadow of a doubt” that Ptolemy “sought and gave a physical account of the constitution and movements of the heavenly bodies.” Methods and Problems, 250. He adds that this “realist” view “that the circles or epicycles are indeed physical realities corresponds to the majority opinion in those practicing astronomers for whom we have good concrete evidence on the point.” The Ambivalences of Rationality: Ancient and Modern Cross-Cultural Explorations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 48. For concurring opinion, see William H. Stahl, Roman Science (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), 125; Liba Chaia Taub, Ptolemy’s Universe (Chicago: Open Court, 1993), 112, 114; and R. J. Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 368-69. On Galileos repudiation of a “nominalist” interpretation of Copernicus, see Mario Biagioli, Galileo’s Instruments of Credit: Telescopes, Images, Secrecy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 244­53. Biagioli describes as “nominalist” a position on theoretical entities that English­speaking philosophers typically call “anti-realist.” When “nominalism” is understood as I do in §27, referring to the philosophy of William Ockham, Galileo is a decided nominalist, accepting Ockham's equation of substance with extension (quantity). “Like Ockham, Galileo clearly identified corporeal substance with its qualities by means of quantity—a quantity of shaped matter. Like Ockham, Galileo rejected Scholasticism and relied on Democretian atomism.” Pietro Redondi, Galileo Heretic, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (1983; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 236. This was a dangerous argument in early seventeenth-century Europe, because it undermined the scholastic distinction between substance and accident, which was required to recon­cile transubstantiation and natural philosophy.

95. Ernan McMullin, “Empiricism and the Scientific Revolution,” in Art, Science, and History in the Renaissance, ed. Charles S. Singleton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 331-69; Hans Blumenberg, The Genesis of the Copernican World, trans. Robert M. Wallace (1975; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 40-43, 45, 642-43,670-71.

96. Parmenides, in Freeman, Ancilla, fr. 7.

97. Stillman Drake, Cause, Experiment, and Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). This work includes a translation of Galileo, “Bodies That Stay atop Water or Move in It” (1612).

98. Plato, Phaedrus, 270b-e.

99. Randall, “School of Padua,” 194.

100. Paolo Palmieri, “On Scientia and the Regressus” in Lagerlund and Hill, Sixteenth­Century Philosophy, 332; and Zabarella, in Randall, “School of Padua,” 198, 197.

101. Agostino Nifo and Zabarella, in Randall, “School of Padua,” 201, 194.

102. According to what scholars call the Randall Thesis, Galileo incorporated the results of generations of Paduan discussion of scientific method into his own ex­perimental practice. It seems widely agreed that the thesis is insupportable. See Neal Ward Gilbert, “Galileo and the School of Padua,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 1, no. 2 (1963): 223-31; William P. D. Wightman, “Quid sit methodus? Method in Sixteenth-Century Medical Teaching and Discovery,” Journal of the History of Medicine 19, no. 4 (1964): 360-76; Charles B. Schmitt, “Experience and Experiment: A Comparison of Zabarella's View with Galileo's De Motu” Studies in the Renaissance 16 (1969): 90-91; Nicholas Jardine, “Galileo's Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 7, no. 4 (1976): 277-318; and in reply, John H. Randall, “Paduan Aristotelianism Revisited,” in Philosophy and Humanism, ed. Edward P. Mahoney (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 275-82.

103. Peter Machamer, “Galileo's Machines, His Mathematics, and His Experiments,” in Cambridge Companion to Galileo, ed. Peter Machamer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 53-79.

104. Galileo, Dialogues Concerning the Two New Sciences, trans. Henry Crew and Alfredo de Salvio (New York: Dover, 1954), 160; and Letter to Fortunio Liceto, September 15, 1640, in Randall, “School of Padua,” 230.

105. Galileo, Letter to Belisario Vinta, 1610, in Discoveries and Opinions, 62; and Carlo Ginzburg, “Clues: Roots of a New Evidential Paradigm,” in Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 103, 105, 102.

106. Ginzburg, “Clues,” 108.

107. Joseph Glanvill and Robert Hooke, in Eamon, Secrets of Nature, 297, 294, 295.

108. Francis Bacon, in Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (1957; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 159.

109. Bacon, New Organon (Adelaide: eBooks@Adelaide, 2014), book 1, aphorism 50.

110. Bacon, New Organon, book 1, aphorism 95.

111. Bacon, New Organon, book 1, aphorism 46; and Great Instauration (Adelaide: eBooks@Adelaide, 2014), unpaginated.

112. Bacon, New Organon, book 1, aphorism 69.

113. Bacon, New Organon, book 2, aphorism 20.

114. Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 473-81.

115. Bacon, New Organon, book 1, aphorism 82, and Plan of the Instauration, argument of book 4.

116. Joseph Marie, Comte de Maistre, Examen de la philosophie de Bacon (1836); Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, trans. Henry Copley Greene (1865; New York: Dover, 1957), 23, 24, 225; Augustus de Morgan and William Jevons, in Antonio Perez-Ramos, “Bacon's Legacy,” in 'I he Cambridge Companion to Bacon, ed. Makku Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 326.

117. Curt J. Ducasse, “Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science,” in Madden, Theories of Scientific Method, 71.

118. Bacon, New Organon, book 1, aphorism 117; and Guido Giglioni, “Learning to Read Nature: Francis Bacon's Notion of Experiential Literacy,” in Medical Empiricism and Philosophy of Human Nature in the 17th and 18 th Century, ed. Claire Crignon, Carsten Zelle, and Nunzio Allocca (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 81-110.

119. Bacon, New Organon, book 1, aphorism 61; Perez Zagorin, Francis Bacon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 254 n. 86, 98.

120. Bacon, Great Instauration, unpaginated.

121. Bacon, Advancement of Learning (1605; Adelaide: eBooks@Adelaide, 2014), book 2, chap. 7, §7; and Rossi, Francis Bacon, 10-11.

122. Bacon, New Organon, book 1, aphorism 83.

123. Plato, Phaedrus, 270a. On Greek attitudes toward the banausoi, see Alison Burford, Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972). For a different reading of Plato on progress in the arts, see Ludwig Edelstein, The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 105-6.

124. Plato, Statesman, 299d-300a.

125. Plato, Republic, 590c.

126. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 981b.

127. Aristotle, Politics, 1278a; Cicero and Seneca, in A History of Private Life, vol. 1: From Pagan Rome to Byzantium, ed. Paul Veyne, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 120-21. Aristotle was not unusual in pro­posing to withhold citizenship from banausoi. Burford, Craftsmen, 28-36.

128. Bacon, in Rossi, “Bacon's Idea of Science,” in Peltonen, Companion to Bacon, 38; “ttoughts and Conclusions” (1607), in Benjamin Farrington, 'Ike Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 93; and New Organon, book 1, aphorism 124. Rossi translates, “’Hie very things themselves are, in this kind, both truth and utility.” “Bacon's Idea of Science,” 37.

129. Luis Garcia-Ballester, “Medieval Galenism,” in Knowledge and the Scholarly Medical Traditions, ed. Don Bates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 127­50; see also Charles B. Schmitt, “Aristotle among the Physicians,” in 'Ike Medical Renaissance of the Sixteenth Century, ed. Andrew Wear, Robert K. French, and Iain M. Lonie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1-15.

130. Rossi, “Bacon's Idea of Science,” 43; and Bacon, in Rossi, 40.

131. Boyle, in Lawrence M. Principe, 'Ike Aspiring Adept: Robert Boyle and His Alchemical Quest (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 106. On Newton's alchemy, Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, 'Ike Janus Faces of Genius: the Role of Alchemy in Newton’s 'Thought. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). On his deathbed, Boyle communicated to each of his literary executors, including Locke and Newton, a method for multiplying gold, which Locke began at once to investigate, though Newton dissuaded him, not from skepticism but because he had already tried it to no avail. Kenneth Dewhurst, John Locke 1632-1704. Physician and Philosopher (1963; New York: Garland, 1984), 284.

132. See William R. Newman, Atoms and Alchemy: Chymistry and the Experimental Origins of the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); and Bruce T. Moran, Distilling Knowledge. Alchemy, Chemistry, and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).

133. John C. Briggs, Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 16-17; and Bacon, Great Instauration, unpaginated.

134. Francis Bacon, New Atlantis, in Essays, Advancement of Learning, New Atlantis, and Other Pieces, ed. Richard Foster Jones (New York: Odyssey Press, 1937), 480.

135. Bacon, New Atlantis, 468, 488.

136. Bacon, New Atlantis, 489, 490.

137. Bacon, in Rose-Mary Sargent, “Bacon as an Advocate for Cooperative Scientific Research,” in Peltonen, Companion to Bacon, 152. See also Perez-Ramos, “Bacon's Legacy,” 311-34; and Zagorin, Francis Bacon, 174.

138. Zilsel, “Origin of Gilbert's Scientific Method,” 32; Kargon, Atomism in England, 9. I cite Gilbert's work from William Gilbert, On the Magnet, Magnetick Bodies also, and on the Great Magnet the Earth; a new Physiology, Demonstrated by many Arguments & Experiments, trans. Charles Whittingham, ed. Silvanus P. Thompson (1600; Adelaide: eBooks@Adelaide, 2014).

139. Hooke repeated the demonstration for the Royal Society; see J. A. Bennett, “The Challenge of Practical Mathematics,” in Science, Culture and Popular Belief in Renaissance Europe, ed. Stephen Pumfrey, Paolo L. Rossi, and Maurice Slawinski (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 176-90.

140. J. A. Bennett, “The Mechanics' Philosophy and the Mechanical Philosophy,” History of Science 24, no. 1 (1986): 1-28.

141. John Henry, “Animism and Empiricism: Copernican Physics and the Origins of William Gilbert's Experimental Method,” Journal of the History of Ideas 62, no. 1 (2001): 99-119. Gilbert does not discuss annual revolution. Kepler mentions Gilbert's “magnetical philosophy” as one of three sources of his astronomy, the others being Copernicus and Tycho Brahe. The motive soul that moved the planets in Kepler's Cosmographical Mystery (1596) becomes Gilbert's magnetic motive force in the New Astronomy (1609). J. A. Bennett, “Cosmology and Magnetical Philosophy, 1640-1680,” Journal of the History of Astronomy 12, no. 3 (1981): 165-77.

142. Gad Freudenthal, “Theory of Matter and Cosmology in William Gilbert's De Magnete,” Isis 74, no. 1 (1983): 22-37; and Stephen Pumfrey, “Neo-Aristotelianism and the Magnetic Philosophy,” in New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought, ed. John Henry and Sarah Hutton (London: Duckworth, 1990), 177-89.

143. Harvey was acquainted with Bacon and apparently attended him during illness, but enjoyed no closeness. John Aubrey passed to posterity Harvey's remark that Bacon “writes philosophy like a Lord Chancellor.” Bacon never refers to Harvey by name in his works, though he does refer to both Galileo and Gilbert. Geoffrey Keynes, The Life of William Harvey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), chap. 18.

144. Roger French, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 73, 89-90, 91, 325; Galen, Cause of Pulses, 9.1-10; Thomas S. Hall, Ideas of Life and Matter: Studies in the History of General Physiology, 600 BC- 1900 AD, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 1:244; and Harvey, Anatomical Exercises, in Owsei Temkin, The Double Face of Janus (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 310. The mechanical idea of the heart as a pump comes from Descartes. Writing of Harvey to a medical friend he says, “He will have it, if my memory serves me, that the heart in the diastole by expanding permits blood to enter and in the systole forces it out by contracting.... All these operations are truly mechanical.” Descartes to Beverwijck, July 5, 1643, in G. A. Lindeboom, Descartes and Medicine (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978), 106-7.

145. William Harvey, Disputations Touching the Generation of Animals, ed. Gweneth Whitteridge (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 378; and in Temkin, Double Face of Janus, 311; compare Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 736b-37a.

146. Harvey, On the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals, trans. Robert Willis, rev. Alexander Bowie (Adelaide: eBooks@Adelaide, 2014), unpaginated.

147. Andrew Wear, “William Harvey and the Way of the Anatomists,” History of Science 21, no. 3 (1983): 235; Michael T. Ghiselin, “William Harveys Methodology in De motu cordis from the Standpoint of Comparative Anatomy,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 40, no. 4 (1966): 320; and James G. Lennox, “William Harvey, Enigmatic Aristotelian of the Seventeenth Century,” in Teleology in the Ancient World, ed. Julius Rocca (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 169-200. Harvey apparently planed a work, “Practice of Physic conformable to the thesis of the circulation of the blood,” which was either lost or merely projected. Keynes, Life of Harvey, 162.

148. Unlike Bacon and Descartes, Harvey was not philosophically opposed to final causes, and admitted them in his work; see for instance, Disputations Touching the Generation of Animals, 176. On Harvey's embryology in context, see Charles W Bodemer, “Embryological Thought in Seventeenth Century England,” in Charles W Bodemer and Lester S. King, Medical Investigation in Seventeenth Century England (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 1968), 3-25.

149. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 87b; Harvey, in Ware, “Way of the Anatomists,” 230.

150. Harvey, in Ware, “Way of the Anatomists,” 238, 239.

151. Walter Charleton, 1657, in Luthy, “Fourfold Democritus,” 470n. Also Harold J. Cook, “Victories for Empiricism, Failures for Theory: Medicine and Science in the Seventeenth Century,” in Wolfe and Gal, Body as Object, 9-32; and Claire Crignon, “Debate about Methodus Medendi in England,” in Crignon, Zelle, and Allocca, Medical Empiricism, 13-33.

152. Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth­Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 126, 144. On the continuity between Boyle's laboratory empiricism and his religious life, see Courtney Weiss Smith, Empiricist Devotions: Science, Religion, and Poetry in Early Eighteenth-Century England (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2016); and Sorana Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind: Boyle, Locke, and the Early Modern Cultura Animi Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

153. Boyle, in Shapin, Social History of Truth, 158. Kepler described himself as a priest of God in the Book of Nature. The expression recurs in Ficino, Thomas Browne, and Newton, who traced it back to Philo of Alexandria. Dobbs, Janus Faces of Genius, 151-52.

154. Boyle, in Michael Ben-Chaim, “The Value of Facts in Boyle's Experimental Philosophy,” History of Science 38, no. 1 (2000): 57-77.

155. Boyle, in Wolfe and Gal, Body as Object, 187, 186.

156. See James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt. Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).

157. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, in Rose-Mary Sargent, “Scientific Expertise and Legal Expertise: The Way of Experience in Seventeenth-Century England,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 20, no. 1 (1989): 37. See also Robert Kargon, “The Testimony of Nature: Boyle, Hooke, and Experimental Philosophy,” Albion 3, no. 2 (1971): 72-81; and Barbara Shapiro, “The Concept ‘Fact': Legal Origins and Cultural Diffusion,” Albion 26, no. 2 (1994): 227-52.

158. The “empirical” credentials of the common law are reaffirmed by Herman Oliphant, “A Return to Stare Decisis,” American Bar Association Journal 14, no. 2 (1928): 71­107, no. 3, 159-62.

159. Marie Boas Hall, Promoting Experimental Learning: Experiments and the Royal Society, 1660-1727 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 9; and Boyle, in Michael Hunter, Establishing the New Science: The Experience of the Early Royal Society (Woodbridge, UK: Boyell Press, 1989), 24-25. I am grateful to Ted Davis for confirming Boyle's attendance at the inaugural meeting.

160. Hunter, Establishing the New Science, 11, 60; and Roy Porter, “The Early Royal Society and the Spread of Medical Knowledge,” in The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, ed. Roger French and Andrew Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 272-93.

161. Boyle, in Hunter, Establishing the New Science, 4, and in Rose-Mary Sargent, “Learning from Experience: Boyle's Construction of an Experimental Philosophy,” in Robert Boyle Reconsidered, ed. Michael Hunter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 57-78.

162. Leclerc, Nature of Physical Existence, 168.

163. Peter R. Anstey, The Philosophy of Robert Boyle (London: Routledge, 2000), 2.

164. Christoph Meinel, “Early Seventeenth-Century Atomism: Theory, Epistemology, and the Insufficiency of Experiment,” Isis 79, no. 1 (1988): 70; see also Anstey, Philosophy of Boyle, 43. Boyle was silent on Bacon's ideas about induction and his theory of forms, retaining only the method of natural histories as a foundation for natural philosophy. This was a new view of Bacon and became the Bacon of the Royal Society. See Peter Anstey and Michael Hunter, “Robert Boyle's ‘Designe about Natural History,'” Early Science and Medicine 13, no. 2 (2008): 83-126. Several other scientific thinkers before and after Boyle felt as he did about mechanical explanations; for instance, James Clerk Maxwell: “When a physical phenomenon can be completely described as a change in the configuration and motion of a ma­terial system... we cannot conceive any further explanation to be either necessary, desirable, or possible.” The Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, ed. W D. Niven, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1890), 2:418.

165. Boyle rarely used the expression “secondary quality,” which we owe to Locke; Boyle called them sensible qualities. Anstey, Philosophy of Boyle, 7.

166. Boyle, in Anstey, Philosophy of Boyle, 55, 105, 111 n. 50.

167. Boyle, in Anstey, Philosophy of Boyle, 60.

168. Boyle, in Anstey, Philosophy of Boyle, 73; Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 37; and Shapin, Social History of Truth, 376, 389.

169. Barbara Beigun Kaplan, “Divulging of Useful Truths in Physick”: The Medical Agenda of Robert Boyle (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 137. See also Gordon W Jones, “Robert Boyle as a Medical Man,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 38, no. 2 (1964): 139-52; Lester S. King, “Robert Boyle as an Amateur Physician,” in Bodemer and King, Medical Investigation in Seventeenth Century England, 29-49; and on Sydenham and Boyle, Andrew Cunningham, “Thomas Sydenham: Epidemics, Experiment and the ‘Good Old Cause,' ” in French and Wear, Medical Revolution, 164-90.

170. Boyle, in Rose-Mary Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist: Robert Boyle and the Philosophy of Experiment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 76; and in Kaplan, Divulging Useful Truths, 124.

171. Michael Hunter, “Boyle versus the Galenists,” Medical History 41, no. 3 (1997): 322-61.

172. Boyle, in Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, 125, 103; and in Edwin Arthur Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, rev. ed. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1954), 171.

173. James Bryant Conant, “Robert Boyle's Experiments in Pneumatics,” in Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science, ed. James Bryant Conant, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 1:6. On the rise of interest in “void” in sixteenth-century thought, see Charles B. Schmitt, “Experimental Evidence for and against a Void: The Sixteenth-Century Arguments,” in Studies in Renaissance Philosophy and Science (London: Variorum Reprints, 1981), 352-66.

174. Conant, “Boyle's Experiments in Pneumatics,” 55-56. Edme Mariotte independ­ently discovered the law in 1676, but Boyle had already published in 1662.

175. Boyle, in Anstey, Philosophy of Boyle, 158-59. See also Nancy Cartwright, Nature, the Artful Modeler (Chicago: Open Court, 2019), 37-38.

176. Boyle, in Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, 97. See also J. E. McGuire, “Boyle's Conception of Nature,” Journal of the History of Ideas 33, no. 4 (1972): 523-42.

177. Boyle, in Anstey, Philosophy of Boyle, 163-64; and in Ben-Chaim, “Value of Facts,” 63.

178. Shapin, Social History of Truth, 236, 337; and George Starkey to Boyle, in Shapin, 233 n. 149. On historia, evidence transmitted from others, in ancient medicine, see Heinrich von Staden, “Experiment and Experience in Hellenistic Medicine,” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 22 (1975): 178-99.

179. Boyle, “Of Unsucceeding Experiments,” in Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, 177, 178. On the proliferation of detail as a textual sign of veracity and realism, see Michael Riffaterre, Fictional Truth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).

180. I draw extensively from Charles Bazerman, Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity of the Experimental Article in Science (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).

181. My account of Hobbes's natural philosophy closely follows the still unmatched treatment in Frithiof Brandt, Thomas Hobbes’ Mechanical Conception of Nature (London: Libraire Hachette, 1928; rpt. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1972).

182. Hobbes, in Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 117, 326, 680.

183. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.1. On Hobbes and Aristotle, Brandt, Hobbes’ Mechanical Conception, 57.

184. Hobbes, De Corpore, 1.25, in Brandt, Hobbes’ Mechanical Conception, 358-59.

185. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.1.

186. Hobbes, Elements of Law, 9.18, in Brandt, Hobbes’ Mechanical Conception, 353.

187. Madden, “Hobbes and the Rationalistic Ideal,” in Theories of Scientific Method, 110; Hobbes, De Corpore, 15.7.

188. Hobbes, in Brandt, Hobbes’ Mechanical Conception, 272.

189. Brandt, Hobbes’ Mechanical Conception, 340, 342; and Hobbes, in Brandt, 371.

190. Boyle, in Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, 37; and Galileo, in Brandt, Hobbes’ Mechanical Conception, 318.

191. Hobbes, Dialogus physicus, in Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump, 348.

192. Hobbes, in Madden, “Rationalistic Ideal,” 107, 108.

193. Leibniz, “An Introduction on the Value and Method of Natural Science,” in Philosophical Papers, 281, 282, 283.

194. Leibniz, in Alan E. Shapiro, “Newton's Experimental Philosophy,” Early Science and Medicine 9, no. 3 (2004), 209; to Huygens, February 20, 1691, in Cartesian Empiricisms, ed. Mihnea Dobre and Tammy Nyden (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 81; and Leibniz, “Value and Method of Science,” 284. On admiration for Leeuwenhoek, see Alessandro Becci, “Between Learned Science and Technical Knowledge: Leibniz, Leeuwenhoek, and the School for Microscopists,” in Tercentenary Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Leibniz, ed. Lloyd Strickland, Erik Vynckier, and Julia Weckend (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 47-79. Jacques Roger observes that Leeuwenhoek carries on research as if Descartes never existed. “Nothing was less Cartesian than Leeuwenhoek's genius, a genius for unpremed­itated observation, which abandoned itself to serendipity and delighted in the spectacles offered it without bothering to make systems of them.” The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, trans. Robert Ellrich (1963; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 355. On Leibniz's empiricism, Dale Jacquette, “Leibniz's Empirical, Not Empiricist Methodology,” in Strickland, Vynckier, and Weckend, Tercentenary Essays, 179-202.

195. Leibniz, in Justin E. H. Smith, Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 37, 43, 58. There is a good treat­ment of Leibniz's thought on medicine in Francois Duchesneau, “Leibniz's Model for Analyzing Organic Phenomena,” Perspectives on Science 11, no. 4 (2003): 378­409. See also Anne-Lise Rey, “The Status of Leibniz's Medical Experiments,” Early Science and Medicine 18, nos. 4-5 (2003): 360-80.

196. Leibniz, New Essays, 427. Einstein concurs: “Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction. But the cre­ative principle resides in mathematics.” “On the Methods of Theoretical Physics,” Herbert Spencer Lecture, Oxford, 1933, The World as I See It (New York: Cocivi- Friede, 1934), 36.

197. Boyle, in Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, 101; Leroy E. Loemker, “Boyle and Leibniz,” Journal of the History of Ideas 16, no. 1 (1955): 22-43; also Stuart Brown, “Leibniz and Robert Boyle,” in Leibniz and the English-Speaking World, ed. Pauline Phemister and Stuart Brown (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 82-93.

198. Leibniz, New Essays, 455. John F. W Herschel repeats the complaint a century later, referring to Boyle's “undistinguishing appetite” for experiments. A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (1830; New York: John Reprint Co., 1966), §107.

199. Leibniz, New Essays, 50.

200. See Ralph M. Blake, “The Role of Experience in Descartes's Theory of Method,” in Madden, Theories of Scientific Method, 75-103; and McMullin, “Empiricism and the Scientific Revolution,” 349-52.

201. Descartes, in Dennis Des Chese, Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 11; L. W. B. Brockliss, “Philosophical Teaching in France 1600-1740,” History of Universities 1 (1980): 131-68.

202. Patricia Reif, “The Textbook Tradition in Natural Philosophy, 1600-1650,” Journal of the History of Ideas 30, no. 1 (1969): 17-32. See also Francis R. Johnson, “Astronomical Textbooks in the Sixteenth Century,” in Science, Medicine, and History: Essays on the Evolution of Scientific Thought and Medical Practice, ed. E. Ashworth Underwood, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 1:285-302.

203. Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Melanchthon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 174-75.

204. Reif, “Textbook Tradition,” 30, 31; and Brockliss, “Philosophical Teaching in France.”

205. Descartes, Description of the Human Body, and letter to Plempius, October 30, 1637, in Blake, “Role of Experience,” 88, 89.

206. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, 4, 205; The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, 3 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984-1991), 1:289. On “moral cer­tainty,” see Robert Pasnau, After Certainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

207. Leibniz, to Hermann Conring, March 19/29, 1678; in Duchesneau, “Analyzing Organic Phenomena,” 385.

208. Descartes, in Blake, “Role of Experience,” 100; Descartes to Mersenne, in Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, 32-33; Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 1:48, 47.

209. Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. Andrew Motte, rev. F. Cajori (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 546, 399; McMullin, “Empiricism and the Scientific Revolution,” 365-66; Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations, 221-22; Leclerc, Nature of Physical Existence, 245.

210. Newton, Opticks, in Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations, 216.

211. Newton, to Oldenberg, 1672, in Ernan McMullin, “Empiricism and the Scientific Revolution,” in Singleton, Art, Science, and History, 361; and in Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations, 218. On Newton and medicine, see Anita Guerrini, “Isaac Newton, George Chenye, and the ‘Principia Medicinae,'” in French and Wear, Medical Revolution, 222-45.

212. Newton, in Shapiro, “Newton's Experimental Philosophy,” 188; Aristotle, De Caelo, 274a, Generation of Animals, 788b, and Friedrich Solmsen, Aristotle’s System of the Physical World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960), 254-56. See also Mary Domsk, “Newton's Empiricism and Metaphysics,” Philosophy Compass 5, no. 7 (2010): 525-34; and Kirsten Walsh, “Principles in Newton's Natural Philosophy,” in The Idea of Principles in Early Modern Thought, ed. Peter R. Anstey (New York: Routledge, 2017), 194-223. On Bacon's influence, see Dana Jalobeanu, “Constructing Natural Historical Facts: Baconian Natural History in Newton's First Paper on Light and Colors,” in Newton and Empiricism, ed. Zvi Biener and Eric Schliesser (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 39-65. An earlier treatment, still persuasive, is in Kargon, Atomism in England, chap. 11.

213. Newton, in Stephen Gaukroger, “Empiricism as a Development of Experimental Natural Philosophy,” in Biener and Eric Schliesser, Newton and Empiricism, 27. On Newton's alchemical speculations on light, see Teeter, Janus Faces of Genius.

214. Newton, Opticks, in Ralph M. Blake, “Isaac Newton and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method,” in Madden, Theories of Scientific Method, 123.

215. Newton, in Shapiro, “Newton's Experimental Philosophy,” 205.

Chapter 3

1. Howard Jones, Pierre Gassendi, 1592-1655: An Intellectual Biography (Nieuwkoop: B. De Graaf, 1981), 40; Saul Fisher, Pierre Gassendi’s Philosophy and Science: Atomism for Empiricists (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 16. On Gassendi and empiricism, see David Fate Norton, “The Myth of ‘British Empiricism,'” History of European Ideas 1, no. 4 (1981): 331-44.

2. Horace, Epistles, 1.4 (de grege porcum), in Jones, Pierre Gassendi, 226; Ralph Cudworth, in Thomas M. Lennon, The Battle of the Gods and Giants: The Legacies of Descartes and Gassendi, 1655-1715 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 7; and Berkeley, Notebook, 1707-8, in Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 1274-1671 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011), 82. Cudworth was not opposed to at­omism, only to the Epicurean implementation. He thought the true author of the atomic philosophy was Mochus the Phoenician, who was really Moses. See Robert Hugh Kargon, Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 134; and 'Thomas Franklin Mayo, Epicurus in England, 1650-1725 (Dallas, TX: Southwest Press, 1934), 139-40.

3. Gassendi, in Barry Brundell, Pierre Gassendi: From Aristotelianism to a New Natural Philosophy (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1987), 16, 85, 79; Catherine Wilson, Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), 90; Jones, Pierre Gassendi, 56, 57, 95-97, 99, 103, 110, 292. Gassendi was not the first to rehabilitate at­omism. Jean Crysostome Magnen, author of Democritus reviviscens (1646), says that he “wanted to bring back the atomist philosophy, the first born among all the sects of wise men.” Christoph Luthy, “The Fourfold Democritus on the Stage of Early Modern Science,” Isis 91, no. 3 (2000): 443-79.

4. Lisa Sarasohn, Gassendi’s Ethics: Freedom in a Mechanistic Universe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 203, 207; Alan Charles Kors, Epicureans and Atheists in France, 1650-1729 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 60­61. On Gassendist physicians, Lennon, Gods and Giants, 78, 79, 80, 98-99, 101, 105. Thomas Jefferson self-identified as an Epicurean; see Dumas Malone, The Sage of Monticello (Boston: Little, Brown, 1981), 197-98.

5. I draw from Fisher, Gassendi’s Philosophy and Science, 374-75.

6. Aristotle, De Anima, 416b; Gassendi, in Fisher, Gassendi’s Philosophy and Science, 11.

7. Howard T. Egan, Gassendi’s View of Knowledge (Lanham, MD: University Presses of America, 1984), 109-10; Gassendi, in Egan, 105; in Brundell, Pierre Gassendi, 100; in Fisher, Gassendi’s Philosophy and Science, 31n; and Democritus, in Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), fr. 8. On Carneades, see John Dillon, “Carneades the Socratic,” in The Roots of Platonism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 61-78.

8. Brundell, Pierre Gassendi, 99, 102-3.

9. Gassendi, in Sarasohn, Gassendi’s Ethics, 38. In his early writing against Aristotle he condemned syllogistic, but in the Institutio logica, the Logic part of the posthu­mous Syntagma philosophicum, he warms to it, describing syllogistic as “the heart and muscle of all reasoning,” though in need of simplification. Unfortunately his simplifications need simplification, and residual commitment to the Paduan regressus method is, to me, hard to understand. See the discussion of Gassendi’s regressus in Fisher, Gassendi’s Philosophy and Science, 93-95.

10. Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, in The Epicurus Reader, ed. and trans. Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), 22; Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in Selections from the Major Writings, ed. Philip Hallie, trans. Sanford G. Etheridge (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1985), book 2, chap. 10 (100-102).

11. Gassendi, in Brundell, Pierre Gassendi, 112; Galen, Three Treatises on the Nature of Science, trans. Richard Walzer and Michael Frede (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1985), 49.

12. Sarasohn, Gassendi’s Ethics, 171; Robert Boyle, to Samuel Hartlib, May 8, 1647, in Barbara Beigun Kaplan, “Divulging of Useful Truths in Physick”: The Medical Agenda of Robert Boyle (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 187 n. 29. On Charleton, see Mayo, Epicurus in England.

13. Gassendi, in Fred S. Michael and Emily Michael, “The Theory of Ideas in Gassendi and Locke,” Journal of the History of Ideas 51, no. 3 (1990): 392. Henry Lee took the same view of Locke as a Gassendist in the earliest commentary on Locke's Essay, Lee's Anti-Scepticism or Notes upon Each Chapter of Mr. Locke’s Essay (1702).

14. G. W Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. and trans. P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 70; Sarasohn, Gassendi’s Ethics, 29, 170, 175, 176; Michael and Michael, “Theory of Ideas”; and Howard Jones, “Gassendi and Locke on Ideas,” in Acta Conventus Neo-L atini Bononensis, ed. R. J. Schoeck (Binghamton, NY: Center for Medieval & Early Renaissance Studies, 1985), 51-59. Gassendi's Institutio logica was also followed in detail by Arnauld in the Port Royal Art of Thinking, despite strenuous objection to the theory of ideas.

15. Pierre Gassendi’s Institutio Logica (1658), ed. and trans. Howard Jones (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1981), part 1, canon 3, 85.

16. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. N. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 4.20.4.

17. Robert Westfall, Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac Newton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 18; Peter Anstey, “John Locke and Helmontian Medicine,” in The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science, ed. Charles T. Wolfe and Ofer Gal (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 114. On Paracelsus in England see Peter Elmer, “Medicine, Religion and the Puritan Revolution,” in The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, ed. Roger French and Andrew Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 10-45.

18. Reconciliation of Galen and Paracelsus was an exercise before Locke tried it, for example, in Daniel Sennert; see Ian Maclean, Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renaissance: The Case of Learned Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 78.

19. Sydenham, in French and Wear, Medical Revolution, 183; Locke, in Patrick Romanell, John Locke and Medicine (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1984), 71. See also Kenneth Dewhurst, John Locke, 1632-1704: Physician and Philosopher (1963; New York: Garland, 1984).

20. Sydenham, in Jonathan Walmsley, “Sydenham and the Development of Locke's Natural Philosophy,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16, no. 1 (2008): 63; and in Romanell, John Locke and Medicine, 80. Sydenham's Methodus curandi febres was dedicated to Boyle, at whose behest it was written. On Locke's relationship with Sydenham, see Peter R. Anstey, John Locke and Natural Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), who renews the argument that Locke understood the relation between natural philosophy and medicine as seamless.

21. Sydenham, in Walmsley, “Sydenham and Locke's Philosophy,” 68. Sorting out re­lations between Locke and Sydenham has been described as “one of the most

difficult tasks of Locke scholarship.” J. R. Milton, “Locke, Medicine and Mechanical Philosophy,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9, no. 2 (2001): 229.

22. Locke, letter to Dr. William Molyneux, June 15, 1697, in Miguel A. Sanchez- Gonzalez, “Medicine in John Locke's Philosophy,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15, no. 6 (1990): 683; and to William Molyneux, January 20, 1693, in Peter Anstey, “The Creation of the English Hippocrates,” Medical History 55, no. 4 (2011): 472.

23. Locke, Anatomia (1668), in Romanell, John Locke and Medicine, 111.

24. Locke, Anatomia, in Romanell, John Locke and Medicine, 111-12; Leibniz (1677), in Francois Duchesneau, “Leibniz's Model for Analyzing Organic Phenomena,” Perspectives on Science 11, no. 4 (2003): 392.

25. Locke, De arte medica, in David E. Wolfe, “Sydenham and Locke on the Limits of Anatomy,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 35, no. 3 (1961): 209; Locke to William Molyneux, January 20, 1693, in Wolfe, 208-9; Sydenham, in Wolfe, 209; and Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 4.3.16. Descartes expressed the most ambitious expectation of a new medicine from the new natural philosophy, antic­ipating knowledge of nature such as “to enable one to deduce from it rules in medi­cine which are more certain than those we have had up to now.” Discourse on Method (1637), trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1980), 41. See also G. A. Lindeboom, Descartes and Medicine (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978); Richard B. Carter, Descartes’ Medical Philosophy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); and Steven Shapin, “Descartes the Doctor: Rationalism and Its Therapies,” British Journal of the History of Science 33, no. 2 (2000): 131-54.

26. Locke, De arte medica, in Romanell, John Locke and Medicine, 117.

27. Locke, De arte medica, in Romanell, John Locke and Medicine, 118.

28. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1.1.6, 4.12.10. On Bacon and Locke, Peter Anstey, “Locke, Bacon, and Natural History,” Early Science and Medicine 7, no. 1 (2002): 65-92.

29. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 3.3.11, in J. R. Milton, “John Locke and the Nominalist Tradition,” in John Locke, ed. Reinhard Brandt (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1981), 128-45.

30. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 4.14.3, 4.6.13.

31. Hippocratic Epidemics, 1.23, in Theodore James Tracy, Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle (The Hague: Mouton, 1969), 71n.

32. John Cotta, A Short Discoverie of the Unobserved Dangers of Severall Sorts of Ignorant and Unconsiderate Practisers of Physicke in England (London, 1612), in Harold J. Cook, “Victories for Empiricism, Failures for Theory: Medicine and Science in the Seventeenth Century,” in Wolfe and Gal, Body as Object, 13; and Boyle, in Rose­Mary Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist: Robert Boyle and the Philosophy of Experiment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 208, 127. On the problem of quacks, see Claire Crignon, “Debate about Methodus Medendi in England,” in Medical Empiricism and Philosophy of Human Nature in the 17th and 18 th Century, ed. Claire Crignon, Carsten Zelle, and Nunzio Allocca (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 13-33.

33. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 4.12.10; Locke, to Stillingfleet, June 29, 1697; in Margaret J. Osler, “John Locke and the Changing Ideal of Scientific Knowledge,” Journal of the History ofIdeas 31, no. 1 (1970): 11.

34. Newton, Opticks, in Ralph M. Blake, “Isaac Newton and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method,” in 'Theories of Scientific Method: The Renaissance through the Nineteenth Century, ed. Edward H. Madden (Seattle: University ofWashington Press, 1960), 123.

35. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.1.2.

36. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.1.23; and John W Yolton, “The Concept of Experience in Locke and Hume,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 1, no. 1 (1963): 53-71.

37. Lorenz Kruger, “The Grounding of Knowledge on Experience: A Critical Consideration of John Locke,” Contemporary German Philosophy 2 (1983): 20-38.

38. Kruger, “Grounding of Knowledge.”

39. Hume, History of England, chap. 71, in Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941), 57; and A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), xxiii, 1.4.2. On Newton and Hume, see R. W Serjeantson, “Hume's General Rules and the ‘Chief Business of Philosophers,'” in Impressions of Hume, ed. Marina Frasca-Spada and P. J. E. Kail (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 187-212; Tamas Demeter, “Newton's Method and Hume's Science of Man,” in Newton and Empiricism, ed. Zvi Biener and Eric Schliesser (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 171-203; and Mitias Slavov, “Newtonian and Non-Newtonian Elements in Hume,” Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14, no. 3 (2016): 275-96.

40. Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1977), 112; and Treatise of Human Nature, 1.1.4. This insouciant Newton is Hume's fabrication. Newton was obsessed with the question of the cause of gravity, and convinced that the answer lies in alchemy. See Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, The Janus Faces of Genius: The Role of Alchemy in Newton’s Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

41. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, introduction, 1.3.16, 1.4.1; and Shaftesbury, Characteristics, in Kemp Smith, Philosophy of Hume, 138. Hume's debt to Shaftesbury et al. is a thesis of Kemp Smith's book, where the evidence is analyzed.

42. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, introduction; 1.3.16; 1.4.7.7; and History of England, chap. 71, in Smith, Philosophy of David Hume.

43. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, 1.3. On skepticism and usualism, see Odo Marquard, “Skeptics,” in In Defense of the Accidental, trans. Robert M. Wallace (1986; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

44. Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 15; Treatise of Human Nature, 636.

45. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933), A51/B75.

46. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A123.

47. Pseudo-Simplicius, in Active Perception in the History of Philosophy, ed. J. F. Silva and M. Yrjbnsuuri (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2014), 74; Plotinus, Enneads, 3.6.1, 4.4.23, in Eyjolfur Kjalar Emilsson, “Plotinus on Sense Perception,” in Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Pekka Karkkainen (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 23-33.

48. Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (1855, 3rd ed., 1880; New York: D. Appleton, 1910), 1:470, 505n.

49. Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, 1:467-68.

50. Spencer, in Robert J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 294.

51. Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, 1:460, 462; and George H. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, First Series, 2 vols. (Boston: James R. Osgood, 1874), 1:26.

52. Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, 1:507, 500. On evolutionary perspectives in epistemology, see Nicholas Rescher, A Useful Inheritance: Evolutionary Aspects of the Theory of Knowledge (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990).

53. Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, 2:195.

54. Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, ed. Keith Q. Benson, trans. Robert Ellrich (1963; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 163.

55. Roger, Life Sciences, 433-34, 437.

56. Claude-Adrien Helvetius, in John C. O'Neal, TheAuthorityofExperience: Sensationalist Theory in the French Enlightenment (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 84-85, 90, 101.

57. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.1.4; Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, in O'Neal, Authority ofExperience, 16.

58. Condillac, in O'Neal, Authority ofExperience, 16; and in Michael J. Morgan, Molyneux’s Question: Vision, Touch, and the Philosophy of Perception (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 75-76.

59. Condillac, in O'Neal, Authority ofExperience, 29, 37.

60. Denis Diderot, Diderot’s Early Philosophical Works, ed. and trans. Margaret Jourdain (Chicago: Open Court, 1916), 105. On Condillac's complicated relation to Berkeley, see Nicholas Pastore, Selective History of Theories of Visual Perception, 1650-1950 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 101-13.

61. Timo Kaitaro, Diderot’s Holism: Philosophical Anti-reductionism and Its Medical Background (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1997), 56-57; and Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will, trans. F. L. Pogson (1889; Mineola, NY: Dover, 2001), 130-32.

62. Kaitaro, Diderot’s Holism, 67-69; and Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, in Guido Giglioni, “Learning to Read Nature: Francis Bacon's Notion of Experiential Literacy,” in Crignon, Zelle, and Allocca, Medical Empiricism, 431.

63. Condillac, in Hans Aarsleff, “Condillac's Speechless Statue,” in From Locke to Saussure (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 211-12, 213-14.

64. Condillac, in Jacques Derrida, The Archaeology of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac, trans. John P. Leavey (1973; Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 45, 47; and Derrida, 46.

65. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 3.2.2; and E. J. Ashworth, “Do Words Signify Ideas or Things? The Scholastic Sources of Locke's Theory of Language,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 19, no. 3 (1981): 299-326; Condillac, in Aarslef, “Speechless Statue,” 221 n. 2; and letter to Gabriel Cramer, in Derrida, Archaeology of the Frivolous, 111. The liaison is voluntary, an expression of reason and reflection; it is not “association des idees” which Condillac considers involuntary.

66. Holbach, 1770, in O'Neal, Authority of Experience, 199.

67. The diminished status of surgeons was a Parisian and north European tradi­tion. Surgery had always been an academic discipline at Padua and other Italian universities in the Middle Ages, with doctorates granted, and practitioners ac­cepted as full colleagues by physicians. Nancy G. Siraisi, Arts and Sciences at Padua (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1973), 165-66.

68. Ann Thomson, Materialism and Society in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: La Mettries “Discours Preliminaire” (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1981).

69. La Mettrie, Man a Machine, in Kathleen Wellman, La Mettrie: Medicine, Philosophy, and Enlightenment (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 188.

70. Wellman, La Mettrie, 190; and Leonora Cohen Rosenfield, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine: Animal Soul in French Letters from Descartes to La Mettrie, 2nd ed. (New York: Octagon Books, 1968), 143-44.

71. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.1.4; also 2.6.1; Peter A. Schouls, Reasoned Freedom: John Locke and Enlightenment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 80-81; and J. Douglas Rabb, “Reflection, Reflexion, and Introspection,” Locke Newsletter 8 (1978): 35-52.

72. Fran^ois-Pierre-Gonthier Maine de Biran, The Relationship of the Physical and the Moral in Man, trans. Darian Meacham and Joseph Spadola (1811; London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 49. See also Jeremy Dunham, “A Universal and Absolute Spiritualism: Maine de Biran's Leibniz,” in Biran, Physical and Moral, 157-92; and Philip P. Hallie, Maine de Biran, Reformer of Empiricism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959).

73. Biran, Physical and Moral, 76.

74. Wilhelm Dilthey, “Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology,” in Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding, trans. Richard M. Zaner and Kenneth L. Heiges (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977). See also Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (1968; Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), chap. 7. The philosopher is Rudolf Carnap, “Protocol Statements,” in Essential Readings in Logical Positivism, ed. O. Hanfling (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 153.

75. Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (1883), in Rudolf A. Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 37. On Dilthey's “completely new understanding of the term ‘empirical,' ” see Christian Dambock, “Rudolf Carnap and Wilhelm Dilthey: ‘German' Empiricism in the Aufbau” in Rudolf Carnap and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism, ed. Richard Creath, Vienna Circle Yearbook 16 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 67-88.

76. Han-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Continuum, 1975), 55-57. On the contrast between Erlebnis and Erfahrung (also “experience,” e.g., in Kant), see Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 10-11, 95.

77. Dilthey, “Ideas,” 55; see also Makkreel, Dilthey, 143, 148-49, 257-58.

78. Jean Fernel, Physiologia, and Albrecht von Haller (1747), in Georges Canguilhem, Vital Rationalist, ed. Francois Delaporte, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Zone Books, 1994), 91, 92; see also 'Thomas S. Hall, Ideas of Life and Matter: Studies in the History of General Physiology, 600 BC-1900 AD, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). Galen expressed no “trusting expec­tation of a future full of discoveries; if anything, there is the fear of an immanent decline of science, the signs of which can already be read in the present.” Mario Vegetti, “Tradition and Truth: Galen's De Placitus” in Ancient Histories of Medicine, ed. Philip J. Van der Eijk (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 356.

79. Domenico Bertoloni Meli, “Of Snails and Horsetails: Anatomical Empiricism in the Early Modern Period,” in Crignon, Zelle, and Allocca, Medical Empiricism, 111-30.

80. Broussais (1816) and Emile Littre (1865), in Canguilhem, Vital Rationalist, 136.

81. Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, trans. Henry Copley Greene (1865; New York: Dover, 1957), 108, 109, 112.

82. Bernard, Experimental Medicine, 87, 2, 23, 24. In addition to his own copious expe­rience Bernard was probably thinking of what he read on the value of hypotheses in Auguste Comte's Course of Positive Philosophy (1830-42).

83. Bernard, in Canguilhem, Vital Rationalist, 109.

84. Bernard, Experimental Medicine, 146; and as cited in William Coleman, “The Cognitive Basis of the Discipline: Claude Bernard on Physiology,” Isis 76, no. 1 (1985): 54, 56.

85. Bernard, Experimental Medicine, 52, 49, 28, 167.

86. Bernard, Experimental Medicine, 76.

87. Bernard, in Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett (1966; New York: Zone Books, 1989), 68.

88. Bernard, in Canguilhem, Vital Rationalist, 277, 276.

89. Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage, 1975), 199. See also Francois Delaporte, “The History of Medicine According to Foucault,” in Foucault and the Writing of History, ed. Jan Goldstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 137-49.

90. Foucault, B irth of the Clinic, xiv.

91. Foucault, Birth of the Clinic, 137.

92. Michel Foucault, “On the Archaeology of the Sciences” (1968), in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley, in Essential Works, 3 vols. (1994; New York: New Press, 1998), 2:330, 331.

93. Foucault, “Archaeology of the Sciences,” 331.

94. Foucault, “Archaeology ofthe Sciences,” 331-32; and “Life: Experience and Science,” in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 475.

95. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 4; Remarks on Marx, trans. R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), 124; On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the College de France, 1979-1980, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (2012; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 115. See also Timothy O'Leary, “Rethinking Experience with Foucault,” in Foucault and Philosophy, ed. Timothy O'Leary and Christopher Falzon (Malden, MA: Wiley- Blackwell, 2010), 162-84.

96. Foucault, Essential Works, 3:240; Remarks on Marx, 27, 38-39.

97. Elizabeth Asmis, Epicurus’ Scientific Method (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

1984), 86, 101-3. The first occurrence of a dated observation and precise meas­urement in Greek, from early third century BCE (Timocharis), is recorded in the style of Babylonian celestial diaries. See Bernard R. Goldstein and Alan C. Bowen, “The Introduction of Dated Observations and Precise Measurement in Greek Astronomy,” Archive for the History of Exact Science 43, no. 2 (1991): 93-132.

98. Nancy G. Siraisi, History, Medicine, and the Traditions of Renaissance Learning (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 79, 90; Gianna Pomata, “Observation Rising: Birth ofan Epistemic Genre, 1500- 1650,” in Histories of Scientific Observation, ed. Lorraine Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 45-80; “A Word ofthe Empirics: The Ancient Conception of Observation and Its Recovery in Early Modern Medicine,” Annals of Science 68, no. 1 (2011): 1-25; and Iain M. Lonie, “The Paris Hippocratics: Teaching and Research in Paris in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century,” in The Medical Renaissance ofthe Sixteenth Century, ed. A. Wear, R. K. French, and I. M. Lonie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1985), 155-74. On Renaissance humanist learning in the evolution of natural phi­losophy, see Hiro Hirai, Medical Humanism and Natural Philosophy: Renaissance Debates on Matter, Life, and the Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

99. Boyle, in Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, 137. D'Alembert, from his article “Experimental” in Diderot's Encyclopedia, and Leibniz, in Lorraine Daston, “The Empire of Observation, 1600-1800,” in Daston and Lunbeck, Histories of Scientific Observation, 86.

100. Bernard, Experimental Medicine, 5; and Cuvier, in Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature, trans. Michael Chase (2004; Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 94. He seems to allude to Francis Bacon's comparison of experimentation to torture in The Great Instauration.

101. John Frederick William Herschel, A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (1830; New York: John Reprint Co., 1966), §§67, 389; James E. Lidsey, The Bigger Bang (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 84. For the story of COBE see John C. Mather and John Boslough, The Very First Light, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006). On LIGO, Paul J. Steinhardt and Neil Turok, Endless Universe: Beyond the Big Bang (London: Phoenix, 2008), 216.

102. David Gooding, “Putting Agency Back into Experiment,” in Science as Practice and Culture, ed. Andrew Pickering (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 65-112. On hands, Raymond Tallis, The Hand: A Philosophical Inquiry into Human Being (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2003).

103. H. Reeves, in L. H. Aller and D. B. McLaughlin, eds., Stellar Structure (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 113-93; cited in Dudley Shapere, “The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy,” Philosophy of Science 49, no. 4 (1982): 485-525; and Einstein, in Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond: Memories of a Life in Science (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971), 63.

104. P. B. Medawar, The Uniqueness of the Individual (New York: Basic Books, 1957), 77.

105. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897), 405, 128, 127, 129.

106. William James, to Charles Renouvier, 1876, The Letters of William James, ed. Henry James, 2 vols. (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), 1:188; and Pragmatism, in Writings, 1902-1910 (New York: Library of America, 1987), 508. Shadworth H. Hodgson, The Metaphysic of Experience, 4 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1898; New York: Garland, 1980), 1:74, 75, 118, 83, 88. See also Holly Anderson, “The Hodgsonian Account of Temporal Existence,” in The Routledge Handbook of Temporal Experience, ed. Ian Phillips (London: Routledge, 2017), 69-81.

107. William James, A Pluralistic Universe, in Writings, 758-59; and The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1950), 1:606-7.

108. Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), 55. I discuss Oakeshott's idea of experience in “Experience in Experience and Its Modes” in Education and Conversation: Exploring Oakeshott’s Legacy, ed. David Bakhurst and Paul Fairfield (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 27-45.

109. Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, 37.

110. Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, 17, 324-25.

111. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), §12; and Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, 1.4.6. On English philosophy, Beyond Good and Evil, §252.

112. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §§22, 21. Elsewhere he acknowledges his point about causality as Hume's. “Hume was right; habit (but not only that of the indi­vidual) makes us expect that a certain often-observed occurrence will follow another: nothing more!” The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), §550. On Hume and Nietzsche, see Daniel Breazeale, Toward a Nihilist Epistemology: Hume and Nietzsche (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975); Peter Kail, “Nietzsche and Hume: Naturalism and Explanation,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 37 (2009): 5-22; Louise Mabille, Nietzsche and the Anglo-Saxon Tradition (London: Continuum, 2011); Peter Poellner, “Causation and Force in Nietzsche,” in Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Babette Babich, 2 vols. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), 2:287-97.

113. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §36.

114. Nietzsche, marginalia, in Robert C. Holub, Nietzsche in the Nineteenth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 403-4.

115. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §21; Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 19.

116. Nietzsche, Nachlass (1885), in Holub, Nietzsche in Nineteenth Century, 396.

117. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, preface.

118. Plato, Sophist, 245e; Nietzsche, The Anti- Christ, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), §14. Elsewhere Nietzsche iden­tifies himself as among “the strictest opponent [s] of all materialism.” On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Maudmarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998), 93. He is probably thinking of F. A. Lange, whose History of Materialism was written as an epitaph for what he thought was a refuted approach to philosophy.

119. Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in a Nonmoral Sense,” in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, trans. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Much of Nietzsche’s argument in this unpublished writing was borrowed, even verbatim, from Gustav Gerber, Die Sprache als Kunst (1871-72). See Christian J. Emden, Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005).

120. Nietzsche, “Truth and Lying,” 145.

121. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, preface, §4.

122. Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (1881; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), §§453, 501; Human, All Too Human, trans. Marion Faber (1878; Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), preface, §4; The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), §51.

123. Nietzsche, Gay Science, §110.

124. Nietzsche, Human All Too Human, in Christian J. Emden, Nietzsche’s Naturalism: Philosophy and the Life Sciences in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 58; and Ernst Mach, Knowledge and Error, trans. Paul Foulkes and Thomas J. McCormack, 5th ed. (1926; Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), 157. Bacon made the same point earlier. “The arts of discovery grow in solidity and truth” when they “grow together with what has been discovered up to that point.” He deplores the idea that arts of discovery “can be devised and presented as complete from the beginning,” which he describes as “fat­uous and narrow-minded.” Advancement of Learning, in Guido Giglioni, “Learning to Read Nature: Francis Bacon’s Notion of Experiential Literacy,” Early Science and Medicine 18, nos. 4-5 (2013): 423.

125. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 123.

126. Gay Science, §324; and letter to Dr. O. Eiser, January 1880, in Daniel W Smith, Essays on Deleuze (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 329.

127. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §1.

128. Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, Third Essay, §§24, 27. I discuss Nietzsche’s idea of truth in Truth in Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), chap. 3.

129. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §116; Ecce Homo, 96; Twilight of the Idols, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 205; and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 24.

130. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), in Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, ed. H. B. Acton (London: Dent, 1977), 115, 122. Nietzsche carefully read Mill’s “Socialism,” “Labor and Its Claims,” and “Subjugation of Women” in translations by Sigmund Freud. Holub, Nietzsche in Nineteenth Century, 159. On disparaging references to Mill, Holub, 202-3. George Eliot described her fictions as “experiments in life,” which she explained as “an endeavor to see what our thought and emotion may be capable of—what stores of motive, actual or hinted as possible, give promise of a better life after which we may strive.” Selections from George Eliot’s Letters, ed. Gordon S. Haight (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 466. Zola's “experimental novel” aspires to demonstrate “the reciprocal effect of society on the individual and the individual on society, showing by experiment in what way a passion acts in a certain social condition.” Emile Zola, “The Experimental Novel” (1879), in Philipp Erchinger, Artful Experiments: Ways of Knowing in Victorian Literature and Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), 101-2.

131. Mill, On Liberty, 130; Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §224; see also §215.

132. Paul K. Feyerabend, Problems of Empiricism, vol. 2 of Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 67, 71n, 73; and Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1995), 227.

133. George Edward Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), 28-29, 30.

134. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 6.

135. Bertrand Russell, “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” (1914), in Mysticism and Logic, and Other Essays (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), 155; Problems of Philosophy, 32; “On the Nature of Acquaintance” (1914), in Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert Charles Marsh (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956), 128.

136. Mark Sainsbury, Russell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 202.

137. Anil Gupta, Empiricism and Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 145. In a later work Gupta takes a more generous view of Russell's sense-data theory, and even praises the idea that appearances are crucial for fixing meaning. Conscious Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 23.

138. Tyler Burge, Origins of Objectivity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 126; also 137-38.

139. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007), 31, 17.

140. Daston and Galison, Objectivity, 43, 29. “We need very much a name to describe a cultivator of science in general. I should incline to call him a Scientist.” William Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, 2 vols. (London: John W Parker; Cambridge: J. and J. J. Deighton, 1840), 1:113.

141. Helmholtz, in Michael Friedman, “Scientific Philosophy from Helmholtz to Carnap and Quine,” in Creath, Rudolf Carnap, online (unpaginated); and Helmholtz, Science and Culture, ed. D. Cahan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 342-80. I also draw from Daston and Galison, Objectivity, 253. John F. W Herschel in 1830 also argued that sense perceptions are signs conveyed from their objects “by a wonderful, and, to us, inexplicable mechanism.” The “phenomena... are only sig­nals.” Preliminary Discourse, §§74, 76.

142. Ernst Mach, Analysis of Sensations, trans. C. M. Williams, revised by S. Waterlow (5th ed., 1914; London: Routledge, 1996), 369.

143. Michael Friedman, “Overcoming Metaphysics: Carnap and Heidegger,” in Origins of Logical Empiricism, ed. Ronald N. Giere and Alan W Richardson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 45-79; Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, in A. W Carus, Carnap and Twentieth-Century 'Thought: Explication as Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 83n.

144. Cassirer, in Carus, Carnap, 86, 87.

145. Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, and Rudolph Carnap, The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle (1929; Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973), 11.

146. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: Victor Gollancz, 1936), 35.

147. Michael Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 94.

148. Peter Galison, “Constructing Modernism: The Cultural Location of Aufbau” in Giere and Richardson, Origins of Logical Empiricism, 17-44. On modernization, see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).

149. Carnap, in Galison, “Modernism,” 34.

150. I draw from Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, 6-10; Leszek Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought, trans. Norbert Guterman (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968), 145; and Henri Poincare, Science and Hypothesis, trans. George Bruce Halsted (1902; New York: Science Press, 1929), 65. On conventionalism before Poincare, see Warren Schmaus, Liberty and the Pursuit of Knowledge: Charles Renouviers Political Philosophy of Science (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018), 113-24.

151. Carnap, in Carus, Carnap, 115, 116, 168.

152. Carnap, in Carus, Carnap, 204; and The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, trans. Rolf A. George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), §100.

153. Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language” (1932), in Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer (New York: Free Press, 1959), 76; Logical Structure of the World, §§16, 177; and Philosophy and Logical Syntax (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1935), 20.

154. Carnap, Logical Construction of the World, §§16, 66.

155. Max Newman, “Mr Russell's Causal Theory of Perception,” Mind 37, no. 146 (1928): 137-48; Emile Meyerson, The Relativistic Deduction: Epistemological Implications of the Theory of Relativity, trans. David A. Sipfle and Mary-Alice Sipfle (1925; Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), 111-12. This excellent argument has been revived in the critique of computationalism. Symbols must “have an actual inter­pretation in order for there to be something substantive for their formal manipula­tion to proceed independently of. Without a semantic character to be kept crucially in the wings, the formal symbol manipulation construal would collapse into va­cuity.” Brian Cantwell Smith, On the Origin of Objects (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 15.

156. Andrew G. Van Melsen, The Philosophy of Nature, 3rd ed. (1953; Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1961), 201-2, 205, 216.

157. Bas van Fraassen, “From a View of Science to a New Empiricism,” in Images of Empiricism, ed. Bradley Monton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 368; and The Empirical Stance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 259 n. 29; and Gupta, Conscious Experience, 325.

158. Carnap, “Protocol Statements,” 153.

159. Peter Galison, How Experiments End (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 248. On the diversity of experiments in natural science, see Rom Harre, Great Scientific Experiments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

160. Ian Hacking, “The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences,” in Pickering, Science as Practice and Culture, 54; Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, trans. Fred Bradley and Thaddeus J. Trenn (1935; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 89. For a development of Fleck's ethnographical approach to science, see Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).

161. Fleck, Scientific Fact, 97; Galison, How Experiments End, 254 (my emphasis).

162. Sir John Herschel, in William Sheehan, Planets and Perception: Telescopic Views and Interpretations, 1609-1909 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 14; Fleck, Scientific Fact, 95-96.

163. Fleck, Scientific Fact, 85, 86.

164. Isabelle Stengers, “Comparison as a Matter of Concern,” Common Knowledge 17, no. 1 (2011): 50; The Invention of Modern Science, trans. Daniel W Smith (1993; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 89; and Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

165. Latour, Politics of Nature, 195-96.

166. C. S. Peirce, “The Essentials of Pragmatism,” in Philosophical Writings, ed. Justus Buchler (New York: Dover, 1955), 252; and The Collected Papers of Charles Saunders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-58), 1:336; Foucault, Essential Works, 3:240. Writing of himself, Peirce said he “may almost be said to have inhabited a laboratory from the age of six... and having all his life associated mostly with experimentalists.” Collected Papers, 5:411.

167. Hobbes, De Corpore, 15.7.

168. Mach, Knowledge and Error, 108, 146, 105. The mistake in considering Mach a pos­itivist is well exposed in Eric C. Banks, The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

169. Kolakowski, Alienation of Reason, 120-21.

170. Galen, in David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 11.

171. Kepler, in Laura J. Snyder, Eye of the Beholder: Johannes Vermeer, Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, and the Reinvention of Seeing (New York: W W Norton, 2015), 140; and in Lindberg, Theories of Vision, 200, 203.

172. J. J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), 60; George Berkeley, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, in Philosophical Works (London: J. M. Dent, 1975), §88.

173. William Molyneux, in Pastore, Theories of Visual Perception, 68; Berkeley, New Theory of Vision, §§41, 158; Condillac, in Pastore, Theories of Visual Perception, 113.

174. Johannes Muller, Elements of Physiology, trans. William Baly (1838; London: Taylor and Walton, 1842), 1065.

175. Helmholtz, in Theo C. Meyering, Historical Roots of Cognitive Science: The Rise of a Cognitive Theory of Perception from Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 186.

176. Kohler, in Pastore, Theories of Visual Perception, 304; Gibson, Visual Perception, 54, 55, 217; and Reasons for Realism: Selected Essays of J. J. Gibson, ed. Edward Reed and Rebecca Jones (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1982), 75; and Semir Zeki, A Vision of the Brain (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific, 1993), 15, 77-78, 142.

177. Gibson, Visual Perception, 226.

178. Harre, Scientific Experiments, 140.

179. Gibson, Visual Perception, 219, and Reasons for Realism, 178, 183; Horace Barlow, “Single Units and Sensation: A Neuron Doctrine for Perceptual Psychology,” Perception 1, no. 4 (1972): 373; and Mohan Matthen, Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 51.

180. Gibson, Visual Perception, 127; Reasons for Realism, 289. On Gibson's experimental work, see Harre, Scientific Experiments, 137-39.

181. Jakob von Uexkull, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, trans. Joseph D. O'Neil (1934; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 96; Wolfgang Metzger, Laws of Seeing, trans. Lothar Spillmann, Steven Lehar, Mimsey Stromeyer, Michael Wertheimer (1936; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 56.

182. On this theory of concepts, see Jesse J. Prinz, Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); Edouard Machery, “Concept Empiricism,” Cognition 104, no. 1 (2007): 19-46; and Pierre Jacob, “Action-Based Accounts of Perception,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, ed. Mohan Matthen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 217-36.

183. Christopher Peacocke, A Study of Concepts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 61; Martin Davies, “Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92, no. 1 (1992): 22; John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 36, 11. Daniel Dennett describes this so-called perceptual propositionism as a case of “misprojecting the categories of language back on to the activities of the brain too enthusiastically.” Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), 365.

184. Tim Crane, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?,” Philosophical Quarterly 590, no. 236 (2009): 456-57.

185. J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 11; Pierce, Collected Papers, 7:622, 619. Austin's argument is reimagined for cognitive science by Charles Travis, “The Silence of the Senses,” Mind 113, no. 449 (2004): 57-94.

186. Lambert Wiesing, The Philosophy of Perception: Phenomenology and Image Theory, trans. Nancy Ann Roth (2009; London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 89.

187. Wiesing, Philosophy of Perception, 90, 106, 94.

188. Probably nothing alive does not learn from experience. Internet searches easily find numerous studies of experiential learning in, for instance, plants or bacteria.

Conclusion to Part I

1. See Raymond Williams, “Empirical” and “Experience,” in Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 115-17, 126-29. “Among the most difficult words in the language” (115).

2. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 99b; Nifo, in Paolo Palmieri, “On Scientia and the Regressus” in Routledge Companion to Sixteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Benjamin Hill (New York: Routledge, 2017), 329.

3. Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (1967; New York: Norton, 1973), 111-14.

4. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Experience,” in Essays and Lectures, ed. Joel Porte (New York: Library of America, 1983), 471, 483.

5. Alcmaeon, in Plato, Phaedo, 96b; and Michael Frede, “An Empiricist View of Knowledge: Memorism,” in Epistemology, ed. Stephen Everson, Companions to Ancient Thought, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 238, 245, 246.

6. Hippocrates, Techne, in Jacques Jouanna, “Rhetoric and Medicine in the Hippocratic Corpus,” in Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen, trans. Neil Allies, ed. Philip van der Eijk (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 45.

7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a. On the popularity of Democritus in the sev­enteenth century, see Christoph Luthy, “The Fourfold Democritus on the Stage of Early Modern Science,” Isis 91, no. 3 (2000): 443-79.

8.Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 10.32.

Chapter 4

1. George Santayana, in Francesca Bordogna, William James at the Boundaries: Philosophy, Science, and the Geography of Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 67.

2.Bordogna, William James, 75.

3. William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover, 1956), 14; and Essays in Radical Empiricism, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1971), 84, 106.

4. See Thomas Hill Green, Hume and Locke (1874; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968). On James and Green, see Alexander Klein, “On Hume on Space: Green's Attack, James's Empirical Response,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 47, no. 3 (2009): 415-49.

5. William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1950), 1:244­45; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby- Bigge, 2nd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 636; and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1977), 50.

6. James, “Reflex Action and Theism,” in Will to Believe, 132-33. On Peirce's animadversions against nominalism, see Aaron Bruce Wilson, Peirce’s Empiricism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 62-68. W V. Quine thinks it was only after taking on nominalism that empiricism became a serious scientific philosophy. “Five Milestones of Empiricism,” in Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 67-72.

7. C. S. Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Saunders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-58), 6:348, 191, 193.

8. Peirce, Collected Papers, 5:492; 4:157.

9. James, Principles of Psychology, 1:224, 245, 247.

10. Claude Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 57.

11. Hans Blumenberg, The Genesis of the Copernican World, trans. Robert M. Wallace (1975; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 440; and Aristotle, Physics, 247b.

12. James, Principles of Psychology, 1:609; Peirce, Collected Papers, 4:172.

13. James, A Pluralistic Universe, in Writings, 1902-1910 (New York: Library of America, 1987), 758.

14. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897), 27, 28, 29.

15. James, The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism, in Writings, 826; and Essays in Radical Empiricism, 27.

16. James, Pluralistic Universe, 776, 649.

17. Elizabeth Bishop, “Over 2,000 Illustrations and a Complete Concordance,” in Poems (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 57; Gilles Deleuze, “Lucretius and Naturalism,” in The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester (1969; New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 267; Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, trans. W H. D. Rouse, re­vised by Martin Ferguson Smith, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), book 1, ll. 633-34.

18. Wendell T Bush, Avenarius and the Standpoint of Pure Experience (New York: Science Press, 1905), 33, 34; and William James, Notebook (1895-96), in David C. Lamberth, William James and the Metaphysics of Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 84.

19. James, Principles of Psychology, 1:488; and Wesley Cooper, The Unity of William James’s Thought (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002), 44.

20. Nicholas Pastore, Selective History of Theories of Visual Perception, 1650­1950 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 117-18, 120; Michael J. Morgan, Molyneux’s Question: Vision, Touch, and the Philosophy of Perception (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 110, 112. Ever since the cognitive revolution, psychology has expressed skepticism about the value of the distinction between sensation and perception.

21. Mohan Matthen, Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical 'Theory of Sense Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 67; Semir Zeki, A Vision of the Brain (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific, 1993), 177, 182; and Robert L. Gladstone and Lisa A. Byrge, “Perceptual Learning,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, ed. Mohan Matthen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 812-32.

22. James, Principles of Psychology, 2:6, 77.

23. James, Principles of Psychology, 1:224.

24. James, Radical Empiricism, 50.

25. James, Radical Empiricism, 15, 40.

26. Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensation, trans. C. M. Williams and Sydney Waterlow (1896; New York: Dover, 1959), 16. See also Eric C. Banks, The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

27. On James's pure experience and the connection to Mach, Banks, Realistic Empiricism, chap. 3. James himself speaks of stuff—“ Thought and reality are made of one and the same stuff, which is the stuff of experience in general.” He also denies it— “Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and does not denote a specific stuff or way of being.” Radical Empiricism, 113, 16.

28. The objection is raised by Marcus Peter Ford, William James’s Philosophy: A New Perspective (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), 89. For another reply, see Cooper, Unity of James’s Thought, 42, 46.

29. James, Meaning of Truth, 898, 899; and Marian C. Madden and Edward H. Madden, “William James and the Problem of Relations,” Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society 14, no. 4 (1978): 241.

30. James, Meaning of Truth, 883, 900. What James says of “the bridge of intermediaries” transporting reference anticipates a point of Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, trans. Catherine Porter (2012; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). “Continuity is always the effect of a leap across discontinuities; immanence is always attained by a paving of minuscule transcendences” (267). Writing elsewhere Latour aligns himself with James's radical empiricism. “What we have to do, if we want to be faithful to what William James called radical empiricism, is to deny the claims of the ‘bifurcators' [who divide nature into primary and secondary qualities] to represent common sense and to speak in the name of science.” What Is the Style of Matters of Concern? (Assen: Royal Van Gorcum, 2005), 38.

31. James, Pluralistic Universe, 725; and see Donald Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” in Inquiries Concerning Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 183-98.

32. Bertrand Russell, “On the Nature of Acquaintance” (1914), in Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert Charles Marsh (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956), 139, 149.

33. James, Meaning of Truth, 967; Russell, “Nature of Acquaintance,” 148. Within five years of this blistering attack Russell abandons the principle of acquaintance and reformulates his theory of knowledge along the very lines he strenuously attacked in James. See Robert E. Tully, “Three Studies of Russell's Neutral Monism,” Russell 13 (1993): 5-35,185-202.

34. John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1934), 175.

35. Russell, “Nature of Acquaintance,” 169, 127; The Problems of Philosophy (1912; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 32. There is good discussion of Russell's ac­quaintance model of experience in Anil Gupta, Conscious Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 16-31.

36. John Grote, Exploratio Philosophia (London: Deighton, 1865), 60; in James, Meaning of Truth, 838.

37. James, Principles of Psychology, 1:221, 2:7; Meaning of Truth, 851; and “Reflex Action and Theism,” 122-23. On “acquaintance,” see also John Wild, The Radical Empiricism of William James (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969).

38. James, Some Problems of Philosophy, in Writings, 1031.

Chapter 5

1. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W Scott Palmer (1896; Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004), 239-40, 240-41.

2. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (1907; Mineola, NY: Dover, 1998), 363; The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (1934; Mineola, NY: Dover, 2007), 147.

3. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 8; Creative Evolution, 186.

4. Henri Bergson, The Philosophy of Poetry: The Genius of Lucretius, trans. Wade Baskin (1884; New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).

5. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 9; Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (1983; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 9; and Bergson, Creative Mind, 158-59.

6. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (1985; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 180.

7. Bergson, Creative Mind, 105; Matter and Memory, 241.

8. Deleuze, Movement-Image, 64.

9. William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1950), 1:149.

10. Bergson, Matter and Memory, viii.

11. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 233, 232. Bergson's theory of perception as virtual ac­tion has been unknowingly rediscovered more than once. See Alva Noe, Action in Perception (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004); and Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

12. William James, “Reflex Action and Theism” (1881), in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover, 1956), 114.

13. Tyler Burge, Origins of Objectivity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 226, also 292-93; and Bergson, Matter and Memory, 261.

14. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 285.

15. Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will, trans. F. L. Pogson (1889; Mineola, NY: Dover, 2001), 34. Affective feeling accompanies practically all perception; see Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2003), 93.

16. David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1977), 9-10.

17. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 71.

18. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 171, 125.

19. On the relation of perception, memory, and action see my Striking Beauty. A Philosophical Look at the Asian Martial Arts (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), esp. chap. 3.

20. C. S. Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Saunders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-58), 6:495, 195; and an unpublished ms. (1909), in Aaron Bruce Wilson, Peirces Empiricism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 53.

21. Tendencies are what Nancy Cartwright calls capacities, and which, like Peirce, she regards as the substance of what is lawlike in nature. Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Tendencies are to the virtual as causa­tion is to the actual, which is why Deleuze refers to the power of the virtual as a quasi­cause. The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester (1969; New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

22. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 99; Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1050a. “The priority of act assures the absolutely dominant role of form, for Aristotelian act and form are understood to coincide.” Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian “Metaphysics”, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1978), 409. Thomas Aquinas introduced what is probably the inaugural concept of virtual to re­solve problems in Aristotle’s concept of potential. See Ernan McMullin, “Four Senses of Potency,” in The Concept of Matter, ed. Ernan McMullin (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1963), 295-315.

23. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 118.

24. Bergson, Mind-Energy, trans. H. Wildon Carr (1919; New York: Henry Holt, 1920), 71.

25. Bergson, Creative Mind, 102.

26. Bergson, Creative Mind, 155. My analysis of Bergson’s contribution to radical empir­icism does not require the details of his philosophy of time, which I hope to treat in a monograph.

27. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 241; Creative Mind, 163, 139, 165.

28. Jacques Maritain, Redeeming the Time (London: Centenary Press, 1943), 65; Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, trans. M. L. Anderson (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), 66; Bergson, Creative Mind, 36, 110; and Bergson, Mind-Energy, 77. See also R. C. Grogin, The Bergsonian Controversy in France, 1900-1914 (Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press, 1988).

29. “[Duration] implies consciousness; and we place consciousness at the heart of things for the very reason that we credit them with a time that endures.” Henri Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, trans. Leon Jacobson (1922; New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 49.

30. William Ockham, in Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1987), 750; and Peter King, “Two Conceptions of Experience,” Medieval Philosophy and 'Theology 11, no. 2 (2003): 203-26. “Error of empiricism,” Bergson, Matter and Memory, 239.

31. William James to F. C. S. Schiller, June 13, 1907, in William James: Selected Unpublished Correspondence, 1885-1910, ed. Frederick J. Down Scott (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1986), 442; and Pragmatism, in Writings, 1902-1910 (New York: Library of America, 1987), 574, 579. For an account of James and Bergson much in James's favor, see Horace M. Kallen, William James and Henri Bergson: A Study in Their Contrasting Theories of Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1914); also my “The Use of Useless Knowledge: Bergson against the Pragmatists,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (2013): 37-59.

32. On the relation of Bergson's thought to the indeterminacy that quantum physics attributes to nature, see Milic Capek, Bergson and Modern Physics (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1971), 284-91.

33. Bergson, Matter and Memory, xvii; Creative Mind, 38. Bergson was not an orthodox Darwinist, but his deviations left lots of Darwin's theory intact.

34. See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), §355. Bergson almost never refers to Nietzsche, except once, when he refers to “Nietzsche's mistake.” The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton (1932; Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 278.

Chapter 6

1. John Dewey, The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981-88), 1:361; and Art as Experience (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1934), 34. See also John E. Smith, “The Reconception of Experience in Peirce, James, and Dewey,” The Monist 68, no. 4 (1985): 538-54.

2. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920; Boston: Beacon, 1957), 95.

3. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, in Later Works, 4: 90, 91; and Reconstruction in Philosophy, 91.

4. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 87, 90; Quest for Certainty, 91.

5. John Dewey, “The Need for Recovery in Philosophy,” in The Middle Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), 10:26; Art as Experience, 147; Quest for Certainty, 99.

6. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 2nd ed. (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1929), 341, 284; and Quest for Certainty, 79.

7. “What does not kill him makes him stronger.” Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 77.

8. Dewey, Art as Experience, 46, 274.

9. Dewey, Experience and Nature, xv, 16.

10. Dewey, Art as Experience, 281, 267.

11. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 282.

12. Dewey, Art as Experience, 28, 29.

13. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 340, 341; Quest for Certainty, 171.

14. Dewey, Art as Experience, 151, 185, 152.

15. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 345.

16. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 105, 314; Art as Experience, 26.

17. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 315, 290.

18. Dewey, Art as Experience, 346, 348; and Experience and Nature, 168-69. Arnold's words are “Poetry is at bottom a criticism oflife.” Matthew Arnold, preface, The Poems of Wordsworth (London: Macmillan, 1879).

19. Dewey, Quest for Certainty, 84.

20. Rudolf Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography,” in The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1963), 18, 16.

21. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, ix; and Quest for Certainty, 177.

22. Dewey, Quest for Certainty, 73; and Reconstruction in Philosophy, 66.

23. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 113-14.

24. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt, 1938), 68; and Late Works, 14:31.

25. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 283-84.

Chapter 7

1. Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 232; Joan Wallach Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry 17, no. 4 (1991): 779; Richard Rorty, Philosophy as Cultural Politics, vol. 4 of Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 11. See also Jules David Law, The Rhetoric of Empiricism: Language and Perception from Locke to

I. A. Richards (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

2. Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1971), 223; Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (1967; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 152; and Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1967; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 60, 61-62.

3. W V Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1961).

4. Donald Davidson, “The Myth of the Subjective,” in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 39-52; W W Quine, Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 39, 72.

5. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 75; Davidson, Truth, Language, and History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 49; and Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, 146; Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, vol. 1 of Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 150.

6. Donald Davidson, Inquiries Concerning Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 194.

7. Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, trans. Rolf A. George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), v; Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 128.

8. Sellars, “Empiricism,” 140, 169, 167.

9. Thomas Hill Green, Hume and Locke (1874; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), §§34, 237, 66, 24. Dewey's graduate supervisor at Johns Hopkins was George S. Morris, an Oxford student of Green's.

10. Sellars, “Empiricism,” 167.

11. Sellars, “Empiricism,” 168, 176, 162. On nominalism in Sellars, see Johanna Seibt, Properties as Processes: A Sympathetic Study of Wilfrid Sellars’ Nominalism (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1990), who describes his work as a “unique example of radical and systematic nominalism” (42).

12. Sellars, “Empiricism,” 196, 172. See also the account of Sellars's argument in Anil Gupta, Conscious Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 34-50.

13. Sellars, “Empiricism,” 169; and Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress, vol. 3 of Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 141.

14. I touch on arguments developed in my Knowledge and Civilization (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004). For another philosopher exasperated by Sellars's exaggeration of language, see Tyler Burge, Origins of Objectivity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 139n, 282-83.

15. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1009b; Alexander and Philoponus, in The Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus: Fragments. A Text and Translation with a Commentary, C. C. W. Taylor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 146, 145.

16. Aristotle, De Anima, 418a, 416b.

17. Gassendi, in Saul Fisher, Pierre Gassendi’s Philosophy and Science: Atomism for Empiricists (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 11; John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. N. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 2.32.3.

18. Plotinus, Enneads, 3.6.1, in Eyjolfur Kjalar Emilsson, “Plotinus on Sense Perception,” in Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Pekka Karkkainen (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 31; Pseudo-Simplicius, in Active Perception in the History of Philosophy, ed. J. F. Silva and M. Yrjonsuuri (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2014), 74.

19. See Simo Knuuttila, “Aristotle's Theory of Perception and Medieval Aristotelianism,” in Knuuttila and Karkkainen, Perception Medieval and Modern, 1-22; and Peter Adamson, “Non-discursive Thought in Avicenna's Commentary on the Theology of Aristotle” in Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam, ed. Jon McGinnis (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 87-111. Authorship of the Theology of Aristotle was not contested until the sixteenth century, and not traced to Plotinus until the nine­teenth. Plotinus’ Legacy: The Transformation of Platonism from the Renaissance to the Modern Era, ed. Stephen Gersh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 260.

20. Sellars, “Empiricism,” 157; and C. C. W Taylor, “All Perceptions Are True,” in Pleasure, Mind, and Soul: Selected Papers in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), 37. See also Klaus Corcilius, “Activity, Passivity, and Perceptual Discrimination in Aristotle,” in Silva and Yrjonsuuri, Active Perception, 31-53; and Miira Tuominen, “On Activity and Passivity in Perception,” in Silva and Yrjonsuuri, 55-78.

21. The question of language and experience in the new pragmatism is the theme of papers gathered in the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 6, no. 2 (2014). See also Steven Levine, Pragmatism, Objectivity, and Experience (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019). On this argument in Foucault, see my “Foucault’s Theory of Knowledge,” in Foucault and Philosophy, ed. T O'Leary and C. Falzon (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 143-61.

22. William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1971), 50.

23. Dewey, “Psychology as Philosophic Method,” in The Early Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, 5 vols. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), 1:172; Experience and Nature, 2nd ed. (La Salle: Open Court, 1929), 143; and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt, 1938), 38, 139. Dewey has been crit­icized for adherence to the Myth of the Given. See Richard Schusterman, “Dewey on Experience,” Philosophical Forum 26 (1994): 127-48; and Colin Koopman, “Conduct Pragmatism: Beyond Experientialism and Lingualism,” European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 14, no. 2 (2014): 145-74.

24. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 283-84.

25. Rorty, Truth and Progress, 150, 292.

26. Rorty, Truth and Progress, 142-43, 148. The expression “linguistic turn” was coined by Gustav Bergmann. Rorty is not associated with the linguistic turn because he took it, or urged philosophers to take it. He is the metaphilosophical observer of the turn. See The Linguistic Turn, ed. Richard M. Rorty, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Much later he described the linguistic turn as “a rather desperate at­tempt to keep philosophy an armchair discipline.” The turn from mind or experience to meaning “was supposed to insure the purity and autonomy of philosophy by pro­viding it with a nonempirical subject matter.” Essays on Heidegger and Others, vol. 2 of Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 50.

27. Sellars, “Empiricism,” 160.

28. Rorty, Heidegger and Others, 115.

29. Jean Wahl, The Pluralist Philosophies of England and America, trans. Fred Rothwell (London: Open Court, 1925), 280. Rorty avers his nominalism in “The Higher Nominalism in a Nutshell,” Critical Inquiry 12, no. 2 (1986): 462-66.

30. William Ockham, in The Concept of Matter, ed. Ernan McMullin (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1963), 330. See also John Boler, “Ockham’s Cleaver,” Franciscan Studies 45 (1985): 119-44. The scientific interest ofthe sheer count of enti­ties quantified in theories is negligible. The sort of reduction that has scientific value is one that eliminates required coincidences. See Tim Maudlin, The Metaphysics within Physics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 180-81.

31. Charles S. Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Saunders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-58), 1:19.

32. Archaeological evidence associates Parmenides with an Eleatic tradition of priest­healer, iatromantis, possibly a founder or figurehead associated with a temple at Elea, where the tradition of his name endured for five hundred years. A bust iden­tifying Parmenides as a phusikos was found in the temple's medical compound amid other evidence of medical practice. Thomas Rickert, “Parmenides: Philosopher, Rhetorician, Skywalker,” in Logos without Rhetoric: The Art of Language before Plato, ed. Robin Reames (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2017), 47-62; and Vivian Nutton, Ancient Medicine (London: Routledge, 2004), 46.

33. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999), 55, 48; Truth and Progress, 298.

Chapter 8

1. For an exception, see the chapter on Deleuze in A. W Moore, The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), chap. 21.

2. Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (2002; Los Angles: Semiotext(e), 2004), 142. On Deleuze and empiri­cism, see Bruce Baugh, “Transcendental Empiricism: Deleuze's Response to Hegel,” Man and World 25, no. 2 (1992): 133-48; and “Deleuze and Empiricism,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 24, no. 1 (1993): 15-31; Patrick Hayden, Multiplicity and Becoming: The Pluralist Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze (New York: Peter Lang, 1998); Martin Bell, “Transcendental Empiricism? Deleuze's Reading of Hume,” in Impressions of Hume, ed. Marina Frasca-Spada and P. J. E. Kail (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 95-106; Levi Bryant, Difference and Givenness: Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008); Marc Rolli, Gilles Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism, trans. Peter Hertz-Ohmes (2012; Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2016); and David Lapoujade, Aberrant Movements: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, trans. Joshua David Jordan (2014; South Pasadena, CA: Semiotext(e), 2017), chap. 4.

3. Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, trans. Constantin V Boundas (1953; New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 107-8. For an introduction to Deleuze on Hume, see Jon Roffe, Gilles Deleuze’s Experience and Subjectivity (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2016).

4. Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, 99; and Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (1977; New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 57.

5. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 55; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 1.3.8. Compare Odo Marquard, Farewell to Matters of Principles, trans. Robert M. Wallace (1981; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Aristotle defines arche: “It is common to all principles to be the first point from which a thing either is, or comes to be, or is known; of these, some are immanent in the thing while others are outside.” Metaphysics, 1013a. On the Ionian arche, see Charles H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960).

6. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (1991; New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 82, 140.

7. Francois Dosse, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, trans. Deborah Glassman (2007; New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 318; Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 259. For an example of what Deleuze is referring to, see Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 109-33.

8. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (1968; New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), xx; and Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, in Guido Giglioni, “Learning to Read Nature: Francis Bacon's Notion of Experiential Literacy,” in Medical Empiricism and Philosophy of Human Nature in the 17th and 18th Century, ed. Claire Crignon, Carsten Zelle, and Nunzio Allocca (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 431.

9. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 101, 111.

10. Deleuze, Desert Islands, 142.

11. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 144.

12. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 143.

13. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 57; and Benjamin Paul Blood, in William James, “A Pluralistic Mystic,” in Writings, 1902-1910 (New York: Library of America, 1987), 1312.

14. Jean Wahl, The Pluralist Philosophies of England and America, trans. Fred Rothwell (London: Open Court, 1925), 117; and James, “Pluralistic Mystic,” 1312-13. Deleuze reminisces about Wahl in Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 57-58. On Deleuze and James, see Deleuze and Pragmatism, ed. Sean Bowden, Simone Bignall, and Paul Patton (New York: Routledge, 2015).

15. William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1971), 24; Pragmatism, in Writings, 600, 614; and A Pluralistic Universe, in Writings, 776.

16. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 59, 57; Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (1985; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 180; Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (1980; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 25.

17. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 57; and Empiricism and Subjectivity, 120, 121.

18. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 59.

19. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (1953; Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), §198. There is a large literature on this problem in Wittgenstein, much of it departing from Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). Kripke compares Wittgenstein's paradox of rule following to Nelson Goodman's “grue” paradox. All the past is equally consistent with green and grue in the next instance. The next emerald is no more likely to be green than blue, that is, grue, like all the rest. See Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, 4th ed. (1955; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).

20. Deleuze, Time-Image, 275.

21. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 98.

22. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§49, 110. “ ‘So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?'—It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life” (§241).

23. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1054b. Compare Plato: “What is different is always so called with reference to another thing... whatever is different, as a necessary consequence, is what it is with reference to another,” Sophist, 255c-d. On auto kath auto, see the anal­ysis in Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 72-76.

24. Deleuze, Desert Islands, 89. On Deleuze and Simondon, see Alberto Toscano, “Gilbert Simondon,” in Deleuze’s Philosophical Lineage, ed. Graham Jones and Jon Roffe (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2005), 380-96. Hylomorphism was never supposed to be a physical explanation. It was felt to be enough to explain the unity and endurance of substances. Late scholastic thought lost this thread and tended to treat it as a theory of causal forces, as if an experiment might confirm the hylomor­phism. What happened instead is that all the experiments went the other way. Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 1274-1671 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011), 101.

25. Herbert Spencer might be an exception, though his evolutionary embryology is open to severe objection. See Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (1907; Mineola, NY: Dover, 1998), chap. 4.

26. Gilbert Simondon, L’individuation a la lumiere des notions de forme et d’information (1958), in Andrea Bardin, Epistemology and Political Philosophy in Gilbert Simondon (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), 53.

27. Simondon, “The Position of the Problem of Ontogenesis,” trans. Gregory Flanders, Parrhesia, no. 7 (2009): 6. An alternative translation appears as “The Genesis of the Individual,” trans. Mark Cohen and Sanford Kwinter, in Incorporations, ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 297-319. See also Muriel Combes, Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual, trans. Thomas LaMarre (1999; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 21.

28. Deleuze, Desert Islands, 87; Simondon, “Problem of Ontogenesis,” 5; and Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 239. Simondon does not describe these pre-individuals as virtual, and even criticizes the idea of the virtual, but it is not clear whether the dif­ference from Bergson is substantial or terminological. See Pascal Chabot, “Simondon as a Reader of Bergson,” Angelaki 10, no. 2 (2005): 103-8.

29. Simondon, “Problem of Ontogenesis,” 10, 8-9.

30. Henri Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, trans. Leon Jacobson (1922; New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 63.

31. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 151-52.

32. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 183.

33. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 222; and Rolli, Transcendental Empiricism, 78-79.

34. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (1988; London: Continuum, 2006), 86-87.

35. Karl von Baer, in Ernst Mayr, What Evolution Is (London: Phoenix, 2002), 31-32; and Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 183.

36. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 216, 219. On Deleuze and embryology see Ronald Bogue, “Raymond Ruyer,” in Jones and Roffe, Deleuze’s Philosophical Lineage, 300-316.

37. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 411. Readers looking for an introduction to this work may consult Brent Adkins, Deleuze and Guattaris “A Thousand Plateaus” (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015).

38. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 503, 499. The biologist is G. Ehrensvard, in Leo W Buss, The Evolution of Individuality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 169.

39. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 99.

40. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 20; Gilles Deleuze, “Lecture Course on Creative Evolution, Chapter Three” (1960), Substance 36, no. 3 (2007): 90. See also Bergson, Time and Free Will, trans. F. L. Pogson (1889; Mineola, NY: Dover, 2001), 104, where he explains duration as “pure heterogeneity,” that is original, endless dif­ference, no matter how thinly sliced.

41. James, Pluralistic Universe, 725.

42. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 361.

43. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 373.

44. See Wilbur Richard Knorr, The Ancient Tradition of Geometric Problems (Boston: Birkhauser, 1986).

45. Proclus, Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s “Elements”, trans. Glenn R. Morrow (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 157-58; Reviel Netz, The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 259-60; and Knorr, Tradition of Geometric Problems, 10, 350-52.

46. Deleuze, Time-Image, 174, 175.

47. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 362.

48. Paul K. Feyerabend, Problems of Empiricism, vol. 2 of Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 8. On Babylonia, Francesca Rochberg, The Heavenly Writing: Divination, Horoscopy and Astronomy in Mesopotamian Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 209, 278, 277; and Ulla Susanne Koch, Mesopotamian Divination Texts: Conversing with the Gods (Munster: Ugarit Verlag, 2015), 201. On Buddhism, Antoine Panaioti, Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 39.

49. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 411, 410.

50. Paracelsus and a Danish follower, in William Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature: Books of Secrets in Medieval and Early Modern Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 161-62.

51. Michel Serres, The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mixed Bodies, trans. Margaret Sankey and Peter Cowley (1985; London: Continuum, 2008), 227, 333, 312-13. On cybernetics as a nomadic science, see Andrew Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 31-32.

52. Plato, Sophist, 246c, 248a (emphasis added).

Chapter 9

1. Barry Allen, Vanishing into Things: Knowledge in Chinese Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). On the Needham Problem, see Nathan Sivin, “Why the Scientific Revolution Did Not Take Place in China,” Chinese Science 5 (1982): 45-66; for a statement by Needham, see Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 3: Mathematics and the Sciences of the Heavens and the Earth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 448. See also Benjamin Nelson, “Sciences and Civilizations, East and West,” in On the Roads to Modernity, ed. Toby E. Huff (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), 164-98. Chinese thought is sometimes said to be deter­mined by special features of its language, a thesis Robert Wardy carefully examines and finds insupportable. Aristotle in China: Language, Categories and Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Sinologist Angus Graham observes, “The transient first impression of a fundamental strangeness, a difference in kind, does not survive a prolonged study of Chinese thought.” “China, Europe, and the Origins of Modern Science,” in Chinese Science, ed. Shigeru Nakayama and Nathan Sivan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1973), 62.

2. Ye Shu-Xian, “Jingyan: Three Aspects of Experience,” in Achille Mbembe et al., Keywords: Experience (New York: Other Press, 2004), 73-89; Xianglin Lei, “How Did Chinese Medicine Become Experiential? The Political Epistemology of” Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 10, no. 2 (2002): 333-64.

3. Xunzi, trans. John Knoblock, Library of Chinese Classics (Changsha: Hunan People's Publishing House, 1999), 23.10 (757). This is a bilingual edition with English on alter­nate pages, so page references sometimes have an anomalous range.

4. Citations from Zhang Dainian, Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy, trans. Edmund Ryden (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2002), 482, 483.

5. Wang Chong, Balanced Inquiries, in Zhang, Key Concepts, 484.

6. Mozi, in Angus C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao (Chicago: Open Court, 1989), 37; and Zhang, Key Concepts, 481.

7. Mozi, in Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, ed. Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W Van Norden (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2001), 94.

8. See Anne D. Birdwhistell, “An Approach to Verification beyond Tradition in Early Chinese Philosophy: Mo Tzu's Concept of Sampling a Community of Observers,” Philosophy East and West 34, no. 2 (1984): 175-83.

9. Mozi, in Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Classical Chinese Philosophy, 95; Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 38; and Jane Geaney, The Epistemology of the Senses in Early Chinese Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 57. The eleventh- century neo- Confucian Zhang Zai takes up Mozi’s argument about spirits, reaching the opposite conclusion. See Anne D. Birdwhistell, “The Concept of Experiential Knowledge in the Thought of Chang Tsai,” Philosophy East and West 35, no. 1 (1985): 37-60.

10. Mozi, in Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 138.

11. Mozi, in Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 141.

12. The notion of Chinese “schools” has to be taken with a grain of salt. See Kidder Smith, “Sima Tan and the Invention of Daoism,” Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 1 (2003): 129-56; and Nathan Sivin, “On the Word ‘Taoist’ as a Source of Perplexity,” History of Religions 17, nos. 3-4 (1978): 303-30.

13. Xunzi, 22.5 (713), and Geaney, Epistemology of the Senses, 39.

14. Xunzi, 713-15.

15. Xunzi, in Geaney, Epistemology of the Senses, 51, 19. See also Anne D. Birdwhistell, “Knowledge Heard and Seen: The Attempt in Early Chinese Philosophy to Analyze Experiential Knowledge,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 11, no. 1 (1984): 67-82.

16. Xunzi, 21.1 (671-73).

17. Mozi, in Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 140.

18. Mozi, in Christoph Harbsmeier, Language and Logic, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), vol. 7, part 1, 339; Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 154; and Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science (1978; Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003), 32, 416.

19. Sunzi Art of War, in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (New York: Basic Books, 1993). A good study ofthis material for philosophers is Francois Jullien, The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone Books, 1999); also my Vanishing into Things, chap. 3.

20. Joseph Needham, The Great Titration: Science and Society in East and West (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), 283.

21. Guanzi, trans. Zhai Jianyue (Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005), chap. 29 (665); The Book of Lord Shang, trans J. J. L. Duyvendak (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2006), 325. On the legalists, see Hsiao-po Wang and Leo S. Chang, The Philosophical Foundations of Han Fei’s Political Theory (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986); and Roger T Ames, The Art of Rulership: A Study of Chinese Political Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).

22. Guanzi, chap. 13 (309), chap. 74 (1399-1401).

23. The Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons, trans. Leo S. Chang and Feng Yu (Changsha: Yuele Publishing House, 2006), 2.2 (77); The Spring and Autumn of Lu Buwei, trans. Zhai Jianyue (Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005), 13.5 (451-52); 13.1 (417).

24. The Huainanzi, trans. and ed. John S. Major, Sarah A. Queen, Andrew Seth Meyer, and Harold D. Roth (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 9.14 (308); 9.22 (318-19); and cited in Geaney, Epistemology of the Senses, 25-26.

25. Guanzi, chap. 77 (1487); Huainanzi, 9.3 (313); Guanzi, chap. 9 (189).

26. Guanzi, chap. 45 (949).

27. Guanzi, chap. 49 (991); Needham, Great Titration, 17; Kiyosi Yabuuti, “Chinese Astronomy: Development and Limiting Factors,” in Nakayama and Sivan, Chinese Science, 91-103; and Ho Peng-Yoke, “The Astronomical Bureau in Ming China,” Journal of Asian History 3, no. 2 (1969): 137-57. Thatcher E. Deane, “Instrumental Observation at the Imperial Astronomical Bureau during the Ming Dynasty,” Osiris 9, no. 1 (1994): 126-40, has details on the instrumentation of the Astronomical Bureau at this time. On the association with the observatory at Maragha, Benjamin A. Elman, On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 67-68.

28. Nathan Sivin, Cosmos and Computation in Early Chinese Mathematical Astronomy (Leiden: Brill, 1969), 9; and Yabuuti, “Chinese Astronomy,” 97.

29. Nathan Sivin, “On the Limits of Empirical Knowledge in Chinese and Western Science,” in Medicine, Philosophy, and Religion in Ancient China (New York: Variorum,

1995), 181, 170; Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons, 161; Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 319; and Joanna Grant, A Chinese Physician: Wang Ji and the Stone Mountain Medical Case Histories (Milton Park: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 85.

30. Li Kan, Zhupu xiang lu (Ji Nan: Shangdong Hua Bao, 2006).

31. The Study of Human Abilities: The “Jen Wu Chih” of Liu Shao, trans. J. K. Shryock (New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 1937; rpt. New York: Krauss, 1966).

32. Sung Tz'u (Song Ci), The Washing Away of Wrongs: Forensic Medicine in Thirteenth Century China, trans. Brian E. McKnight (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1981), 27. On the European office of coroner, see R. F. Hunnisett, The Medieval Coroner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).

33. Washing Away of Wrongs, 72, 62.

34. Washing Away of Wrongs, 134-36.

35. Washing Away of Wrongs, 20-21.

36. Huainanzi, 767; Ancient Chinese Encyclopedia of Technology: The Artificers’ Record (Kaogong ji), trans. Jun Wenren (London: Routledge, 2013), 3; Shen Kuo, in Ira E. Kasoff, The Thought of Chang Tsai (1020-1077) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 23-24; and citations in Needham, Civil Engineering and Nautics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), iii. Extant technical literature also includes the Important Arts for the People’s Welfare (Qi men yao shu) (sixth cen­tury CE), which describes many processes of industrial chemistry. In the Song dy­nasty, poet Su Dongpo wrote a classic of viticulture; Ho Peng Yoke, Explorations in Daoism: Medicine and Alchemy in Literature, ed. John P. C. Moffett and Cho Sungwu (London: Routledge, 2007), 141.

37. Needham, Great Titration, 23, 38, 211-12. On the lack of experimental records, see Jin Guantao, Fan Hongye, and Liu Qingfeng, “Factors Delaying the Development of Science and Technology in China,” in Chinese Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, ed. Fan Dainian and Robert S. Cohen (Dordrecht: Kluwer,

1996), 158; and Lin Wenzhao, “Chinese Studies of the History of Science and Technology in China,” in Dainian and Cohen, 200.

38. Guanzi, trans. A. Allyn Rickett, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985-98), 1:326; Joseph Needham, Clerks and Craftsmen in China and the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 145-46.

39. Francis Bacon, in Guido Giglioni, “Learning to Read Nature: Francis Bacon's Notion of Experiential Literacy,” Early Science and Medicine 18, nos. 4-5 (2013): 433.

40. A sixteenth-century pharmacopeia describes four such methods. Investigation in a modern laboratory determined that one of them produces highly pure steroids, another does so less successfully, and the other two yield therapeutically inert substances. H. T. Huang, Eloy Rodriguez, V. Torres, and F. Gafner, “Experiments on the Identity of Chiu shi (Autumn mineral) in Medieval Chinese Pharmacopoeias,” Pharmacy in History 32, no. 2 (1990): 63-65. On the Chinese laboratory see Ho Ping- yu and Joseph Needham, “The Laboratory Equipment of the Early Medieval Chinese Alchemists,” Ambix 7, no. 2 (1959): 58-112; and Nathan Sivin, “Science and Medicine in Chinese History,” in Heritage of China, ed. Paul S. Ropp (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 186.

41. Needham, Great Tritation, 68; and Nathan Sivin, Chinese Alchemy: Preliminary Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). The root-form of the word chymeia is from the Chinese word for gold, jin, kiem, or kim, according to dialects. Through maritime contact with Arabs this becomes alkimiya. Ho Peng Yoke, Explorations in Daoism, 136.

42. Needham, Spagyrical Discovery and Invention: Physiological Alchemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 255-57. On Go Hung, Alchemy, Medicine, Religion in the China of A.D. 320: The Nei P’ien of Ko Hung, trans. James R. Ware (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966). See also Fabrizio Pregadio, Great Clarity: Daoism and Alchemy in Early Medieval China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).

43. Sivin, Chinese Alchemy, 35-36.

44. Sivin, Chinese Alchemy, 50, 51, 150, 167.

45. Needham, Magisteries of Gold and Immortality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 14-15; Spagyrical Discovery and Invention, 293; and Apparatus, Theories, and Gifts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 261, 243; Michael Puett, To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinization in Early China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 115-16. On Chinese metallurgy, see Ursula Franklin, John Berthrong, and Alan Chan, “Metallurgy, Cosmology, Knowledge: The Chinese Experience,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12, no. 4 (1985): 333-69; and Qiu Lianghui, “Preliminary Study of the Characteristics of Metallurgical Technology in Ancient China,” in Dainian and Cohen, Chinese Studies, 219-41. On Bacon and al­chemy, see Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (1957; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 21-22; William R. Newman, Promethean Ambitions: Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); and my Knowledge and Civilization (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004), chap. 3.

46. Donald J. Harper, Early Chinese Medical Literature: The Mawangdui Medical Manuscripts (London: Kegan Paul International, 1998), 44, 55-57, 63, 65. For an­other cache of medical manuscripts, though from a later era, that gives further in­sight into medicine beyond the Yellow Emperor tradition, see Medieval Chinese Medicine: The Dunhuang Medical Manuscripts, ed. Vivienne Lo and Christopher Cullen (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005). On the impact these caches of medical manuscripts has had on the field of the history of Chinese medicine, see Vivienne Lo, “But Is It History of Medicine? Twenty Years in the History of the Healing Arts of China,” Social History of Medicine 22, no. 2 (2009): 283-303.

47. Innovation in Chinese Medicine, ed. Elisabeth Hsu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 316; Nathan Sivin, “Text and Experience in Classical Chinese Medicine,” in Knowledge and the Scholarly Medical Traditions, ed. Don Bates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 177-204; and Huangdi Neijing: Synopsis with Commentaries, trans. Y. C. Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010).

48. Christopher Cullen, “Yian Case Statements: The Origin of a Genre of Chinese Medical Literature,” in Hsu, Innovation in Chinese Medicine, 309.

49. Shigehisa Kuriyama, The Expressiveness of the Body and the Divergence of Greek and Chinese Medicine (New York: Zone Books, 1999), 40. The first important Chinese medical text to appear in Europe, Specimen medicinae sinicae, 1682, included several Chinese texts on the treatment of pulse conditions. See Marta Hanson and Gianna Pomata, “Medicinal Formulas and Experiential Knowledge in the Seventeenth Century Epistemic Exchange between China and Europe,” Isis 108, no. 1 (2017): 1-25.

50. Sun Simiao, in Medieval Chinese Medicine: The Dunhuang Medical Manuscripts, ed. Vivienne Lo and Christopher Cullen (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 182; Yellow Emperor, in Kuriyama, Expressiveness of the Body, 179; see also 180-81.

51. Grant, Chinese Physician, 76; Cullen, “Yian Case Statements,” 309, 311. On the re­markable parallel of Chinese and European medical “cases” in the sixteenth cen­tury, see Gianna Pomata, “The Medical Case Narrative in Pre-modern Europe and China: Comparative History of an Epistemic Genre,” in A Historical Approach to Casuistry, ed. Carlo Ginzburg and Lucio Biasiori (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 15-43.

52. Asaf Goldschmidt, The Evolution of Chinese Medicine: Song Dynasty, 960-1200 (London: Routledge, 2009), 45. On literati interest in swords and martial arts, see my Striking Beauty: A Philosophical Look at the Asian Martial Arts (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), chap. 1.

53. Goldschmidt, Evolution of Chinese Medicine, 41; also 20-23, 50.

54. Goldschmidt, Evolution of Chinese Medicine, 44, 46, 56, 59. On ruyi (Confucian physicians), see Yuan-ling Chao, Medicine and Society in Late Imperial China: A Study of Physicians in Suzhou, 1600-1850 (New York: Peter Lang, 2009).

55. Zhu Zhenheng, in Charlotte Furth, “The Physician Philosopher of the Way: Zhu Zhenheng 1282-1358,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 66, no. 2 (2006): 451.

56. Kathlyn Maurean Liscomb, Learning from Mount Hua: A Chinese Physician’s Illustrated Travel Record and Painting Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 63-64, 88, 91, 127.

57. William Cooper and Nathan Sivin, “Man as a Medicine,” in Nakayama and Sivan, Chinese Science, 203-72.

58. Goldschmidt, Evolution of Chinese Medicine, 109, 111, 114-15.

59. Elman, On Their Own Terms, 5, 57-58.

60. Emile Littre, Oeuvres completes d’Hippocrate, 10 vols. (Paris, 1839-61).

61. See G. E. R. Lloyd, “Epistemological Arguments in Early Greek Medicine,” in Bates, Scholarly Medical Traditions, 25-40; and Don Bates, “Scholarly Ways of Knowing,” in Bates, Scholarly Medical Traditions, 1-22.

62. William Gilbert, On the Magnet, Magnetick Bodies also, and on the Great Magnet the Earth; a new Physiology, Demonstrated by many Arguments & Experiments, trans. Charles Whittingham, ed. Silvanus P. Thompson (1600; Adelaide: eBooks@Adelaide, 2014); and William Harvey, On the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals, trans. Robert Willis, revised by Alexander Bowie (Adelaide: eBooks@Adelaide, 2014), unpaginated.

63. Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings, trans. Brook Ziporyn (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2009), 140. On Daoist history and practice, see Louis Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

64. On “effortless efficacy,” see Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: Wu-Wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). I discuss this concept at length in Vanishing into Things.

65. Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (1934; Mineola, NY: Dover, 2007), 22; and Zhuangzi, in Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Classical Chinese Philosophy, 229.

66. Zhuangzi, in Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Classical Chinese Philosophy, 217; and Bergson, Creative Mind, 148-49.

67. Bergson, Creative Mind, 21-22; and Zhuangzi, in Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Classical Chinese Philosophy, 217.

68. Zhuangzi, in Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Classical Chinese Philosophy, 242; and Livia Kohn, Sitting in Oblivion: The Heart of Daoist Meditation (Dunedin, FL: Three Pines Press, 2010).

69. Daodejing, chaps. 12, 49, 35. I follow The Daodejing of Laozi, trans. Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2003).

70. Huainanzi, 74 (244); 1.13 (66).

71. Daodejing, 55; Zhuangzi, in Geaney, Epistemology of the Senses, 170.

72. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W Scott Palmer (1896; Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004), 276; and Huainanzi, 6.3 (219); 1.13 (64).

73. Huainanzi, 7.3 (248, 243).

74. Master Sun’s Art of War, chap. 6; and The I Ching or Book of Changes, trans. C. F. Barnes (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1967), 323, 287.

75. Francois Jullien, Living Off Landscape, or The Unthought-of in Reason, trans. Pedro Rodriguez (London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2018); Mitukuni Yosida, “The Chinese Concept of Nature,” in Nakayama and Sivan, Chinese Science, 89; Teng Ch'un, Hua chi (1167), in Susan Bush, The Chinese Literati on Painting (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2012), 21.

76. Yuan dynasty painter T'ang Hua, in Yosida, “Chinese Concept of Nature,” 89; and in Bush, Chinese Literati on Painting, 128.

77. Jullien, Living Off Landscape, 99, 47, 91, 49, 54.

78. Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, The Janus Faces of Genius: The Role of Alchemy in Newton’s Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 94-95. See also Ernan McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978).

79. William Harvey, De generatione animalium, in The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, ed. Roger French and Andrew Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 94; Galileo, Letter to Piero Dini, March 23, 1615, in William R. Shea, “Galileo's Atomic Hypothesis,” Ambix 17, no. 1 (1970): 20-21.

80. Samuel Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), 36, 5.

81. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 295, 320, 297.

82. Yosida, “Chinese Concept of Nature,” 71-89. For one version of this natural phi­losophy, see Lo Ch'in-shun, Knowledge Painfully Acquired, trans. Irene Bloom (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 172; also the discussion in Vanishing into Things, 195-99.

83. Analects, 7.28; in The Analects, trans. Simon Leys (New York: W W Norton, 2014), 20.

84. Confucius, Analects, 5.28. Unless otherwise indicated, I follow the translation in Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Classical Chinese Philosophy. See also Franklin Perkins, “Love of Learning in the Lun Yu” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 33, no. 4 (2006): 505­15; and Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Thinking and Learning in Early Confucianism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17, no. 4 (1990): 473-93.

85. Analects, 19.6, 5.15, 19.5, 6.3, 17.8.

86. Zhang Zai, in Kasoff, Chang Tsai, 88; Wilhelm Dilthey, Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding, trans. Richard M. Zaner and Kenneth L. Heiges (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 17.

87. Lo, Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 120; and Zhu Xi, in Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2000), 52-53; and in Hsi Chu, Learning to Be a Sage, trans. Daniel K. Gardner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 133, 157.

88. Birdwhistell, “Knowledge Heard and Seen,” 68; and Zhang Zai, in Birdwhistell, “Experiential Knowledge,” 52. See also Steven C. Angle and Justin Tiwald, Neo­Confucianism: A Philosophical Interpretation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), chap. 6.

89. Zhang Zai, in Angle and Tiwald, Neo-Confucianism, 113.

90. Zhang Zai, in Birdwhistell, “Experiential Knowledge,” 38, 39.

91. Zhuangzi, in Geaney, Epistemology of the Senses, 170.

92. Shen Kuo, in Kasoff, Chang Tsai, 31; and Mencius, in Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Classical Chinese Philosophy, 6A15. In an alternative translation, “Thinking is not the office of the eyes and ears, and they are clouded by things. Things interact with things and pull them astray. That is all. The office of the heart is thinking.” Geaney, Epistemology of the Senses, 20.

93. Shen Kuo, Kasoff, Chang Tsai, 31.

94. Zhu Xi, in Angle and Tiwald, Neo-Confucianism, 117, 118.

95. Angle and Tiwald, Neo-Confucianism, 116-17, 119.

96. Daxue and Zhongyong, trans. Ian Johnston and Wang Ping (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2012), 135.

97. Cheng Yi, cited by Zhu Xi, in Daxue, 151. It seems right to conclude, with D. C. Lau, thatge wu “definitely means ‘to examine things closely.' ” “A Note on ‘ke wu,' ” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 30, no. 2 (1967): 356. But Needham probably goes too far when he describes the ge wu text ofthe Greater Learning as “the frank charter for the natural sciences.” Botany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 214.

98. Cheng Yi, in Dainian, Key Concepts, 454; Wang Fuzhi, in Dainian, 457. I pass over Wang Yangming's different understanding of ge wu, which I discuss in Vanishing into Things, chap. 5.

99. Cheng Yi, in A. M. Alpert, “Knowledge and Cosmos in the Philosophies of Mach and Cheng I: An Analysis of the Cognitive Structures of Empiricism in Two Cultures,” Philosophy East and West 30, no. 2 (1980): 172; and Lo Ch'in-shun, Letter to Wang Yangming, in Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 177. On li as Platonic, Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 482-507. For the view I take, see A. C. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers: Cheng Ming-Tao and Cheng Yi-Chuan (London: Lund Humphries,

1958) ; and Brook Ziporyn, Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and Coherence in Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its Antecedents (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013).

100. Needham, Botany, 214.

101. Li Shizhen, Bengao gangmu, 1596, in Georges Metailie, “The Bencao Gangmu of Li Shizhen,” in Hsu, Innovation in Chinese Medicine, 223. On the Confucian “rectifica­tion of names,” see Analects, 13.3, and Vanishing into Things, 30-33.

102. Metailie, “Li Shizhen,” 242; see also Cooper and Sivin, “Man as a Medicine,” 263; and Elman, On Their Own Terms, 59.

103. Michel Serres, The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mixed Bodies, trans. Margaret Sankey and Peter Cowley (1985; London: Continuum, 2008), 333; Mencius, 1A7, in Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Classical Chinese Philosophy, 121.

104. Complete Works of Hanfeizi, trans. W K. Liao, 2 vols. (London: Arthus Probsthain,

1959), 2:328; Bergson, Creative Mind, 19.

105. Analects, 13.4.

106. On ethical work and the practice of the self, see Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, vol. 2 of The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1985).

107. Angus Graham describes as “a general assumption of Chinese philosophy” that “‘Know!' is the supreme imperative.” Disputers of the Tao, 146. “Supreme” seems extravagant—supreme over harmony, over ren? The problems of ren are not essen­tially or exclusively problems of knowledge. Chinese tradition is bullish on know­ledge, which is obviously worthy, certainly better than ignorance, but also elusive and not without dangers of its own. Allowed to become unbalanced, it is as one­sided as any vice.

108. James Bridle, The New Dark Age: Technology and the End of the Future (London: Verso, 2018), 185.