References

Armendt, B. 1993. “Dutch Books, Additivity and Utility Theory.” Philosophical Topics 21.1: 1-20.

Arntzenius, F., A. Elga, and J. Hawthorne. 2004. “Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding.” Mind 113.450: 1-34.

Bertrand, J. 1888. Calcul des Probabilites. Paris: Gauthier-Villars.

Cardano, G. 1663. The Book on Games of Chance. English translation in O. Ore, Cardano: The Gambling Scholar. New York: Dover, 1965 [1953].

Carnap, R. 1950. Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Carnap, R. 1963. Replies and Systematic Expositions. La Salle, IL: Open Court.

Christensen, D. 1991. “Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs.” Philosophical Review 100.2: 229-47.

Christensen, D. 1996. “Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Con­sistency for Partial Believers.” Journal of Philosophy 93.9: 450-79.

Colyvan, M., H.M. Regan, and S. Ferson. 2001. “Is it a Crime to Belong to a Reference Class?” Journal of Political Philosophy 9.2: 168-81.

Cox, D.R. 1955. “A Use of Complex Probabilities in the Theory of Stochastic Processes.” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 51: 313 -19.

de Finetti, B. 1931a. “On the Subjective Meaning of Probability.” In P. Monari and D. Cocchi (eds.), Induction and Probability. Bologna: Clueb, 1993.

de Finetti, B. 1931b. “Probabilism.” Published in English in Erkenntnis 31 (1989): 169-223.

de Finetti, B. 1974. Theory of Probability, vol. 1. Wiley Classics Library. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1990.

Dickson, M. 2001. “Quantum Logic is Alive ë (It Is True v It Is False).” Philosophy of Science 68.3: S274 - 87.

Eagle, A. 2004. “Twenty-One Arguments Against Propensity Analyses of Probability.” Erkenntnis 60: 371- 416.

Earman, J. 1992. Bayes or Bust? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Eells, E. and B. Fitelson. 2002. “Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support.” Philosophical Studies 107.2: 129-42.

Elga, A. 2000. “Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.” Analysis 60.2: 143-7.

Fetzer, H. 1981. Scientific Knowledge: Causation, Explanation, and Corroboration. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Feynman, R.P. 1987. “Negative Probability.” In B.J. Hiley and F. David Peat (eds.), Quantum Implications: Essays in Honour of David Bohm, New York: Routledge.

Fine, T. 1973. Theories of Probability. New York: Academic Press.

Fitelson, B. 2006. “Logical Foundations of Evidential Support.” Philosophy of Science 73: 500 -12.

Gillies, D. 2000a. Philosophical Theories of Probability. New York: Routledge.

Gillies, D. 2000b. “Varieties of Propensity.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51: 807-35.

Hacking, I. 1967. “Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability.” Philosophy of Science 34.4: 311-25.

Hacking, I. 1971. “Equipossibility Theories of Probability.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22.4: 339-55.

Hajek, A. 1997. “‘Mises Redux’ - Redux: Fifteen Arguments against Finite Frequentism.” Erkenntnis 45: 209-27.

Hajek, A. 2003. “What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.” Synthese 137.3: 273-323.

Hajek, A. 2007a. “Dutch Book Arguments.” In P. Anand, P. Pattanik, and C. Puppe (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hajek, A. 2007b. “Interpretations of Probability.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/ probability-interpret/ (accessed March 18, 2008).

Hajek, A. 2007c. “The Reference Class is Your Problem Too.” Synthese 156: 563-85.

Hajek, A. Forthcoming. “Arguments For - or Against - Probabilism.” In F. Huber and C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Humphreys, P. 1985. “Why Propensities Cannot Be Probabilities.” Philosophical Review 94: 557-70.

Jaynes, E.T. 1967. “Foundations of Probability Theory and Statistical Mechanics.” In M.

Jaynes, E.T. 1973. “ The Well Posed Problem.” Foundations of Physics 4.3: 477-92.

Jeffrey, R.C. 1983. The Logic of Decision. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Johnson, W.E. 1921. Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Joyce, J. 1998. “A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.” Philosophy of Science 65: 575 - 603.

Keynes, J.M. 1921. A Treatise on Probability. London: Macmillan.

Kolmogorov, A.N. 1933. Foundations of Probability. New York: Chelsea Publishing Company, 1950.

Laplace, P. 1814. A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities. New York: Dover, 1951.

Levi, I. 1980. The Enterprise of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lewis, D. 1980. “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.” In R.C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, vol. 2. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lewis, D. 1999. “Why Conditionalize?” In D. Lewis (ed.), Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Maher, P. 1993. Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marinoff, L. 1994. “A Resolution of Bertrand’s Paradox.” Philosophy of Science 61.1: 1-24.

Mikkelson, J.M. 2004. “Dissolving the Wine/Water Paradox.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55: 137-45.

Miller, D.W. 1994. Critical Rationalism. A Restatement and Defence. La Salle, IL: Open Court.

Miller, D.W. 1996. “Propensities and Indeterminism.” In A. O’Hear (ed.), Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nover, H. and A. Hajek. 2004. “Vexing Expectations.” Mind 113: 237-49.

Poincare, H. 1902. Science and Hypothesis. New York: Dover, 1952.

Popper, K.R. 1938. “A Set of Independent Axioms for Probability.” Mind 47.186: 275-7.

Popper, K.R. 1955. “Two Autonomous Axiom Systems for the Calculus of Probabilities.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6.21: 51-7.

Popper, K.R. 1957.

Popper, K.R. 1959a. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books.

Popper, K.R. 1959b. “The Propensity Interpretation of Probability.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10.37: 25-42.

Popper, K.R. 1990. A World of Propensities. Bristol: Thoemmes.

Putnam, H. 1968. “Is Logic Empirical?” In R. Cohen and M. Wartofsky (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 5. Dordrecht: Reidel, 216 - 41.

Ramsey, F. 1931. “Truth and Probability.” In R.B. Braithwaite (ed.), Foundations of Mathematics and Other Essays. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 156-98.

Reichenbach, H. 1949. The Theory of Probability. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Renyi, A. 1955. “On a New Axiomatic Theory of Probability.” Acta Mathematica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 6: 286 - 335.

Renyi, A. 1970. Foundations of Probability. San Francisco, CA: Holden-Day, Inc.

Roeper, P. and H. Leblanc. 1999. Probability Theory and Probability Logic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Schick, F. 1986. “Dutch Bookies and Money Pumps.” Journal of Philosophy 83.2: 112-19.

Seidenfeld, T., M.J. Schervish, and J.B. Kadane. 2001. “Improper Regular Conditional Distributions.” Annals of Probability 29.4: 1612-24.

Shackel, N. 2007. “Bertrand’s Paradox and the Principle of Indifference.” Philosophy of Science 74: 150 - 75.

Shafer, G. 1976. A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Shannon, C.E. and W. Weaver. 1962. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Skyrms, B. 1980. Causal Necessity. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Skyrms, B. 1984. Pragmatics and Empiricism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Sober, E. 2008. “Evolutionary Theory and the Reality of Macro Probabilities.”

In E. Eells and J. Fetzer (eds.), Probability in Science. La Salle, IL: Open Court. van Fraassen, B. 1984. “Belief and Will.” Journal of Philosophy 81.5: 235-56. van Fraassen, B. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. van Fraassen, B. 1995. “Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens.”

Philosophical Studies 77: 7-37.

Venn, J. 1876. The Logic of Chance. 2nd edn. London: Macmillan and Co. von Mises, R. 1957. Probability, Statistics and Truth. New York: Macmillan. Weatherson, B. 2003. “From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability.” Notre Dame

Journal of Formal Logic 44.2: 111- 23.

Weatherson, B. 2005. “Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70: 613 - 35.