IN SECTIONS 1 TO 3 of the present chapter I turn to four speculativeviews about simplicity that do not assert that nature is simple or that the simplicity of a theory provides epi- stemic grounds for belief.
These include: (i) that theories are underdetermined by evidence, and so must be selected on the basis of simplicity; (ii) that in conducting their inquiries, scientists must presuppose that nature is simple; (iii) that it is the aim of science to present theories that are simple; and (iv) that simplicity is a scientific virtue worthy of having for its own sake.
Each of these views, I argue, has serious problems. In section 4, I consider the idea that simplicity is a pragmatic virtue. This I take to be its most important role, one that I illustrate by showing its use in various speculations made by Maxwell in developing his molecular-kinetic theory of gases. In the remainder of the chapter I consider Newton's use of simplicity in his argument for the law of gravity. Despite the fact that Newton appeals to simplicity in this argument, I argue that these appeals carry no ontological or epistemicweight, only a pragmatic one, and that the law, contrary to Newton's claim, was a speculation, albeit a grand one.
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More on the topic IN SECTIONS 1 TO 3 of the present chapter I turn to four speculativeviews about simplicity that do not assert that nature is simple or that the simplicity of a theory provides epi- stemic grounds for belief.:
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