Achinstein P.. Speculation: Within and about Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press,2019. — 297 p.. 2019

Newton urged scientists never to speculate, only to prove by establishing experimental facts. By contrast, Einstein urged scientists to speculate freely, since only daring speculations, not experimental facts, can advance science. Who, if either, is right? Is speculation a legitimate part of science, even in the absence of testing? If so, can speculations be evaluated without testing? How? To answer these questions it must first be determined what counts as a speculation, a task not usually investigated by those who express strong views about speculation. InSpeculation, Peter Achinstein develops the basic idea that speculating involves introducing assumptions, under certain "theorizing" conditions, without knowing that there is evidence for those assumptions. This idea is made precise by utilizing a concept of "evidence" Achinstein has introduced in previous writings and also explains here. With this concept, Achinstein defends a view according to which, by contrast with Newton, speculations are crucial in science, and by contrast with Einstein, they are subject to constraints. The latter include pragmatic ones, reflecting the particular aims of the scientist in speculating, and epistemic ones that are subject to a different standard then "evidence sufficient for belief." This viewpoint is illustrated and evaluated by critically examining historical and contemporary speculations in fundamental physics as well as more general speculations within or about science, including these: nature is simple, and simplicity is a sign of truth (Newton, Einstein); a theory can only be tested "holistically" (Duhem and Quine); and there is, and must be, a "Theory of Everything" (string theorists and reductionists).

Books and textbooks on the discipline Philosophy of Science and Technology:

1. Allen B.. Empiricisms: Experience and Experiment from Antiquity to the Anthropocene. Oxford University Press,2021. — 527 p. - 2021 ãîä
2. Alger Bradley E.. Defense of the Scientific Hypothesis: From Reproducibility Crisis to Big Data. Oxford University Press,2020. — 449 p. - 2020 ãîä
3. Aguirre A., Foster B., Merali Z. (Eds.). What is Fundamental? Springer,2019. — 189 p. - 2019 ãîä
4. Agazzi E. (ed.). Varieties of Scientific Realism: Objectivity and Truth in Science. Springer,2017. — 411 pp. - 2017 ãîä
5. Alai M., Buzzoni M., Tarozzi G. (eds.). Science Between Truth and Ethical Responsibility: Evandro Agazzi in the Contemporary Scientific and Philosophical Debate. Springer,2015. — 337 pp. - 2015 ãîä
6. Ackermann R.J.. Data, Instruments, and Theory: A Dialectical Approach to Understanding Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press,2014. — 230 p. - 2014 ãîä
7. Achinstein P.. Evidence, Explanation, and Realism: Essays in Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press,2010. — 344 p. - 2010 ãîä
8. Allhoff F.. Philosophies of the Sciences: A Guide. N.-Y.: Wiley-Blackwell,2010. — 386 p. - 2010 ãîä
9. Agassi Joseph. Science in Flux. Springer,1975. — 559 p. - 1975 ãîä