Fixing Ideas
Let me start by specifying what I regard as the form of institutional racism with respect to which the no-individual-is-to-blame thesis is most plausible. It is the kind of covert institutional racism that occurs when a social institution E whose policies are officially colorblind,2 actually has a covert racist goal G (for example the perpetuation of racial hierarchy) and is organized in such a way that it promotes G through its normal operation, without any of its office holders having to share G or harbor racially objectionable attitudes.3
To clarify: E’s policies count as officially colorblind in virtue of the fact that they are not overtly discriminatory and make no explicit reference to race.
E counts as intrinsically racist in virtue of the fact that it has a racist goal and as racially oppressive in virtue of the combination of its purpose and effect: it aims at preserving racial inequality and contributes materially to the realization of this goal. E was founded or given its current shape at some point by a group of agents (the “founders”) who were themselves racist and intended for E to have a racist goal and organized E so that it would actualize that goal. E’s founders were aware of E’s racist goal. E’s current office holders are not aware that E has a racist goal.G is covert in virtue of the following: (i) the founders did not publicly acknowledge that E has G or any racist goal; (ii) its current office holders do not know that it has a racist goal; (iii) its goals were and are represented as exclusively nonracist and benign. The proximal explanation of how E’s officers are able to participate in its structures without admitting its racism is found in the covertness of its goals and the colorblindness of its policies. The underlying explanation can be found in the fact that E’s normal operation depends on an ideology, specifically, the ideology of colorblindness.4 This ideology consists in a normative and descriptive idea.
The normative idea is that individuals and institutions ought to be colorblind, that is, not “see race” and see “just people” instead. The idea of “not seeing race” is that of not registering the racial categories to which individuals are assigned. The idea of seeing “just people” is that of viewing individuals as individuals rather than members of racial groups. The descriptive idea is that society is colorblind in the sense of being free of social structures that maintain racial stratification. The corollary of this idea is the notion that such racial inequalities as there are, are due to the voluntary choices or culture of individuals. It is ultimately because E’s officers are in the grip of this ideology that they cannot see E’s racism.Goal G can be attributed to the institution E because (a) the institution was specifically founded or given the shape it has by its founders in order to promote this goal and because (b) it is organized in such a way as to actually promote this goal through its normal operation. E has this goal despite the circumstance that its current office holders fail to recognize this fact. E itself is best understood as a social artifact (something made by human activity as opposed to natural processes), one function of which is to promote the subordination of members of a particular racial group or groups.5 This function is one that E is designed to have: E is intended to serve this function and was specifically made or modified to do so.6 Just as agents can invest a physical object with a certain physical make-up (for example, a can opener) with a certain end (opening cans) that it continues to have after its manufacturer has left the scene, so too can agents invest a social object (for example, an institution) organized in a particular way with an end that it continues to have after its founders departure from the stage.
The fact that G is E’s goal can be brought out most clearly by considering the special case in which E promotes G despite the fact that none of its officers share G or hold racist attitudes.
Of course, the idea of a racist institution with no racist operatives is an idealization. In the real world, the pervasiveness of racial hostility and contempt is such that at least some of a racist institution’s officer holders are virtually bound to harbor racist attitudes. The crucial point for our purposes, however, is that, although E’s racist operation may be buttressed and even enhanced by the racist attitudes of its officers, the existence of these attitudes is incidental to the fact that E promotes G, since, by hypothesis, E is organized—structured—in such a way that it will actualize this goal whether or not any of its officers are themselves personally racist.7 Because this form of institutional racism can promote racial inequality in the absence of personal racism on the part of office holders, it can be called attitude-independent institutionaI racism (attitude-independent racism for short). It is “structural” in that it is rooted in the purpose and organization of institutions that exhibit it in the ways we have just seen. It can, accordingly, also be called structural institutional racism.3Two clarifications. First, it is not part of the idea of attitude-independent racism that institutions exhibiting it would (continue to) be racist and racially oppressive if all of their officers were anti-racist (Cf. Glasgow 2009: 73). Institutional racism that could survive in the face of officers “wholly committed to eliminating their racist institutions” could be called attitude-invulnerable institutional racism (Glasgow 2009: 73). But attitude-independence is not attitude invulnerability. To my knowledge, no theorist who conceives of institutional racism in structural terms thinks of it as attitude-invulnerable. Second, it is not part of the idea of an E-like institution that such an institution could actualize its malefic goal without being supported by racial indifference.9 By and large, theorists who conceive of institutional racism in structural terms have not attended to the way in which this attitude might figure in the reproduction of racist structures.10 Now with respect to attitude-independent racism, Haslangers basic point is well-taken.
When institutions are E-like, the structures themselves are the problem. The fundamental explanation of their promotion of racist ends is found in the way in which they are organized, not the “bad attitudes” of their officers (Haslanger 2014). If we want to eliminate the racial inequality to which the institutions contribute, we should focus less on changing their office holders’ “bad attitudes” and more on changing their structure. Blaming role occupants is simply a misallocation of political energy. So far so good. But Haslanger goes further. She suggests that, when institutions are racist, no individual is to blame (Haslanger 2004: 103). We are now in a position to examine whether this is true in the case of E-like institutions.
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