Grounding Collective Obligations in Demands on Individuals

The problems for the capacity response all suggest that it is the moral agency of the members of non-agential groups that make it seem plausible that such groups have obligations.

Uncertain Success: Like OffshoreWind,but the boat looks leaky and difficult to handle and the adults are unsure whether an attempt to use it to save all would be successful. If they tried, they could find themselves struggling with a useless sinking boat, having wasted their chance to save their own children while they were within swimming distance. (In fact, a joint attempt to save all would have been difficult but ultimately successful.)

Assume that the pro tanto agent-relative duty of each parent to save her own child outweighs the possibility of saving all, such that a parent’s participation in a joint attempt would at most be permissible, not required. Unlike in Offshore Wind, it now seems false that the group has an obligation to save all the children. Based on this contrast, it seems that if it cannot be morally demanded of the members of the group that they react and act in ways that would result in a group’s action, then that action cannot be demanded of the group.¹ Moreover, it is not clear how the agent-relative duties of the parents can provide the group, understood as an inde­pendent duty bearer, with reasons outweighing the prospect of saving many more of the chil­dren. This suggests that three’s obligation is grounded in individual obligations, which are in turn grounded in the moral issue at hand and the group’s capacity to handle that issue through some combination of individual actions.

This grounding suggestion conflicts with Wringe’s (2016) claim that, phenomenologically, individual obligations in cases like Offshore Wind depend on the collective obligation. But it allows that concrete individual obligations to contribute to a collective outcome are dependent on various collective matters. In Offshore Wind, for example, individual obligations to act and react in various ways in light of what others do depend on the fact that (a) it is important that two or more adults team up to save the child, which in turn depends on the fact that (b) if two or more adults wanted to save all the children, they would. In other cases, individual obligations depend on such things as members’ implication in a collective harm or the importance of a joint promise being kept. It is not clear that phenomenology requires more dependence than this.

If a group’s obligation to φ is grounded in obligations of individuals, we need answers to these two questions:

(1) What are the relevant individual obligations?

(2) How must they be related to the group’s φ-ing?

Regarding the latter, one might think that if the individuals discharge their obligations, this should make it sufficiently likely that they φ (Aas 2015; Collins 2013). Alternatively, one might think that in order for the group to have an obligation to φ rather than merely an obligation to try to φ, the satisfaction of their individual obligations must ensure, under the circumstances, that they φ (Bjornsson 2014; Forthcoming; cf. Pinkert 2014).

But most work has been focused on the former question, regarding what individual obligations ground group obligations. Since, as we saw in section 9.1, individual obligations to actually participate in or help bring about φ-ing are dependent on what other members will do, the relevant individual obligations will have to be farther removed from contributions to actual φ-ing. It has thus been suggested that a group’s obligation to φ is grounded in the fact that the group would φ, or would be sufficiently likely to φ, if members discharged their indi­vidual obligations to:

take steps to collectivize: to transform the group into a group agent that has as its own obligation to φ (Collins 2013; cf.

we-reason: to identify φ-ing as the optimal solution to a problem that group members cannot solve individually and to deduce their own individual actions based on this (Schwenkenbecher 2018; 2019);³

be prepared to do their part in φ-ing should they be sufficiently certain that others would as well (Aas 2015)⁴; or

care to the right extent about what is morally at stake, in the sense of being disposed to (i) pick up information about what reactions and actions tend to promote what is morally important and (ii) be moved by such information when opportunity arises (Bjornsson 2014; Forthcoming).⁵

Though these proposals all violate the agency requirement, they suggest a principled way of explaining why collective obligations are not subject to this requirement while individual obligations are: it is specifically basic obligations—obligations to we-reason or care, say—that require rich forms of agency. Moreover, each proposal seems to get cases like Offshore Wind right. At least at a first glance, it seems plausible that each of the three adults has an obligation to care about the predicament of the children, to be prepared to collaborate with the others, to think about how they can together best solve the problem at hand, and, assuming that the others discharge these obligations, to take steps to come together with the others in some con­stellation or other in a coordinated effort to save all children based on a shared understanding of the situation. And it seems likely that if they all discharged these duties, they would indeed save all the children. Each proposal also seems to capture the fact that what concrete actions can be demanded of the individuals will depend on what the others do, as well as the fact that the obligation to save all disappears in Uncertain Success.

As we shall see, however, the first three of these proposals fail to account for at least two kinds of intuitively compelling cases of group obligations.

Visible Helplessness: It is true of each adult that were she to consider ways of saving all the children, she would immediately see that the other two would not be interested in a joint effort and that any sufficient effort to convince them would risk her own child.

The additional features of Visible Helplessness seem to do nothing to undermine three’s obli­gation : together they can save all, and they would if they all wanted to. This is in line with the caring proposal, as it seems plausible that the individuals can be required to care about survival of all the children in the relevant dispositional sense, and that this would ensure that they saved all. But contrary to the collectivization, we-reasoning, and preparedness proposals, the individuals have no obligations to we-reason, take steps to collectivize, or be prepared to act with the others should they be willing to contribute.

In the second kind of problem case, the discharging of a collective obligation requires no collaborative coordination in relation to a joint goal. In discharging paradigmatic individual duties—such as duties not to steal, lie, or kill—we rarely have this as a goal around which we coordinate our actions: for most of us, the idea of stealing, lying, or killing never comes up.

The same seems true about various group obligations. The divorced parents might discharge their obligation to preserve a reasonable relationship by being sensible and respectful without even considering the possibility that their relationship would turn sour. Similarly for:

Ferry Ride: A small ferry would capsize if many of its passengers moved laterally in sync. On this ride, as on most, almost all passengers are sitting quietly after a hard day’s work.

Even if the possibility is too remote to consider, they could easily capsize the ferry if they wanted to. In light of this, it is plausibly their obligation not to. This is very much in line with the caring proposal, as it seems both (i) that it can be demanded of the passengers that they care about what is bad about capsizing, and (ii) that if the passengers do care, this would ensure that they don’t capsize the ferry (cf. Bjornsson 2014; Forthcoming). But the group’s obligation not to capsize the ferry conflicts with the preparedness, we-reasoning, and collectivization proposals. Absent any present danger, the passengers have no obligations to try to form a group agent with all the other passengers, or to think about how the group is best to avoid capsizing the ferry, or even to be prepared to join the others to prevent it from capsizing.

In light of Visible Helplessness and Ferry Ride, it thus seems that any understanding of a col­lective obligation to φ as grounded in individual obligations would require us to understand the latter as concerned with dispositions of some sort to contribute towards φ-ing, rather than as some overt action, mental activity, or even active state of preparedness.

9.5